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        ABSTRACT
“Performing Democracy”:
Kyoto’s Higashi-kujo Madang as a counter-public event
by
Bruce Reid Caron
The role of the public performance in the display and maintenance of cultural and 
social meanings and institutions has been variously described in and out of anthropology 
for some time, but this is only now emerging as a central topic in urban anthropology, cul-
tural geography/sociology and cultural studies.  My work updates the ethnographic critique 
of public performance within more general critiques of modernity and urban cultural prac-
tice.
My work reaches out to issues of civic space, civil society, popular culture, and the 
public sphere.  The festival under study is a focal place for local democracy, and a tactical 
space of resistance to cultural hegemony by the state/marketplace.  For “the festival” is also 
a primary example of civic participation, and offers a particularly clear model for commu-
nity action within the modern public sphere.   
Kyoto, Japan is an exceptionally valuable site for the study of urban festivals, due to 
the numbers of festivals that annually occur; the range of meanings imputed to these fes-
tivals; the central place of Kyoto’s main civic festivals as cultural properties within Japan’s 
national cultural self-image.  Kyoto’s Higashi-Kujo Madang festival was organized by mem-
bers of an undercaste community made up of Koreans permanently residing in Kyoto 
together with Japanese citizens from a stigmatized neighborhood called a “buraku.” I was 
extremely fortunate to have begun my study of this festival from the time of its initial plan-
ning and performance through its second year.  
My critique of Kyoto is also aimed at the Japanese nation-state, where most of the 
efforts at cultural management are situated.  Koreans in Japan are making demands that the 
society open itself up to multicultural civic participation.  But what are the current qualities 
of the public sphere in Japan, and how does this open (or close up) to participation by a 
diasporic community?   I will continue to work with the diasporic Korean/buraku com-
munity in Kyoto, and to look also at Kyoto, at its urban self-representations, how the city 
maintains its cultural spectacles, and at the governance of civic space within Kyoto. vii
    You are listening to the first para-
graph of this Preface spoken by an 
Apple Power PC computer.
Preface
Multimedia ready or not
As you are probably reading this from the CD-
ROM, you have already crossed a threshold from the 
written page to whatever will come next, currently 
the screen on a monitor on your desk, but soon a 
pocket viewer as thin as a piece of note card, unfold-
ing to the size of a sheet of music, which reflects an 
image from a thimble-sized projector.  Becoming 
“multimedia ready” in order to view and hear what is 
on this disk may have been difficult and expensive in 
time and funds, but soon this capacity will be built-in 
to many devices and academic training from kinder-
garten, and will become as cheap as a well-bound 
book.  But whatever the future holds on the digital 
front, you are experiencing one of its beginnings.  And 
as a beginning, this project stumbles where others will 
later be nimble, and its grasp is far less now than will 
be possible even six months hence.  
Most of the problems of “authoring” this text are 
the same as those that have challenged ethnographers 
for decades: finding a problem in the field that illumi-
nates a larger cultural/social concern; developing a 
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       rapport with the group where the practices under 
study occur; thickening the description of the circum-
stances of the situation to situate the practice in a 
manner that informs how and why and where this 
occurs; and then bringing all of these materials back to 
a room where they are transcribed, translated and 
transcoded for use; and finally sitting down to write 
the thing.  These are the core tasks of ethnography 
that, I trust, are well displayed in what follows.  But in 
what follows there is also something else, something 
novel in both form and content, something that, in its 
nascent outline, leads us to a new manner of ethnog-
raphy.
making a digital text
One of the “moments” of my 
fieldwork in Kyoto was the use of 
my interest in the festival commu-
nity by the community to achieve 
publicity for the event: in this case 
as a feature news story on the 
Osaka evening news (Yomiuri 
TV).  At the same time, I was also 
performing a part within the festi-
val drama —a part that had been 
written for me, in which I played 
myself as a visual anthropologist 
always sticking the lens of my 
video camera into spaces and 
rehearsal zones where it is not 
entirely welcome.  This sort of 
interaction would be very difficult 
to explain without the use of the 
original video (on the right).  
NOTE: if this video space is WHITE: 
you need the Iterated Systems plug-in 
for Quicktime: GO TO the disserta-
tion download link at:
http:www.rain.org/~matsuri
Knowing that my work relied on the use of visual  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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     material, and that the reader should have control over 
this material, I decided to make a digital text.  At first, I 
was thinking only of a book with videos where photo-
graphs would have been placed.  Had I stayed in that 
idea, I would have simply used the digital capabilities of 
this text to mimic the written, paper form, with a few 
added “bells-and-whistles.”  But somewhere in the 
middle of this project, I began to ask myself about the 
potential for a new form of writing—a text as differ-
ent as it need be to express what is available from 
within the digital mode of textual production.  No 
more asking how the text attaches to the older, paper, 
mode, but searching for its own logic.  I opened the 
digital box, and out jumped this disc.
Actually, nothing actually jumped out on its own.  
Most of what you see below is several generations of 
design away from the original design notion, and the 
final version became possible only in February of 
1997, because of a radical advance in Adobe Acro-
bat™.  Choices in font and color, page layout and text 
organization were all improved during this process.  
Meanwhile, the World Wide Web (WWW) continued 
to grow in content and capabilities, and the text 
acquired the capability to connect directly to this.  
Today, we are almost to the point where field-sites 
and web-sites will both be required spaces for all new 
urban ethnographic work.
But the main difference in this text (from the one 
that was printed out on paper for a library that is only 
now beginning to consider digital texts) is that the lin- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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     ear order of argumentation used by printed texts no 
longer applies here.  Because of “hyper-links” embed-
ded in the text, the theoretical statements are pre-
sented through a collection of short essays that are 
held in what I call the “commentarium."  These statements 
are called when appropriate by the main, communica-
tor text that supports them and moves the central 
argument forward.  There is no order to the essays 
within the commentarium: it would make no sense to 
try to read these together as a text.  At the same 
time, it would make little sense to read the main text 
without referencing the commentarium as these links 
appear.  The same essay may be called several times 
from the main text, to be re-read, or simply recalled 
by the reader.  
The instant link to these, and other texts, allows 
the argument to “loop” between the essays, where 
theoretical nodes (at one point I called these “theor-
oids”) are articulated, and the main text, where these 
nodes are put to use in explicating an empirical obser-
vation or a theoretical move.  The commentarium 
provides a set of fasteners (nails, screws, glue) and the 
main text a supply of structural materials (boards, 
bricks, steel rods), which, when put together in an 
iterative fashion, construct the arguments.  Or by 
another, more provocative analogy, the entire text 
creates its own meta-language: with the main text 
providing the syntax, the commentarium, the seman-
tics, and the vocabularium, specific lexical items.  
The text-as-language image is useful as this pre- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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   sents the possibility of a fractal homology between the 
digital text and its iterative elements: including its lin-
guistic form.  Freed from the linear constraints of the 
page, the digital text may allow a more “conversa-
tional” and “dialogical” flow where the pragmatics will 
include a range of digitally encoded information.  
The reader gains an ability to navigate a text that 
can include a much greater variety of source materi-
als, and also an ability to offer direct (if infuriatingly 
slow today) feedback to the author via the World 
Wide Web.  Every page has a “send comment” link 
which allows the reader to access a discussion forum 
for that chapter.  This ability, when readers become 
more comfortable with it (and as it becomes less 
cumbersome), will open up a second text, based on 
the orginal text, but no longer authored by the origi-
nal author (also he/she might participate).  Readers 
can talk to one another in this dialogic text.  Of all the 
openings that the digital text provides, this is perhaps 
the most interesting, and fundamentally provocative 
one.  For it returns the idea of “publishing” a work to 
a public of readers who can bridge the divide between 
production and reception and add their voices to the 
text.
Still the challenge for the reader is to understand 
that a “chapter” of ten pages in the main text might 
also include links to fifty other pages, as well as videos 
to watch, and websites to view.  At more than eight-
hundred pages and two hours of video—some of it 
time lapsed for frame-by-frame viewing—there is a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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     whole lot of material here.  And since some of the 
essays many be called more than once (although the 
reader may not need to re-read these more than a 
couple of times to remember them) the iterative 
dimensions of the text may make it read much longer 
than a linear text.   
For the digital-text reader, texts  become more of 
a resource compendium than a text to be consumed 
cover-to-cover.  Individual essays can be read and then 
tracked through links to their various applications.  
Videos can be viewed with an eye for selected infor-
mation.  Individual texts (such as this dissertation) can 
be gathered into larger collections that are automati-
cally indexed together to form information “oceans” 
on selected topics.  When mounted on the internet, 
these can be referenced from anywhere on the planet.  
New forms of collaboration open up in the process.
The problem for the digital-text author is to gain 
enough of a purview of the entire field of possible 
information (usually this requires a small-scale 
research locale) to be able to generate a text that re-
assembles this faithfully for the reader.  This is similar 
to the need for “thick description” within written eth-
nographies, but this task is complicated by the avail-
ability of visual and audio information.  Everything just 
gets that much thicker.
through thick and thin
On the reader's side, the text needs to offer 
pathways through its “thick” information load.  And 
here the digital realm offers real advantages.  Hyper- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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         links are not only used to loop together theory and 
description, but to automate the reference functions 
that formerly involved paging back and forth between 
tables of contents, indexes and end notes and the text 
being read.  
In the following text, the reader is linked instantly 
to a table of contents, to a series of indexes, and to an 
entire accompanying compendium (the Quotadium) 
where longer quotes are available for short citations 
given within the main text, and where supplementary 
texts, such as the MADANG STATEMENT OF PURPOSE are 
also provided.  There is also a side text, the vocabularium, 
where special terms, or terms from Japanese, are 
described in the manner they are used in the main 
text.
Still, perhaps the most obvious difference 
between this digital text and the one printed out and 
sitting on the shelf is the inclusion of video and sound 
(not to mention the hundreds of photos and graphics).  
Here are literally the voices and the bodies of this 
Kyoto group.  Because these images and sounds are 
now so readily available in the text—more or less on 
their terms (not to deny the editorial control of the 
camera) —the text itself moves that much closer to 
the field.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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    Here, for example, is one of the 
most important moments of the 
very first Madang: in fact, the 
defining climactic dance that sig-
nalled both the end of the event 
and the beginning of the social 
movement.  The shared emotional 
intimacy of this dance re-ani-
mated the collective imagination 
of the group, as buraku-dwelling 
Japanese, resident Koreans, phys-
ically challenged persons, and 
others from the neighborhood and 
from Kyoto, created circles and 
danced into the night.  Apart from 
slowing the action so that the 
reader might better see the expres-
sions of the dancers, the video 
runs mostly in real time and 
space.
The video is presented to bring the reader a 
more complete, immediate (also less-mediated), and 
convenient access to the sites of practice under study.  
The amount of information packed into video is itself 
rather humbling.  For, at another level of description, 
any of the included videos could provide enough ques-
tions and materials for another dissertation.  It is only 
the limitations of CD-ROM that prevented the inclu-
sion of more video resources to this text (I was only 
able to use about one percent of my video).  
With the advent this year of DVD (digital video 
disk), instead of ninety minutes of video, nine-hundred 
minutes of (similarly compressed) video will be possi-
ble on a disk, and so digital field reports will be able to 
(and so, at some point, expected to) achieve a site-ref-
erence capability: storing enough materials to 
approach either an encyclopedic reference of a short 
event in a small locale—literally bringing the site with 
it with multiple perspectives (equality of participation  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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     between the ethnographer and members of the group 
who are also collecting these resources).  For this we 
can expect that the skills of the ethnographer and the 
reader will necessarily converge: readers will have 
more direct access to massive amounts of field-site 
generated information, and will be enabled to ask 
their own questions based on this information.  
At a workshop on the Japanese 
sex trade, held at the YWCA in 
Kyoto in 1994, several women 
spoke.  One of the speakers, an 
Filipina activist who had started a 
call-in hot-line in Tokyo, spoke 
with great passion about the 
“everyday racism” that Filipinas 
face in Japan.  With estimates of 
more than 100,000 “Japa-yuki” 
Filipinas working—often under 
conditions that border on sexual 
slavery (subject to physical abuse, 
with their passports having been 
taken away by their bosses)—in 
Japan, their circumstances, much 
like those of resident Koreans, 
articulate the borderlands of Japa-
neseness.  Since 1995, Filipinas 
and Filipinos living in Higashi-
kujo have been active participants 
in the Madang.
The ability to see this speaker and 
listen to this voice is not inciden-
tal to the task of ethnography.  
Her passion is more than words.
Video by the author.
Even in this nascent phase of digital text produc-
tion, I have tried to increase the reader's control over 
the video materials.  These have generally been pre-
sented without prior internal narrative editing.  Some-
times a time-lapse video is used to show either an 
event across hours or a space through an entire jour-
ney.  Other times, this means that several short videos 
with no internal editing are used to reduce the pre-
narrativization of this material.  In a few months, the 
ability to use hyperlinks to specific video stills or a 
short selection from within a video clip, will enable 
the videos to run interactively with the text.  But, for  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
 
Preface—the work of ethnography in an age of digital reproduction
 
—10—
           now, the interface between the video and the text 
remains that of juxtaposition.  
The potentials opening up on the digital front 
offer many more challenges for than they do relief 
from the problematics of doing urban ethnography in 
late modernity.  For the availability of digitally repro-
duced material adds to the burden of working with 
and through this.  And as groups produce their own 
web-sites and videos, another layer of reflexive 
expression is added on to an already layered fabric of 
representations.   At times it seems difficult to simply 
keep pace with the amount of self-ethnography being 
done by the groups we are attempting to study.
the work of ethnography in an age of digital reproduction
I do not here wish to present yet another argu-
ment about the need for cultural critique in anthro-
pology.  I hope that anthropology has gotten past the 
idea it cannot or should not be so engaged.  After all, 
the peoples under study do this all of the time, and it 
is their reflexive critiques (or their lack), in and of the 
practices they do that makes up much of what anthro-
pology might well consider its primary object of study.  
We commonly use their critiques to make our aca-
demic points.  Not only are we obligated to them for 
the use of this, but the best way to repay this obliga-
tion is to then develop other critiques that are not 
available to the communities where we go as ethnog-
raphers, and to return these to the communities in 
some fashion.  And here the “digital age” offers new 





     the field.  For example, by linking webpages ethnogra-
phers and communities can join into a common net-
work of action and critique.
being (t)here
This brings us to perhaps the most important 
aspect of digital ethnography: the increasing overlap 
between here and there, between the field and the 
classroom, in late modernity.  This is not news: the 
time/space distanciation effects of globalizing moder-
nity have been discussed for decades now.  But here I 
want to comment on the effect of these for the task 
of writing ethnography.  Although the metaphor of a 
“global village” obscures the power effects of who 
gets to write and who gets written about in the eth-
nographic process, it does suggest that as much as we 
can now never completely “leave home” when we go 
to the field, we are also never that far from the field 
upon our return (Through the World Wide Web, the 
internet, and the mail, I am in contact with members 
of the group back in Kyoto.)  
The work of ethnography in the age of digital 
reproduction includes staying in pace with the space-
time distanciation of late-modernity in order to merge 
the field (the old “there”) and the ethnography (the 
former “here”) in an engaged conversation.  
The terms of engagement between the ethnogra-
pher and individuals within the group under study 
expand to include the group's study of the ethnogra-





         locale1.  These links are also made to symbolize a 
shared outcome from the work performed by the eth-
nographer.  
This work includes critiques of some of the prac-
tices of the group, or of practices in the locale that 
affect the group—critiques that not only echo those 
available within the group, but that expand the entire 
arena for self-critique.  By the same token, the group 
receives these critiques with counter critiques of their 
own directed at the critiques within the ethnography 
(and sometimes at the person or the background of 
the ethnographer).  As long as the lines of engagement 
are kept open, then the work continues.  When either 
the ethnographer or the group closes down these 
links, then the ethnography stops.
There are also individual, personal effects of work-
ing in this manner over time.  For the field is not some 
place that can be left behind as the career of the eth-
nographer moves forward.  There is a joint investment 
between the group and the ethnographer.  An interest 
that informs both group and individual identities.  The 
practice of ethnography in the age of digital reproduc-
tion requires the ethnographer to share an (imagined) 
identity with the group being studied.  This means that 
the ethnographer must admit an internalized (or -ize-
able) affiliation with the group under study, and vice 
1. For example, I am pursuing a study of a festival in Santa Barbara, and in which I am a long-
term member.  Already I have taken video of this festival to Kyoto, and I will be providing 
more information about this event to festival organizers in Kyoto.  I will also link my personal 





     versa.  This sharing reflects the intimate engagement 
between the group and the ethnographer that goes 
beyond what was always there: the proximal sharing 
of the space of the field site.   
In late modernity this connection means much 
more than “eating with the natives:” particularly 
where the meal being shared includes a Big Mac™.  
Both the group and the ethnographer need to find a 
space where identities and interests overlap.  Much of 
the communication will happen within this overlapping 
arena, and so the ethnographer (for whom communi-
cation with the group is crucial) generally works to 
widen this overlap as far as possible.
Today the differences between the ethnographer 
and those living at the field-site can mostly be reduced 
to a differential in their ken—in their percept-abilities 
of the situation at hand.  There are many places where 
the ken of individuals in the group exceeds that of the 
ethnographer (this is why and where we learn from 
them), and there are a few places where the reverse 
holds: where the ethnographer brings new informa-
tion to the situation at hand.  There is not a “transcen-
dental” perspective on either side, these kens are very 
simply different.  And a main outcome of ethnography 
is to expand the kens of both the ethnographer (and 
her readers) and also of the group, through the prac-
tice of ethnographic engagement.  When this happens, 
then the critiques of the group and the critiques of the 
ethnographer become mutually comprehensible and 





                  tinues.
placements and movements
The “Koreans” in Higashi-kujo are not going any-
where soon.  Not unless the Japanese Government 
decides to send them all back to Korea.  And yet their 
collective action is actually a movement in social and 
physical space: without their going anywhere.  I am 
tempted to call their group a “social placement” 
instead of a social movement, for this very reason. 
“A free city for international cul-
tural exchange is one where peo-
ples of any country may assemble
freely and in peace, regardless of
race, creed or social system, for
the purpose of cultural exchange”
Kyoto Declaration
Their movement in physical space is to finally, 
after several generations of dwelling in the same 
neighborhood, appropriate this as their own cultural 
home.  They are coming home to Kyoto by remaking 
this neighborhood on their own terms.  Their move-
ment in social space is to re-move the notion that 
some cultural/racial “Japaneseness” is required in 
order to live in Kyoto.  
The “demonstrations” against 
ongoing the social discrimination 
toward Japanese individuals liv-
ing in Buraku neighborhoods have 
been domesticated by the City.  
Every year, after speeches held 
inside the buraku area behind 
Sanjo Station (a place where only 
those who live in the buraku area 
can hear these), the City’s band 
strikes up and the parade moves 
out.  By the time the parade 
approaches City Hall the band is 
silent.  There are no speeches in 
front of City Hall.
Video by author.
To do this they play on the City’s own words, 
such as the Kyoto Declaration, in which Kyoto’s City gov-
ernment pledged the city to be a “free city for interna-





                adherence to international standards for human rights 
and civil liberties.  
While virtually every other pub-
lic event in Kyoto is planned in 
advance with the police, the 
parades that the Higashi-kujo 
Madang stage on the day before 
the event simply emerge from the 
housing projects and explode onto 
the street, sending the police 
scrambling to keep up.  NOTICE: 
how the police are taking photo-
graphs of the parade.  
And, finally, they rely on the City’s long-term 
Domestication of its many festivals (matsuri) to hide the 
fact that their festival (madang) is an actual public festi-
val, capable of fostering and sustaining a civil crowd, and 
of reproducing a counter-public social movement.  
The main problem I faced in preparing the reader 
to see how this Madang worked to re-place this dis-
trict of Kyoto as a space of heterogeneous cultural 
production was to articulate the many, and mostly 
mis-recognized features of Kyoto’s public sphere that 
made this replacement necessary.  
In one paragraph,  Alberto Melucci (1989, 12) lays 
out the problem of locating the conflicts of the public 
sphere, once these have been moved away from the 
political arenas where their resolution, under most 
definitions of democracy, would become possible: 





               pressures to conform are heaviest. These conflicts act increasingly at a distance from political organi-
zations. They are interwoven with the fabric of everyday life and individual experience. The new con-
flicts are often temporary and they are not expressed through ‘instrumental’ action. Contemporary
movements operate as signs, in the sense that they translate their actions into symbolic challenges to
the dominant codes. This is understandable, since in complex societies signs become interchange-
able: increasingly, power resides in the codes that order the circulation of information. In this
respect, collective action is a form whose models of organization and solidarity deliver a message to
the rest of society. Collective action affects the dominant institutions by modernizing their cultural
outlook and procedures, as well as by selecting new elites; but it also raises questions that transcend
the logic of instrumental effectiveness and decision-making by anonymous and impersonal organiza-
tions of power. Contemporary social movements stimulate radical questions about the ends of per-
sonal and social life and, in so doing, they warn of the crucial problems facing complex societies.      
The essay on State-nation moder-
nity shows how formative notions 
are developed in the Commentar-
ium, and then applied, when 
needed to arguments in the main 
text.  This one will be used often, 
as it carries a load of descriptive 
uses.
What Melucci did not bring to this description 
are circumstances that do not hold for nation-states 
such as Italy, but which are central to state-nations, 
such as Japan (SEE here: State-nation modernity).  Namely, 
what we see in Japan is the interest of the state in 
removing conflict from the political/public sphere.  In 
their public festival, the Higashi-kujo Madang organiz-
ers return culture to the public sphere.  
Melucci does bring to the fore an ethnographic 
concern: the location of the effects of this social 
movement in Kyoto.  And here, he is quite correct in 
steering us away from some external, instrumental 
outcome.  To a great extent, it is the performance of 
the festival itself that is the desired outcome for this 
social movement: and the success of each iteration of 
the Madang is judged internally on the amount of cul-
tural expression, and self-reflection that was done.   
When The festival performs what it proposes, we need not 
look any further than the event itself. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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        From Korea to Kyoto: histories
Of all the diasporic groups trapped in the wake of 
colonial empires, global markets, and geopolitics, one 
of the least heard about or heard from is the Korean 
population in Japan.  The population of persons hold-
ing North- or South- Korean passports who live per-
manently in Japan is close to 600,000, and about 
40,000 of this population reside in Kyoto city.  Actu-
ally, the great majority of Kyoto's “foreign” population 
are second-, third-, and now fourth-generation 
“Korean” residents who were born in Kyoto and who 
fully expect to live their lives there.  
Strangers on a Japanese street
Today, this diasporic community is caught 
between two exclusions: they are divorced from affec-
tive ties to Korea (their “official” nationality) by their 
Japanese language mother-tongue and life-long resi-
dence outside of the Korean peninsula; and they are 
excluded, by their foreign (Korean) names, social/eco-
nomic marginality, and their lack of citizenship, from 
identity with the larger Kyoto society.  
It is against these twin exclusions that one group 
of Koreans living in South Kyoto have struggled, and 
their struggle has recently taken the form of a cultural  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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—30—festival.  The tactical use of this festival in creating an 
opening—both to an imagined Korean culture, and 
also within Kyoto society and the Japanese “public 
sphere”—brings to the fore the notion of the public 
sphere as a space of inclusion/exclusion, and of the 
sites of practice where inclusion can be tactically 
attained.   
Who are the Koreans living in 
Kyoto?  Why are they there?  Why 
are they called “Korean” even 
though the great majority of them 
were born in Kyoto?  Why are 
there no “Korean-Japanese” (or 
“Korean Japanese”) in Kyoto?  
What are the histories that can 
inform their present?  
“Koreans1” in Kyoto are a sub-population with a 
highly diverse makeup: economically, they range from 
wealthy families who have ridden the Post-War eco-
nomic “boom” into conspicuous prosperity to families 
who have lived for generations in conditions of under-
class poverty that most families in Japan would be 
greatly surprised existed within the nation (this sur-
prise would also reflect a denial of the life-style condi-
tions of many Buraku  dwelling Japanese).  
Today the Kansai area of Japan is home to several 
large concentrations of Koreans: Ikunoku in Osaka, 
Nagataku in Kobe, Utoro, south of Kyoto, and 
Higashi-kujo in Kyoto city.  All of these districts have 
organizations that represent the major political divi-
sions in the resident Korean communities, and there 
are multiple similarities and also many local differences 
between these neighborhoods.   
1. I begin with the word Korean in quotes to make the point that this designation is highly 
problematic.  Most of this chapter and the next attempts to explore some of the problems 
with the term “Korean” as this is applied (from the outside or by the individual) to tens of 
thousands of persons born in Kyoto, Japan. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Strangers on a Japanese street —31—“The life-style of the Koreans was
always very difficult.  In addition
to the  body-punishing [labor],
there was a great difference
between their wages and those of
the Japanese.  Even the 8-10% of
those who were doing the same
work as Japanese made only 50%
of the [Japanese] wages...”
(Mizuno 1994, 69)
The resident Korean population (“zainichi 
kankoku-/chosen-jin” [persons with either North or 
South Korean citizenship permanently residing in 
Japan]) in Kyoto traces its origins to the “annexation” 
of the Peninsula by Japan in 1910.  In 1913 there were 
only 87 Koreans living in Kyoto-ku, but by 1941, this 
number had risen to more than 80,000 (Mizuno 1994, 
68).  Their occupations were listed as “earth-construc-
tion” (55%) and “fabric industry” (44%).   Earth-con-
struction meant manual labor in the many public 
works projects of the time (notably the Higashiyama 
train tunnels).  At first the workers were mostly men 
(80%), who worked on contracts and then returned 
home.  But by the beginning of the War, a third of the 
population were women, and most families had cre-
ated homes in Kyoto.  This was the beginning of the 
community of Koreans that still makes their homes in 
Kyoto.
“It is in Japanese society, one
where the myth of society as
mono-racial and mono-ethnic is
deeply embedded, that zainichi
youths live their lives. An enor-
mous amount of invisible pressure
is at work to assert that being ‘the
same as others’ is both vital and a
matter of course. Even a slight
deviation from the norm could
render one a potential target of
ostracism, bullying, and abuse.”
(Fukuoka, 1996)
Politically, Kyoto’s “Koreans” today are equally 
diverse, from party-line communists who have visited 
and admire North Korea, to ultra-conservative capi-
talists bemoaning the current economic conditions 
that may limit their portfolio futures.  Local individuals 
and families are affiliated with a variety of religions, 
from ecstatic traditional shamanic practitioners to 
Methodist Protestant Christian churches.  And they 
also exhibit the fissures that tend to occur between 
generations of immigrant families: gaps in language and 
background that pull apart parents and children into 
spheres of mutual incomprehension.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Strangers on a Japanese street —32— Because they are physically iden-
tical as a group with the surround-
ing Japanese community, and 
because they have spoken Japa-
nese from birth, special practices 
are required to isolate and mark 
resident Koreans as outsiders.  
This is an actively applied racial/
national identity, which, in many 
ways resembles a gendering 
rather than a racial distinction.  
Just as many lesbians, for exam-
ple, have little difficulty passing 
as straight in everyday circum-
stances (assuming they desire to 
pass), the simple fact is that resi-
dent Koreans in Kyoto can easily 
pass as Japanese on the street.  
This fact decenters the notion of 
Japaneseness as being the product 
of a unique, shared blood- and 
place- based heritage.
In terms of their self-conscious identification with 
“being Korean,” this group of permanent residents 
(zainichi)  is also strung along a wide spectrum, from 
passionate affirmation to equally passionate denial.   
As Fukuoka (1996) noted, much of this internal spread 
of identities and affinities is due to the conflicting log-
ics at play in local identity formation.  For as much 
time as it is possible, many of the young adult zainichi 
in the Higashi-kujo community, as well as other Kore-
ans I met in Kyoto, simply tucked away the fact of their 
Koreanness during interactions on the street.  
Being physically indistinguishable from other, “Jap-
anese” locals (despite the fact that almost all of the 
Japanese persons I spoke with claimed to be able to 
make such a distinction1), and raised in homes where 
the local variety of Japanese is spoken, they have no 
difficulty in “passing” as long as this interaction does 
not require them to show their official residence 
records.   But this ability to “pass” on trains and in 
stores and restaurants serves also to remind them of 
the arbitrariness of their official outsider status.
Given that there is as yet no final way of either 
constantly asserting a positive “Korean” identity, nor 
in assembling a durable “Japanese” identity—the 
1. I attempted to test this ability using a set of random street photographs I took in Osaka, but 
the experiment failed completely.  Nearly all of the persons who volunteered to evaluate the 
photographs—after saying that they had no difficulty recognizing Koreans on the street— 
stopped mid-test, and requested that the test not continue.   My interpretation of this prag-
matic failure is that the person faced unacceptable consequences if the test were com-
pleted, such as the following: 1) an ability to distinguish Koreans may be perceived as a 
desire to socially discriminate against them; and 2) the actual task was far more difficult 
than they realized, and they risked publicly failing in this skill.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Strangers on a Japanese street —33—former because of the widespread negative stereo-
types assigned to a Korean “national character,” and 
the latter because there is no broad support for a 
total assimilation of foreign nationals as “Japanese” in 
Kyoto—there will be times when any one identity 
position taken will not fit into the expectations of oth-
ers, who expect a full measure of either  “foreignness” 
or of “Japaneseness” but not something in between.  
And these expectations arise mostly from the way 
that “Japanese” identity is conferred and legitimated.  
Even as notions of race were dis-
cursified in ethnological writings 
in Europe/America in the 19th 
century, notions of Japaneseness 
were also the product of ethnolog-
ical speculations.  One task of 
doing ethnography today is to 
rethink these earlier anthropologi-
cal notions.
The discourses that have shaped the collective 
imagination of “Japaneseness” over the last couple of 
hundred years included centrally a string of “nativist” 
writings that were influential from be beginning of the 
nineteenth century, and which both heralded and 
warned against cultural changes.  Here is one situation 
where the term “ultra-conservative” has an appropri-
ate use, for these foundational ideas about Japanese-
ness were intended not only to conserve the present 
into the future, but to reanimate an authentic local/
national past as the source for the present.  And one 
of the primary tropes of this “Japanese” past was the 
village.   As Hartoonian (1988) put it;
“Increasingly, it was believed [by nativists in the late Tokugawa period] that the Tokugawa village
possessed a structure of ties based on relationships in place and blood.  These relationships com-
bined to create a natural communal unit. The strategic purpose of such a claim was to show that
such structures were reinforced by a variety of communal, cooperative activities, which made possi-
ble the reproduction of the peasantry's means of social existence.  People lived, worked, worshiped,
and died in the same place, with others to whom they were bound by natural relationships of kin-
ship, friendship, and, above all else, divine necessity. This is not to say that Tokugawa villages lacked
classes or hierarchical status relationships. But regardless of social distinctions, the village was able
to enforce communal responsibility and, thus, reproduce the character of the cooperative, commu-
nal unit, despite the prevailing impulse toward “private activity.”  Even though villagers might pursue TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Strangers on a Japanese street —34—their private interests, the weight of the communal consciousness, which stressed kinship and neces-
sary reciprocity as natural endowments, still guaranteed the performance of crucially important
activities ensuring reproduction.  The place of the village became the “natural environment” for car-
rying out reproduction.  The village and reproduction were complementary; one was unimaginable
without the other” (244).
While Japanese colonial emi-
grants were lured to the mainland 
with films that showed wealthy 
villages where Japanese customs 
ruled, immigrant laborers to Japan 
were made to fit into a cultural 
“mold” enforced through police 
surveillance, and police-run man-
datory cultural education.  This 
film, made by the Japanese gov-
ernment in the 1930s shows the 
good life for Japanese colonists in 
Manchuria.  Notice the Shinto 
Shrine and the abundant harvest.
NHK TV
Kinship (blood) and residence (place), as exempli-
fied in the model Japanese village, became the media 
through which communal identity and personal claims 
to belonging were forged. 
“...In using the term incorpora-
tion regime, I refer to the patterns
of policy discourse and organiza-
tion around which a system of
incorporation is constructed. All
states develop a set of legal rules,
discursive practices, and organi-
zational structures that define the
status of foreigners vis-à-vis the
host state, and the forms and
boundaries of their participation
in host polity institutions”
(Soysal 1994, 32).
 Later, when colonies were being set up on the 
mainland, the image of the village needed to become 
mobile, but only one way: Japanese colonists were 
able to become the progenitors for new villages in 
Manchuria or Korea, but laborers from these colonies 
were not allowed to establish official residences 
within Japanese villages or towns.  These diasporic 
populations, often fleeing the economic ruin of their 
own villages under Japanese colonial administration, 
became strangers on the Japanese home-front.  They  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Strangers on a Japanese street —35—were strangers, but not, as we shall see, permitted to 
remain individually or collectively strange.     
The Japan-as-village narrative 
continues to be used as a trope to 
describe modern Japanese society.  
In this clip from a promotional 
film of the Jinjahoncho   
(made in the last decade), the 
structure of ancient village life is 
said to provide the answer to the 
riddle of Japan’s unique culture.  
Of course, this is a riddle that 
begs other, deeper deconstruc-
tions.
Koreans, Taiwanese and others who came to 
For decades, resident Koreans 
have faced the paradox of wide-
spread assimilation practices that 
require them to learn to act “Japa-
nese” and to reject and despise 
Korean cultural practices, while 
also being excluded from all 
claims of proper Japanese iden-
tity.  One of the Madang organiz-
ers asked me, “Don’t you think 
that our situation resembles that 
of blacks in the US?”  To the 
extent that African Americans are 
not allowed symbolic identifica-
tion as “American”—to the 
extent that, to paraphrase Gilroy, 
‘there is no black in old glory’— I 
would certainly have to agree.
Japan were subjected to a host of incorporation 
regimes aimed at controlling their movements and 
actions, and at lessening the cultural impact of their 
presence in Japan.  Never meant to be absorbed into 
the host society, they were, none-the-less, forced to 
behave in a “proper” (Japanese) manner.   
Here was a “melting pot” incorporation  regime 
where the pot already had its lid on tight, and so all 
the cultural  “melting” among immigrant groups— col-
onized peoples filling the bottom end of the labor 
market for the rapidly industrializing Japanese econ-
omy:  mostly Koreans and Taiwanese men performing 
bracero work in mines and infrastructure construction 
projects (mostly railroad tunnels)—took place on the 
outside of the pot.  The bitter irony of being taught to  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Counter-histories —36—resemble Japanese persons while being kept apart 
from the latter in areas where Japaneseness brings cul-
tural, social, and economic advantages is not lost 
among Koreans in Kyoto.  
This Domestication  of immigrant laborers is a 
policy that has continued since the beginning of the 
century.   And it is against this aspect of Japanese gov-
ernment policy and associated social discriminations 
that Koreans living in Kyoto today construct counter-
discourses and practices. 
Counter-histories
One of the features of working in 
Japan is the availability of local 
writings about the local situa-
tion.  Visiting members of the 
local Korean population who 
were active in counter-practices to 
the institutionalized exclusions of 
Koreans, it was not unexpected to 
also receive pamphlets and books 
they have authored.  However, 
those who have not acquired a 
position in the community where 
they are active (and authoring/
authoritative) also tend to not 
openly express any opinion at all, 
even offu reko (off the record).
One aspect of the  local critique of “Japanese-
ness” is the rewriting of accounts of the history of 
events and migrations between Korea and Kyoto or 
Japan.  As with other post-colonial peoples1, Koreans 
face a history that was once used to justify their dom-
ination.   Not surprisingly, counter-colonial historical 
writings find arenas where histories constructed in 
Japan during the colonial period did not record the 
breadth of perspectives available.  And so new voices 
and novel thinking about the historical relationship 
between the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese archi-
pelago are emerging.
The current, problematic presence of “Koreans” 
in Kyoto is simply the latest go-around in a millennium 
of migration between this region and the nearby 
Korean Peninsula.    The official story of the history of 
1. The deconstruction of the dominant colonial history is a task that all scholars in and of the 
region need to pay heed to, and so this is one area of constructive collaboration between 
local historians in Kyoto and students of Asia across the globe.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Counter-histories —37—Japan may today foreground the isolation of the archi-
pelago from the mainland until the “opening” of Japan 
in the middle of the nineteenth century.  However, 
this notion of Japan’s closed—and thus independently 
developed, and so, unique—cultural history is itself a 
product of the nineteenth century, and, in any case, 
most accurately describes the immediate, premodern 
(16391-1868) period of Japan, while hiding several 
centuries through which the intercourse of persons 
and objects between Japan and its neighbors was 
active on many fronts.  From the “Silk Road” that 
brought goods from the Levant to Kyoto, to religious 
institutions and pilgrimage to the mainland, to military 
incursions on the Korean Peninsula, movements 
across the narrow stretch of water between these 
two places were regular and extensive.  A shared leg-
acy of writing, literature, architecture, cuisine, philos-
ophy, religion, military and agricultural technology, and 
biological and social heritage connected Japan with the 
mainland long before the Tokugawa shoguns shut this 
off in the seventeenth century.
It is useful to consider in what ways the Korean 
Peninsula and the Southern and Western parts of the 
nearby islands that are now part of Japan may have 
once constituted an informal social/economic/cultural 
entity, within which the islands and the mainland were 
simply internal destinations.  For those centuries 
before the advent of the Yamato polity in what is now 
1. Ironically, the very idea of isolationism was borrowed from the Ming Chinese, who instituted 
a similar policy after 1433 (Sansom 1963, 229).  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Counter-histories —38—Kyushu and Kansai Japan we have archaeological1 
records that suggest a continuum of farming and craft 
techniques between the Peninsula and the Archipel-
ago, but hoe far should this suggest a shared social 
community?  
1. Because so much of the imperial-family archaeological and textual evidence is either unex-
amined, or covered already with narratives that speak a whole story, it is proving difficult to 
renarrativize this story without simply “taking the other side,” which is what Prof. Hong from 
Seoul University (1994) has done by proclaiming the Paekche origins of much of modern 
Japan.  Should enough scholars find clear reasons to doubt the existing narratives, this 
might help to convince the Japanese Imperial Household that it no longer has an advan-
tage in withholding archaeological evidence. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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A rich peninsula extending out
one-thousand, two-hundred kilo-
meters from the Eurasian Conti-
nent, this is the bright sunrise of
the East, and the grand country of
the Han.  The people living there
are the closest neighbors of the
Japanese.  There, the ancestors of
the people of the Republic of
Korea and the Democratic Peo-
ples’ Republic of Korea created a
wonderful culture  [subarashii
bunka].
Stand on a street corner in Seoul
today and look around: it is easy
for a Japanese to think they are
not on a street corner in a foreign
country.  The features and figures
of the people and their fashions
are all similar to Japanese, and the
food, although a little salty, is
delicious to us.  There is a draft
sake called Makkari, and a brand
of shochu [rice brandy] called
Jisoro, and the beer also tastes
like Japanese beer....”
(ZenChoKyouKyouto 1993, 108).
This retelling of Kyoto’s history
with Korea by Koreans in Kyoto
begins with the commonalities of
the present, and then details the
many connections of the past.
Geographically, from the peninsular shoreline to 
the island shoreline, merchants, migrants, and mendi-
cants might have travelled by boat without consider-
able linguistic or bureaucratic difficulty.   Beneath the 
political intrigues and military moves, we can imagine 
that a wide range of travel and trade occurred.    What 
had not yet occurred was the creation of a Japanese or 
a Korean “nation-state,” and yet these more modern 
configurations tend to color our perceptions of the 
early history of the area.
This situation between the Peninsula and its 
nearby islands (now Japan) persisted in some always 
changing complexity from the earliest known migra-
tions (and so earlier, as we have little reason to 
assume our knowledge is complete) through the time 
of the founding of Kyoto (794) and in the centuries 
following, when island powers attempted to shift the 
center of this away from the mainland.  But this move 
by shogunal powers in Kyoto (and elsewhere) mainly 
served to increase the influence of China on the 
Korean Peninsula, as Hideoshi Toyotomi (a Shogun rul-
ing in Kyoto) discovered in the late 16th century.  His 
failing and enormously costly military adventure on 
the Peninsula, repelled by combined Korean and Chi-
nese troops, was abandoned at the time of his death.   
A short excursion into the history of the area will 
allow the reader to glean additional dynamics of the 
evidence of a shared history from local perspectives in 
Kyoto. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Many aspects of Kyoto’s early history are coming 
into view of late, as scholars rework historical narra-
tives that were first created during Japan’s pre-WWII 
era, when political objectives, such as its recent 
“annexation” of Korea encouraged a singular interpre-
tation of Japan’s relationship to its surrounding 
nations.   Japanese history and Kyoto’s role in this (and 
also of Kyoto’s history and “Japan’s” role in this) form 
pieces of the narrative that serves to position Koreans 
in the social space of today’s Kyoto.   Much of this 
position is the result of Japan’s modern, colonial his-
tory.   But Koreans in Kyoto are not ready to forget 
the long history that connects their city to the Penin-
sula.
Clans and claims The early history of Japan is dominated by the 
presence of two connected types of dominant organi-
zations: noble clans (uji) with their affiliated occupa-
tional-clans (be); and clan-deity/Buddhist shrine/
temple institutions1.     
1. With various elaborations, these lineage-based organizations dominated local Kyoto affairs 
(often with internal and many times violent conflicts) until the Meiji period, when the exodus 
of ruling families to the new capital of Tokyo (and consequent and subsequent political and 
social changes under Meiji and later governmental control) resulted in the acephalous 
political structure that remains today.  When the Emperor Meiji departed, 130 years ago, 
the city’s population dropped by about a third.  Today, Kyoto,  like any other Japanese city, 
competes for central government attention and largess.  This attention comes with bureau-
cratic involvement, including assigned personnel from Tokyo to oversee how funds are 
used.  While other cities may also chafe under these conditions, in Kyoto the loss of cen-
trality still remains a deeper sore point.  The transformation of Japan from a lineage-based 
ruling class to a ministry/corporate-based upper class needs to be further explored. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Korean Kingdoms and the founding of Kyoto —41—“The influence of Korea in this
transmission of Chinese civiliza-
tion to Japan has not yet received
adequate attention among schol-
ars...
Koreans and Chinese had
migrated to Japan from at least the
beginning of the fifth century.
But during Silla’s rise to power
the number of immigrants from
the continent—especially refu-
gees from Paekche and 1Kogu-
ryou—increased substantially, as
we can tell from accounts of how
they were given land and allowed
to settle in different parts of the
country”
(Varley 1984, 22).
1. Paekche, Silla and Koguryou were rival states occupying territories on the Korean Penin-
sula at that time.
Claims for the continental origins of Buddhist 
institutions are the most clearly documented.  But the 
other institutions, the noble clans themselves (either 
their structure or their own clan histories, or both), 
and thus the clan deities as well, can also sometimes 
be traced to the Asian continent.  And where this 
trace is obscure, this obscurity itself can no longer 
support a claim for aboriginal clan/institutional begin-
nings within Japan.  
Some historians working on the history of resi-
dent Koreans in Kyoto tell another story of the early 
history of the archipelago.  Because of its position 
downstream on the Yellow river from China,  they 
remind their readers that Korea was influenced far 
earlier than Japan by Chinese culture, and so were in a 
more “advanced” technological state even from early 
pre-historic times (ZenChoKyouKyouto 1993, 108).  
During the final centuries of the Neolithic, Jomon, 
period of Japanese history, they note that:
 “...many people used the oceans to travel to the Northern side of Kyushu and the San’in (Japan
Sea) side of [what is now] Kyoto Prefecture.... These people, perhaps in groups of a dozen or so,
would have come to Japan where it was warm and suitable for farming.  They carried seed for food-
stuffs, such as rice, tools for farming, and decorative goods for ceremonies.  In various places [in
Japan] they made paddy fields that used irrigation systems, and they increased the efficiency of their
agriculture and their military with iron and bronze implements.  This was the beginning of Yayoi cul-
ture” (ibid).
Contrast this account with that supplied by Tokyo 
University historian (now emeritus) Saitou Tadashi:
“The culture of the Yayoi period... is distinguished from the preceding Joumon culture by irrigated
rice cultivation and the use of bronze and iron artifacts.  There was considerable contact with China TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Korean Kingdoms and the founding of Kyoto —42—and Korea during this period, and it is supposed that these technological innovations, which spread
northward from Kyuushuu, were made under continental stimuli...” (In Kodansha Encyclopedia of
Japan 1983 edition).
 This idea of some non-specific “stimuli,” rather 
than migration of peoples to Japan is also found in 
mainstream literature, such as the Encyclopedia Britan-
nica:
“In 108 BC the armies of the emperor Wu Ti occupied Manchuria and the northern part of the
Korean peninsula, where they established Lo-lang and three other colonies. These colonies served as
a base for a strong influx of Chinese culture into Korea, whence, in turn, it spread to Japan. The fact
that Yayoi culture had iron implements from the outset, and bronze implements somewhat later,
probably indicates borrowings from Han culture. ...
While these new cultural elements represent a migration to Japan from the Korean peninsula or
China, the migration was not of a magnitude to change the character of the people who had inhab-
ited the islands from Jomon times. Yayoi culture undoubtedly represents an admixture of new san-
guineous elements, but it seems likely that the chief strain of proto-Japanese found throughout the
country during the Jomon period was not disrupted but was carried over into later ages. Differences
in Jomon and Yayoi skeletal remains can better be explained by nutritional than genetic reasons” Ency-
clopedia Britannica On-line, 1996).
Varly’s “diplomatic” account of the early Yayoi 
(300 bce-300 ce) also influenced by earlier Japanese 
sources, acknowledges the spread of wet-paddy agri-
cultural technology from China to Japan, but then 
notes that this was, “transmitted almost simulta-
neously at this time to both southern Korea and west-
ern Japan” (1984, 4), a feat that begs some 
explanation. 
 It is, of course, possible for technology to spread 
without significant “sanguineous” admixing—thus pre-
serving a homo-genetic (and -geneous) story of pre-
historic Japan.  However, this would presuppose some 
sort of active, and effective control over migration 
onto the archipelago at this early date—i.e., some 
method of acquiring the technology, while preventing  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Korean Kingdoms and the founding of Kyoto —43—those who hold this from moving in.   Without evi-
dence for this type of control, and with ample evi-
dence for migration into Japan, and even of the active 
recruiting of cultural specialists from the Peninsula 
into early (Nara period—pre-ninth century C.E.) 
Japan, the above story becomes more difficult to 
accept.  Instead we are faced with the task of uncover-
ing a history of the migration of people, and not just 
of ideas.  And, in fact, this history is now being 
explored.
Sansom (1958) is fairly generous in his description 
of the cultural impact of early immigrants from 
Korean and China.  “Such people,” he noted, “entered 
Japan in large numbers, if we are to believe the native 
chronicles, which record the arrival of hundreds of 
households of ‘men of Ts’in’ and ‘men of Han’...” (ibid 
38).  He is talking about a later migration from around 
400-700 CE, and he goes on to say:
“...by the sixth century they were firmly established and were without a doubt a most important,
perhaps the most important, element in the composition of the Japanese people, if we exclude the
mass of agricultural workers.  Their contribution to the growth of civilized cultural life was indispens-
able, for whatever virtues the Japanese possessed, prior to the fifth century their leaders were very
backward in comparison with the exponents of the great cultures of the Asian mainland” (ibid 39).
And so, there is an alternative picture of the early 
Japan that is rather different from that promulgated by 
Japanese scholars before WWII—or, indeed, by some 
Kyoto historians today. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Korean Kingdoms and the founding of Kyoto —44—“The founders of Yamato Wa must
have been a group of military
leaders from Paekche’s ruling
families who crossed over the sea
in search of the New World....
Archaeological evidence clearly
indicates that conquest was an
important element in the forma-
tion of Yamato Wa.  The develop-
ment of Yamato Wa should thus
be seen as one part of the history
of Paekche.”
(Hong 1994, 271)
The uneasiness of city leaders in Kyoto to 
acknowledge the presence of tens of thousands of 
“Koreans” in that city also extends to the millennia of 
immigration, trade, warfare and other contacts 
between Kyoto and the Korean Peninsula (the one 
exception being spectacles of the diplomatic entou-
rages of the Choson Court to Japan, which are avail-
able on paintings, and which can also serve to support 
the importance of the Japanese Court). 
CLICK BELOW to go to ATLAS
 Resident-Korean historians in Kyoto recount the 
arrival of Korean clans in the Kansai area before and 
during the pre-Kyoto (pre-Heiankyo), Nara period 
(646-794).  Various notable clan names have corre-
sponding Korean names, usually from Paekche.  And 
no clan was more notable, and more notably Korean 
than the Hata clan of Kyoto.  
“The Hatas, for example, reclaimed the Yamashiro basin in Kyoto, which became a bountiful agri-
cultural area through their abilities.  Until then, local people lived near the three rivers and on the
hillsides, but the Hatas and others from Korea made a dam to store water, and transformed the low
marshy ground [of Yamashiro] into a rice field.  The Hatas also constructed the Kadono river dam
near Arashiyama [in Kyoto] and they maintained their religious heritage.  Hata Noimiki established
the Matsuo great shrine in Fushimi where he prayed for the rice harvest... and [he donated] the
statue of the Miryoku Boddhisattva at Horyuuji, which has been declared Japanese National Treasure
number one...” (ZenChoKyouKyouto 1993, 108). TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Korean Kingdoms and the founding of Kyoto —45— “Apart from the Hatas, the Yasa-
kas made the Yasaka Shrine to
their patron saint, which became
the foundation for the Gion area
[of Kyoto] and the Komas at Nan-
san castle... received visitors from
Korea by the fifth century.  If we
turn our eyes if little bit east, to
Lake Biwa, we find first the Wani
clan, and from this the Onon
Nishikiori, Ootomo, Okinaga...
etc., who descendents are still
there”
(ZenChoKyouKyouto 1993, 108).
The Nara period was an time of active diplomacy 
and cultural borrowing between the Yamato courts 
nd those on the Korean peninsula.  The official sup-
port for Buddhism in this period increased the traffic 
in Buddhism-related artists and practitioners, and in 
associated literature and arts.  At the same time, 
other clan/ancestor-deity related practices also main-
tained whatever historical connections they had with 
the Korean Peninsula, and it is likely that they also 
entered into new connections with contemporary 
counterpart institutions or the literature of these 
institutions on the Peninsula.  (Here I am suggesting 
that there is little information to suggest that the 
Shinto stream of the religious practice was not some-
how insulated from inputs external to the archipel-
ago.)  
The choice of (what is now) Kyoto as site of the 
new palace and its surrounding city (heiankyou) in the 
late 8th century is often described in terms of proper 
geomancy (the position of the surrounding mountains 
and the river Kamo).  But the social positioning of this 
new imperial home1 also suggests that connections 
with local, already established clans that were linked 
to Paekche were perhaps another consideration (as 
was perhaps some distancing from the powerful 
Kasuga/Toudaiji shrine/temple institution in Nara).
1. The possibility of direct kinship between the clan on the throne in Nara in the Sixth century 
CE (and therefore, later in Kyoto) and royal lineages on the Korean Peninsula is a topic that 
is difficult to examine, in large part because the tombs of early rulers in the Yamato area 
have not been excavated, in large part, one might suspect, to avoid the likelihood that the 
Japanese Imperial lineage might prove to be a side-family of some early Korean royal clan.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—the nation story —46—“At its beginnings in the eigh-
teenth century, kokugaku [the
school of “national learning’]
concentrated on locating an
authentic experience which had
been suppressed by contempo-
rary conditions that could be
found only in literary works pro-
duced in the native idiom.
Kokugakusha [proponents]
quickly recognized, however, that
the representation of such experi-
ence in texts had been seriously
compromised by the use of Chi-
nese conventions and that it was
necessary to resuscitate the native
language, which was buried under
alien and unnatural Chinese
words, syntax, and sounds.”
(Hartoonian 1988, 35-36)
For the emerging political and economic institu-
tions of the time in Heiankyou (Kyoto), including 
recently imported Buddhist institutions, were heavily 
influenced and sometimes directly dominated by older 
institutions on the mainland.  The building of the new 
capital on a Chinese model is a good example of the 
pervasive “continentalizing” of aristocratic, social and 
cultural production in Heiankyou.  
Here we can see that Kyoto’s early “multicultural” 
institutions were a part of a widespread traffic in cul-
tural materials and skills, a traffic that was, early on, 
dominated by cultural production on and from the 
Asian continent.  Centuries before “modernization” 
or “Westernization,” other-Asian influences decentred 
Japanese cultural institutions (for example, priests first 
had to go to abroad to be ordained). 
the nation story
 The importation of peoples and skills also fos-
tered avenues of local embellishment and innovation 
that produced the contents of what is now regarded 
as classical Japanese culture.  There came a point, 
however, where the “foreign” roots of these localized 
cultural institutions became perceived of as a liability 
for the creation of a sufficiently credible national nar-
rative.  This point arrived at a time when other, non-
Asian influences were also arriving: the mid nine-
teenth century. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—the nation story —47—Nationalist narratives inscribed 
over the last hundred and fifty 
years in Japan have overcoded the 
more complex historical circum-
stances between peoples and cul-
tural institutions throughout the 
region, fashioning a narrative of 
national unity and of separation 
from the continent.  
Koreans in Kyoto point to a 
counter-history: one of connec-
tions and mutual borrowings.
Unable to effectively hide the external cultural 
influences on its long history, Japanese cultural chau-
vinists (such as scholars who wrote works about 
kokugaku [“nation-knowledge”]) in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth century Japan still sought to find an essen-
tial Japanese culture within practices they claimed pre-
dated later Chinese borrowings.  This extended to 
efforts to find pure Japanese words and meanings 
from within a language that had, for several centuries, 
borrowed not only its writing system, but its entire lit-
erary and institutional vocabulary from Chinese1.   It 
is precisely this early modern re-imagination of Japan’s 
national past that has created both the ground for 
subsequent misrecognition of historical circum-
stances, and fostered much of the misunderstanding 
between peoples living in the islands and those dwell-
ing on the Peninsula, and those who move between 
these artificially separated spaces.
1. Institutions on the Korean peninsula also took advantage of the Chinese writing system (and with it 
Chinese as a court language), and were at times under direct Chinese domination.  This serves to 
help conflate the origins of texts and other influences from the Korean Peninsula with those from 
China.  Since before WWII the Asian cultural influences upon Japan have been almost entirely clas-
sified as Sinitic.  Against this background, claims of Kyoto’s early Korean influences might be per-
ceived as exceptional; when these influences were, if anything, mundane.
 CLICK on Map to go to MAPS The history of an early and continuing contact 
between Korea and Kyoto is a history of peoples living 
in close proximity across a short stretch of water (the 
coast of Korea is nearly as close to Kyoto as is Tokyo) 
for several centuries.  The present obscurity of this 
history, particularly the details of its premodern 
scope, is a tribute to more modern political projects.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Japanese Expansionism —48—And one of the projects of some Koreans living in 
Kyoto today is to rearticulate this history, not so 
much with a mind to show the primacy of Korean cul-
ture, but rather to mark as exceptional the current 
lack of contact, and lack of respect, between these 
peoples.
The Korean Peninsula, with its long coastline, and 
its position between China and Mongolia and the 
islands that have since become Japan, is one of the 
world’s social midlands—a position that is a blessing 
when there are new knowledges and skills to be had, 
but a curse when these travel by conquest.  As with 
the Benelux or Cambodia, being in the middle often 
means getting caught in the middle.
Japanese Expansionism
The early Meiji era (late Nineteenth century) also 
brought in a new era of continentalism to Japan, how-
ever, it was Europe (and Europeanized North Amer-
ica) that became the source of new knowledges, 
which were articulated against the freshly constructed 
(but supposedly ancient) features of a “timeless” cul-
tural Japanese history.  And this time, Japan was the 
first society in the area to realize the military effects 
of modern industrialization.  
“These enterprises [the Japanese
colonial programs in Korea]
pushed the Korean farmer from
landed farming into tenant farm-
ing. In 1935 86% of the Koreans
in Osaka prefecture were laborers
who had been farmers. (Mayu
1994)
By 1900, Japan’s increasing grasp of global geopol-
itics together with its growing industrial capacity made 
territorial expansion a credible prospect.  The Korean 
peninsula again became the middle ground for its 
politically and militarily adventuresome neighbors.  
When Japan consolidated its “interests” in the Korean  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Japanese Expansionism —49—Peninsula with the 1910 annexation, this was simply 
the first of other expansionist moves.  The US, which 
had recently occupied the Philippines, could hardly 
complain, and then WWI gave Japan both political 
breathing-time and an expanding world market for its 
industrial goods.  
LOOK AGAIN:  Japanese gov-
ernment films from the 1930s 
showed rural Manchuria as an 
agricultural bonanza to encour-
age Japanese emigration to this 
region.  The creation of Shinto 
shrines also marked the extension 
of Japanese Imperial control over 
these new colonies.  Of course 
this “new” land was expropriated 
from local landowners and tenant 
farmers.
(NHK TV
By the 1920s, Japan was moving into Manchuria, 
and its colonial sway over Korea had expanded from 
early “land reforms” that put much of Korean agricul-
ture into Japanese hands, to more invasive cultural 
experiments (such as the use of Japanese in the 
schools), some of which were alibied by a liberal senti-
ment of an eventual “Greater Japan” in which Japanese 
and Koreans would share equal status.  But the sever-
ity of police control, the lack of social and employ-
ment opportunity, and the continuing drain of 
resources (including food) from Korea, pushed many 
people into fleeing the Peninsula either to Manchuria, 
or to Japan.  By 1938 there were about 800,000 Kore- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Annexation of the Korean Peninsula —50—ans in Japan.  
Annexation of the Korean Peninsula
Back in Korea, Japanese military/police rule of the 
“annexed” Peninsula had encountered moments of 
serious resistance, and had responded with a program 
of cultural assimilation aimed at erasing those Korean 
cultural practices that informed this resistance (such 
as the use of the Korean language).  A policy of assimi-
lation to Japanese institutional cultures (business, gov-
ernment, and religion) and the promulgation of the 
Japanese language in education and official business 
replaced Korean dominant institutions and discourses 
with Japanese1 ones.  
1. A case might be made that this was a part of a plan to integrate the entire space of Korea 
and Japan into one nation/state.  But any argument about the ultimate goal of this erasure 
of Korean cultural practices must also look ahead to the way that assimilated Koreans liv-
ing in Japan were treated by the Japanese government under the American Occupation.  
For despite their knowledge of the Japanese language and familiarity with Japanese cus-
toms, and despite the fact that many had been born in Japan, as soon as Japan’s colonizer 
status dissolved, these would-be citizens were declared to be foreign nationals.  In any 
case, as soon as the War started, the dominated status of Koreans became quite obvious. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Post-war predicaments —51—“...When special supplementary
rations were distributed to most
foreign nationals in Japan, Kore-
ans were not included. The SCAP
directive of 8 January 1948 on
rationing specifically stated that
‘nothing in this directive will be
construed to change the food
ration for Korean nationals who
have elected to remain in Japan,
and who receive the same ration
as Japanese nationals.’ Further-
more, SCAP noted that legal
jurisdiction over Koreans was to
continue to be exercised by the
Japanese authorities....”
(Lee 1981, 76-77)
The use of Koreans as conscripted labor in Japan 
during World War II—a time when the circumstantial 
slavery of colonization gave way to an outright 
enslavement of millions of women and men, including 
tens of thousands of women who were used as sexual 
slaves by the Japanese military—brought an increase in 
the Korean population in Japan to nearly three million 
(Fukuoka 1996, n.p.).  
When Japan was defeated at the end of World 
War II, most of the surviving conscripted workers 
returned to Korea as soon as transport could be 
arranged.  But many of the Korean families who had 
resettled in Japan from before the War, and whose lan-
guage, livelihood, and affinities were now locally 
attached within Japan, did not leave for Korea immedi-
ately, for several reasons, including the fact that the 
American authorities (SCAP) were not allowing the 
export of capital resources (including family savings) 
from Japan as a part of the reconstruction effort.
Post-war predicaments
SCAP gave the Japanese a broad control over the 
Korean population, a control the Americans had kept 
for themselves when other foreign nationals were 
involved.  This allowed the Japanese police to monitor 
and suppress nascent Korean political and social orga-
nizations (including Korean leadership in labor unions) 
and it presaged the difficulties that the Korean resi-
dents would have in asserting their claims for recogni-
tion and compensation for war-time service.
Again, as with the aftermath of the Kanto earth- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Imposed “alien” status —52—quake of 1923, when more than six-thousand Korean 
(and also Taiwanese) residents in the Tokyo area were 
massacred by vigilante groups, Koreans were scape-
goated by Japanese authorities who faced a shattered 
economy and social unrest.   Police reports of Korean 
acts of violence against Japanese individuals reinserted 
the difference between these populations.
This reported increase of violence and unlawful acts appears to have given the Japanese police
sufficient excuse to resort again to the systematic intimidation of all Koreans, as had occurred in the
prewar period. Subsequently, Koreans became frequent subjects of unreasonable search and seizure
against which they had little defense. Long-held prejudices on the part of the Japanese were again
overtly expressed. For example, during an anticrime campaign conducted by the police, a Korean
emblem was used as background in posters illustrating a clutching hand reaching out to rob a cring-
ing Japanese woman...    (Lee 1981, 75)
In 1947, the Alien Registration Law was passed 
which can only be seen as a law aimed specifically at 
Koreans, who then comprised more than ninety-three 
percent of all “aliens” in Japan.   This law, with some 
modifications, remains in effect today.  The law, which 
is administered by the Ministry of Justice (the police), 
requires foreign nationals to register their residential 
and occupational information with the local district 
office (kuyakusho), to be fingerprinted, and to carry 
with them at all times, and surrender upon request a 
photo identity card.  
Imposed “alien” status
While this law is similar to registration require-
ments imposed on foreign nationals in other states, 
such as the United States, its original imposition on 
Koreans residing in Japan occurred with another law 
that summarily stripped them of their status as Japa- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Imposed “alien” status —53—nese citizens.  Overnight they became “aliens” subject 
to active police supervision.  The application of the 
Alien Registration Law to this population and its 
descendents has been challenged continuously since 
1947 on the basis of international human rights, social 
fairness, and historical documents that question the 
right of the Japanese government to selectively disen-
franchise citizens living in Japan.  For many resident 
Koreans, the card they carry marks them not as 
“aliens” but as criminals in the eyes of the police and 
the public.   
This recent history of enforced assimilation col-
ors the regimes of assimilation Koreans face in Japan 
today with a sour patina of colonialism.  Until the Jap-
anese government addresses the cultural measures it 
applied to the Korean population during its colonial 
period, many resident  Koreans are not willing to 
grant its authority to demand cultural assimilation as a 
condition of citizenship.  Quite the contrary, Koreans 
in Kyoto look to this history of required assimilation 
as a history of human-rights violations, and press for a 
public sphere where dis-similar peoples have equal 
access. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Literature on Resident Koreans —54—Literature on Resident Koreans
CLICK on IMAGE to go to MAP 
of Korean Sites in Kyoto
There is an available literature on Koreans in 
Japan, and also Koreans in Kyoto.  Most of this is in 
Japanese but other sources are available in English, and 
much of it is useful in detailing the personal hardships, 
institutional discrimination, and identity problems that 
Koreans in Japan face.   Of great value to the Kyoto 
situation is a two volume set, Zainichi no ima—Kyoto 
hatsu [Resident Koreans Today—dateline Kyoto], pub-
lished in Kyoto in 1993 by the Kyoto branch of the 
National Resident Korean Academic Research Associ-
ation.  Part One of Zainichi 1993 deals mainly with 
problems in the Japanese school system, Part Two 
emphasizes information about lifestyle and local 
Korean cultural practices (such as the Higashi-kujo 
Madang).  
Weiner (1989) outlines the first 13 years of 
Korean immigration to Japan after annexation (1910-
1923).  He ends his work with a discussion of the 
massacre of thousands of Koreans by vigilante groups 
after the Kanto (Tokyo area) earthquake of 1923. Lee 
and DeVos (1981) is a large anthology about the situa-
tion of Koreans in Japan, but this is not as up-to-date 
as one would like.  Harajiri (1989) updates this discus-
sion (in Japanese).  And even more recent discussions 
can be found on a website about Koreans in Japan, 
including a copy of Fukuoka Yasunori’s research into 
the history and identity problems of Koreans.
http:\\
Many of the recent writings on Koreans in Japan  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
From Korea to Kyoto: histories—Literature on Resident Koreans —55—note the “coming of age” of third-generation resident 
Koreans, many of whom have moved “beyond” 
debates centered around either repatriation to Korea 
or assimilation to some acquired Japanese identity.  
Norma Field (“Beyond Envy...”, and “Resident Korean 
Literature...”) has written about how Koreans are 
addressing their alienation within an ambient lifestyle 
that is both viscerally coded for immediate and con-
tinuous conspicuous consumption, and as intimately 
“Japanese.”  
Resident Koreans still face
unwritten forms of exclusion from
the workplace.
“In the case of interviews for jobs,
the results from school [work] are
less important than the materials
that are ‘not said, not written, and
not submitted’.”
(Mayu 1994)
Field notes, (in “Resident Korean Literature...”) 
that “internationalism” in Japan includes a continuing 
distancing of the archipelago from the Asian mainland, 
a place which has relatively low prestige on the locally 
negotiated global scale of cosmopolitan centrality.  
This so-called  “internationalism” thus continues an 
“ethnicization” of Koreans as irremedially “esunikku” 
[ethnic]—Asian types, just one of several varieties of 
whom now supply off-shore (but not on-shore1) labor 
to large Japanese multinational corporations.   
Field looks at recent literary works of resident 
Koreans, but she does not consider their festival pro-
duction, which overlaps (in its dramatic narratives) 
with this, and which also brings a group performance 
into play, a performance that offers therapy (A festival is 
a space of social therapy) for the bodies and the moods of 
resident Koreans.
1. The same companies that work around Japan’s unenforced labor laws to avoid hiring Kore-
ans in Kyoto—but which will import “pure blooded Japanese” from South America— are 
building factories as fast as capital can move to China, Malaysia, and elsewhere. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Higashi-kujo no Ima: East 9th street Today —56—Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto
In the previous chapter we introduced to the his-
tory and circumstances of  resident Koreans (zainichi 
kankoku-chosen-jin”) in Japan.  Here we want to nar-
row the focus to the city and prefecture of Kyoto. 
Higashi-kujo no Ima: East 9th street Today
As part of the Higashi-kujo
Madang festival in 1994, I
proposed a photography
exhibit: “Higashi-kujo no
Ima,” based, in part on the
“Day in the Life...” Photogra-
phy shoots that have
occurred in many places, and
that occur every year in
Kyoto—but that do not ade-
quately represent this dis-
trict.   I selected disposable
panorama cameras (25 of
were generously donated by
Pix Panorama)  so the image
would record both what-
ever the photographer was focusing on, and also the surrounding space.  The local volunteers
included women and men from the ages of 13 to 70.  A single day in September 1994 became the day
when all the photos were taken. The idea was simple: photograph those spaces and objects in the
neighborhood that either attracted affection or disaffection.  As you read about Higashi-kujo Kyoto,
please look at these local representations, selected from the more than 600 photographs taken on
that day.  GO DIRECTLY TO PHOTOGRAPHS FROM THIS EXHIBIT TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—the “official” version of Kyoto —57—The City’s image of Kyoto fronts 
the claim for a national-cultural 
cachet.  Based entirely on its 
former status as the place of the 
imperial family, it reminds the 
nation that much of the imperial 
culture that has become the trope 
for “real” Japanese culture under 
the guidance of the Ministry of 
Education (Monbusho) used to 
happen in Kyoto.  Today, only res-
ident Koreans have managed to 
resalvage parts of Kyoto as local 
and disconnected from the recod-
ing of the city as a national cul-
tural icon.
“Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto” opens up a host 
of representational issues which are of interest in the 
exposition of how and where “democracy” is per-
formed (or denied) in this city, and how a community 
that is fiercely “Kyoto-an” in its self-representation, is 
also completely excluded from the city government’s 
self-representation.   “Higashi-kujo no Ima” provided a 
forum for the self-expression of place attachment and 
disaffection among residents of Higashi-kujo Kyoto.  
To provide the City’s side of representation, I have 
borrowed images from the city-backed Kyoto Cham-
ber of Commerce & Industry’s  convention promotion 
website.  [http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/]
the “official” version of Kyoto
“Kyoto sells itself as a kind of
Rome on the Kamo river: a place
where ancient dynasties flour-
ished and fought (and forni-
cated), and, in the process, forged
that rare “alloy” known as “elite
culture.”  Ever dwindling stocks
of this stuff make up the mother-
lode of Kyoto’s tourist drawing
power.  Kyoto spins less and less
new “alloy” every year, and
meanwhile, consumes itself in
the process of pandering its his-
torical image”
Heritage management
 No one expects the City of Kyoto to advertise 
its thorniest urban/social problems when it markets 
itself to tourists and industrial concerns.  It is, how-
ever,  the lack of attention to these—and the laisser 
faire policy toward these— internally that is the most 
difficult for residents in Higashi-kujo to accept.  But 
this seeming lack of concern for decades-old urban 
circumstances is also highlighted when the City 
announces urban design plans that continue to ignore 
the lifestyle conditions of its “furyoujuutakuchiku” 
[“inferior/delinquent residential districts”] now com-
monly known as suramu: slums. 
 Like most cities in the world, Kyoto tries to hide 
its slums.   For decades, Higashi-kujo was visually 
removed from the adjacent Kyoto Station, first by the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—the now newly historical ancient modern city —58—remnant of the centuries-old city wall, and then by a 
city-built fence.  These are gone today, but less-visible 
barriers remain—walls within institutions, gateways to 
opportunity that never open in certain directions, 
“glass ceilings” that keep certain people in minimum-
wage jobs.  Again, Kyoto shares many of these same 
social problems with Los Angeles and London, but the 
circumstances within Kyoto are also locally significant 
for understanding the creation of an entire social 
movement, in the form of a festival community, made 
specifically (although without the specificity that 
would allow for retaliation) to counter the city/state 
construction of Kyoto’s cultural and public sphere.
the now newly historical ancient modern city
The city government’s representation of Kyoto is 
self contradictory: not satisfied to maintain the city-
scape as an historical site, with an economy centered 
on cultural tourism, fine crafts, and higher education 
(Kyoto has the largest per capita population of college 
students in Japan), the city also promotes urban com-
mercial and residential growth and redevelopment.   
And the city government’s plan for Kyoto is basically a 
list of new construction ideas, from elevated freeways, 
to a new city hall and a new concert hall replacing the 
one they built 30 years ago.  The major issues for his-
torical management in Kyoto are available in: Heritage 
management.  For residents in South Kyoto, the plans to 
limit growth in the north incorporate plans to 
increase use density in the South, particularly as a site 
for industrial expansion. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—the now newly historical ancient modern city —59—At the second Higashi-kujo 
Madang, residents of the neigh-
borhood exhibited a selection of 
photographs taken on one day, a 
exhibit that revealed their ambigu-
ous attachment to the place where 
they live.  On one hand, they 
found a comfort in the exclusivity 
of exclusion—here was a place no 
one else would care to bother 
with, and so their community was 
relatively autonomous.  On the 
other hand, they were surrounded 
by the consequences of urban 
neglect, and their exclusion from 
Kyoto’s mainstream cultural cen-
ters did not enamor them of either 
the City or of the lack cultural ser-
vices and places in Higashi-kujo.  
“Higashi-kujo no Ima: East 9th 
street Today” was photographed 
and curated by residents and 
workers in Higashi-kujo.  We 
shall be looking at the results of 
this photo exhibit on the follow-
ing pages.
 So much of the latter—the “New Kyoto”—has 
destroyed so much of the former, old Kyoto, that the 
city itself is not recognized (by UNESCO) or recog-
nizable (by residents or tourists) as an historical city-
scape.   
Cornerstone of the City’s plan to 
attract convention goers is the 
Kokuritsu Kyouto Kokosai Kaikan 
(National Kyoto International 
Hall), referred to in English as the 
Kyoto International Conference 
Hall, built in 1966.
photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
To be fair,  building 
and rebuilding 
“public” works in 
Japan—as means to 




the central activity 
for prefectural and 
municipal governments.  Taxation in Japan is domi-
nated by national taxes, and cities often choose to  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—the now newly historical ancient modern city —60—compete for nationally funded projects without care-
ful consideration of local impacts beyond the benefits 
of new jobs in construction:  this type of state-driven 
local construction occurs in virtually all nation-states, 
but it is most acute within state-nations, given the 
greater scope of central government power and purse 
(see also:State-nation modernity).   
Convention center facilities in 
Kyoto were constructed for inter-
national events, but today, with 
the high cost of the yen, most 
events are regional or national.  
Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
While a significant 
amount of housing in 
other Japanese cities was 
destroyed during WWII,  
much of the city’s hous-
ing, although spared  of 
the WWII bombing, was built before the 1930s, and 
was in need of renovation in the decades after the 
war1.  
1. One of the local circumstances that residents faced in Kyoto was the increase in height of 
the local population.  Interior wall openings in traditional buildings being only about 170 cm 
in height was no real problem until the Japanese population grew taller—by an average of 
more than 10 cm!—after the war.   Old homes are physically too small for these new giants.
The changes in Kyoto’s street-
level ambiance are nowhere more 
evident than in the underground 
malls north of Kyoto Station, and 
in the central Shinkyogoku street 
mall, where tourist shops domi-
nate.  Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
For decades, the notion of 
preserving at least the 
façade of the earlier archi-
tecture when rebuilding 
these urban residential areas 
was not promoted in any 
fashion by the city, and actively opposed by Japan’s 
steel industry, which benefited from new national laws 
constraining wood construction within urban zones.   
By the time the city began to tout itself as an historical 
city in the 1970s, almost eighty percent of Kyoto’s  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Living on the edge —61—urban residences had already been lost to metal and 
stucco apartments and townhouses. 
 Cultural production for the tourist 
trade requires that formerly elite 
modes of craft work be repro-
duced mechanically at a much 
cheaper cost.  Plastic “lacquer” 
dishes resemble the laquerware 
found in Kyoto’s museums.  And 
it can be put into the dishwasher. 
Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
The opportunity to rebuild in a manner that 
reflected the local history of wood construction was 
lost, and the city has become indistinguishable in most 
parts from parts of Osaka or Yokohama, or any other 
Japanese metropolis.   Despite its cultural pretensions, 
the physical, street-level experience of Kyoto city is 
almost entirely a post-WWII experience today.  The 
historical/cultural sites of value have been preserved 
behind walls with some paid admission required.
Living on the edge
Go to map of Kyoto in 1873  
Much of the spacial underpin-
nings of the cultural geography of 
Kyoto in 1997 can be seen in this 
map from just six years after the 
Meiji emperor decamped.  
For the most part, Kyoto’s Koreans who arrived 
since 1910 did not find housing in the city’s old neigh-
borhoods,  but rented spaces in the outlying areas: in 
Higashi-kujo, which before the war had been an agri-
cultural district famous for its scallions; or in the new 
suburbs such as Yamashina, close to the camps built 
for Korean workers who dug the Higashiyama train 
tunnels.  Their residential geography is today a map of  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Living on the edge —62—the outer limits of Kyoto society.  As Yoshida (1994) 
put it “Yonju banchi [the riverside area of Higashi-
kujo] is the crystallization of Kyoto’s social problems.”
“Here’s the Takaseigawa canal on 
one hot summer day.”
©1994 Teir Chin 
Photos are from Higashi-kujo no 
Ima: East 9th street Today. 
GO TO NEXT PHOTO 
Of course, “Koreans” residing in Japan face similar 
legal and other constraints based on their lack of Japa-
nese nationality.  Here they are no different from 
other foreign nationals in Japan (including, for a time, 
myself), although their collective history—as a group 
that suffered through Japan’s colonization of the 
Korean peninsula—should have long ago provided 
them with a final, agreeable resolution to the issue of 
their status in Japan. 
The interior of the main hall of 
the Kyoto International Confer-
ence Center.  Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
  The fact that Koreans born in 
Japan today are not automati-
cally given the choice of Japa-
nese citizenship can only be the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Geographies of Exclusion —63—result of a conscious program of exclusion1, as other 
reasons for this are insufficient to explain its origin 
and continued practice. 
1. Japan is hardly alone as a state requiring infants born in the nation to also have one or 
more parents that are already citizens in order to automatically receive citizenship (it was 
only recently that the mother’s nationality was sufficient)—more than half of all states do 
not give citizenship on the basis of birth alone, although this is becoming more popular.   
But Japan today is a singularly exclusive nation in terms of the minuscule number of natu-
ralizations it does annually.  ISSHO, an NGO in Tokyo recently (November 1996 at 
http://www.iac.co.jp/~issho) reported that Japan’s total naturalization for 1994 was about 
11,000 (with more than half of these were resident Koreans born in Japan).  By compari-
son, the United States now records more than one million naturalizations in a year (while 
automatically conferring citizenship on all infants born in the US), and the EU countries 
combined record more than one-third of a million in a year.  Clearly, so far at least, “interna-
tionalization” in Japan has not included the welcoming of immigrants and refugees from 
other nations.
“We call this place ‘Hikari Park.’ 
What is noticeable is that it is full 
of chainlink fences, but as soon as 
these were put up, kids found bro-
ken spots to go play inside.”
©1994 Naomi Manabe
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
As Fukuoka (1996a) argues, it makes little sense 
to see the practices of the Japanese government as 
leading either towards assimilation (with the aim of 
integration) or towards internationalization (with the 
aim of a multicultural state).  Exclusion and geographic 
control are the operating logics, and these resemble 
very much the same logics that perpetuate Buraku 
places in Kyoto today.  
Geographies of Exclusion
An internal geographical exclusivity is how the 
right of inclusion has long been enforced within Kyoto.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Geographies of Exclusion —64—Social status under the Tokugawa bakufu (the Shogunal 
government) was administered geographically.  Physi-
cal residence became a synecdoche for social position 
(“you are where you live...”), and movement through-
out the countryside was under strict control (avoiding 
or running a checkpoint was a capital offense). 
“I tried to shoot something 
through the fence”
©1994 Seiko Taoka
The fences of Higashi-kujo sur-
round land, to keep it from being 
used, as less visible fences sur-
round the residents to hedge in 
their use of the life-style advan-
tages that are reserved for others.
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
The Buddhist temples became party to this, as 
their lists of parishioners became official residence 
documents, documents that served to place families 
socially and physically well into the 20th Century.   
One of Kyoto city’s oldest univer-
sities, Doshisha University, 
unable to secure the property 
needed to expand within its pri-
mary campus, built this second 
campus outside of the city.  Two 
other private universities in Kyoto 
have also created new campuses 
outside of the city.  In the last few 
decades Kyoto city has lost every 
major opportunity to keep its 
higher education “industry” at 
home—at the same time as it 
failed to resolve the continued 
presence of buraku areas, several 
of which adjoin universities.  One 
could certainly imagine a joint 
solution to both problems. Photo 
from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
Today, long-term residential addresses in long-time 
upscale Kyoto neighborhoods are still given by prox-
imity to important street corners and buildings, such 
as the (old) Imperial Palace.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Geographies of Exclusion —65—Koreans and Japanese who dwell 
in buraku areas readily draw con-
nections between their lack of 
social status and the status that is 
still granted to the imperial family 
in Japan.  In large part this is 
because of the discourse of 
“blood” that connects the imperial 
family to a primordial “Japanese-
ness” and the same logic of blood 
that separates the Japanese body-
politic from those outside groups 
(most specifically shunned buraku 
dwellers and Koreans, but logi-
cally extending to other “gaijin”) 
that share the city of Kyoto and 
other cities and neighborhoods in 
Japan.  Through their custodial 
services some buraku-dwelling 
Japanese (such as the person on 
the right) find themselves sweep-
ing up Imperial properties.  But 
tours of Imperial properties are 
not generally high on their recre-
ational agenda.
On the other end of the scale, areas set aside for 
out-grouped families had no address at all, and so the 
families who dwelled within also had no permanent 
official address. 
This is Matsunokimachi public 
housing where my friends live.  
It’s a good shot I think.
©1994 Sachiko Yukihara
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
It was this bureaucratically-enforced lack of 
address1 that marked those who were excluded from 
society.   
1. With social reform movements in this century, buraku’s acquired addresses: but these 
addresses also were catalogued, and the lists widely distributed among potential employ-
ers, schools, and other interested parties (such as marriage brokers).  So nothing really 
changed. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Geographies of Exclusion —66—“When it comes to the hiring of
high-school graduates, the public
employment security office
entrusts the school with the busi-
ness of introductions...many times
the application [made by the stu-
dent to the school to pass on to
prospective employers] seems to
be withdrawn by the school at the
point in time where it was under-
stood that a foreign country fam-
ily registration [was involved].”
Mayu 1994
Foreign residents, although required to register 
their address, and not to move or change jobs with-
out notifying the city government, also do not have an 
official family residence, a central part of the family 
registration (koseki) laws1 that the Japanese govern-
ment and police use to monitor their population.  
Foreign residents are located thus by their lack of offi-
cial location.   But Japanese citizens are also locatable 
to an extent that the citizens of many countries are 
not.  
1. This set of papers, which is held by the city government forms the basis for an official his-
tory of family members, including a history of every past residence.  The Chinese character 
“ko” in koseki is the term for “door.”  There are no post-office boxes for mail in Kyoto, no 
addresses that are not official.   Today the city is computerizing all of its residence records, 
for the “convenience” of its citizens.  The consequences of the Family Registration Law on 
the continuation of buraku discrimination should be enough for this to be abolished, if, in 
fact the government is concerned about resolving this on-going abuse of human rights in 
Japan.  But as much as the Japanese government (through its Ministry of Education and 
other organs of state) seems determined to forget recent history (such as war crimes 
and later environmental “crimes”), it seems more than willing to track the histories of its 
own citizens for its own purposes.  
This is the vegetable market 
where I usually shop.  It’s differ-
ent than a supermarket—we can 
meet and talk person to person 
while we shop.  It’s a place to 
make contact with others.  I like it 
so much I always go here.
©1994 Kanja Shin
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
To say that foreign residents in Kyoto are tracked 
by the government is not to suggest that government 
does not also keep track of its own citizens.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Geographies of Exclusion —67—One of the few remaining street 
scenes preserved from the pre-
War period, this district today 
shows not only the urban vocabu-
lary of an earlier time, but, by 
example, it shows how much the 
remainder of the city has lost in 
its post-War redevelopment.   It is 
daunting to reflect on the fact that 
perhaps a majority of Kyoto 
streets could once have been eas-
ily renovated in this manner. 
Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
As in many other 
examples of Japa-
nese government 
practices (such as 
when public 
schools monitor 
and intervene in 
the home life of 
their students), 
the overall effect of 
the spatial regula-
tions that manage the activities of people living in 
Kyoto is felt by the Japanese citizen population, if for 
no other reason than demographic ones: less than 
three percent are either Japanese living in a buraku 
area, or persons holding foreign passports.  
In the morning the children gather 
at Matsunoki public housing 
before they set off together for 
school.
©1994 Naomi Manabe
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
And so when the residents of Higashi-kujo speak 
of social change, they often speak of issues and con-
flicts that are not limited to, nor that only directly 
apply to either Koreans or buraku residents in 
Kyoto.   In terms of state interventions into life-styles, 
citizens in state-nations such as Japan (see also: State-
nation modernity) are not treated that much differently 
from resident aliens.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —68—The wrong side of the tracks
For decades this part of Kyoto has 
been the center for “recycling,” 
from gleaning scrap metal in the 
early post-war years, to organized 
glass and metal collections today.
However, the sight of collected 
refuse is also one of the features 
of the area that many object to, as 
it reminds them of their position 
at the bottom of the occupational 
status ranking.
Midori Taoka, an eighteen-year 
old resident of Yonju-banchi used 
her part in the “Higashi-kujo no 
Ima” photography day to docu-
ment the conditions of this neigh-
borhood








lar location generally gets most of the attention.  For 
Higashi-kujo is the home of one of Japan’s most 
famous “suramu” districts: Yonju -banchi (“address 
number 40”), also known as “zero banchi”.  This is a 
collection of houses and buildings constructed on the 
flood plain of the Kamo river.  
The original structures of Yonju-
banchi were not constructed so as 
to be durable.  In part their lack of 
sturdiness reflected an optimism 
about the situation between Japan 
and Korea in the 1950s—an opti-
mism that was destroyed when the 
treaty between Japan and South 
Korea made no provisions for 
compensation of Koreans resi-
dent in Japan.





War I was 
agricultural 
plots (the 
area was once famous for growing green onions) sur-
rounding a few clusters of houses,  some small indus-
try, one of Kyoto’s larger buraku areas, and the river 
and its banks.  
Yonju-banchi is really only a 
riverbank.  And with 80% of its 
population being Korean, it is the 
most “international” neighbor-
hood in Kyoto.





in the area, 
and the fields 
were slowly 
built in as housing (much of it substandard), and more  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —69—small industrial (piecework factories) and service 
industries.  
More fences to keep out those 
who might have some use of the 
land.
Photo © 1994 Midori Taoka
Used with permission
The construc-




many to move 
south into this district, as did the later (1960s) con-
struction of the shinkansan (bullet-train) line and sta-
tion.  
Kyoto Station and its many tracks 
and trains separates the northern 
from the southern parts of the 
town.  The northern (ekimae—in 
front of the station) side faces the 
old imperial palace, while the 
southern (ekiura—behind the sta-
tion) side is the “wrong-side-of-
the-tracks” side, where tightly-
packed residential areas abut 
warehouses and small industries.  
This photo shows the new airport 
shuttle train. Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
Today the area is zoned for industrial use and for 
the highest residential concentration in the city.  The 
city’s “Grand vision for 21st Century Kyoto” [see:
http://www.city.kyoto.jp/index_e.html]  calls for build-
ing  “...a dynamic and attractive city: careful measures 
to preserve the natural and historical scenery of old 
Kyoto and surrounding mountains; harmonious regen-
eration of work, residence, learning and leisure facets 
of the city center; creative development in the south-
ern region of Kyoto - the key to growth in the 21st 
century.”  But for the Higashi-kujo district, the “cre-
ative development” plans to date include rezoning for  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —70—greater residential density and a higher level of indus-
trial use, and a new 40+ meter tall Kyoto Station 
building creates a modern “odoi”: a visual barrier sepa-
rating the south from the central old city of Kyoto.  
But then Korean have always inhabited “the wrong 
side of the tracks” in Kyoto.
“By 1950 the economy was start-
ing to recover, and the [city]
administration began to consider
cleaning up this messy place.
When foreign tourists and royalty
arrive on the train through the tun-
nel from Yamashina and enter
Kyoto station right there they see
the barracks.  In order to get rid of
the black market and the tempo-
rary shelters in the 1950s [the
city] started a policy of compul-
sory removal [of people from the
barracks]. But because it doesn’t
matter if you are removed, you
have to live somewhere, and so a
house is built whenever another is
destroyed, so it was a vicious cir-
cle...”
Local activist
Interviewed in 40 banchi
Housing in Kyoto, particularly
pre-war housing, is often built on
a very modest plan, with narrow
lots that can today only hold only
a “nagaya” [tenement-house], or a
house like the one my family
rented (SEE: RIGHT), a
“machiya” that maintained the
floor plan that was designed for
such a lot.  The City has spent
many resources trying to design
modern houses that can fit these
lots, but the results are not what
they hoped for.
The end of the war 
brought thousands 
of Korean conscripts 
to Kyoto station—
one of the main 
intact train centers 
in the area (Kyoto 
was never bombed 
in the war).   These 




rary shelter in this 
region adjacent to 
the Station.  Board-
ing houses and other 
accommodations 
were available here, 
where they were 
not to the North.  
Hundreds of temporary shelters were fashioned just 
outh of the station and rented to this influx of transi-
tional persons.  So too, the proximity to the railways  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —71—and to regional highways made Higashi-kujo the cen-
tral black market in Kyoto’s post war period.   In the 
1950s the City received funds from national programs 
to upgrade housing in the burakus.  
“If you were Japanese, even
though it would take money, and
was only a hut, you could slip into
it [a new house] somehow.  But if
you were Korean with a for-
eigner’s residence or a family reg-
ister, the authorities
discriminated against you when
you moved.
“They’d tell you ‘You must under-
stand that housing is not avail-
able,’ or simply ‘it is impossible
[shikataganai=there is no way],’
or ‘do you drink liquor?’ or ‘I bet
if you went and over in that
area...’ but you’d go there and it




interviewed in 40 banchi
Although many Koreans had houses in the buraku 
area south of Kyoto station, unlike their Japanese 
neighbors they were not compensated1 when their 
houses were destroyed to make room for public 
housing blocks.  This created another source of ani-
mosity between the Korean community and the city, 
and between Koreans and their Japanese neighbors.  
Adding to the problem, Koreans also faced the diffi-
culty of locating new housing: a difficulty that remains 
until today.  Vacant apartments are suddenly not 
vacant.  
This was the first of major “slum clearance” in the 
City,  and it resulted in the razing of hundreds of 
houses and the construction of city-owned housing 
blocks with the burakus.   But in the 1950s there were 
many problems with housing in Japan and Kyoto, and 
many still persist.  The lack of adequate housing, par-
ticularly in terms of affordability and  is perhaps the 
single greatest problem in urban Japan.
1. Until recently, when written contracts have begun to be used in these transactions in Kyoto, 
renters acquired an informal right to stay in the place they were renting, and the rents 
rarely increased.  Landlords were not bothered for small repairs.  In order to move a renter, 
some compensation was necessary.  So too, moving into a new house would require “key 
money” a significant cash payment ($2-20,000 US), which the landlord would pocket. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —72—Narrow catwalks connect the 
structures to a central spine run-
ning parallel to the river.
Photo © 1994 Midori Taoka
Used with permission
But in the 
1950s this 
discrimina-
tion was not 
done surrep-
titiously, but 
openly.  “And so they [resident Koreans] went around 
and found no place, and they moved to the south side 
of the Kamogawa, where there was not a house in 
those days, only a grassy plain, and they began to build 
houses by themselves.  That is the origin of Yonju-ban-
chi [address number 40]. (resident of Yonju-banchi)” 
This photographer’s work façade  
particularly on Yonju-banchi’s 
many fences.
Photo © 1994 Midori Taoka
Used with permission
The construc-
tion of houses 
on this site 
increased con-
stantly through 
the 1950s to the 1960s.  By 1963 there were 150 
structures, and the present state of Yonju-banchi was 
almost complete.  This coincided with the end of the 
“slum clearance” of temporary shelters south of 
Kyoto Station.
Yonju-banchi is built out over the 
southernmost end of the 
Takaseigawa, where this joins the 
Kamo River.  
Photo © 1994 Midori Taoka
Used with permission
This is no 
coincidence.  
The city was 
instrumental 
in the cre-
ation of this 
neighborhood by pushing hundreds of local families 
onto the street with nowhere else to go. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —73—Each fence has its own sign warn-
ing against trespass.
Photo © 1994 Midori Taoka
Used with permission
The site 
itself is not in 
the city 
proper, as the 
flood plain of 
the river is 
technically national land.  This is one reason why the 
city has avoided the issue of creating alternative hous-
ing for these residents. 
Photo © 1994 Midori Taoka
Used with permission
“Today there are 1300 people liv-
ing in Yonju-banchi, in the mid
1960s there were 4500.  They’d
take a space for a pig-pen, and
make a house, then they’d divide
this into two with a wooden panel:
[the result] an ‘octopus1 house’
[takobeya].”
Local activist
Interviewed in 40 banchi
1. The octopus is famous for fitting its large body into the smallest of spaces.
 The over-
crowding in 




changed (fewer children).  Today about 23% of the res-
idents are elderly (over 65 years of age).  And after 
fires and floods, the damaged structures are fenced 
off, and so the number of structures is slowly dwin-
dling.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —74—Many of the structures have been
damaged or have deteriorated in
the last 30 years.
Photo © 1994 Midori Taoka
Used with permission
“On the north side [of the station]
they gave compensation when
they tore down the houses, but on
the south side, they did not: it was
determined as an ‘issue of
national territory’”
Local activist
Interviewed in 40 banchi
In other words, because they were
Koreans, they did not merit com-
pensation when their houses were
torn down.
The struc-
tures are not 
actually 
hooked up to 
a sewer sys-
tem, and so 
there is a problem of hygiene and odor.  Families still 
live 4-5 to one small room, and in many cases there is 
only a single parent. High-school entrance is below 
the national average, as is the number of high-school 
graduates who go on to college, but these are statis-
tics that are common to the local buraku area as well.
Well up river from Higashi-kujo 
(and north of the Gojo-minami 
buraku areas) expensive Kyoto-
cuisine (kaiseki)  restaurants have 
been given space to extend their 
premises out over the banks of the 
Kamo River.  These patio dining 
areas are popular in the summer, 
but are generally unaffordable 
apart from business-expense 
entertainment.  The riverfront 
south of Gojo offers the same 
potential ambience, but that area’s 
geographical stigma prevents its 
occupants from using this oppor-
tunity.  Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
gg to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
There is no water system 
for fighting fires, and 
when a wind comes up, 
the entire neighborhood 
is vulnerable to disaster.   
Should a hundred-year 
flood occur the entire 
neighborhood is likely to 
be washed away.  But there are some who would 
rather live here than in an other part of Kyoto.  
Though the rents are not justified by the accommoda-
tions, they are cheap by Kyoto standards.  As this is a 
majority Korean neighborhood with virtually no offi-
cial links to the city, it maintains a sense of cultural and 
social independence that some residents enjoy.  
Korean songs and food, language and dress are not 
marked here.   “There is a carefree space here for 
Koreans who are working” said one resident.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —75—The aseptic hallways of the public 
housing block is an alternative 
that many people living in Yonju-
banchi would not prefer to their 
own catwalks.
Photograph ©1994, Yu Chinmi
Used with permission




and it is diffi-
cult to 
escape the mood that arises with too little available 
work (and too much hard labor when it comes) for 
too little money; too many bosses, and too few 
opportunities to move up.   There are too many rea-
sons here to become depressed about the present 
and desperate about the future.   
Kyoto’s kaiseki cuisine, probably 
the most expensive food in the 
world, represents one of the pin-
nacles of aristocratic cultural 
achievement in the city.  With a 
dinner for two that could easily 
cost a month’s wages for a day 
laborer in Kyoto, this is food that 
few persons outside of the corpo-
rate world can enjoy.   Photo 
from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
The future of Yonju-banchi 
is an interesting ques-
tion.  I have seen a model 
of a proposed public 
apartment complex (the 
proposal came from 
Kyoto University) that 
would be built on this 
site, after it was raised 
above flood level.  But the 
money to build this is not yet secure.  The city man-
aged to celebrate its 1200th anniversary year without 
facing its most glaring challenge.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —76—The campus of the self-pro-
claimed “International Institute 
of Advanced Studies,” where all 
of the research and all of the plan-
ning is done by Japanese individ-
uals from Japanese universities 
and corporations.  This is another 
example of the local use of “inter-
national” which does not include 
persons from other nations, but 
merely refers to topics or interests 
that are not limited somehow to 
Japan.  Foreign scholars need not 
apply.  Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
Yonju-banchi is one of Japan’s most notorious 
slum areas, having been the target of regular NHK 
(Japan’s government television) programs.  
Yonju-banchi from the 10th Street 
bridge across the Kamo River.  
The towering public-housing 
block of Matsunokimachi danchi 
is on the left.  Here hundreds of 
Kyoto natives who happened to 
have Korean ancestry built their 
own neighborhood, when the city 
and the nation destroyed their 




After each program there would be a moment of 
hope within Yonju-banchi that something positive 
would result from this attention.  But today that hope 
is pretty much gone.  So now  TV cameras are not 
allowed into Yonju-banchi.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—The wrong side of the tracks —77—The sight of geisha on the street is 
on of the most enduring of 
Kyoto’s photo-ops.  The continu-
ance of the geisha system, which 
requires women at a very early 
age to be pledged to a life of “cul-
tural servitude” with both oppor-
tunities and constraints—neither 
of these within their control—is 
one of the social paradoxes of the 
vestigial forms of Kyoto’s  once-
aristocratic (and nearly always 
sexist) cultural production. Photo 
from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go back to first Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
There are people 
in other parts of 
Higashi-kujo who 
find a small com-
fort in feeling supe-
rior to those who 
live such a precari-
ous life on the 
riverbank, and so 
the isolation of 
this neighborhood is rather fiercely drawn.  At some 
point it will fall to fire, wind or water, or to old age 
and decrepitude.  The city thinks it has time on its 
side.  But the residents of  Yonju-banchi may not go 
down to defeat so easily.  
Here is a geisha that was sent to 
the Heian Shrine for a photo 
opportunity with a group of 
wealthy businessmen and their 
wives.  One the way back to her 
cab she is also “acquired” 
momentarily by others (including 
the odd anthropologist with a 
video camera) who wish to cap-
ture her image as a memento of 
Kyoto.  Look at how completely 
she maintains her acquired geisha 
composure.  Video by the author.
This is a home 
ground of the 
Higashi-kujo 
Madang festival, 
and its residents 
are ready to 
transform their 
outsider condi-
tion into a new 
demand for multiculturalism in the city.  
They see their place not at the margin, but at the 
forefront of a more international society in Kyoto.  
But in order to move themselves and the city into a 
space of mutual respect and dialogue they will have to 
confront the city’s public sphere and self constructed 
identity.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Higashi-Kujo today —78—Higashi-Kujo today
During the four decades of Japan’s remarkable 
Post-War economic growth (a period which ended—
at least in its “remarkable” aspect— about 1991) 
Higashi-kujo Kyoto was remarkable for it’s visible lack 
of change.  “Look ahead twenty years, and tell me 
what would be the worst situation you could imagine 
for Higashi- kujo,” I asked one resident Korean 
woman, during an interview at a Kentucky Fried 
Chicken restaurant in Western Kyoto.
“The worst situation?” She mused, and then said, 
“would be for it to be exactly like it is now, which is 
what I expect will happen.  Look at it.  Very little has 
changed here for so long.”  
ON THE RIGHT
Take a half- hour tour (you can 
use the fast-forward button to go 
faster, or move the slider to skip 
through the video) down the 
Takaseigawa canal into the heart 
of Higashi-kujo.  Take note, as 
you travel, of the many empty lots 
that are fenced off, and the lack of 
accessible open spaces, and the 
general lack of new (post 1980) 
buildings—although some of the 
standing buildings show signs of 
repair/renovation.  Much of the 
residential stock of this district’s 
non-buraku neighborhoods was 
created during the post-war 
urbanization of Japan.  It is only 
now beginning to show neglect.
Takaseigawa VIDEO
What new buildings there are in Higashi-kujo are 
mainly modest houses built by the residents, or city-
built public housing blocks (danchi) that were con-
structed in response to the long-standing and visible 
presence of substandard housing in the area (and  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Higashi-Kujo today —79—nation-wide agitation from buraku groups (See: Hane, 
1982). 
 Local industry in Higashi-kujo falls into four main 
areas: small retail and entertainment, refuse collection 
(and, dismantling, and rag collection, and general recy-
cling), building maintenance, and small-scale metal fab-
rication and subconcontracting.   Back before Kyoto’s 
neighborhoods were connected to city sewers, human 
refuse had to be picked up as well, and some of these 
“honey-wagons” also were a local business.
One of the many service occupa-
tions that were often located in 
buraku areas was that of collect-
ing human waste.  Nationwide, 
nearly half of Japan’s households 
are not connected to sewers.  But 
in Kyoto, the punctual (and pun-
gent) visits of “honey wagons” to 
the neighborhoods are now only a 
memory.
The one main ingredient in the local job scene—
apart from the generally lower wages and social unde-
sireability of these industries—is that most job loca-
tions (except for building maintenance or refuse 
collection jobs) are small enough to be operated by 
one family without a great amount of capitalization.  
Such services are also a part of the wider economy 
with relatively inelastic demand—even in bad eco- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Higashi-Kujo today —80—nomic times, garbage must be hauled.  And so, while 
this district did not enjoy a great bounty during Japan’s 
economic boom years, they may not be as vulnerable 
as other parts of Kyoto’s economy to the downside of 
the current recession. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Higashi-Kujo today —81—In this sequence of shots, a field 
of empty lots, made empty when 
their buildings were torn down or 
abandoned, has become a thicket 
of wire fences.  And open space 
for play and relaxation is thus 
appropriated by governmental 
institutions for no other reason 
than to keep the local people out, 
although children have created 
gaps to allow them to play within 
the space.  
The proximity to the train station 
is not accidental.  The first train 
line was created to link the city’s 
southern edge, where property 
values were low.  Many of the 
Korean families in Higashi-kujo 
have ancestors who came to 
Kyoto early in the century to help 
dig the tunnels through the eastern 
hills (Higashiyama) to allow the 
trains to pass through to Lake 
Biwa, and on to Tokyo.
The location is near the raised 
tracks of the Shinkansen (bullet 
train) line.  And here we see a 
train slowing to a stop at nearby 
Kyoto Station.
©1993 Bruce Caron
  Higashi-kujo occupies the 
eastern (higashi) region sur-
rounding a main east-west 
street (Kujou) south of 
Kyoto’s main rail station 
(Kyouto-eki).  On its eastern 
border is the Kamo River 
(Kamogawa) and its west-
ern reaches are the train 
tacks of the Kintetsu rail-
road.  To the south are the 
southernmost districts of 
Kyoto city, notably the 
Fushimi region, and then 
unincorporated farm lands 
and suburbs of south Kyoto 
Prefecture.  On tourist 
maps (for Japanese or for-
eign tourists), this area can 
be located by the absence 
of any marked tourist desti-
nation.  There are no civic 
destinations (public parks, 
auditoriums, etc.), no gov-
ernment offices, no temples 
or shrines, no notable shop-
ping centers (apart from the 
Avanti building immediately 
adjacent to Kyoto Sta-
tion)—no tourist “destina- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Higashi-Kujo today —82—tion” value whatsoever, and also a lack of facilities for 
local use.  
“Indeed, in the past Japan's atten-
tiveness to its international image
has been an important factor in
determining how the country
responded to social issues and
protests—occasionally with per-
verse results. For example, in
1951, when Japan was about to
rejoin the international commu-
nity and the country was gearing
up for tourism, Kyoto city admin-
istrators, anxious that the poverty
of a burakumin ghetto near the
central train station would harm
the city's image, built a board
fence to screen the neighborhood
from view; rather than address the
ghetto's problems, in other
words, they initiated a stark dem-
onstration of conflict avoidance
behavior.”
(Pharr 1990, 231)
Ceremonially, the neighborhoods of Higashi-kujo 
are not linked to any larger Shinto shrine, nor to the 
organizations (shrine or civic) that manage Kyoto’s 
main civic events (the “big three” festivals: Aoi Matsuri, 
Gion Matsuri, and Jidai Matsuri).   Higashi-kujo is the 
first and the last place that visitors who arrive on the 
Shinkansen (bullet train) see, as it is immediately to 
the south of the station.  But it is a district where visi-
tors rarely, if ever go to.  
“Look across the river,” one Higashi-kujo resident 
instructed me as we were sitting in upstairs dining 
areas of one of Kyoto’s 27 (at last count) MacDonalds 
restaurants.  Looking west I could see a row of single-
story houses flanking the Kamo river north of where 
the trains cross the river, and west of these, a wall of 
five- to seven-story condominiums and office build-
ings.  “Why do you think there are no tall buildings 
near the river?”  
the first 4:49:00 of the Takaseigawa 
Video tours the neighborhood 
described on the right.  I had trav-
elled through its quiet, tree-lined 
streets for a year before I discov-
ered why its streets were so quiet.
I confessed that I thought the city was trying to 
maintain a heritage of older buildings along the Kamo, 
but she said otherwise.  “It’s just neglect.  That is one 
of Kyoto’s fumiirenai tokoro— “a place you should not 
enter”—and it used to be famous for Yakuza [profes-
sional criminal gang] activity.” 
She did not use the term “buraku”, and, in fact I 
learned that the area she pointed at has both buraku 
and non-buraku regions, the boundaries of which are 
best known to those who dwell in the vicinity.   It also  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Higashi-Kujo today —83—has no Japanese inns, no tourist hotels, no tourist des-
tinations at all.  The whole strip of the city  south of 
5th street (gojo) and along the Kamo is today a space 
excluded from the casual perambulations of locals and 
tourists (apart from unknowing foreigners).  “Fumi-
irenai tokoro,” a “don’t set-foot-in-here” place.  
The city/chamber of commerce 
organizers of the Kyoto 1200 cel-
ebrations choose Hiro Yama-
gata’s “Golden Pavilion” as the 
poster for the event.  As with the 
majority of his work, which is 
enormously popular in Kyoto, the 
scene is peopled by images of 
frolicking individuals, none of 
whom resemble (either physi-
cally or by dress) the majority of 
the people who live in Kyoto.  An 
assortment of blondes and red-
heads gambol near Kyoto’s trade-
mark historical landmark (com-
pletely reconstructed in the 1950s 
after a case of arson).  Yamagata 
lives in Malibu, California, and 
most of his work that sells (often 
for six-figure US$ amounts) in 
Japan depicts scenes of cities in 
Europe and the US.
















struction (such as the “Golden Pavilion” that was 
burned to the ground in the 1950s and reconstructed 
on its site), and the history of exclusion—the mainte-
nance of places through an active neglect which, over 
time, adds to their history as artifacts of urban social 
planning.  
As the urban core of Kyoto is reconstructed 
without reference to its historical, architectural legacy,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Resident Koreans in modern Kyoto—Higashi-Kujo today —84—neighborhoods that are excluded from real-estate 
speculation because of their stigmatized status ironi-
cally acquire cultural value as historically interesting 
districts.   However, this unplanned preservation ulti-
mately fails, as the buildings and the urban landscape 
(bridges, etc.) themselves degrade through a lack of 
repair, and eventually are replaced by empty lots.  
In the 1994 Higashi-kujo Madang 
drama, a female character looks 
across the street to where fenced-
off plots of land have sprouted 
fields of tall grass.  On a far-off 
fence she reads the large sign: 
“Minami-ku utsukushikute...” 
[“let’s beautify South Kyoto”].  
The sign represent’s the city’s 
only visible response to the wide-
spread physical degeneration of 
this section of Kyoto.
In the empty lots of eastern Higashi-kujo one 
senses the logic of some longer-range plan, where the 
resident population along the river—now about 80% 
“Korean”— is allowed to age and die.  Their houses 
will be torn down when they too decay, and the land 
fenced against appropriation by other area residents.  
In time, the children will move away, perhaps to Osaka 
or Kobe.  And by the time Kyoto celebrates its 1300th 
anniversary (2094) the entire region will be available 
for civic construction: something expensive, such as a 
soccer stadium.  And the memory of Kyoto’s only 
international town will simply fade away. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—the phantasmic emperor —85—National spaces and identity practices
the phantasmic emperor
“So it seems that at every rupture
point between the moderns and
the traditionalists there occurs a
memory crisis—at the end of the
nineteenth century and once again
in the last few decades of the
twentieth century—a problemati-
zation of the normal relationship
of the present to the past... As
every memory crisis recognizes
that something is lacking in the
present, a desire develops to col-
lect tokens from the past, to store
them in museums and collections
lest these items be allowed to slip
from our view, be forgotten in the
dust of time, or be free to roam at
will and thus disturb the road to
the future.... And like the last half
of the nineteenth century, we too
have experienced a “frenzy of the
visible”: a memory crisis of too
many images, too phantasmagori-
cal, too commodified, that inhibit
the recall and recollection of
images stored in the mind”
(Boyer 1994, 26-27).
The political geography of any modern nation-
state (or state-nation) larger than, say, Hong Kong or 
Singapore, often reveals a logic of centrality, unless 
there is historically  a conscious program of decentral-
ization.  Almost all countries today are less “leveled” in 
their political geography than they are in economic 
and cultural geographies.  Even so, there are some 
states where the political geography is so completely 
centralized that the national capital is a virtual (not 
just metaphorical) synecdoche for the nation.  France 
is the usual example with Paris as the dominant space 
for the nation.  Decades of state-nationality made 
Moscow the dominant city for the entire Soviet 
Union.   In much the same way, but perhaps to an even 
greater degree, Tokyo dominates the state-nation of 
Japan.  One feeder to this central-place logic is an 
older logic that Kyoto knows very well: proximity to 
the emperor.
Even today, the most central of national spaces 
are those made for and by and surrounding the 
emperor in Japan.  To illustrate this, one only needs to 
consider the astounding amount of the nation’s Real-
politik (and economic and cultural)  practices that  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—the phantasmic emperor —86—occur within a half an hour’s walk of the current Impe-
rial Palace in Tokyo.  This clustering of administrative 
and executive functions is not merely vestigial—it is 
not the simple outcome of the former imperial state, 
but is today firmly defended, against an increasingly 
compelling logic in favor of building a new administra-
tive center1 away from Tokyo’s over-congested center.   
Central state bureaucrats who find themselves in 
disfavor often find themselves moved out of the Tokyo 
office to some prefectural city: the more trouble 
they’ve caused, the further away they get.  One health 
ministry official recently did a series of opinion arti-
cles in a Tokyo newspaper, commenting on the pres-
sures of ministry work.  He found himself reassigned, 
first to Shikoku, and then to Kyushu (the furthest 
main island away from Tokyo).  But then bureaucrats 
are accustomed to travel, as central government fund-
ing for local projects usually is accompanied by a cen-
tral government official to oversee the project.  In this 
way, Tokyo maintains a level of direct control over 
regional governmental offices that belies the latter’s 
claim to independent decision making.   Without any 
clear separation of powers between the local “semi-
autonomous” governments and the central state gov-
ernment in Japan, city and prefectural government 
offices serve also to implement central state policies.  
And again, these policies are made within that short 
1. I once spoke with a top-level bureaucrat at the Ministry of Finance in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo, 
who noted that the Americans had  taken over the building where we were then talking, 
and used it for a school.  After the occupation, the Ministry moved back, “and we are never 
again going to leave,” he assured me. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—the phantasmic emperor —87—walk to the Tokyo imperial palace.
“There are all kinds of ghosts
prowling these confused streets
[of Prague]. They are the ghosts
of monuments demolished—
demolished by the Czech Refor-
mation, demolished by the Aus-
trian counterreformation,
demolished by the Czechoslovak
Republic, demolished by the
Communists. Even statues of Sta-
lin have been torn down. All over
the country, wherever statues
were thus destroyed, Lenin stat-
ues have sprouted up by the thou-
sands. They grow like weeds on
the ruins, like melancholy flowers
of forgetting”
(Kundera 1980, 158).
Meanwhile, Kyoto finds itself haunted by hun-
dreds of vacated (but fenced and maintained) imperial 
sites from a thousand years of court life in a series of 
palace: a cultural production which ended abruptly 
when the emperor Meiji was restored in the 19th cen-
tury and chose to move—as fast as was possible—
into the shogunal palace in Edo (then renamed Tokyo: 
“the Eastern Capital”).   Kyoto became koto: the “old” 
capital: as suddenly acephalous (in a political sense) as 
the tens of thousands of people—many of them Bud-
dhist monks— who had been separated from their 
heads on the banks of the Kamo River during the 
course of Kyoto’s imperial era.
Although the ghost of Meiji is 
enshrined in Tokyo, his body is 
entombed in an enormous mound 
on a hill near Kyoto.  As with 
other imperial sites, this one is 
also off-limits, and so a visit to 
the tomb allows one to stand out-
side a gate several hundred meters 
away (and several gates removed) 
from the actual mound.
Photo by the author
Almost since the day when the emperor (and a 
hundred thousand or so of his relatives and other 
court and government officers) “skipped town,” more 
than a hundred years ago now—this after a millen-
nium of  building its own cultural production on the 
basis of the presence of the imperial aristocracy—
Kyoto has been searching for some way to recapture  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—the phantasmic emperor —88—its imperial past.   Early in the Meiji period, the phan-
tasm of the emperor, lurking in Kyoto, became the 
core of the city’s plans to retain its cultural position, 
this time as the cultural center of a modern nation.   
The primary construction for the 1100 year anniver-
sary of the city in 1894 was the building of the Heian 
Shrine, wherein were captured and worshipped the 
spirits of the first and the last emperors to rule in 
Kyoto (the emperor Meiji, although entombed nearby, 
has his spirit enshrined in Tokyo—where it pre-occu-
pies one of the only major, not-quite-public open 
spaces in the city).
Rather than being constructed on 
the model of other Shinto shrines, 
the Heian Jingu (Shrine) repli-
cates the original palace of the 
early emperors in Kyoto.  It is the 
home not for the current emperor, 
who has chosen to live in Tokyo, 
but rather for the phantasmic 
“ghosts” of the first and last 
emperors of Kyoto1.  Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
1.  Japanese who visit on tours are reminded when they approach the main building that, in 
prior times, this would have been off-limits to them.  In 1994 one of Japan’s top rock-and-
roll stars gave a concert at the Heian Jingu in celebration of the 1200th anniversary of the 
city.  Instead of holding the concert in front of the gates where there is a wide public park, 
the city held the concert inside the shrine, and again the population was left out as the 
city’s top officials distributed the tickets to their friends. 
Marilyn Ivy (1995) has 
ploughed the fields of mar-
ginalized traditions in 
Japan’s rural districts, find-
ing at the far side of Japan’s 
modernity a ghost of the 
past.   This phantasm 
appears as the vestige of 
the vanishing practices that were once so embedded 
into daily life that they were considered atarimae .  
And also, it appears as the continuing vanishing of past 
practices within those practices that now memorialize 
the past through novel media and means: TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—the phantasmic emperor —89—“An organizing theme of this study is that of the vanishing, which (dis)embodies in its gerund
form the movement of something passing away, gone but not quite, suspended between presence
and absence, located at a point that both is and is not here in the repetitive process of absenting.
How is that moment-if it can be called that-made to signify?  What marks it as founding entire
regimes of authentication? The vanishing can only be tracked through the poetics of phantasm,
through attentiveness to the politics of displacement, deferral, and originary repetition. Practices and
discourses now situated on the edge of presence (yet continuously repositioned at the core of the
national cultural imaginary) live out partial destinies of spectacular recovery. Their status is often
ghostly. And it is through the ghosts of stories and (sometimes) stories of ghosts that I work, disclos-
ing an economy of the appropriated marginal, of lacunae in representation at the center of the dom-
inant” (Ivy 1995 20-21).
The same phantasms, I have found,  are at literally 
work at the self-proclaimed center if Japan’s national 
cultural project.  In Kyoto, phantasmagoric emperors 
watch over the city’s spectacles, which, in turn, pay 
homage to past emperors while overlooking the 
absence of the current emperor, who rarely visits 
Kyoto, although several residences are kept ready for 
such occasions.  
The Jidai Matsuri travels from the 
Kyoto gosho palace to the Heian 
Shrine. It celebrates the times 
when Kyoto was the imperial cap-
ital of Japan.  Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo









ments of imperial processions that now take place 
without an imperial presence.   Costumed historical 
pageants, they move through the traffic-choked 
streets like a party of somnambulating geriatrics: out 
of time, and out of place—but still representing the 
central (imperial-ized),  national space, and the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—the phantasmic emperor —90—national historical project to a population that is regu-
larly excluded  from the many imperial sites that sur-
round them. 
The Aoi (hollyhock) Matsuri rein-
vents another imperial procession, 
this one from the Kyoto gosho 
palace to a shrine north of the pal-
ace.  Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
The old Imperial Palace 
(gosho) in Kyoto is today 
off-limits to Japanese citi-
zens (overseas tourists can 
visit these at any time) 
except for a few days in the 
year; and the same holds 
true for the two nearby 
“Imperial Villas.”  In part, this is done to signify their 
potential use by the imperial family.  Imperial tombs 
and temples ranging from modest to enormous are 
located in various parts of the city and its environs.  
The tombs are also shut off to the public: each one 
presents another closed gateway1 and a high wall 
behind which one would find a well-tended garden 
space usually emptied of the living.  These phantasma-
goric spaces are tended by workers hired by the impe-
rial household agency, and would, if they were turned 
to public use, provide Kyoto with much-needed open 
green space.  
1. One of these sepulchral gardens lay along a road I often walked near my house.  One day, 
after several months when it was closed, the giant gate stood ajar.  I plucked up my cour-
age (and armed myself with the usual foreign-tourist alibis) and wandered inside.  I met no 
one.  Along a curving hillside a gravel path with marble pavers led, surrounded by an 
immaculate garden of moss and ferns.  Overhead there were palm trees (not usual in 
Kyoto), and a few hundred yards in, there was the granite marker, not quite an obelisk.   I 
wandered back out the gate and down the road.  On my return the gate was closed.  It 
remained closed for the rest of my stay in Kyoto. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Kyoto City margins and centers —91—Kyoto City margins and centers
The Golden Pavilion, one of 
Kyoto’s most popular tourist land-
marks, was an aristocrat’s villa 
and then a temple before a dis-
gruntled priest burned it to the 
ground in the 1950s.  It was then 
reconstructed, and it remains in 
this newly fashioned, traditional 
form, a metaphor for all that is 
from Kyoto’s past that has been 
commodified in the present.  
Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
The city is full of margins and centers, and of 
occasions that demarcate these with bright colors.  
The work of keeping the margins marginal is done in 
large part by the continual display of the center as 
central.   In its buraku districts, Kyoto contains geo-
graphic zones of exclusion that are as exclusionary as 
its imperial zones are exclusive: an homology that is 
not lost among Buraku  activists.  
Most residents dwell in between these zones of 
exclusion: connected ceremonially to the imperial/
national spaces, and connected also to the stigmatized 
neighborhoods by the everyday practices of discrimi-
nation required to avoid contact with buraku places.  
The “civic” middle ground mimics the imperial space, 
building fake palaces (such as the Heian Shrine) as civic 
projects, and marching in or onlooking at imperial 
parades that lack the essential ingredient: the emperor  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Kyoto City margins and centers —92—is elsewhere.   
The city-run art museum is a pre-
war building across the street 
from a much larger national 
museum of modern art.  Nearby is 
the city’s main library, another 
pre-war building which offers a 
collection of books similar in size 
to that of a small-town library in 
the United States.  The national 
Ministry of Education has not 
made local library support one of 
its priorities, and the city budget 
for cultural matters is inadequate 
to maintain a library of any size.  
The city’s many universities also 
do not allow public use.  In the 
absence of  public libraries, local 
bookstores are usually very busy. 
Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
The city competes 
for Ministry of Con-
struction (kensetsus-
hou) funding to build 
national museums for 
its cultural legacy: 
subsequently turning 
over the manage-
ment to the Ministry 
of Education, and 
thus giving to the state (which exists mostly in that 
half-hour walking distance from the Tokyo imperial 
palace) control over the representation of Kyoto-gen-
erated arts and crafts, which are, in the process 
“nationalized.”   
Perhaps the most famous of 
Kyoto’s crafts is that of yuuzen—
painted silk.  Painted silk kimonos 
are still used for weddings and 
other occasions, but competition 
from abroad and a general decline 
in the market signal a long-term 
decline in this industry.  To cut 
production costs, yuuzen factories 
now replace the home-based art-
ists who created both the design 
and executed the drawing.  Two of 
the main yuuzen producing cen-
ters are West Kyoto, and Fushimi 
in the south.  Ironically, I was told 
by a worker in Fushimi that more 
than half of the laborers/artists 
today are Koreans. Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo
go to previous Kyoto web photo
Almost all of the 60 or so museums in Kyoto 
operate with the active management of national minis-
tries (usually the Ministry of Education).   In this man- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Kyoto City margins and centers —93—ner, the city government over the last fifty years has 
literally built itself out of control of the management 
of the elite cultural legacy that was its main value-
added cultural commodity.  The city-run museums 
(and the paltry few local libraries) appear to be grossly 
underfunded in comparison to the national museums.
The Gion Matsuri is Kyoto’s larg-
est civic event, although the 
crowds at its main parade of giant 
floats (yamaboko) are modest (40-
50,000).  As this is performed to 
be the exactly the same each year, 
almost everyone has already seen 
it, and anyhow, any interesting 
accidents that might happen will 
be shown on the evening news.  
Actually, the parade has been 
changed substantially in modern 
times: the route was altered to fol-
low the newer, wider streets, and 
the parade must now stop and go 
to allow cross traffic to flow.  But 
the more ironic changes occurred 
early on.  This festival was origi-
nally performed by a Korean tem-
ple outside of the city (the city 
limits now encompass the Gion 
district) as a shamanic ritual 
(mudang kut) of cleansing (See: 
McMullin 1988).  None of this 
history is provided in the current 
literature provided by the city 
about the event.  Instead, the festi-
val has become an icon of “real 
Japaneseness” and Gion-style fes-
tivals occur in several cities. 
Photo from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo





















arts has been proceeding for several decades, and 
today adds yet another zone of exclusivity/exclusion 
to Kyoto’s social geography: the national zone.  While 
the valorized imperial zones and the stigmatized  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—in-corp-oration —94—buraku zones were geographically fixed more than 
one hundred years ago, the national zone continues to 
grow.   
The popularization of Kyoto’s 
formerly elite arts, such as the tea 
ceremony, add another layering of 
national culture onto that directly 
managed by the state.  The 
schools of tea and also flower 
arranging that are based in Kyoto 
are managed in a hierarchical 
fashion throughout the nation.   
However, these are also the best 
example of  Kyoto’s claim to 
national cultural centrality. No 
wonder then that the head of the 
largest tea ceremony school was 
chosen as the head of the 1200th 
anniversary celebration. Photo 
from:
http://web.kyoto-inet.or.jp/org/hellokcb/
go to next Kyoto web photo










aged by or under the guidance (gyoseishido) of the 
national Ministry of Culture) to the national zone, and 
then the many Shinto Shrines (reconstructed under 
pre-war state Shinto programs, and still managed by a 
national organization (the Jinjahoncho ) that was for-
merly a government office to this zone of national cul-
ture: the great majority of cultural spaces and nearly 
all open spaces in Kyoto are nationalized spaces 
where local residents are as much tourists as the 
hordes of school children that arrive every year on 
state-sponsored cultural trips.   
in-corp-oration
The idea of “homogeneity” in Kyoto (See also: the 
politics and semantics of homogeneity),  and in other places 
in the world where assimilation to normative cultural 
behaviors is a part of “incorporation regimes” 
directed at immigrants (or school children) may be  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Contours of the public sphere —95—represented as the natural result of a national history.  
But this representation is merely the first institutional 
practice that needs to be interrogated.  
“...In using the term incorpora-
tion regime, I refer to the patterns
of policy discourse and organiza-
tion around which a system of
incorporation is constructed. All
states develop a set of legal rules,
discursive practices, and organi-
zational structures that define the
status of foreigners vis-à-vis the
host state, and the forms and
boundaries of their participation
in host polity institutions”
(Soysal 1994, 32).
 The problems the Kyoto’s Koreans face when  
articulating their particular demand for heterogeneity 
in the face of a homogeneous cultural/national Japa-
nese identity are, at moments, similar to those faced 
by lesbians/gays who would demand that notions of 
sexuality open up to a greater diversity of practice and 
imagination.  At some point these demands must also 
find a social geographic target—a demand that actual 
(and media) spaces be opened up to these practices.   
But the practice of articulating such a demand in 
Kyoto is also made problematic by local constraints 
on protest in public.   
Contours of the public sphere
Let’s turn now to look for the discursive and 
practical contours of public sphere participation in 
Kyoto and in Japan before we continue the task of 
locating where Korean residents fit into (or are 
excluded from) this.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Contours of the public sphere —96—“Priority will be given to basic
aspects that are regarded as essen-
tial for future citizens, and educa-
tion will be enhanced to give full
scope to individuality. In addition,
consistency in the curriculum for
each subject area among different
school levels, from kindergarten
through upper secondary school,
should be ensured.”
(Monbusho 1994)
The idea that this (national, pater-
nalist) educational institution
should instill “individuality” was
first presented in 1985 (after many
years of study).  Fourteen years
later virtually nothing in the cur-
riculum has changed to promote
this notion.  But “consistency”
has always been maintained.
Outside of the schools, the state, at various lev-
els, continues to provide inputs into civic identity 
through state-run and state-controlled media, from 
television and radio, to newspapers, pamphlets, and 
fliers distributed door-to-door.  Questions about the 
influence of the state over “private” media corpora-
tions—television networks and newspapers—are 
beyond the scope of this work1.   Until just recently, 
the Japanese consumer has not been provided with 
broadcast media sources of information originating 
outside of Japan.  In part, this is due to Japan’s reliance 
on the Japanese language, which offers few interna-
tional inputs, although programming for the Japanese 
market is now underway in Australia and elsewhere.  
Foreign language learning in Japan, a multi-billion yen 
business, is notoriously ineffective in terms of verbal 
ability (despite six years of required English in public 
pre-college schools, and more years of college English, 
Japan ranks low [46th in 1994] in national TOEFL 
scores).  
However, the market for Japanese translations of 
foreign books is also huge, and works in French or 
German are often available in Japanese translation in 
Japan long before they appear in English translation in 
the United States.  The growth of the internet and 
direct satellite television will give the Japanese con-
sumer sources of information and knowledge outside 
1. What is easily noted in this regard is the careful lack of critique concerning the imperial 
family, and the imperial system, and the fact that foreign governments that object to stories 
in “private” Japanese newspapers or television find it convenient and effective to complain 
to the Japanese government. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Information overload —97—of the control or “guidance” of Japanese ministries.
Information overload
Government publications continually stress the 
government’s subservience to the desires of the popu-
lation, a position supported by polls verifying “public 
opinion” in support of their programs.   
The City of Kyoto publishes a 
free monthly magazine as well as 
















of charge to 
every mailbox, as well as being reported on by the 
Japanese press.  
Such commissions may take several years to 
attain a recommendation on their topics1, but in the 
interim, the state can announce that the problem is 
under study.    This glut of government-supplied infor-
1. A government commission on education reform, after long deliberation, in 1985 presented 
the opinion that Japan needed to foster “individual creativity.”  The Ministry of Education 
responded that any curriculum changes would require at least twenty years to implement.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Information overload —98—mation (which is not, however, information about the 
government, apart from applauding the services it 
provides the public) adds to the Overcoding, Coding, and 
Recoding of public spaces as places managed by the 
government...with access allowed to the public.   
One outcome of the pervasive narrative of meri-
tocracy—a story that the system under which all Japa-
nese citizens live (Koreans and other foreigner 
citizens do not have entry into this system) places the 
best people into positions of power, and that, from 
the vantage point of their chosen/elevated (erai) posi-
tion, everything that can be done on behalf of the lives 
and life-styles and the future of “We Japanese” is, of 
course, being done—is the assumption that the ken of 
people in executive positions is necessarily greater 
than that of the average citizen.  
This story also hints that the rest the nation—the 
great majority who have neither the responsibility nor 
the perspective that only those who are in positions 
of power can acquire—cannot understand fully the 
circumstances that need to be understood in order to 
assemble an informed opinion.  For this reason, all of 
the necessary opinions are somewhere being formed  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—place holding —99—and will find expression1 at the appropriate time.  
Because virtually all of these times and their expres-
sions take place in Tokyo, Kyoto (like other non-Tokyo 
Japanese cities) plays a greatly reduced role in national 
debates over policy.
1. This delegation of opinion, of expression, explains both the silence below and the silence 
above: the reluctance of citizens to organize groups that propose national counter expres-
sions; and the hesitancy of public officials from openly commenting on important issues.  
This silence leaves the space of expression open to others, but only those with the right 
credentials.  For example, academics, preferably from one of the national universities, may 
become regular guests on television talk shows, where they speak from a position of 
(learned) authority while not having to claim responsibility to a political process.  These are 
also courted by the national government as members of advisory committees that are 
formed to study vexing social issues.
place holding
Kyoto Prefecture’s glossy Kyou 
magazine is one of several media 
that local governments use to 
keep the citizenry informed about 
various government programs and 
services.  The cover of this 
month’s issue presented the 
County’s “gift” to Kyoto for the 
City’s 1200th anniversary:  
mounted police in pseudo-Prus-
sian uniforms.  Posters of these 
police were also widely posted.  
Whether or not Kyoto needed this 
gift was a matter of some debate.  
I overheard one comment to the 
effect, “Just what we need. We 
ask for a fancier life-style 
(seikatsu) and we get fancier cops 
(keisatsu).”  The title “Kyou” in 
Roman letters elides the hom-
onym for the kyou of Kyoto (actu-
ally “kyouto:” the place) and the 
word “kyou” which means 
“today.”
This type of 
practice is a 







sive spaces.  
Place-holding 
is most obvi-
ous when the 
government 
has nothing to 
say on a topic,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—place holding —100—but still stresses that it will have something to say 
sometime later.  
A recent posting to the “Dead 
Fukuzawa Society” internet list 
noted that in Japan everything that 
is not regulated, everything that 
does not have some governmental 
rule, is impossible.  In the US, to 
the contrary, he noted that every-
thing that is outside of govern-
ment regulation is fair game.  In 
my work with the Korean Minis-
try of Culture and Sports, I have 
noted the former also holds in 
Korea.  The idea of expression 
outside of government control is 
itself unthinkable.
Place holding also occurs when the government 
creates “government-sponsored non-government 
organizations”1: organizations that might have been 
otherwise created within civil society, except that this 
space has been already taken by the state.  Kyoto 
City’s new Institute for World Human Rights, created 
as a part of the City’s 1200th anniversary year cele-
bration, acquires resources and visibility that an inde-
pendent organization would need massive amounts of 
capital to match.  
So too, the city-founded League of Historical Cit-
ies (formerly the “World Conference of Historical 
Cities”) includes Kyoto as one of 25 historical cities in 
the world—a designation that UNESCO would later 
deny Kyoto after reviewing the current condition of 
the cityscape.
1. I have been told that in Indonesia this term is actually used. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—place holding —101—Kyoto’s new mounted police were 
poster material for the national 
fall traffic safety campaign: “the 
1200 year of Kyoto’s building: 
[Let’s have]  everybody show 
Kyoto’s traffic manners.”
Out on the streets, 
the holidays, which 
are fairly numerous 
in Japan (due prima-
rily to the fact that 
each new Emperor 
gets one), offer 
instances of “time-
holding.”  Apart from 
“Golden Week” (a 
springtime multiple-
day national holiday 
that serves as the 
only real vacation 
that many Japanese 
will ever take), the other national holidays tend to be 
occupied by state-sponsored events that can, of 
course, be ignored (you can stay home), but not easily 
countered.   “Sports Day” and “Culture Day” (both 
formerly Imperial birthdays) are holidays when the 
City’s apparatus goes to work overtime providing ath-
letic meets and public plazas where the city’s politi-
cians are conspicuous amid a potpourri of cultural 
offerings.  There are no competing events of any size 
on these days, no counter-articulations for the holiday.
“Space-holding” is particularly noticeable in 
Kyoto, due to the lack of public open spaces.  Apart 
from scattered tiny play areas (usually a swing-set and 
a sand box) and a couple larger open areas near the 
river, there is a lack of spaces available for un-managed  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—place holding —102—physical play in Kyoto.  Schoolyards are locked after 
school, and university grounds are never available to 
the general public.  The City continues to build sports 
facilities (pools, and courts) that it operates in an 
organized manner, but it refuses to create spaces that 
can simply, without prior approval, be acquired for 
casual play.  
This City of Kyoto’s Housing 
Bureau pamphlet describes its 
plans to create open spaces within 
the city: plans that call on neigh-
bors to replace their current hous-
ing with high-rise housing that 
sits on only part of the reclaimed 
space.  The cover displays the 
City’s current modest achieve-
ments in this effort, a program 
marked by a lack of funding, a 
lack of regulatory constraints, and 
a lack of commitment by the City 
to use city property for open 
space.  NOTE: the space on the 
upper right (with the red 
umbrella) was recently redesigned 
to prevent homeless persons from 
sleeping under the umbrella.
Open civic spaces 
are also in short sup-
ply.   The open space 
in front of the City 
Hall has become a 
parking lot.  Private 
residences and com-
mercial buildings are 
constructed to the 
edge of the sidewalk 
(or to the street 
where no sidewalk 
was designated) without setback regulations that 
would open up space for public use.  And where there 
are openings in this wall of inaccessible space, most of 
these are memorials to an Imperial person or event, 
or gateways to religious spaces (Shinto shrines or 
Buddhist temples)—spaces guarded either by custom 
or by actual guards (or both) against appropriation as 
a place for resting or conversation.
The street in Kyoto is devoted to auto and truck 
traffic.  Despite the fact that many of the streets were 
designed with only pedestrian traffic in mind, there  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Who controls Saturday? —103—are few places and times where automobiles are not 
allowed.  Even the City’s own festivals make room for 
traffic today.  Decisions about traffic are made by the 
City, and so here too, the City chooses to hold the 
space of the street for a use it controls.  
Who controls Saturday?
One of the most visible features of time-holding, 
and government/industry cooperation in Japan is the 
continuation of the six-day school week and six-day 
work week.  Saturdays in Japan are not days when 
families gather for their own recreation, or where 
children play in public parks (assuming these are avail-
able).  Saturdays are work days and school days, 
although the Saturday curriculum is somewhat less 
demanding than the other days.  However, this prac-
tice of late seems less and less in step with the gov-
ernment’s own proclaimed goal of creating a “leisure 
society,” and is also out of step with other nations that 
Japan desires to have as its international partners (e.g., 
the G7 nations).  And so, for more than a decade, the 
Ministry of Education (monbusho) has agonized over 
how to solve this problem; in its own words:
“Introduction of the five-day school week requires substantial changes to an educational frame-
work that is firmly established in society. The impact that these changes will have on schools, families,
and communities must therefore be considered comprehensively.
The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture accordingly established the Consultative Com-
mittee for Research and Surveys Regarding New School Management and Related Matters Necessi-
tated by Social Change. This panel, organized within the Ministry, consisted of people from various
fields. It conducted in-depth studies of the issues involved and in February 1992 issued a report on
its deliberations, in which it expressed the view that a smooth transition to the five-day school week
could best be achieved by first introducing a monthly five-day school week and then proceeding to
the next stage after resolving any problems that might arise during the initial phase. In line with this TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Who controls Saturday? —104—recommendation, the Ministry introduced a monthly five-day school week, with schools closed on
the second Saturday of the month. The new system was implemented in the second term of the 1992
school year.” (monbusho homepage: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN EDUCATION, SCI-
ENCE AND CULTURE 1994, PART I ,Chapter 2).
The Ministry’s admonition that its own six-day 
school week is so “firmly established” in society that 
the consequences of simply switching  to a five-day 
week required monumental pre-consideration might 
also be seen as its own reluctance to give up control 
over Saturday.  The Ministry itself created the six-day 
school week earlier in this century.  And a simple deci-
sion to close schools on Saturdays is certainly within 
its purview.
“Introduction of the five-day
school week involves the struc-
tural reform of school education,
which will affect the public in
various ways. Therefore it is nec-
essary to seek the understanding
not only of schools, families, and
communities but also of various
other sectors of society. The Min-
istry of Education, Science and
Culture is taking this aspect into






1994, PART I ,Chapter 2).
Its own solution to this problem, the release of 
students on only one Saturday a month beginning in 
pilot schools in 1992, has probably created more 
problems than an outright abolishment of Saturday 
schooling would have, because it put the parents of 
these children into a conflict between their roles as 
parents and guardians and their continuing duties in 
their jobs: and without sufficient justification for them 
to demand changes in their work schedule to accom-
modate their need to stay at home on Saturdays.    
And so, many children were left home from school on 
Saturdays without parental supervision, and some of 
parents of these children have asked that the schools 
resume classes on every Saturday.  This predictable 
negative reaction permits the ministry’s ill-conceived 
implementation of what should be a straightforward 
reform to serve as an alibi for those who seek to 
maintain the government/industry hold on Saturdays.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Who controls Saturday? —105—In its defense, the Ministry has conducted surveys 
of the opinions of students, teachers, and parents, and 
recorded (to its own satisfaction) a general confusion 
about the move to a five-day week.   As it provided 
the multiple-choice answers it wished to hear, these 
surveys have predictable outcomes, and are useful to 
the Ministry in defense of its decisions.   
BELOW: one of the Ministry’s charts, based on its own survey, from the Monbusho homepage.
 Instead of coordinating the release of Saturdays 
as public holidays from work and school with the 
other ministries that exert “administrative guidance” 
over Japan’s industries with the aim of fostering a 
space where this reform would lead to an actual 
increase in free time for families in Japan, the Ministry 
of Education couched this reform as a potential threat 
to the established “life rhythm” of Japanese children.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Who controls Saturday? —106—And so, while the institutions that hold onto Saturday 
in Japan and Kyoto have little obvious difficulty in 
cooperating to maintain this, they are stymied when it 
comes to cooperating in relinquishing this control.
The problem created by place-holding, space-
holding, and time-holding is that this preempts alter-
native practices in these places, spaces and times.   
With public places, times, and discursive spaces 
already filled by the spectacular production of the 
state, counter-practices are pushed into the margins.
“Guided by an aesthetic, desensi-
tized approach to politics, Musso-
lini conceived the world as a
canvas upon which to create a
work of art, a masterpiece com-
pletely neglectful of human val-
ues.  I would argue that fascism’s
conception of aesthetic politics
here reveals its truly totalitarian
nature”
(Falasca-Zamponi [in press], 13).
 And when the state brings to bear multiple 
resources—when it controls mass media outlets and 
levels of bureaucratic interventions into individual 
lives—then a ubiquitous hegemonic narrative 
becomes possible, and space and time may congeal 
into a single nationalized space/time.  This collapse 
into a singularity of narrative and national interest (as 
managed by the state) is today mostly attributed to 
modern totalitarian regimes, such as Nazi Germany or 
Fascist Italy—or Pre-War Japan.   Under these circum-
stances the state so colored public space and time 
that counter-practices could find no neutral ground 
from which to articulate alternative visions.  There 
were no alternatives but sedition.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—discourse, discussion, and dissent —107—“More than any other type of role,
hierarchal roles depend on the
shielding of backstage rehearsals,
practice, and relaxations.
...Judges, lawyers, and political
leaders similarly try to shield their
backstage areas. The greater the
ability to hide the time and effort
needed to maintain a high status
role or rest from it, the greater
one's seeming power and omnipo-
tence”
 (Meyerowitz 1985, 64-5).
During its post-war recovery, under the gover-
nance of essentially the same institutions that held 
power before the war, but stripped of its military pre-
occupations (although its defense budget belies this 
lack of military power), Japan did little to alter this 
form of governmentality, which, after all, had taken it 
to the brink of global military power.  Fronting its new 
pacifist constitution to the world, the nation turned to 
economic renewal as its primary task.   But internally, 
despite the various openings that the American occu-
pation, demilitarization, land reform, and the new con-
stitution provided, the state-nation, centered, as 
before, in its bureaucratic institutions, consolidated its 
position as the source of  authorizing power on the 
topic of things Japanese.
discourse, discussion, and dissent
Before I continue to talk about 
“being Korean” in Kyoto, I will 
explore briefly some of the con-
tingencies of identity formation in 
Kyoto, particularly the inescap-
ably present narratives of “We 
Japanese.”
The hegemony of the state over space and time in 
cities like Kyoto is again maintained by the overcoding 
of the practices it supports through the use of 
national narratives that reposition alternative articula-
tions as “anti-Japanese.”   But this is not rarely articu-
lated in these terms.  Instead one finds the obverse:  
“We Japanese don’t do such and such.”   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—discourse, discussion, and dissent —108—“A free city for international cul-
tural exchange is one where peo-
ples of any country may assemble
freely and in peace, regardless of
race, creed or social system, for
the purpose of cultural exchange.”
Kyoto Declaration
In the 1970s Kyoto’s government
declared the city open to cultural
exchange.  By this they hold a
position in the discourse on
“internationalization,” a position
hollowed by their refusal to hire
foreign residents to city or prefec-
tural positions.
 This coloring of the space of discourse—this 
mapping of national symbolic onto a space that is only 
national because of this mapping—eliminates the cru-
cial zone where public discourse can occur without 
this being labeled “dissent.”  While discourse in a pub-
lic sphere may lead to forms of active, and radicalized 
dissent (e.g., sedition), the public sphere itself (as 
such) cannot survive unless it also opens up to 
reforms that are constructed within the dominant 
space of discourse.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—discourse, discussion, and dissent —109—In 1993, the Japanese Govern-
ment was forced to allow foreign 
rice imports because of a harvest 
shortfall.  But the last thing the 
Government apparently wanted 
was to give the Japanese con-
sumer a taste for high-quality for-
eign-grown rice, which sells on 
the open market for about a tenth 
of the price of good quality Japa-
nese-grown rice.  So they 
imported large quantities of mid-
quality long-grain rice from Thai-
land1, and mixed this with the 
other rice they imported.  The 
resulting blend was difficult to 
cook consistently, and it was a 
poor ingredient for sushi.  This 
government pamphlet (on the 
right), “Cooking points on how to 
steam delicious imported rice,” 
emphasized the many essential 
differences between Japanese and 
other rice, but did little to resolve 
the problem of cooking this.  It 
finally recommended putting a lot 
of sauce on the stuff to cover its 
strange taste.
1. The Thailand Government bristled at the bad press the Thai rice received in Japan, and 
noted that the Japanese Government had purchased an inferior grade of rice.  After a few 
months, pure Thai rice (the only imported rice that was not blended) literally could not be 
given away in supermarkets, and, when the next harvest arrived, the Japanese Govern-
ment exported tons of this to Africa as foreign aid.
When the state fills 
the media with con-
structed opinions of 
its own programs it is 
holding the place 
where an indepen-
dent opinion might be 
found in other cir-
cumstances.  There 
may be actually noth-
ing to say, apart from 
an assertion that 
“those persons with the most information and the 
best minds are considering the problem.”  But this 
assertion takes the place of other statements, which 
must be considered premature until the government 
findings are announced.  
The inputs that the state has into population life-
style goals and expectations hold the place in the “cul-
tural imagination” (or the “cultural imaginary” as 
Stallybrass and White call this [1986, 193]) that might 
have been occupied either by individuated imagina-
tions, or by competing ones provided by other 
sources, by capitalism, say, or religious institutions.   
Often, the state answer questions it has, itself, raised, 
or tries to push other questions into more manage- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—discourse, discussion, and dissent —110—able directions.  
The cover of a pamphlet entitled 
“tegami” [letter], the City of 
Kyoto, as a part of what it calls its 
Human Rights campaign [jinken 
kyanpeen], encourages people to 
send more letters to one another.  
The inside back cover text reads: 
“From me to you, a message of 
love” and it recounts the five 
example letters the pamphlet con-
tains: letters between parents and 
children when they are apart, or to 
a favorite friend or someone sick, 
or from a Resident Korean 
woman to a sympathetic former 
elementary school teacher.
Robertson’s (1991) 
work on the Naka-
sone government’s 
national cultural policy 
of “furusato-zukuri” 
[“hometown mak-
ing”] describes how 
the government, fors-
eeing undesirable cul-
tural effects from 
Japan’s rapid urbanization—namely a severing of the 
most pervasive thread of  Nihonjinron, that of an inti-
mate tie to the land—sought to prevent this through a 
reattachment of younger Japanese to the places where 
they or where their parents had been born.    
“‘Old villages’ are presumed to
have existed in harmonious tran-
quility until vitiated and transmo-
grified by outside forces—such as
westernization, industrialization,
and urbanization.  In the furusato-
zukuri literature, change for the
worse is described as precipitated
by external agents.  Change for
the better, on the other hand, is
presented as a wholly Japanese
undertaking, a rallying against
intrusive foreign agents.
(Robertson 1991, 29)
Many of those who ventured back to their furu-
sato were simply reminded of the many reasons that 
compelled them (or their parents) to leave.   For 
urbanization in Japan has had many adverse effects 
upon rural communities.  And as a counter-cosmopol-
itan strategy, the program had virtually no discernible 
effect after ten years.  And the strength of the Japa-
nese currency of late has, instead pushed hundreds of 
thousands of Japanese tourists into international travel 
circuits.
Cultural and social programs at the national and 
local governmental level, programs undertaken by the 
state specifically to correct the attitudes of the popu-
lation in relation to some identified problem, rarely  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—discourse, discussion, and dissent —111—view the workings of the state itself as a part of the 
problem.  When the City of Kyoto advertises its “365 
days [a year] human rights campaign” with messages 
that offer paternalist advice on how everyone should 
act with greater kindness toward each other, it hopes 
to avoid the questions of those who have tallied the 
social and economic circumstances and consequences 
of human rights violations in Kyoto.  
“In the following lectures I will
try to show how governmentality
was born out of, on the one hand,
the archaic model of Christian
pastoral, and, on the other, a dip-
lomatic-military technique, per-
fected on a European scale with
the Treaty of Wesphalia; and that
it could assume the dimensions it
has only thanks to a series of spe-
cific instruments, whose forma-
tion is exactly contemporaneous
with that of the art of government
and which are known, in the old
seventeenth- and eighteenth-cen-
tury sense of the term, as police.
The pastoral, the new diplomatic-
military techniques and, lastly,
police: these are the three ele-
ments that I believe made possible
the production of this fundamen-
tal phenomenon in Western his-
tory, the governmentalization of
the state
(Foucault 1991, 104).”
Place-holding discourses create totalizing mes-
sages, answers that carry with them (and that rein-
force) rationales that are difficult to argue against.  “If 
Japanese individuals held the tight-knit cooperative 
spirit of the ‘Old Village’ and a personal connection to 
the future well-being of their rural hometowns, then 
they would be invested in voluntary service to main-
tain these interests.”  And then the state could rely on 
mass voluntary cooperation with its internal pro-
grams.  And,  “If everyone were nicer to each other, 
human rights abuse would disappear.”  There is thus 
no reason to blame the city for this problem: it is 
veryone’s responsibility.  
Further discussion about the types of knowledge 
and understanding that would allow people to become 
nicer (and not simply act tolerant) toward others, or 
about the government regulations that now allow for 
discrimination—these are not ever included in some 
next step in this discursive process.   There is, in fact, 
no next step, only the next campaign, which will pick 
some other metaphorical message to hold the very 
same place. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Public propriety —112—But these formally announced cultural attitudinal 
campaigns are only the rare discursified tip of a larger 
practical arena, where instruction is provided in the 
home, at the workplace and in school, but where the 
practice is done on the street.  
Public propriety
“...The first Kyowa National Con-
ference, convened in Tokyo in
December 1940,
adopted the following pledge:
1. In accordance with the wishes
of Emperor’s universal benevo-
lence, we pledge to become loyal
Japanese subjects.
2. In accordance with the princi-
ple of the Imperial way, we
pledge to devote ourselves to pub-
lic service.
3. In accordance with the princi-
ple of unity, we pledge to reform
and improve our life style.
The Kyowa project was literally
designed to restructure the souls
of Koreans to conform to an
Imperial Japanese society.
Included in these programs were
the changing of Korean names,
compulsory Shinto worship, and
the learning of Japanese language
and customs.
(Lee 1981a, 162)”
Notions of propriety and civility hold the place in 
the streets where individual and counter-group behav-
iors might find expressions.  Ideas about public 
hygiene, rules for driving autos and riding bicycles, 
expectations of courtesy and of emotional control in 
public are only a few of the many bodily rules that cre-
ate the Public Body in Kyoto, as in any city.   Throughout 
this century, the central government of Japan, perhaps 
more than in any other nation/state of this size (Sin-
gapore is similar in scope, but much smaller in size), 
has chosen to instruct its population on the minutiae 
of correct behavior in public.  
In part this was done to address the severe, class-
linked behavioral semiotics that marked pre-Meiji 
Japan, and can be seen as an effort to include the gen-
eral population (then called heimin, or “equal-people”) 
in behaviors that were formerly excluded to them.  
And in part this was done through a spirit of “mod-
ernization” which also contained new demands for 
bodily discipline (e.g., for factory work).  But the posi-
tion and distinctions of the Japanese nobility (kazoku) 
and gentry (shizoku) were also maintained until after 
WWII, and the manners that were taught to the pop-
ulation, and that are still taught, are essentially behav- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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one’s “superiors” (in social-class, age, occupation, or 
gender).  
“Do former kazoku [nobility]
have any role in democratic Japan
today in relation to the emperor?
It goes without saying that the
kazoku no longer constitute a cen-
tralized force supporting the
throne. Although a large majority
still reside in the capital, and the
clubhouse in the heart of Tokyo,
now called Kasumi Kaikan, pro-
vides a central focus for survivors,
by and large former kazoku are
today more scattered than central-
ized. Nor do they exhibit the pres-
tige associated with the kazoku
status, but rather maintain a low,
cryptic profile and joke about
their having become shin heimin
(“new commoners,” a post-Meiji
name for former outcaste)”
(Lebra 1993, 353).
Of course, some people can afford
to laugh.
So the central logic of manners in public rests on 
these long-established, and now unspoken, hierar-
chies—hierarchies that are most visible at the top (the 
Imperial Household) and at the bottom (persons 
dwelling in buraku areas, and non-Japanese, particu-
larly Koreans).  
As Pharr notes, the more extreme “manners” 
required of the buraku dweller in Tokugawa time, were 
simply one end of a continuum of deference: “If all Jap-
anese, by virtue of being women or junior to others, 
may occasionally find themselves treated unsatisfacto-
rily or oppressively because of attributes that are 
beyond their power to change, burakumin experience 
a far more extreme form of status-based discrimina-
tion. Historically, prejudice toward burakumin often 
denied their humanity entirely; nevertheless, it is 
important to note that such discriminatory treatment, 
while extreme, was on a scale that encompassed all 
deference behavior—for example, whereas in 
Tokugawa times all status inferiors were expected to 
bow deeply to their superiors, for a burakumin this 
meant prostrating oneself before any majority Japa-
nese” (1990 87-88).  
Curiously, one of the markers of low-status in 
Kyoto, levied against kawaramono (people of the river), 
who included indigent laborers, beggars, and other 
dispossessed peoples—including the actors who cre- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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wear indigo-died clothing.  Today, the market for 
brand-name indigo-died jeans in Kyoto puts most peo-
ple under 30 into this type of clothing.
“In fiscal 1993 the Ministry of
Education, Science and Culture
[monbusho] conducted an exhaus-
tive survey on the implementation
of moral education under the new
Courses of Study. The survey cov-
ered public and private elemen-
tary and lower secondary schools
and boards of education through-
out Japan. The results indicate
that almost all elementary and
lower secondary schools have
now drawn up teaching plans for
moral education and are using
supplementary readers, and that
moral education is being pro-
moted both through the subject of
“moral education” and through
school education as a whole.
Japanese Government Policies in
Education, Science and Culture:
1994”
Acting fully within its established pastoral, pater-
nal relationship to these new heimin1, (which it had, 
through its own generosity, created—and without 
democratic interference) the Japanese state began to 
inform its population about the responsibilities and 
behaviors appropriate to citizenship.  “Moral educa-
ion” still occupies a prominent position within public 
education in Japan.
1. At first, buraku dwellers were not included in the heimin status, but they were later added, 
and given the distinction shinheimin (new, equal persons), a word that continued to mark 
their separateness from the general population. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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used to reinforce its image as a 
“world-class” cultural destination 
is through the creation and spon-
sorship of an organization of sis-
ter-cities, based upon a claim to 
historical cultural properties.  And 
in 1994, as a part of its 1200th 
Anniversary celebration, the City 
again hosted the bi-annual meet-
ing of the organization it controls.  
The meeting was held in the Inter-
national Conference Center (a 
building which my son suggested 
may be the world’s best example 
of “Romulan” architecture), and 
its theme was “the wisdom of his-
torical cities.”  This organization 
competes directly with the Orga-
nization of World Heritage Cities, 
[http://www.ovpm.org] which 
includes cities recognized on the 

















ing their bodies at the work site at the end of the 
work day, in public view) was prohibited.  Public toi-
lets were erected to discourage urination on the 
street.  Prostitution was corralled into selected quar-
ters.  Police boxes (koban) were distributed through-




Before WWII, Koreans in Japan, citizens of Japan 
by right of their Korean heritage under Japanese 
“annexation,” were singled out by the Ministry of the 
Interior for corrective socialization, and all were 
forced to join Kyouwa (harmony) Associations (Lee 
1981a, 162).  These took the place of neighborhood 
associations [chounaikai] where similar instructions  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Public propriety —116—about proper behavior were provided to every Japa-
nese citizen.  
However the “Harmony” associations were oper-
ated through the police precincts (as were the con-
trols over prostitution), and were plainly used as a 
means of policing1 the Korean population.  The soci-
ety’s membership card became an identity card that all 
Koreans were forced to carry with them.
1. This intrusive police interaction with their lives is a memory that was not severed after the 
war, when Koreans (and all foreigners) were (and are) forced to carry their foreign resident 
identification at all times.  Foreign residents can be stopped by the police at any time to 
have their identities checked, although this is not currently a common practice.  It remains 
one of those practices that can become more common should the authorities desire this.
“The kyouwakai [Harmony asso-
ciations] opened lecture/film
classes for the ‘general mobiliza-
tion of the national spirit’, classes
on Japanese language, and for
Shinto worship, where Koreans
were [encouraged] to offer their
physical labor (construction or
farming) as a service [to the
Shrine]. There were also classes
on “Japanese Dressing” and on
incorporating Japanese culture
into the daily life of Koreans.”
(Mizuno 1994, 71)
The contents of this involuntary indoctrination 
included a combination of Japanese-style home eco-
nomics, correct manners in public, Japanese-style cer-
emonial customs (marriage and funeral), proper 
attitudes toward the Imperial Household and the 
Imperial State, and also behaviors within Shinto wor-
ship, as well as instruction in the Japanese language.   
Korean children in Japan at that time attended Japa-
nese schools, and no alternative schooling was 
allowed.   But then Japanese children also attended 
Japanese state schools, with no alternative schooling 
allowed.  
The main difference was the position of the Japa-
nese student within the “We Japanese” [warera nihonjin 
ha...]discourse.   The police made sure that the Kore-
ans acted appropriately in public, but they were not 
given the authority to appropriate either the dis-
course of “We Japanese” nor the spaces where this  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
National spaces and identity practices—Public propriety —117—applied.  At least the Japanese children were given a 
participatory narrative of encompassing authority—
however completely this had been delegated to “pub-
lic officials”—and they were, some of them, being 
trained to enter into government service.
Before the War, alternative public behavior, “act-
ing Korean” on the street in Kyoto, and elsewhere, 
was not allowed, and the obligatory instructions were 
provided to ensure that none could escape the expec-
tations placed on proper—Japanese—behavior in pub-
lic.  I contend that this attitude toward the street, as a 
place that is only appropriate for and available for 
appropriation by “Japanese” coded individuals has not 
disappeared either as a program within the State, and 
as a practical expectation on the street.   The pres-
ence of non-Japanese tourists and foreign workers is 
made exotic by this, and a much greater load of 
“strangeness” is both applied and expected of these 
“strangers.”
“...There is no binary division to
be made between what one says
and what one does not say; we
must try to determine the different
ways of not saying such things,
how those who can and those who
cannot speak of them are distrib-
uted, which type of discourse is
authorized, or which form of dis-
cretion is required in either case.
There is not one but many
silences, and they are an integral
part of the strategies that underlie
and permeate discourses.”
(Foucault 1990, 27)
In Kyoto, civility is coded through the expecta-
tions that have long been informed through discursive 
regimes practiced at school, in the workplace, and at 
home.  These regimes not only code the behaviors 
that are appropriate, they also overcode the identities 
of those who can perform these behaviors “naturally.”  
Civility describes expectations on behavior in public 
places. (The current, increasingly visible, debate about 
“civility” in the United States, is, at one moment, a 
debate about the voluntary behavior of persons in 
public.)  Civility generally describes the everyday disci- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Public places acquire publicness through many prac-
tices: publicness is inscribed in laws, enforced by regu-
lations, and granted and respected through formal and 
informal practices of those who enter the spaces.  But 
public places are most generally described by the rep-
ertoire of practices that are appropriate within them, 
and by the cohort of individuals who can perform 
these practices.
 The boundaries that exclude persons or groups 
from participating in public places are not limited to 
legal definitions of citizenship (for example, when 
land-ownership is a requirement for voting), but are 
created also when discursive fields overcode national 
identity with ethnic background, or when they over-
code appropriate public behavior with sexual gender.
Michel Foucault, in his History of Sexuality (1990), 
described how discursive regimes create silences 
through the application of power (i.e., from a position 
of dominance).  Silence thus becomes as much a part 
of discourse as are discursive practices such as texts, 
and these practices must also be studied in order to 
reveal the silences they produce and require.   
What are discursive “regimes”?  These are institu-
tions that have an interest in positioning themselves 
(and their messages, their codes) within a discursive 
field.  They achieve a position of dominance, I submit, 
by speaking in a manner that overcodes the space of 
the discourse (See: Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding).  
By inserting the logic of an authoritative dis- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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content of potentially unrelated discourses—such as 
expectations on public behavior—an institution, say,  a 
national school system, can overcode the latter with 
the former, creating a discursive regime that links 
manners with national identity.  
When behaviors in public are marked as “prop-
erly Japanese,” alternative behaviors (and all behav-
iors1 by persons who are not visibly “Japanese,” such 
as Europeans) acquire an unmarked, and unspoken 
“not-Japanese” connotation.   Alternative behaviors 
may be seen as “wrong”, or “bad” as well.  But they 
are also inextricably “non-Japanese.”  And counter dis-
courses about behaviors in public are forced into a 
position of first challenging the legitimacy of dominant 
institutions to be arbiters of “things Japanese,” before 
they can even begin to articulate counter-practices.  
This overcoding of the street as a space peculiar 
to, and only properly appropriated by  those who can 
claim membership in the group “We Japanese,” 
silences the expressive imagination of those who do 
not include themselves into this designation.   
Together, the strategies of “place holding” and “over-
coding” result in a hegemony of representation over 
the articulation of how and by whom public spaces in 
Kyoto can be appropriated.  These discourses have 
1. In a recent (1996) show on Japanese television, the Japanese commentator was interview-
ing the proprietor of a restaurant in Tokyo. The proprietor was from India, but he spoke 
absolutely fluent Japanese.  After the interview, the commentator expressed the opinion, “I 
prefer it when foreigners use non-fluent Japanese.”  Attempts by non-Japanese to master 
behaviors that have been overcoded as Japanese will always fail for this reason. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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assistance from Shinto organizations and from indus-
try.  
Today the main threat to this status quo comes 
not from counter-state groups, such as civil-society 
organizations, but from the internationalist, and con-
sumerist discourses of the Japanese capitalist market: 
i.e. from the growing transnational market-state .  
And today it is exclusion from the latter, from the 
means of accumulating capital or acquiring highly val-
ued life-style commodities, that marks the central 
exclusionary effect of racial discrimination against 
Koreans living in Kyoto.  But to gain access to the 
market, they must first recode the popular imagina-
tion that preserves the public sphere (such as this is) 
in Kyoto for persons of ethnic Japanese descent.
Kyoto’s large-scale urban events serve as specta-
cles for the national cultural education trade (adult 
tourists, having “been-there and done-that” in school, 
rarely make a return trip to Kyoto).  These events, in 
content so very similar to other urban events in Japan 
(they have copied one another for centuries), and in 
form, so completely scripted that one never needs to 
see them more than once, are repeated each year not 
to create a presence in the present, but to evoke the 
phantasms of a nationalized past—a past where the 
ghosts of victims of imperial rule should have van-
ished, except that they are also preserved through the 
spectacles of imperial (and post-imperial) rule.   The 
continuing presence of a “Korean” population in  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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non phantasmagoric ongoing imperial event in the city 
today.  Only since 1993 has a group on the margin 
challenged this national hegemonic hold on Kyoto’s 
self image.  And here is the story of Kyoto, of this out-
sider group, and of the event that puts them into the 
center for one afternoon every year. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—recoding the strange —122—Local Spaces and Counter-identities
recoding the strange
HERE is a description of the his-
torical connections between the 
space that became Kyoto and that 
of the Korean Peninsula.  This 
description looks only briefly at 
the major contours of this connec-
tion before it moves to  more 
recent attempts to manage this 
past within narratives of national-
ism.  These narratives are the pri-
mary myths (alibis) that 
legitimate the continuing separa-
tion of those persons who are 
native to Kyoto—but who are 
called “Korean”—and others 
who are native to Kyoto and who 
are hailed as “Japanese.” 
It is against the current construction of Japanese 
national identity and nationalized sites of culture that 
the zainichi Korean community in Higashi-kujo Kyoto 
directs its counter-public actions.  In particular, the 
target is the notion of uniformity [kakuitsu] within this 
dominant identity, the sense that difference itself is 
wrong (actually, in the Japanese language a most com-
mon word used to mean “wrong” means  “to differ” 
or “to disagree” [chigau]; so too, the word “change” 
[hen] carries the meaning of “strange,” or “suspi-
cious.”).   Culturally, uniformity is tied to the message 
of a shared national/racial/linguistic heritage—which 
results in a predictable (as the story goes) homogene-
ity among Japanese citizens. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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are the order of the day: children
absorb more information even as
cram schools repackage it and test
makers reformulate tests; elec-
tronic bidets and specially
designed shampoo sinks crowd
into nonexistent domestic space
and  impose new standards of
hygiene; taped bird calls provide
instant natural stress relief tele-
phonically.  And for the
unguarded vacant moment, there
will always be the ibento (event),
the festivals of capitalism (which
have incorporated the once tradi-
tionally festivals marking nodes
of agricultural time), the planning
of which has become a much her-
alded growth industry”
(Field, “Resident Korean Litera-
ture...”).
 Today the  construction of uniform identity—
across the entire nation, but here, within Kyoto— uti-
lizes at times a national(ist) narrative of “family” 
(kazoku) as a trope for nation (koku).  This, again, is 
not new: the imperial family and the body of the 
emperor served a similar function in prior times.  As 
we will soon see, the “nation as family” preserves the 
logic of a model form of paternalist family: a feature 
that needs to be remembered when “the family” is so 
presented.
The nation-as-family metaphor fronts the close-
ness of the nation as a whole.  But it also disinherits 
those who cannot claim national  “family” ties.  And it 
also shuns those “children” who are different or who 
would chose not to obey the family’s “father”.   These 
orphaned persons become strange-ers, outsiders 
(gaijin, a general and slightly pejorative term for all for-
eigners).  
interrogating the familial
For a few, estrangement from the “national fam-
ily” brings personal release—an opportunity to 
explore other identities— but for most people in 
Kyoto, the threat of estrangement is a subtle terror.  
Opting-out is always possible for anyone who is within 
the national identity fold, but once out, the way back 
is difficult at best.   However, there is a time between 
childhood and adulthood when some degree of devi-
ance has been institutionalized, and increasingly fetish-
ized as the only period in one’s life when self 
expression (usually group-inspired) is possible.  Many  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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alternative life-styles, including, recently, foreign travel 
in much greater numbers (see: Four years of heaven).  
Those who do not go to college may join in youth 
gangs (see: bosozoku ) for a time.  But by the time of 
adulthood (at twenty years of age) these “anti-social 
measles” infections are expected to have passed.
“Giving that sense of freedom and 
that ‘something’” This ad done 
for the organization of commer-
cial broadcasters, uses a montage 
of world events and Japanese 
events together with an astronaut 
whose identity has been made 
strange by his hair (strangely cut 
and colored) and his eyes (a light 
hazel color).  Is he Japanese?  Of 
course, but of that tribe of young 
Japanese seeking out adventures 
and identities in those few pre-
adult years they have for them-
selves.  “Something, something 
free...” the women sing in 
English.  Increasingly the “some-
thing” Japanese pre-adults are 
seeking leads them out of Japan.
This is also the time when adult buying habits are 
formed, and so Dentsu (the world’s largest advertising 
agency) appeals directly to this age cohort and then to 
nostalgia for this time of life, with commercials that 
show young Japanese acting free and strange. 
“I want to be strange (hen na hito),” one of my 
spouse’s Japanese college students admitted to her.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Spending hours at a tanning salon, he had darkened his 
skin, and he wore tie-died t-shirts with Bob Marley’s 
photo on them.  “I want to be Jamacian.”  He hung 
around reggae bars in Kyoto, and bought all the CD’s 
he could afford.   
“What happens after graduation?” I asked him 
one day.
“I cut my hair and put on a suit,” he admitted, 
with resignation.  After all, he was only playing at being 
strange, using the narrow opening of freedom that 
four years in a Japanese college provides, but knowing 
when to reenter the national “family”.
1. The use of the vegetable dye “henna” to mark one’s desire to be strange (hen na) is a curi-
ous homonym.  Almost all the women in my college classes died their hair into some bru-
nette shade (anything but black), but the red-red look of henna dye was reserved for those 
with picaresque outsider identities.  Juvenile gang members (bosozoku [literally “crazy 
tribe”]) in junior high schools or in vocational high schools do this, as do bohemian types in 
colleges.
Strange by birth Korean’s in Kyoto do not have the luxury of being 
strange by choice.  They have “strangeness” applied to 
them with their Korean names.  They turn strange the 
moment when they become thirteen years of age and 
must by law go to the local city office (kuyakusho) and 
register as Koreans.   In families that are more open 
about their Korean status, their children carry this 
badge of “strangeness” to primary school every day.  
Some carry this off with skill and determination, while 
for others, the strangeness of “being Korean” is some-
thing they would do anything to be rid of.   The litera-
ture about the experience of being Korean in Japan,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—Moments of Being Korean in Kyoto —126—particularly during childhood years, is characterizable 
by a common narrative thread of moments of black 
despair.  And more than one zainichi Korean in 
Higashi-kujo spoke to me of suicidal moments, and 
relatives who had chosen this alternative.
Moments of Being Korean in Kyoto
In 1994, for the anthropology meetings in Atlanta, 
I wrote a list of the various identity  “moments” that 
the Koreans I met in Kyoto had described to me as 
occasions where their Koreanness was most deeply 
evident to them.  Let me repeat these briefly:
Being Korean under Japanese colonial rule; 
being quasi-Japanese under the American occupation; 
being non-Japanese when Japanese government war-time compensation plans were determined; 
being “North” Korean when the South makes peace with Japan (without compensation for resi-
dent Koreans in Japan), or; 
being “South” Korean on your passport when the North builds schools in Japan (the only escape
from the Ministry of Education’s walloping dose of pure-Japanese cultural content); 
being Japanese-enough not to know the Korean language well enough to talk with newcomers
from Korea, or having learned Korean in a North Korean school, and so failing the Japanese govern-
ment test that would allow you to be a tourist guide for Koreans, because your accent is wrong; 
being informed enough to despise the unnatural process of naturalization in Japan; 
being disconnected in a city where lives and livelihoods are built on connections—and also hav-
ing no connections to give to your children;
being a buraku dweller in a city where people make this sigma stick;  
being old and finally beyond most of the fears that have marked your everyday life, except for
that of poverty, because being Korean means being locked out of the government pension system
you have been paying into for decades—and also seeing your children and grandchildren kept out of
schools, businesses, condominiums, and marriages, or; 
being young, and learning to labor instead of study, and wanting all the things that they show on
television, but you can’t come close t o affording them;  
being told that discrimination is illegal and the problem is being resolved, but watching as the Jap-
anese government sets up a program to bring in “pure-blood Japanese” laborers from South America,
while you work at three part-time jobs to scrape by;
being tired of being shut out of social or economic interaction with Japanese, and so trying to TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—The outcome is silence —127—pass using some Japanese name, and getting found out and being exposed;
being told by your parents to never break the rules, to never give them a reason to say you did
whatever it was you did because you are Korean;
being proud of being Korean despite not knowing what this means apart from it signifying a dan-
gerous other within yourself; 
being an “alien,” above all, in and to the city of your birth.  
“Surrounded by magnificent
hills, Kyoto with her poetry
reflects the changing of the sea-
sons, and has provided over the
last twelve centuries a natural cra-
dle for the art and culture of
Japan, and a noble heritage for her
people. For this reason Kyoto is
known as the spiritual home of the
Japanese people; it is said that
without knowing Kyoto, it is
impossible to understand the real
Japan. But on the other hand,
Kyoto is not only an old, former
capital but also a modern city anx-
ious to develop new culture based
on a precious inheritance. Kyoto
is now flourishing as the center of
traditional industries, art, scholar-
ship and religion”
Kyoto city tourist info webpage.
http://www.rain.org/~matsuri/
Kyontct.html/#8..
These are some of the moments of being that roll 
through the resident Korean community in Higashi-
Kujo Kyoto.  Some of them reflect Japan’s colonizing 
history.  Other moments occur today on a daily basis.   
Many of these are moments that might connect them 
to other dislocated individuals in other cities around 
the world.  At each moment, the individual must face a 
locally applied identity: “You Koreans...”.  And there 
are more Koreans in Kyoto than one might guess and 
more than the City can even begin to officially ignore, 
although it also seems uneasy1 with the fact that they 
are, by far, the most prevalent population of interna-
tional residents within Kyoto.    With the advent of the 
Madang, there are new moments, a few of which I 
managed to share with members of the community: 
Madang night.
1. A few years ago, the city’s ‘international”  office stopped giving out the percentages of pop-
ulations of foreign residents in its foreigner’s “Guide to Kyoto.”
The outcome is silence
The Korean identity moments that resident Kore-
ans face at home, on the street, and in schools, are 
not shared with the remainder of the city’s population, 
(which has other moments, coded in other ways).  
And so, each moment takes the individual away from 
that shared feeling of belonging that is so assiduously  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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consumer identity moments and desires flow over all 
boundaries in Japan, but again are shared unequally 
because of ethnic, class, and gender domination in this 
arena.  Resident Koreans are more likely than most to 
find themselves on the silenced subject end of the 
domination of money as a means of expression.  
“Consensus is a horizon that is
never reached....”
(Lyotard 1984, 61).
“Abstract space, the space of the
bourgeoisie and of capitalism,
bound up as it is with exchange ...
depends on consensus more than
any space before it”
(Lefevbre 1991, 57)
“The 'normal' exercise of hege-
mony in the area which has
become classical, that of the par-
liamentary regime, is character-
ized by the combination of force
and consensus which vary in their
balance with each other, without
force exceeding consensus too
much.”
(Jenks 1993, 83).
Later in this chapter I will be discussing how the 
international market place is working in an increas-
ingly oblique manner to the aims of programs for 
national(ist) identity formation, and how individuals 
may be able to find a space in this divide for counter 
expressions.  But first, I need to complete this intro-
duction to the application of notions of homogeneity, 
and a resulting uniformity of identity/behavior that is 
the main source for the social exclusion of resident 
Koreans (and other foreign residents) in Kyoto.  All 
activist groups—consumerist and ecology advocates, 
feminists, and groups of Koreans—make their counter 
positions against this façade of a uniform consensus. 
the apparatuses of normality
This “consensus,” which is warranted mainly 
through the silence of complaint or dissent, is tied to 
a narrative of sharing—a shared history, ecology, 
heredity, and suffering by a population which is autho-
rized to self-identify as “Japanese.”  And this narrative 
is supported by institutional practices that are pro-
vided to a citizenry that is always within the ready 
reach of the state.  
 The notion of an inherent uniformity of being and  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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beginning with “We Japanese...” is certainly of a kind 
that is promoted in many states as a positive expres-
sion of shared patriotic belonging. 
“On December 18, Kyoto City
unveiled the [Kyoto Action Plan],
a compilation of activities to be
launched by the 1999 (Heisei 11)
fiscal year. Made up of 216
projects, the [Kyoto Action Plan]
is central to Mayor Masumoto's
strategy for 'building a bridge to
21st-century Kyoto' during his
first 4-year term in office. The
general cost of the plan will be
550 billion yen [about US $5 bil-
lion ]. It has three cardinal pro-
grams: 'Kyoto Vibrant,' 'Cheerful
& Vibrant City Office,' and 'Grand
Vision for 21st-century Kyoto.'
Together, the programs focus on
five areas: people, city, industry,
culture and nature. Mayor Masu-
moto declared his wish to invigo-
rate Kyoto using this plan, and
announced it would be identified
with the catch phrase 'People-




 “We Americans believe in freedom” is a phrase 
no US Senator would hesitate to repeat.   Elsewhere 
(Caron 1997) I have discussed the general problematic 
of desiring to belong to modern “population cohorts,” 
uch as national populations—a desire signalled by the 
enthusiasm with which statements beginning with “We 
[insert nationality here]...” are spoken.  A desire to 
belong to any group, I suggest, might be better 
directed at groups where some form of mutual trust is 
available.     
In any case, the idea of a singular, communal 
national imagination, which Anderson (1983) 
described as the basis for the formation of modern 
nation-states, is today increasingly inadequate to 
escribe the realities of cosmopolitan transnational-
ism found in most localities—but not, as yet in Japan.  
If there is an exceptional quality about modernity in 
Japan this has been produced by decades of official 
refusal to admit internal heterogeneity.   Few states in 
the world today stake as much of their claim to 
national identity on a history of isolation and separate 
(unique) heredity as does Japan.   
 As Ivy (1995) noted, the “refusals of heterogene-
ity” in Japan are multiple and real:
“Japan emerges as the armature of intense preoccupations with essential national-cultural iden-
tity, continuity, and community that mark and remark it with the signs of totality. The effort to sustain
this totality announces itself in every tourist advertisement, every appeal to ‘home’ (furusato), every TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—the apparatuses of normality —130—assertion that ‘we Japanese are modern, but we have kept our tradition,’ every discourse on public
(Japanese) harmony. This effort to maintain the self-sameness of Japanese culture thus exposes itself
by its denial of social difference—race, ethnicity, class. This denial is not sheerly ideological, for the
policies of the Japanese state and historical contingencies have determined that in fact those differ-
ences are reduced: less than 1 percent of the population of Japan are non-Japanese citizens, so say
the official statistics. There are strong structural, institutional, and legal denials and controls of ethnic
and racial differences; there are refusals of heterogeneity at many levels. While anthropologists and
historians attempt to find difference, resistance, and ambiguity in Japan—and of course any polity as
vast and affluent as Japan must generate differences, if only by negation— there is an equal necessity
to come to terms with what is a powerfully normalizing and standardizing nexus of institutional,
legal, and socio-cultural apparatuses” (26).
“The rate of advance to colleges
and universities for Buraku stu-
dents is about half the national
average.  The high school dropout
rate is two to three times higher
among Burakumin  than  non-
Burakumin, and employment and
marriage-related discrimination
against Buraku people are still
common.  Today detective agen-
cies are employed by families and
employers to trace the ancestral
origins of prospective employees
or marriage partners.  Data banks
are maintained and computer lists
of the names of those believed to
be of Buraku origin are secretly
purchased”
(Hirasawa 1992, 5-6).
This situation is mirrored in the
resident Korean neighborhoods.
See also: the politics and seman-
tics of homogeneity
These apparatuses of normality are, again, com-
mon enough elements of what Giddens (1994) has 
called “disembedding” practices of modernity around 
the globe, practices used most rigorously by emerging 
nation-states in creating national spaces out of their 
territories and national populations out of their peo-
ples.  It is crucial, he claims, to see this feature of 
modernization as a “detraditionalizing” practice—even 
when the resulting content is a narrative of tradition-
ality: “The evacuation of local contexts of action—the 
‘disembedding' of activities—can be understood as 
implying processes of intensified detraditionalization. 
We are the first generation to live in a thoroughly 
post-traditional society, a term that is in many ways 
preferable to 'postmodern'. A post-traditional society 
is not a national society—we are speaking here of a 
global cosmopolitan order. ... It is a society... in which 
tradition changes its status. In the context of a global-
izing, cosmopolitan order, traditions are constantly 
brought into contact with one another and forced to 
'declare themselves'” (Giddens 1984, 83).
 Modern states have been “declaring themselves”  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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have not been gentle: racism, colonialism, warfare, and 
genocide have found a place in the declarations of 
nation-contra-nation.  Even the most rational-discur-
sive forums for international affairs (such as the UN) 
have allowed the concept of “national sovereignty” to 
permit a continuance of nation-internal state-spon-
sored practices of racism, colonialism, warfare, and 
genocide.   
The extremes that states must and do go to in 
order to “declare themselves” also serves to show the 
potential imbalance of power that can hold between 
states and their residents.  This imbalance is most evi-
dent in state-nations (see: State-nation modernity),  
where the state’s interests are more complex.  But all 
nations have shared in moments where national iden-
tity, most visibly in patriotic celebrations, but also 
within less visible forms of chauvinism, becomes a 
project of the state.  And this project usually has at its 
central goal the creation of a shared unity of affect 
(See also: orthoposture )—a collective, and reliable 
emotional position among the national population.  
Nationalism has joined with pre-national tradi-
tions (e.g., fundamentalist religions) in an agonistic dis-
cursive project that forces people to “declare 
themselves.”  In an actually “traditional” order, local 
traditions would be so self-evident and ubiquitous—
so utterly normal— that such a declaration would be 
superfluous.   It is only when the ground of tradition 
has been removed from under practices that confes- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Today, life-styles are created in 
counter distinction to this normal-
ity.  Like all fashions, life-styles 
are counter-traditional in con-
tent.  Participation in self-reflex-
ive lifestyle projects creates a 
break with the “traditional life-
style.”
The notion, then, of a “traditional lifestyle” 
becomes oxymoronic when lifestyle becomes reflex-
ively organized, as this is increasingly in late modernity.  
This is why Giddens calls this time a post-traditional 
order.  A reflexive lifestyle is a lifestyle that seeks to 
become ab-normal1,  both formally (by achieving a 
reflexive awareness of normalcy) and in its content 
(by playing with the content of normalcy).  When the 
normal becomes “kitch” it loses its unmarked nor-
malcy.  Here I only want to say that we can expect 
that the projects of the state in promoting a “tradi-
tional lifestyle” are increasingly problematic these 
days.  When linked to a traditional order, state-spon-
sored normalcy is liable to be countered by lifestyle 
projects at all levels.
1. Foucault has called modernity a era of confession, but nobody needs to confess to being 
normal;  rather, the abnormal act, the artificial desire, the transgressive practice is the con-
tent of confession.   A type of normalcy, reconstructed by the state in early modernity, and 
now increasingly with inputs from the market, has acquired the unmarked—unconfess-
able—position where a bricolage of “traditions” once informed daily life.  
deconstructing atarimae  nationalism
There is little one can do to escape Japanese 
national cultural representations within Kyoto.   In 
fact, most of the several million annual tourists (and 
most of these on organized school trips from other 
Japanese cities) are there to indulge in this local/
national spectacle  The calendar and streets are clut-
tered with events and places that remind resident and 
tourist alike of Kyoto’s place in the nation of Japan.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Japanese at all, in a place where all is the minimum—
for there are no hyphens1 in Japan—these inclusive 
Japanese events merely highlight their exclusion.  This 
exclusion works on many levels.
I introduce here a work of Nihonjinron  that I 
use as an example of the model for uniform identity 
formation in post-War Japan.  Here is JAPAN was pub-
lished in1964 by members of a generation that had 
experienced World War II and its post-War economy.  
It prescribes the roles of the next, post-War genera-
tion, the generation blessed to live in a Japan that had 
already achieved industrial miracles.   The nation is 
now (1997) at the point where the third generation of 
post-War population—those born after 1985— is 
reaching its teen years, and this new generation will 
face a future where a slow growth economy, an ageing 
society (Japan’s birth rate is annually among the lowest 
in the world), and transnational culture (by 1999 
Japan’s cable television will grow from three channels 
to more than 300) are central lifestyle features.   
Here is Japan was published five years after mass 
protests against the government’s renewal of the secu-
rity treaty with the US had failed to alter Japan’s offi-
1. While various groups in the U.S. are now dropping the hyphen (such as African-American) 
as marking them as a subgroup of a higher level “American” (while adding terms such as 
“European American” to mark the history of European migration as one among many) 
Koreans in Japan have not even achieved a status that would permit them to add “Korean-
” to “Japanese.”  It would be interesting to see if a move away from “resident Korean” (zain-
ichi kankoku/chosenjin) toward a Korean Japanese (kankoku/chosen nihonjin) would be 
possible. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Japanese to live in a harmony that is at once the out-
come of their mutual ecological and genetic heritage, 
and also the means to continued prosperity.  In Japan, 
the “’60s” was a time when the government ministries 
succeeded in destroying the last of the adversarial 
labor unions, replacing these with “company” unions 
where “harmony” with management was the watch-
word.  By 1970, in the middle of the Vietnam War, 
when the mutual security treaty was again up for 
renewal, opposition to this had become only window-
dressing for the state, a sign that opposition was 
allowed in democratic Japan.  And by 1990, the only 
noises of opposition heard in Tokyo were the ear-split-
ting loudspeaker trucks of right-wing gangsters who 
could extort cash from politicians by threatening to 
either praise or vilify them.
“...the LDP [Japan’s Post-War rul-
ing political party] as a whole
regards furusato-zukuri as the
means by which to forge a new
‘cultural state’ (bunka kokka) in
tandem with a ‘new Japanese-
style welfare state’ (‘Nihonsei no
atarashii fukushi kokka’)...”
(Robertson 1991, 26).
I use Here is Japan as an example from a period in 
Japan when the state had first acquired the budgetary 
means to promote national programs aimed at cul-
tural transformations.  These programs included the 
new fast rail lines (shinkansen) that linked many of the 
outlying regions of the nation to Tokyo, and made day-
trips to provincial centers possible.   Such rapid trans-
portation became the vehicle for later programs, such 
as the “Discover Japan” (jisukabaa Japan) campaign of 
the Japanese National Railway, launched in 1970 (Ivy 
1995, 34).  This was the period in which the institu-
tional roots of the later (1980s) “furusato” program 
that Robertson (1991) describes were made. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Here is Japan—the Mother, the Everyman, the Sister, 
the Brother—continue to be one source for personal 
identity formation, even, ironically within the resident 
Korean communities.   I would also suggest that these 
roles are, in large part, the locally constructed variant 
of the model for a bourgeois worker/consumer family 
that is found in many other states.  For decades, tele-
vision programming in the United States was domi-
nated by images of model suburban families (“Leave it 
to Beaver,” “Father Knows Best,” etc.).  Such models 
are not the only ones available, and are subject to par-
ody and ironic reappraisals, but when promoted not 
only by the media, but by a national educational sys-
tem, they acquire a potential hegemonic position 
within the state. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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plays a decisive role....It even has
distributive power and performa-
tive force (it does what it says)
when an ensemble of circum-
stances is brought together. Then
it founds spaces. ...By considering
the role of stories in delimitation,
one can see that the primary func-
tion is to authorize the establish-
ment, displacement or
transcendence of limits”
(de Certeau 1984 123).
Here is Japan was a collaborative
work of governmental, corporate
and academic minds, who sought
to encapsulate the entire story of
Japan’s modernity as an essential-
izing cultural narrative of heredity
(race), community (family), and
ecology.  It is a self-ethnography
and a prime example of a story
that seeks to delimit a space.
Here is JAPAN is helpful in understanding  some-
thing else, something more than the articulation of the 
typical bourgeois family: it speaks also of, and tells an 
authorized story of the nation in terms of the family, it 
articulates the state as a national family.   This is not a 
casual metaphor, but an organizing principle meant to 
explain the proper relationship the state and  its citi-
zens.  Looking at the four roles proper to citizens 
something curious is missing.  Adult males can be 
either “Mr.  Average,” the salaried worker, or “Japan’s 
Brother” the factory worker.  Pre-adult males are 
“Japan’s Hope: the Student” while females here are 
“Japan’s Sister: the Girl” up until they become “Japan’s 
Mother: the Housewife.”  So what is missing here?  
What is not available as a role available to the citizen 
is the most important position in the family: where is 
“Japan’s Father?”  This is the place the state (with 
some, not fully articulated space for the emperor) 
keeps for itself.   From this space the state’s paternal-
ism guides the future of the national family in collabo-
ration with Japan’s industries, which are themselves 
most often likened to families.  But the national family 
does not include everyone who resides on the archi-
pelago of Japan.  And there are no rules and no histo-
ries of adoption into this family. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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of the nation, is still hugely
important. Japan, in a sense,
developed industry in the spirit of
her agricultural past. The ancient
Japanese ideal was to create a
society wherein individuals could
equally share the burdens of
labour and their fruits. This same
spirit infuses the proliferation of
new industries which are chang-
ing the age-old agricultural land-
scape at such a fantastic rate
today.
The structure of even the most
advanced Japanese industries,
therefore, differs somewhat from
their counterparts abroad. The
‘family’ ideal of the old agricul-
tural days—when the ‘family’
embraced the nation as a whole —
imparts an aura of mutual respon-
sibility between worker and
employer even if they are making
electronic computers.”
Here is JAPAN 1964, n.p.
For example, Korean men in Kyoto do not qualify 
to be “Japan’s Mr. Average: the White-collar Man.”  
Companies that hire university graduates for such 
career positions avoid hiring Koreans on various pre-
texts—the competition for these positions is intense 
in any case (women also find themselves excluded).  
Mostly this exclusion is not allowable under labor reg-
ulations, but it is also rare that such practices are suc-
c ssfully challenged in the courts [See also: The courts].   
Public sector jobs at almost every level are closed to 
Koreans and other foreign nationals by laws and regu-
lations that require citizenship for employment—even 
at the city level.  
Korean women in Kyoto cannot hope to become 
“Japan's Mother: the Housewife” as this role is occu-
pied by those whose husbands work in the companies 
that do not hire Koreans.   The luxury of not working 
is virtually non-existent among adults in neighbor-
hoods such as Higashi-kujo.  The realities of low-pay-
ing jobs creates the opposite scenario:  the need to 
keep two or three jobs.   While there are always jobs 
to be had in the service industry1 (however, this could 
change in Japan’s worsening economy), the cost of liv-
ing in Japan is such that the number of hours per week 
one needs to work to maintain a minimal life-style are 
often more than fifty hours.  
1. The lack of persons willing to work for minimum wage (about US$7) in Kyoto has pushed to 
hourly rate at local fast-food stores/restaurants up to $10 or more an hour.  But with the 
cost of living in Kyoto at something greater than twice that of the cost of living in New York 
City, $10 an hour does not go very far.  As one Korean said to me, “You have to be rich to 
be poor in Kyoto.” TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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these circumstances,  may find part-time work in 
Kyoto’s sex industry1 to be their only source of 
employment above the going minimum wage.   Kyoto’s 
sex industry, physically comprising hundreds of  hostess 
bars, lounges, escort services, and “soap-lands” (for-
merly called “turkish baths)2, caters to the likes of 
corporate and government (and male) workers and 
visitors.  The traditional “pleasure quarters” of Kyoto, 
some of which are architecturally preserved today, 
rely more on local haute cuisine (kaiseki ryori) and high 
brow geisha entertainment, and are only proximally 
connected with the establishments that offer varieties 
of sexual attention.
1. While prostitution is illegal in Japan, the laws only cover direct genital-to-genital contact 
(Constantine 1993), and so there are any number of sexual “services” that are perfectly 
legal, and in any case, the possibility of being caught in flagrante are minimal.  Sex parlors 
operate a few meters away from the police box near Shijo-Kawaramachi.  A variety of 
“salons” and hostess clubs offer the championship of young women without necessarily 
leading to a sexual episode, and most women enter this part-time occupation as host-
esses, and only then, and only sometimes, move on to more direct (and more lucrative) 
sexual services. 
2. Kyoto’s many “love hotels” are typically used by couples seeking privacy and fantasy, and 
are the local equivalent to secluded “lover’s lanes” in the US. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—Hypercorrect behavior —139—Hypercorrect behavior
“The derogatory epithet com-
monly used by the Japanese char-
acterizing Koreans as futei senjin
(rebellious Koreans) is said to
have originated in this [colonial]
period.  In the eyes of many Japa-
nese, the alienated behavior of
Koreans supported the belief that
Koreans were unwelcome intrud-
ers incapable of being assimilated
into Japanese society. The stereo-
type of a Korean was related to
“badness,” not only moral but
even in respect to physical com-
portment.  Even today, it is not
uncommon to find a grandmother
scolding her grandchild by say-
ing, ‘Don’t sit like “Chosenjin”
do’”
(Lee and DeVos 1981c, 41).
While some residents in Kyoto are quick to 
assume that Koreans are (for reasons that seem to 
attach to “Koreanness”) more violent, less responsi-
ble, and in other ways not as reliable as Japanese, Res-
ident Korean life is Kyoto is most often based on 
behavioral norms keyed to those available to their Jap-
anese neighbors.  The stigma associated with being 
Korean and living in a stigmatized neighborhood in 
Kyoto does not release Koreans from reacting to 
expectations on behavior in public.  In fact, among the 
hundred or so most active Madang organizers there 
were very few individuals, one or two, who would, by 
their individual public behavior, perhaps attract notice 
in, say, an up-town department store.  And the streets 
and homes in Higashi-kujo, although modest in con-
tent, were no less modest in their formal public pre-
sentation than homes in my own neighborhood.  
For many families, the best response to the 
stigma is through hypercorrect behavior.  By acting 
correctly according to the standards of the majority 
Japanese population in Kyoto, these families seek to 
distance themselves from the stigma of being Korean.  
However, this also makes them aware of their inability 
to be accepted as Japanese.
“I think we are better Japanese than most Japa-
nese,”  Ms. Yamasaki said once, “because we have to 
try harder.”  I asked her to explain.  
“People outside think that people living in 
Higashi-Kujo are, you know, not capable of proper liv- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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proper, that the street is clean outside our house, and 
that nobody can say anything against us.”
“The Man from Earth did not
answer. But as the days went by,
he began to see the details in the
streets far below his room on the
fourteenth floor of a new hotel.
The people came into focus; they
were not earthlings, but native to
this star. Faces were kin to each
other in a gentle absence of
expression.
Change, too, was so much faster
in the city about him.  As a plant
mushrooms in a hothouse, the city
was growing faster than his eyes
could record. Where there had
been one factory, now there were
two. His hotel had been 14 sto-
ries; now it had silently risen to
15, and atop the new height
sprouted a roof-garden where
there had been only a roof.”
Visit to a Green Star 1964 n.p.
But again, acting correctly is, in itself, insufficient 
to join the general Kyoto population for whom acting 
correctly is also connected to “Japaneseness.”  
Popular perceptions of Koreans in Kyoto mark 
their “rough” ways.  “In my primary school,” a Japa-
nese friend told me, “All the Koreans were bullies.  It’s 
true.  They frightened me.”  
This perception of Koreans as prone to violence 
underplays the role of violence in working class Kyoto, 
and so it hides the notion that working-class Japanese 
also, on occasion, use physical violence or its threat.   
One of the arenas where violence is now undeniable 
is in the schools. In Japan, bullying has been recognized 
as a general problem in all compulsory public schools.   
This is not limited to any nationality, class, or gender, 
although there may be occasions where the differen-
tial exit criteria for students might promote tough 
behavior (see: learning to roudou).    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—Hypercorrect behavior —141—“...and so we being to look down
on and to suppress the Korean
things [in our life].  When I gradu-
ated from junior high school and
took the employment exam, if I
used my real, Korean name, I
could have sent off 30 applica-
tions without getting one
response...”
Mr. Smith1, second generation
resident Korean.
1. The names used to designate local persons who advised me or participated in the event 
and who desired to remain anonymous are chosen randomly from English names.  Why 
English names? I have avoided using Korean names as these tend to be few in number 
(Kim, Lee, etc.) and might resemble an actual person.  Many of the Koreans I worked with 
have a Japanese name they use when this is convenient.  But these names are also 
loaded as signifying the inability to use their real, Korean name.  English will have to do.
Because they face a barrage of (now mostly infor-
malized) barriers to university entrance, along with a 
general lack of adult mentorship to help them through 
these, more young Koreans than young Japanese 
choose to find other, non-university futures for their 
lives.  School then becomes also a space of involuntary 
disciplinary confinement2.
Like bullying, street crime in Kyoto is a topic that 
is difficult to summarize, in part because of a general 
underreporting3 of such crime in the city (a friend 
who worked in 7-11 convenience store on the west 
side of Kyoto spoke of almost daily shoplifting and 
occasional strong-arm robbery, never once were the 
police called.  Signs outside of convenience stores in 
Kyoto demand that motorcycles helmets cannot be 
worn into the store, as these hide the wearer from 
the surveillance cameras).  
2. As the Higashi-kujo Madang takes place on public school yards (the only spaces large 
enough for it in the district), it was particularly poignant for those Koreans who had 
attended the school to see it decked with Korean artwork, and ringing with Korean drums.
3. For example, in the years I was living in Kyoto there were virtually no rapes recorded in the 
local crime statistics, while Sato [1991, 86] described gang rape as one of the activities of 
bosozoku, and certainly one would guess that various types of rape or of molestation 
would be present in Kyoto.  The stigma of rape on the female victim in Japan still seems to 
preclude legal redress.  And in general, calling the Japanese police into any personal situ-
ation is not something that merchants and individuals do unless this is unavoidable.  Bicy-
cles and umbrellas are regularly “borrowed,” and most of my neighbors had elaborate 
security systems against robbery.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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delinquency in Yao [Osaka] was
not confined to the Korean com-
munity, it was recognised that a
disproportionately high number of
the troublemakers were in fact
Korean and that furthermore the
Koreans tended to be the ringlead-
ers.  Most of the Japanese people
living in the area put the problems
down to the youngsters’ ‘family
backgrounds’ and were reluctant
to accept that discrimination
might have had a role to play”
(Leveille and Nuttall 1997).
In neighborhoods where there is a visible pres-
ence of resident Koreans, these are apt to be targeted 
s the “usual suspects” in investigations of local street 
crime, and the visible presence of Koreans living in a 
neighborhood may trigger an expectation among Japa-
nese that the vicinity is a furyoujuutakuchiku (slum) 
neighborhood (See also: Yoshida 1994).  While the city 
avoids a blanket racial explanation, “family problems” 
and “cultural deficiencies” are provided as reasons for 
street crime as this is attached to Koreans in Kyoto.  
“Racism took shape at this point
(racism in its modern, “biologiz-
ing,” statist form): it was then that
a whole politics of settlement
(peuplement) family, marriage,
education, social hierarchization,
and property, accompanied by a
long series of permanent interven-
tions at the level of the body, con-
duct, health, and everyday life,
received their color and their jus-
tification from the mythical con-
cern with protecting the purity of
the blood and ensuring the tri-
umph of the race”
(Foucault 1990, 149)
This also serves to isolate and define Koreans as 
prone to delinquency (see quote at the left).  These 
are the same alibis that allow corporations to reject 
Korean applicants for salaried positions.  In other 
words, however such alibis might help to maintain a 
notion that Japanese nationals (again, 99% of the pop-
ulation) in Kyoto are naturally prone to lawfullness 
(the flip side of the Korean lawbreaker stigma) there is 
ar too much crime in Kyoto to pin this all on the 
Koreans, or on some temporary juvenile delinquent 
phase (see: bosozoku ) that will, like measles, heal all 
by itself.  
The social/cultural discrimination that moves 
Koreans out of the general economy does not re-
move them from the surrounding discourse that artic-
ulates norms for behavior in public.  In fact, in the pre-
war era, Koreans in Kyoto were  subjected to formal 
instruction on proper public behavior, as were (and 
are) all school children in Japan.  But again, these 
behaviors are also overcoded with meanings relating  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—Hypercorrect behavior —143—them to a nationalized history of Japanese culture.
 Crime is a minor spectacle on the Kyoto’s 
streets.  The Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding of holidays 
(most of which are somehow connected to the 
emperor) as collective, national events, and the stag-
ing of numerous national competitions—the most vis-
ible being the national high-school baseball 
tournament— where only Japanese citizens are 
allowed to participate, these spectacles add to a col-
lective national life-style imagination that remains 
closed to Koreans in Kyoto.  The rites of cultural 
inclusion offered in the streets and in schools, always 
use overt “Japanese” symbolism, such as the use of 
“traditional” dress and participation by (generically 
Japanese) Shinto shrines.  These rites bring the major-
ity population into a regular reenactment of their 
national imagined commonality.  But they do not reach 
out to include others living in the City.  
“The fact that resident Koreans
cannot get a job as  a general pre-
fectural public employee [in
Kyoto Prefecture] promotes the
trend in Japanese society to
approve the situation of not
employing resident Koreans.  The
big step [forward] will occur with
the breakthrough of hiring a
Korean as a general prefectural
public employee.”
(Mayu 1994,)
Koreans, like the rest of the foreign expatriate 
community in Kyoto are only “visitors from Earth,” 
temporarily (only four generations so far) housed in 
Kyoto, but hailing from another civilization.  There is 
no method that would allow them to belong to 
Kyoto’s Japanese practices, no matter how long they 
reside under current circumstances.  As much as 
Koreans in Kyoto cannot participate in these events, 
they cannot really escape them, as these events domi-
nate the streets and television channels.   
In the Japanese public schools, annual cultural fes-
tivals highlight national cultural practices and require  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—The over-coded public space —144—all students to learn these and to participate in cul-
tural and historical pageants that present an official 
version of a history that treats Korea in a fashion that 
many Koreans can find fault with.  
Before moving to explore the Higashi-kujo 
Madang I suspect that the reader may find useful some 
introduction to the practical circumstances of the 
public sphere in Kyoto.   What follows are comments 
on the contours  of Kyoto’s public sphere, and about 
the discursive practices that are at work in this arena.
The over-coded public space
Publicity, visibility, ownership:  participation in a 
public sphere brings varying degrees of such signals of 
inclusion to those persons and groups who find a 
place in its now highly mediated space.  I will have 
much to say about the notion of “public sphere” 
below, but here I will start with the claim that a public 
sphere is the arena where transnational persons must 
negotiate their place within the democratic state.  And 
I also propose that a public sphere has its own spatial 
properties, and this is determined by and serves to 
define those spaces we call “public places,” which are 
anchored by physical places—streets and plazas—but 
which extend today into a variety of mediated interac-
tions, from broadcast and print media, to the internet 
(See also: The Street).   We have some recent demon-
strations of the use of the street as a public sphere 
arena. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—The over-coded public space —145—The use of crowd visibility on the 
street as a warrant for democratic 
inclusivity was demonstrated in 
Belgrade, when mass crowds 
occupied the streets for more than 
two months.
SOURCE: CNN
The recent (November 1996-February 1997), 
prolonged, mass demonstrations in Belgrade, and the 
attempts by the government to repress reporting of 
these, shows how confrontations within the public 
sphere can include both physical spaces and media 
institutions.  
“...We must rehabilitate our sense
of ourselves as active human sub-
jects, and liberate ourselves from
the captivity of a purely national
perception of the world.  Through
this “subjecthood” and the indi-
vidual conscience that goes with
it, we must discover a new rela-
tionship to our neighbors, and to
the universe and its metaphysical
order, which is the source of the
moral order.”
(Havel 1993, 9)
The final decision of the government to accede to 
the demands of the demonstrators also shows how 
concerted, visible group action in the street can force 
access to a public sphere, at least when the state is 
not willing to escalate its response through its control 
of the means of violence (as what happened in the 
Tienanmen demonstrations). But where there are no 
visible confrontations, we cannot simply imagine that 
the public sphere is therefore open to counter-articu-
lations.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—body schooling —146—“If one wanted to advance a mod-
ern version of the theory of
national character—which has
gone completely out of fashion,
although we encounter national
differences in everyday life with-
out knowing how to specify or
analyse them—it would begin, for
me, with a theory of the educa-
tional systems in as much as they




The most effective controls of expression are 
often preemptive ones.  And the main strategy (cer-
tainly in Kyoto) for preempting competing/counter-
appropriations of the public sphere is to saturate the 
discursive field/space where civic identity is con-
structed.   The public sphere is an important site for 
counter-state discourse. But often counter-expres-
sions are lost in a fog of expressions produced by and 
for the state.   These state-provided expressions may 
also include normative content and force. 
body schooling
“Numerous factors in Japan con-
strain the emergence of democ-
racy and egalitarianism as both
the “real” and the “official” orga-
nizing principles in social rela-
tions. A key factor, as noted
earlier, is that elites in Japan, who
as status superiors enjoy the larg-
est share of prerogatives, clearly
have little to gain from actively
promoting and legitimizing a
social ideology that does not favor
their interests
(Pharr 1990, 27).”
Counter-public discourses in every modern 
nation must compete with messages provided to the 
public from the state.    From kindergarten through 
high-school, Kyoto’s youth spend more waking hours 
in state-controlled institutions1 than they do at home 
(and their waking time at home is often dominated by 
the homework they receive).   Public schools in Japan, 
as in other contemporary nation-states, are sites for 
an education that trains the body while it informs the 
imagination.  They promote a collective “memory” for 
the state through what Connerton (1989) calls 
“inscribing” and “incorporating” practices.  These 
practices range from micro-body disciplines to collec-
tive group experiences.  Connerton’s comments on 
1. One more word about school.  The importance of schooling as the only possible avenue for 
social/economic upward mobility in Kyoto cannot be overstressed.   And discipline in the 
public schools, in addition to the grades on tests, is tracked by a record that follows the stu-
dent through to the university application (and perhaps even to potential employers, 
although I am not certain about this). This record of daily decorum and attitude is kept by 
teachers and is not available for inspection by the student or the student’s parents.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—body schooling —147—handwriting are a good example for Japanese schools 
where many hours are spent on calligraphy:
“The teacher will place the pupils in the posture that they should maintain when writing, and will
correct it either by sign or otherwise, when they change this position. La Salle is here proposing a
training in rigorous docility, a kind of minuscule gymnastics. The essential point is that what is being
prescribed and learnt is an incorporating practice. It also happens to be a practice of inscription; but
that is a contingent feature of the practice in question, for, fundamentally, what is being learned is an
act of incorporation” (1989, 77-78).
“Myth does not deny things, on
the contrary its function is to talk
about them; simply, it purifies
them, it makes them innocent, it
gives them a natural and eternal
justification, it gives them a clar-
ity which is not that of an expla-
nation but that of a statement of
fact”
(Barthes 1982, 132).
Teaching and learning a “rigorous docility1” is not 
necessarily restricted to those topics that involve 
“minuscule gymnastics.”  Lessons about proper behav-
ior and national history may also be taught in this fash-
ion.   This docile body is subjected to what Foucault 
called the  “technico-political register, which was con-
stituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical 
and calculated methods relating to the army, the 
school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting 
the operations of the body” (1979 [1975], 136).  But 
regulations and carceral and other institutions are 
only one side of the operation of this register.   Gov-
ernments—when they centrally control public educa-
tion and public media—can also supply a steady input 
into the popular imagination, and inform social expec-
tations about how the bodies of citizens2 should 
behave in public.   But again, the interest in state con-
1. The notion of “docile bodies” was earlier developed by Foucault: “La Mettrie's L'Homme-
machine is both a materialist reduction of the soul and a general theory of dressage, at the 
centre of which reigns the notion of 'docility', which joins the analysable body to the manip-
ulable body.  A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” 
(1979 [1975], 136).
2.  We have to look closely at how these inputs are received, and we also have to remember 
that mass public education within modern liberal democracies (Aronowitz 1993, 91)is also 
charged with equipping individuals to better counter even the arguments of the state.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—body schooling —148—trol over the physical bodies of its populations is 
developed to a much higher level under conditions of 
state-nation modernity (see: State-nation modernity), 
where it forms a center of internal state policy.
“As Reich remarks, the astonish-
ing thing is not that some people
steal or that others occasionally
go out on strike, but rather that all
those who are starving do not
steal as a regular practice, and all
those who are exploited are not
continually out on strike: after
centuries of exploitation, why do
people still tolerate being humili-
ated and enslaved, to such a point,
indeed, that they actually want
humiliation and slavery not only
for others but for themselves?”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 29)
The states of state-nations make little effort to 
hide the fact of their interests in this area, and actively 
promote the role of public education as a source for 
“moral education.”  Such lessons are coupled with an 
historical narrative—the myth of the nation— that 
provides them with a naturalized rationale.   In Kyoto, 
a national school curriculum is followed locally, a cur-
riculum designed to promote,  “the shared quality of 
being Japanese” (Dowling 1997).   
According to the current Chairman of Monbusho’s 
(The Ministry of Education’s) Curriculum Council, Mr. 
Miura Shumon, promoting enough of this shared qual-
ity requires that all the children in the nation be pro-
cessed by the same mold: “Miura believes that 
‘compulsory education is much like a processing plant 
where boys and girls are all hammered into identical 
little citizens of their nation,’ but adds that ‘any nation 
advanced enough to have a compulsory education sys-
tem will attempt to force its children into a single 
mold’” (Dowling 1997).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—body schooling —149—“In the eyes of many Japanese, the
alienated behavior of Koreans
supported the belief that Koreans
were unwelcome intruders inca-
pable of being assimilated into
Japanese society. The stereotype
of a Korean was related to “bad-
ness,” not only moral but even in
respect to physical comportment.
Even today, it is not uncommon to
find a grandmother scolding her
grandchild by saying, ‘Don’t sit
like “Chosenjin” do.’  There is no
question that the Koreans com-
ported themselves in a rougher
and more overtly aggressive man-
ner than was customary for the
more obsequious and diffident
lower-class Japanese.  They
aroused both fear and contempt
among the Japanese, who were
accustomed to docility on the part
of subordinates.”
(Lee and  DeVos 1981, 41)
The desired outcome of this molding is a ubiqui-
tous, shared1 “Japaneseness.”  “Miura sees this shared 
quality of being Japanese as ‘a distinctively Japanese 
consciousness, a sense of identity which distinguishes 
Japan from other countries’ being shared spatially 
throughout all Japanese territory, and also temporally 
throughout the whole of Japanese history” (Dowling 
1997). Here Miura is expressing the position that 
Japan is a “homogeneous society” (See: the politics and 
semantics of homogeneity).
What is really shared is the molding practice 
itself, and the resulting sameness—which is attributed 
by its planners to a long history of homogeneous Japa-
nese culture and heredity—is in fact much more the 
outcome of several years of (old-time) Foucaultian 
discipline.  In other words, if Monbusho used the same 
technique while switching “molds” (changing the con-
tent), the result would be a shared “Japaneseness” of 
an entirely different form.  This ability to slide in new 
content with the same practice was practically dem-
onstrated before and after the war, when the pre-war 
discourse of nationalized, imperial Shinto religion as 
the basis for national unity was simply recast into a 
discourse of the state itself, through its many minis-
tries (now officially, but not entirely separated from 
Shinto) in partnership with the large keiretsu corpora-
1. Adult Japanese in Kyoto have told me that the shared experience of being in the mold—of 
going through the Japanese school system—is the most powerful experience of their lives.   
And school friends of the same year are the ones that can become life-long friends.  Con-
versely, students who have gone abroad to study, or who study in Korean schools in Japan 
fail to acquire sufficient “Japaneseness.” TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—state, market, shrine —150—tions (also simply recoded from the pre-War zaibatsu 
conglomerates), as the dutiful father of the Japanese 
national family. 
“Dentsu does more than any sin-
gle corporation, anywhere in the
world, to mould popular culture,
both directly and through hordes
of subcontractors. It also orches-
trates major events such as expos
and visits from the pope. It is
highly active politically, about
which more in a moment. Dentsu
is directly responsible for one-
third of all advertising on Japa-
nese TV, and virtually monopo-
lises the scheduling of sponsors
during primetime hours, not to
mention the control it exerts
through its many subsidiaries and
subcontracting firms. Some 120
film production companies and
more than 400 subcontracting
graphic arts studios are under its
wing. Advertisers wishing to
insert commercials in television
programmes between 7 and 11
p.m. have almost no choice but to
go via Dentsu, because it controls
their selection and much of the
programme material”
(van Wolferen 1990, 176).
Apart from the schools and the government run 
media (and that which is government controlled in 
less direct ways), state inputs into “moral” or civic 
education can also be coupled to legal constraints.  
Admonitions against drug use, for example, are 
enforced through the criminal courts.  (Courts might 
also be available for arguments against the interest of 
the state, but this has not been the case in Japan. [See: 
The courts].)  
Even so, state inputs into the complex, ongoing 
i entification that individuals make with their compa-
triots are never complete.  The tendency to promote 
the activities of the state as totalizing ignores the 
many openings that are available for counter or 
oblique expressions, even in a  state-nation.  The capi-
talist market remolds young adults with its own blitz 
of nation-wide products and lifestyle identity features.  
So the final stamp of the “Japaneseness” mold belongs 
not to Monbusho, but to Dentsu: the world’s largest 
“advertising” agency (and much more than that).
state, market, shrine
In state-nations, as in nation-states, the state is 
not the lone producer of widely available identity nar-
ratives and tokens, although in the former, the state 
may attempt an outright hegemony of expression.  
Various religious institutions have long held personal 
identity to be within their domain.   Industry also  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—state, market, shrine —151—looks to the schools, or provides its own schooling, 
for the bodily disciplines they desire for workers on 
the job.  And the capitalist market, where consump-
tion behavior is informed through identification 
between the consumer’s bodies and consumed 
objects, is an increasingly public arena for the display 
of life-style based identities.   
However, when industry, religion, and the state 
work in concert, a condition that may occur through 
coordination during times of crisis (such as wartime), 
or a condition that may be fostered through a strong, 
centralized state apparatus, such as a state-nation (see 
also State-nation modernity),  which holds the means to 
either directly control or indirectly guide industrial 
and religious organizations,  a “hegemony of represen-
tation” is possible.  Yurchak (1997, 166-167) describes 
this condition in the former Soviet Union:
“In the case of late socialism the hegemony of representation can be visualized as a symbolic
order of tightly interconnected signifiers that were exclusively state controlled and permeated most
aspects of everyday life in the official sphere. These were verbal formulas (structural elements of the
politicized discourse of the official sphere, such as names of Soviet institutions and public organiza-
tions and formulaic phraseology of official speeches), visual images (posters, pictures, placards, mon-
uments), mass rituals (Party and Komsomol meetings, elections, and November and May parades),
the topics in the media, literature, popular culture (all of which were controlled by centralized bod-
ies and ministries), and tightly structured events of daily public life (the use of public transport, work
at a Soviet enterprise where wages were centrally fixed, study in a Soviet school with centrally
adopted curriculum, and shopping in a Soviet store with unified centrally controlled prices and
choices).”
According to Yurchak, the main response to this 
fog of representation in the Soviet Union was neither 
dissident activity, nor active participation, but rather a 
cynical removal of emotion from these representa-
tions.  Over-saturation did not promote an orthopos- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—state, market, shrine —152—tural (See: orthoposture) attitude in the persons of 
Soviet citizens.  Quite the opposite: the signs and slo-
gans, the parades and spectacles became invisible 
through their ubiquity.
Yurchak (Yurchak 1997, 167-168) quotes Vaclav Havel, 
who noted how, when the omnipresent expressions 
of the state became so utterly predictable, they also 
became invisible/silent parts of the “panorama of 
everyday life.”  But also invisible were counter-expres-
sions, kept from the street (if  not from back regions 
of everyday life) through official controls.  Even 
though the street was filled with state spectacles, it 
remained devoid of all counter-expression. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—state, market, shrine —153—“Through the self-construction of
the self in violence, the hardman
came to signify the self-contained
and autonomous singularity of his
community. The hardmen came
from “hard” places like “The
Hammer,” “The Bone,” and “The
Nick.” As one hardman put it, "I
live in the toughest area of Bel-
fast. As you walk down my street,
each house is harder than the next.
I live in the last house on the
street.” There was a reversible
transfer of moral substance
between the hardmen and their
communities. The differential
relation of the hardman to other
men became a metaphor for the
relation of the hardman's commu-
nity to other places.”
(Feldman 1991, 53)
Embodied (personal) habitus,
family habitus and neighborhood
habitus can acquire a homology
that allows them metonymic
access to each other: they can
each stand in for the other. This
also means they cannot be casu-
ally separated.  Korean residents
talk about the onus of not acting
“Korean” in their neighborhoods,
so as to maintain the neighbor-
hood’s image.
In various nation-states the multiple sources that 
inform identities results in a tension, which sometimes 
develops into a discursive negotiation among these 
institutions.  In the United States, for example, there 
is an ongoing, if at times backgrounded, discussion 
about just where life-style “values” should be acquired, 
with “the family,” “the church,” and “school” compet-
ing with each other, but mostly against “the street” (or 
commercial TV) as the source for such values.  In the 
case of the Soviet Union, the state’s monopoly on 
public expression transformed all other expressions 
into counter-state expressions.  Discourse in public 
could then be labeled as dissent against the state.  But 
even where “the state” has not achieved an outright 
monopoly on expression in public, a “hegemony of 
representation” is possible.
In Kyoto, there has been for decades a strong 
congruence between the efforts of the government 
(e.g., monbusho, the Ministry of Education, the succes-
sor to the Pre-War naimusho, [Home Ministry]) to 
teach expectations about normative behavior, and 
similar efforts of nation-wide Shinto religious organi-
zations (notably the Jinjahoncho , which controls 
tens of thousands of Shinto shrines, and also runs the 
Boy Scouts, and which was also formerly part of the 
naimusho),  and government/industry organizations 
(such as MITI, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry [Tsuushousangoyousho]) that control the 
“cram schools” (juku) where more than half of Kyoto’s 
junior and senior high-school students spend their  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—state, market, shrine —154—after-school hours.  
Here we see Cub Scouts learning 
to behave correctly at a Shinto 
festival in Shiga-ken, near 
Kyoto.  The use of governmental 
funds for events held under Shinto 
auspices is not legal under Japan’s 
constitution, however, the courts 
have been known to agree that the 
overall event may also be a social 
event for the benefit of the com-
munity, and allow governmental 
participation1 [See also: The 
courts].  Governmental, religious, 
and social organizations in Kyoto 
often overlap in ways that are not 
commonly seen, nor sometimes 
allowed (because of freedom of 
religion restrictions) in the United 
States.  
Photo by author
1. Oddly, this line of argument never seems to lead to the next logical step: a protest about 
the exclusive use of Shinto religious ceremonials during official community events.
The triumvirate of government/industry/shrine 
organizations, sharing a common paternalist posture 
toward the population, provides a collective message 
that avoids internal schisms that might promote a crit-
ical distance in the receiver.  The messages may or may 
not be couched in the racial metaphors of “Nihonjin-
ron,” as illustrated by the quotes from Here is JAPAN.  
And, in fact, the metaphors and the aesthetics 
used change over time—and here we are talking 
about time stretching back to before the beginning of 
the century (the Post-War Occupation period pro-
vided its own messages, but failed to break the thread 
of the narratives that preceded it).  During this time, 
new media have been called into service, as when 
televisions were introduced at the time of the current  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—state, market, shrine —155—emperor’s marriage, and more recently, when the City 
of Kyoto provides (and so monitors) internet services 
for its citizens.  But the message of a single, univer-
sally/uniquely Japanese way of living and behaving, is 
the common thread that spans these decades.
Kyoto City’s weekly “Shimin 
Shinbun” (Citizen Newspaper), is 
published by the city, and distrib-
uted through the neighborhood 
associations (chounaikai).  Its 
contents list the many programs 
and events happening in city-run 
facilities (culture, sports, health).  
This one highlights events that are 
said to provide a “Timeslip to the 
Heian Era,” as a part of the City’s 
1200th anniversary of the con-











internal goals, and so coordination of this message is 
not always perfect (as when the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry encourages the consumption 
of imported goods that the Government Food Agency 
would prefer to discourage).  But then coordination is 
not necessary when the message is being overcoded 
with regularity from several sources.
Later we will see some of the ways in which the 
“We Japanese...” message is deflected and countered 
upon reception, for now, I would like to stress that 
the history of embedding  a “We Japanese”  discourse 
into other discourses, implicates those counter dis-
course that would comment upon the other dis-
courses as first extracting this “We Japanese” 
construction. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—state, market, shrine —156—BRUTUS magazine, a “Genera-
tion X” life-style journal, pre-
sented its Kyoto 1200 issue with 
the stereotype photograph of pub-
lic school children in uniform 
posing with Kyoto geisha (also in 
uniform).  The headline reads 
“Now to Kyoto’s 1200 year King-
dom” and the subtitle reads, “One 
more time [here is] an adult 
school trip... Kyoto...sum-
mer...Play!” This is the image of 
shinjinrui that the government 
promotes when it sends 4 million 




on the problems 
of the intergener-






humans”] is the 
first generation without direct experience of war and 
post-war economic hardships—announce the fact that 
the reception side of this narrative needs more 
research (See also: Ivy 1995, 55-59).  
Inside the same issue of BRU-
TUS, we find other modes of 
reception and production of the 
image of “Generation X” in 
Kyoto.  Here a group of cross-
dressing men pose on a bridge in 
Gion that is famous for photo-
graphs of geishas and tourists.  
The pop culture market seeks out 
playful and exotic parodies of the 
“We Japanese” posture.
Indeed, the rise of income levels, and the target-
ing of Japanese populations as consumer cohorts, has 
altered the valence of the available media inputs in 
favor of the marketplace.  Increasingly, it is Japanese  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—consuming nationality —157—consumption habits that informs the content of the 
“We Japanese” discourse. 
consuming nationality
 “We Japanese prefer quality over cost,” is one 
message, used to deflect the growth of large-scale dis-
count retailers.  “We Japanese are wary of the use of 
insecticides on our food,” is another message, used to 
close the gates on the import of apples and other 
fruits1.  But shinjinrui have their own uses of this mes-
sage.
1. Although the government does not make public information on the use of agricultural insec-
ticides in Japan—the use of which is suspected to be quite intense, given the market for 
cosmetically perfect fruit.
Apart from what Baudrillard 
would call the “simulation” of dif-
ference—multiple product lines 
produced to create an illusion of 
consumer choice—the internal 
consumer market in Japan shows 
visibly less variation than similar 
markets in the European Union or 
North America.  One reason for 
this is the collaborative market 
domination of a few Japanese 
manufacturers.  And so Sanyo’s 
quarterly catalogue mirrors that of 
Hitachi (below) and others.  Life-
style differences in Kyoto are 
marked by the location of one’s 
residence, and by a gender-spe-
cific progression of life-course 
changes through an expected port-
folio of uniforms, fashions, hob-
bies, and duties.
Within market-driven image consumption too, 
there is a visible lack of variation in Kyoto, and Japan.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—consuming nationality —158—There are a large number of life-style magazines—
each targeting an age/gender cohort— but there are 
surprisingly few available television and radio channels, 
and the advertising on all media is controlled mainly 
by one corporation, Dentsu, which produces nearly all 
the media advertising (and much of the TV program-
ming) in Japan. 
“The Japanese consumer” is a 
cohort that receives regular narra-
tive attention from the govern-
ment and the marketplace.  When 
the government is pressed to 
explain the lack of market pene-
tration by imports, it replies that 
“the Japanese consumer” is very 
conscious of quality and design.  
When asked about imports of 
food, we have been told that the 
Japanese consumer has a diges-
tive tract that is different from that 
of others, and so imported beef is 
difficult to digest.  When asked 
why cosmetics in Japan cost so 
much more than the same prod-
ucts in Europe, Shinseido, the 
main Japanese supplier of these 
products points to the special skin 
of the Japanese consumer. But 
Japanese manufacturers, such as 
Hitachi (right) have few problems 
making products for this market 
and for the international market.  
 Despite the large size of its population and econ-
omy, there is a surprising lack of internal diversity 
either on the advertising side, or on the product side.   
The product lines of the large domestic household-
goods manufacturing firms (Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Mat-
sushita, Sanyo, etc.) are so similar that little customer 
choice is needed to make a purchase from one or the 
other.  It is mainly when goods are made for export 
that the variety of features begins to expand. 
The “Japanese consumer” is also a regular feature 
of the “We Japanese...” discourse (See also: Nihonjinron).  
The bodies, desires, tastes, and moods of this cohort  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—consuming nationality —159—have been proclaimed to be unique in ways that for-
eign manufacturers tend to overlook, which explains 
(without reference to structural impediments) why 
the local market contains so few imported goods, 
despite the fact that these goods would generally be 
highly competitive in price and quality.
The Japanese Government’s 
Japan Travel Bureau runs week-
end tours to the summertime festi-
vals throughout Japan.  This one 
advertises “The height of the sum-
mer. The height of festivals: Japa-
nese Festivals.”  At a hundred-
thousand Yen a day per couple 
(about a thousand dollars), the 
tours choose festival destinations 
that are the most colorfully spec-
tacular (NOTE: no Kyoto festivals 
were included in these summer 
tours).
The subtext reads as the follow-
ing: “In the blossoming dusk of a 
summer day there are lanterns.
In the village that was calm, the 
scroll of history unfolds:
At times heroic, and then solemn, 
cheerful, energetic: because it is 
at the peak of its season, this 
dream story of summer is now 
visible.
Fleeting, passionate, fantastic, 
yes, welcome to the world of 
dream phantasms.”






pose that the 
narratives of 
nation and his-
tory may be 
getting more 
than a little 
stale of late. 
The annual 
Japanese cul-
tural festivals that are held in the public schools, the 
day-trips to cultural museums and memorials, the 
longer school trips to national sites of culture, such as 
those in Kyoto, are all designed to add content and a 
weight of collective experience1 to the notion “We Jap-
1. This is precisely why certain school lunches, on one day a year, contain a small bite of 
whale meat (carefully distributed from the catch allowed by the international agreement “for 
research purposes”): the bite that gives every child the taste of (if not automatically a taste 
for) this “traditional” food: what “We Japanese” eat.  Students in my university classes had 
all tasted whale. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—consuming nationality —160—anese....”  So too does cultural tourism, as Ivy (1995) 
discovered in her exposition of the domestic publicity 
campaign that the Japanese Government’s Japanese 
National Tourist Organization ran in the 1970s (“Dis-
cover Japan”) and the 1980s (“Exotic Japan”).  
all for one and one for us The main internal counter-discourse (although 
not organized as such) to the “We Japanese” dis-
course are the many practices that promote the for-
tunes of particular families and individuals in 
competition with one another in Japan (see:  kone and 
kane: connections and money.)   After all the discourses 
have spoken on shared nationality and homogeneous 
culture, one does not need to look far to see that 
individuals in Japan are also determined to create dis-
tinctions in social circumstances, differences that offer 
a differential advantage to their family in the competi-
tion for capitals (cultural and cash).  
This competition promotes the use of personal 
connections often made through institutional auspices 
(universities, corporations) but also reflecting familial 
histories (social position and marriage alliances).   
Practices that should, by their own definition be “pub-
lic,” are made private by this exercise of personalized 
contact.  Even the “public sphere” can become priva-
tized in this fashion: see Private public sphere.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—some people are just more equal —161—some people are just more equal
“Theorists who allege that Japan
has a 'new middle mass' that is
politically fully in tune with what
the System offers, thereby imply-
ing that the Japanese public has
had the political means to express
its preferences, have forgotten
that no one ever told the Japanese
people that they could set their
own priorities. Prime Minister
Ikeda Hayato summed up Japan's
political relations most succinctly
when he said: 'The government is
the captain and the zaikai [busi-
ness] is the compass of the ship.'
At no time have the chosen repre-
sentatives of the people tried to
bring bureaucrats or business fed-
eration leaders into line.”
(van Wolferen 1990, 410)
It is tempting to see this privatization as a predict-
able consequence of state-nation modernity, because 
of the lack of an en external public sphere capable of 
exerting democratic oversight.  And indeed the most 
egregious example of this, the creation of a dynastic 
succession in a Communist country (North Korea), 
lends support to this general notion.  However, the 
potential for self-generated reform within govern-
ments under state-nation modernity cannot simply be 
dismissed.  But what makes reform more likely, under 
state-nation modernity conditions is a bottom-up 
internal demand for this, and here is where the lack of 
democratic organizational logics is most acute.
Those who are left outside the “market” for cul-
tural capital formation, and who thus have little means 
to influence the social/political situation, look to the 
promise of reform as the only means to secure funda-
mental civil rights in Japan.  However, when unions, 
schools and civil organizations (religious or social) also 
operate in this non-democratic fashion, then the abil-
ity of civil organizations to provide internal, demo-
cratic leadership is questionable.  While bottom-up 
reform may be the most likely avenue for political 
change in Japan in the near term, without skilling in 
inclusive, democratic practices even at this level, the 
possibility of such reform is difficult to imagine.  
Meanwhile, the interest in maintaining the social status 
quo, and the market for social connections finds little 
resistance.   But while “democracy” as such suffers  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—some people are just more equal —162—under such circumstances, it would be wrong to sug-
gest that this fact is not known to people in Japan.  
To literally “drum-up” interest in 
the municipal elections, the 
“Municipal Committee for Youth 
Guidance” stages its start-of-the-
election-campaign period parade.   
Elections, particularly local elections often have 
the participation of less than half of the eligible voting 
population.  In opinion polls, large numbers of citizens 
express doubts about the quality of democracy in the 
government.  Political parties contribute to public cyn-
icism by not always hiding their contempt for their 
constituents.  For example, in 1994, the head of public 
affairs of the long-ruling LDP party in Tokyo published 
a book, Hitora Senkyo Senryaku (Hitler’s Election Strat-
egy) in which he encouraged the LDP to follow Hit-
ler’s lead on manipulating public support (see: Election 
book praises Hitler's methods).  And those official state ven-
ues where the public was supposed to provide input 
have become “invitation only” meetings arranged by 
government officials (see: Who gets to speak at govt hearings?).
    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—middle class democracy —163—While democratic reforms along the lines of 
those promoted by civil organizations in many nation-
states—freedom of information, active acceptance of 
a plurality of life-styles, increasing responsiveness to 
the public sphere, etc.—are not possible with the are-
nas of discourse open within state-nations,  govern-
ments within state-nations can still be held 
accountable to their own democratic self definitions.  
And in Japan, democracy is fundamentally a discourse 
of equality.
middle class democracy
“For example, in 1930, 84 percent
of the populace —peasants and
workers—possessed only 50 per-
cent of the nation’s household
income, while 24,000 families, or
0.0019 percent of Japan's house-
holds, held over 10 percent of the
aggregate family income of the
nation. At the very top of this pyr-
amid were nineteen families with
annual incomes of over a million
yen each, while, at the bottom,
2,232,000 families each had
incomes of 200 yen or less. As for
power, political authority
remained in the hands of an oli-
garchy that emerged to replace the
Bakufu and its regional rulers;
meanwhile the masses ended by
sacrificing their lives on the bat-
tlefields or in the burned-out cities
of 1945 Japan
(Hane 1982, 11).”
Inequality cannot today be legitimated in Japan 
through an acknowledgment of hereditary differ-
ence—of an heritable class prerogative—at least not 
within the discourse of democracy that the state 
maintains in Japan (while also maintaining an 
emperor).  Indeed, the notion of “democracy” in Japan 
is centered on the idea of social equality, rather than on 
ideas of “freedom” (of choice, of speech, etc.) which is 
perhaps central to this notion in the United States.  
Equality in Japan is mostly pinned to the broadening of 
ts middle class, and to a narrative of economic oppor-
tunity, rather than to a wider sense of individual equal-
it  in interpersonal relationships, or in relationships to 
institutions.   kone and kane: connections and money are 
two arterials of power that belie the discourse of 
some eventually universal middle-class Japan.  
The discourse on homogeneity in Japan some-
times alludes to everyone being “in the same boat.”  
Here too it conceals the fact that the boat has several  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—middle class democracy —164—decks.  Forty years of economic growth has allowed 
many families to make the climb up a deck or two, and 
so reinforce popular notions of equality/opportunity 
in Japan.  But this very movement in society (and the 
looming potential for downward movement) also dis-
plays popular notions of actual social inequality based 
on connections to institutions.  
“The aim of school education
must be to foster the healthy
development of each individual.
Courses of Study for schools and
the Course of Study for Kinder-
gartens have been formulated as
curriculum standards that ensure
the actual achievement of this
ideal in schools throughout Japan
and ensure that specific levels of
education are attained. All schools
in Japan base their educational
activities on the Courses of Study
for schools or the Course of Study
for Kindergartens....
...Priority will be given to foster-
ing respect for Japanese culture
and traditions. In addition, efforts
will be made to increase under-
standing of the cultures and histo-
ries of other countries in order to
foster qualities that will enable






PART I ,Chapter 1 )”
A positive sentiment about opportunity for per-
sonal advancement is fed by stories of those who, 
through draconian self-sacrifice (usually in collabora-
tion with the “education-mother” [kyouiku mama]) 
and sheer ability, find their way into Tokyo Univer-
sity.   The tales of dire circumstances during and after 
World War II, stories now mostly gleaned from grand-
parents and television, remain vivid reminders of how 
bad times can get.  And the larger story of Japan’s 
emergence as an economic superpower is big enough 
and visible enough for most people to have their own 
small version of it within their families.  
The great majority of families in Japan (apart from 
many rural families) would admit to improved circum-
stances, and would have to credit elite government 
and industry executives who control more of the 
state’s economic brain than they now like to admit—  
given the current downward trend in the economy.   
But these stories tend to conceal the less spectacular 
statistics that would reveal the overall picture of who  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—middle class democracy —165—gets picked by the bureaucracy1 to join Japan’s “eco-
nomic brain.” 
1. Curiously, there is more of an expectation that opportunities exist for personal advance-
ment than is warranted by the available legal and social guarantees.   Most people I spoke 
with in Kyoto were confident that hard work and talent would pay off.   And, during decades 
of economic growth there has come a growth of opportunities for many.   It is only in the 
last five years that the expectation of continuing prosperity has faded, and so, in the next 
decade, a decade of economic restructuring, the public’s trust in the meritocracy will be 
tested.
“...In a modern, industrial state—
whether it be France, the United
States, or Japan—this equation of
citizenship and ancestry is no
longer tenable. No modern solu-
tion is possible in maintaining a
narrow, defensive ethnicity
through contrastive separation
that diminishes or incapacitates
the individual. The individual
cannot adapt or adjust through
systematic denial of another cul-
ture. The minority group cannot
escape considerable damage from
such prevention of cultural assim-
ilation.  A defensive minority
identity, by its very nature, is mal-
adaptive in a complex modern
society.”
(Lee and Devos 1981, 380)
Hartoonian (1988a) contrasts the new (post 
1960s) governmental programs with those of Pre-War 
Japan.   He asserts that these new programs embrace  
materialism and commodification, allowing “abun-
dance [to] serve as the bond for reinforcing forms of 
‘Japanese-like’ social relationships...  (5)...  the new 
representation appeals to the ethos of an exceptional 
culture (identical with ‘nature’) in order to explain the 
irreducible and unique source of Japan’s status...  [this] 
reveals the operation of a newer division between... 
the ‘Japanized View’ and the ‘Westernized View,’ now 
facing each other as absolutes standing outside of his-
tory, accountable only to an unchanging ‘nature’ (read 
as culture) and ‘race’” (468).  The state made a new 
“boat” out of the post-War economic “miracle,” but 
attached this even more to a naturalized “Japanese-
ness.” 
This picture of how the state viewed culture as a 
national project, which is also evident in Visit to a Green 
Star, transforms personal success within the system to 
a vindication of true Japanese nature.  Curiously, fail-
ure to find personal success reveals not the inade-
quacy of the Japanese spirit to the task at hand, but  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—assembling the national Umwelt —166—some defect in the individual—perhaps the surfacing 
of some residue of non-Japaneseness.  The growing 
numbers of homeless persons camping out in aban-
doned buildings in Higashi-kujo, or under Kamo river 
bridges strain the  “we Japanese” self-identity, and 
need to be ex-communicated as loafers and delin-
quents.  
“This [Cornel West’s work]
reminds us that the importance of
the ‘exclusion of exclusion’
appears at the level of sexuality,
ethnicity, and interest more
strongly than any other: identity
politics has been motivated in part
by a struggle against those per-
sons and practices excluding us
because of our differences, a
motivation which has called into
question those exclusions operat-
ing within identity groups”
(Dean 1996, 42).
These new kawaramono (“river people:”  the 
older Kyoto name for outcaste vagrants) move (and 
get moved) spatially and discursively into the marginal 
places of Kyoto where the only emerging counter 
identity to the “we Japanese” that now excludes them 
is today the plastic “Korean” identity being promoted 
by the Higashi-kujo Madang festival community.  In 
fact, the Madang organizers welcome and include Japa-
nese day-laborers.
assembling the national Umwelt
“The individual, then, divides his
Umwelt into the designed and the
undesigned, into project and set-
ting, into the self-oriented and
incidental....”
(Goffman 1971, 312).
Having examined the practices of state-sponsored 
normalcy, we need to now step back or away from 
this version to remember that, despite the intentions 
of ministries of culture and corporate advertisers, 
normalcy is also a condition of the lifeworld—and 
should the state and the market cease to be inter-
ested in it, this would still need to be cobbled 
together by individuals as a precondition for getting 
on with one’s daily life.  Here my use of “normalcy” 
resembles what Goffman called the “Umwelt”.    
Goffman’s  Umwelt is a bi-modal frame within 
which the individual’s most immediate situations  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—assembling the national Umwelt —167—expectations are assembled.   One mode is the “unde-
signed” mode, wherein normalcy resides: this is the 
sum of all surrounding circumstances concerning 
which the individual assumes she has both no control 
of, and where this lack of control is shared with oth-
ers.  The other mode is the project (or design) mode, 
where the individual assumes that her actions are 
responsible for the maintenance of her surroundings.  
Making a play within a game is a well-formed example 
of the latter.  But, as Goffman noted, the “question of 
how much of any particular scene is part of the indi-
vidual’s current design of action and how much is 
undesigned is interesting” (1971, 311).  
This question is interesting here because the 
state’s1 central interest seems to be in informing the 
“undesigned” Umwelt of its population, often in arenas 
where individuals might have otherwise devised their 
own projects.  Again, normalcy has always been a con-
dition of the lifeworld, it is the interest by state and the 
market in this condition that signals a change within 
modernity.   The Prince, as Foucault would remind us, 
had other things to worry about.  
How is it that the state (and, particularly in state-
nations, in coordination with national capitalist enter-
prises) can acquire a hold upon the Umwelt?  If the lib-
eral question is “why do we need government at all?” 
this other question raises the opposite concern, 
1. Not only the interest of the state, but the instrumentalities available to the state and to cap-
italist organizations in modernity, as Habermas (1989) noted, increase the ability of the 
state and the market to penetrate into the individual’s Umwelt at the “undesigned” level. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—assembling the national Umwelt —168—which might be called the critical dilemma:  How do 
we prevent the state from speaking for us?  What are 
the preconditions of speaking against the position of 
the state?  
“The lifeworld [for Habermas] is
the realm of personal relation-
ships and (at its best) communica-
tive action. But to it is
counterposed a system ordered on
the basis of nonlinguistic steering
media (money and power), inte-
grating society impersonally
through functional or cybernetic
feedback. This split cannot be
overcome, Habermas argues,
because there is no immanent
logic of capitalism to produce its
dialectical transcendence and
because large-scale modern soci-
ety would be impossible without
such systemic integration (and
dreams of doing away with such
large-scale societal integration are
not only romantic but dangerous
because reduction in scale can
come about only in catastrophic
ways). Nonetheless, the lifeworld
is the locus for basic human val-
ues and is undergoing rationaliza-
tion processes of its own; it needs
to be defended against the contin-
ual encroachment of systemic
media”
(Calhoun 1992, 30-31).
These questions are all the more salient within 
state-nations where the state controls a rhetorical 
position that stretches from the “national interest” to 
the “collective will” of its citizens [see also: State-
nations, and debates over democracy].  Curiously, while 
enlightenment apologists would still look to a rational-
ity as subtending modernity’s critique of its own 
founding circumstances, modern forms of mystification 
also must be accounted for.  
Intentional, legitimated, and authoritative prac-
ices of misrecognition tend to obscure whatever 
rationality modern institutions might possess.   This 
has led some critics of modernity to complain that 
this never achieved its own goals of replacing authori-
tative knowledge with knowledge grounded in reason.  
Others complain that these new forms of mystifica-
tion are fully modern, and that only a post-modern 
reflexivity will push us to a new (and thus, ironically, 
modern) condition of life.   Where various late-mod-
ern institutional-critiques increase Institutional reflexivity 
(e.g., an ability of institutions to reflexively monitor 
their own practices), this, in turn, may increase ratio-
nality within institutional discourses.  However, this 
increased reflexivity may not extend to persons gov-
erned by these institutions (or expert systems).   
The very act of governing, of acquiring an interest  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—normalcy and the state —169—in a subject, may require that the subject not attain a 
reflexive awareness (a ken ) of the circumstances of 
their subjectivity (see also Althusser 1986 [1970]).  
Because of this dependency on discursive misrecogni-
tion, one of the primary effects of the state’s interest 
in its population has been a substantial increase in the 
amount of “undesigned” Umwelt as compared to 
designed Umwelt as a feature of normalcy under con-
ditions of late modernity.  
normalcy and the state
“Taste is a practical mastery of
distributions which makes it pos-
sible to sense or intuit what is
likely (or unlikely) to befall—and
therefore to befit—an individual
occupying a given position in
social space. It functions as a sort
of social orientation, a 'sense of
one's place', guiding the occu-
pants of a given place in social
space towards the social positions
adjusted to their properties, and
towards the practices or goods
which befit the occupants of that
position”
(Bourdieu 1984, 466).
What is most of interest to us here is the notion 
that normalcy itself,  and participation in this, can also 
be authorized by the state as, for example, a privilege 
of citizenship.   Turn this around from the perspective 
of the subject, and we find an entire Umwelt that is 
shared among citizens in a locale within a nation, but 
that is kept from others who are thus estranged from 
behaving in a normal manner, and who can, at best, 
only mimic normality.   
One way of explaining how this is so is to see 
how the state can link the unmanaged Umwelt (in 
Goffman’s sense) to habitus (in Bourdieu’s sense): that 
is, to weld the connection between what is normal 
with what is automatically tasteful and proper in 
everyday life, with the latter carrying also a meaning of 
proper to a national (citizen) population.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—normalcy and the state —170—“Through the economic and social
necessity that they bring to bear
on the relatively autonomous
world of the domestic economy
and family relations, or more pre-
cisely, through the specifically
familial manifestations of this
external necessity (forms of the
division of labour between the
sexes, household objects, modes
of consumption, parent-child rela-
tions, etc.), the structures charac-
terizing a determinate class of
conditions of existence produce
the structures of the habitus,
which in their turn are the basis of
the perception and appreciation of
all subsequent experiences”
(Bourdieu 1990, 54).
When we consider that nationality can be 
ascribed not as a blanket identity, but as an inherited 
habitus—e.g., within the discursive formation of “the 
nation as family”—then we can see how a national 
Umwelt can also become the “personal” property of a 
nation’s citizens, a heritage as discriminate as an aris-
tocratic title.   In this way, nationality begins to show a 
homology to class: forming identities that are thickly 
constructed from within individual, family, and, finally 
national histories.  When Bourdieu describes habitus, 
he attempts to show an individual’s perceptions and   
expectations, (i.e., her Umwelt), becomes proper to 
her.  It is not simply self-generated, but has been 
applied to the self, and supplies the social space 
proper to the individual.   This proper Umwelt is artic-
ulated in a “system of preferences” that is the product 
of an intersection of practices and histories:
“...every economic agent acts by virtue of a system of preferences proper to him or her, but
which is distinguished only by secondary differences from systems of preference common to all
agents placed in equivalent economic and social conditions.  The different classes of systems of pref-
erence correspond to classes of conditions of existence, and thus to economic and social condition-
ings which impose different structures of perception, appreciation and action.  An individual habitus
is the product of the intersection of partly independent causal series.  You can see that the subject is
not the instantaneous ego of a sort of singular cogito, but the individual trace of an entire collective
history” (1990a, 91).
Bourdieu points to family and class as the sources 
for an individual’s inherited habitus, but where the 
state has overcoded these with narratives of the 
nation, then the nation (as family and/or class) also 
becomes a source for an inherited habitus. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—normalcy and the state —171—“‘In the modern world,’ Benedict
Anderson writes, ‘everyone can,
should, will “have” a nationality,
as he or she “has” a gender’.  The
implication, I think, is that just as
every culture has ome mecha-
nism—different mechanisms—to
constitute what Gayle Rubin
refers to as a “sex/gender system,”
a way of negotiating back and
forth between chromosomal sex
and social gender, so every mod-
ern culture and person must be
seen as partaking of what we
might (albeit clumsily) call a
“habitation/nation system.” The
“habitation/nation system” would
be the set of discursive and insti-
tutional arrangements that medi-
ate between the physical fact that
each person inhabits, at a given
time, a particular geographical
space, and the far more abstract,
sometimes even apparently unre-
lated organization of what has
emerged since the late seven-
teenth century as her/his national
identity, as signalized by, for
instance, citizenship”
(Sedgewick 1992, 239-240).
  Anderson, as Sedgewick (1992, 239-240) noted, 
attached “nationality” as a required feature of identity 
under conditions of modernity.   Everyone is expected 
to be able to answer the question: “What is your 
nationality.”  For many people this reply would be a 
straightforward one: “I am...”.   And for all but about 
one percent of people living in Japan, the reply would 
be simply “I am Japanese.” 
The fact of Japaneseness as a ubiquitous feature in 
everyday life within Japan has itself become “atari-
mae.”  For example, people of Japanese appearance 
(such as Japanese American1s visiting as tourists) are 
often expected to behave “as Japanese.”  When this 
expectation is violated the transgressor (the tourist) 
may be subject to ridicule.  
Japaneseness is coded in skills that can only be 
mastered from a life that must be lived within Japan: in 
Japanese language fluency and dialectal specificity, in a 
Japanese name, in an official residence, in familial con-
nections and a history of gift-giving and taking, and in 
the practical everyday manners taught in Japanese 
schools.   But how Japaneseness becomes atarimae, 
and the consequences of this situation for non-Japa-
nese persons living in Japan, and the means to shift 
national identity away from an inherited habitus and 
into the project mode of the Umwelt—these are 
issues of some importance for Koreans living in Kyoto.
1. Japanese Americans who visit Japan commonly complain of the discomforting experience 
of violating the expectation of “Japaneseness.”  Europeans face no such expectation, how-
ever, those who stay on in Japan can also not expect to ever experience such an expecta-
tion on the part of others. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—normalcy and the state —172— And here we also should remember that the Jap-
anese “national habitus” is not be equally shared 
among those who make the claim, “I am Japanese.” 
There is, for example, a national habitus for men, and 
another for women (and virtually none for non-het-
erosexuals).  There are also vestiges of the old class 
habitus (most evident in the imperial family, and in 
those who dwell in buraku areas).   At times, the 
national habitus is doubly coded, for example, when it 
is also written into legal statutes (or, in Japan, into 
administrative codes in the absence of legal statutes).  
Ursula Vogel (1994), looking at the position of women 
under contracts of marriage within the legal condi-
tions of citizenship, describes how citizenship can be 
used as a means of gender domination.  
In Japan, the legal means to acquire Japanese citi-
zenship are a practical equivalent to acquiring the 
national habitus: language, name, and behavior all fig-
ure into the naturalization process.  This may be why 
the annual per capita naturalization rate in Japan is 
about that of the annual per capita homicide rate in 
the US (a statistic that says something about both 
countries).  And then after the legal hurdles are fin-
ished, a new citizen still must somehow acquire the 
lifetime background history that enables one to 
behave properly “Japanese.”  Having the official docu-
ment is not enough.  Most people who gain Japanese 
citizenship consider that this will be of value to their 
children, who stand a better chance of properly wear-
ing this as an inherited/inherent status. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—normalcy and the state —173—Here we can finally see why there are no hyphen-
ated Japanese ethnic designations.  There are no step-
siblings for the national family.  One is either all the 
way inside or completely out.  Unfortunately, despite 
attempts at this, the Japanese state has not been able 
to have only Japanese citizens as residents within 
Japan.  As mentioned above, most of the “foreigners” 
in Japan were born there—their ancestors having 
been victims of the Japanese colonial enterprise—and 
so their outsider status represents a day-to-day, life-
long, situation: usually the dominant feature of their 
lifestyle in Japan.
“Dubois' concept of 'double con-
sciousness' is only the best known
resolution of a familiar problem
which points towards the core
dynamic of racial oppression as
well as the fundamental antinomy
of diaspora blacks.
How has this doubleness, what
Richard Wright calls the 'dreadful
objectivity' which flows from
being both inside and outside the
West, affected the conduct of
political movements against racial
oppression and towards black
autonomy?”
(Gilroy 1991, 4).
Against the uniform field of atarimae Japaneseness 
shared by ninety-nine percent of their neighbors, 
these “gaijin” stand out as strangers, as different, and 
necessarily—in the sense that they are not properly 
habituated to the local space—wrong.  It is from this 
position of difference and proximity that thousands of 
Kyoto’s Korean residents have gained a perspective 
edge on life in this city.  The vast majority of individu-
als finds that the effortless fit between their Umwelt 
and Japaneseness gives them no reason to question 
the oddity that these should be conjoined in this man-
ner.  But when “Koreans” in Kyoto can readily pass as 
Japanese when they want to, and still experience daily 
discrimination based upon their “paper selves,” on 
documents that mark them as foreign, then the mis-
recognition of nationality as habitus surfaces as a 
mode of racial oppression.
  Field (Beyond envy...) notes, “There is no question  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—normalcy and the state —174—here of speaking for the subaltern (one major differ-
ence in the situation of Korean-Japanese and African-
American literature is that [the former]... contends 
with claims of undiluted homogeneity and therefore 
utter indifference to any minority cultural produc-
tion); the subaltern must speak for the majority, 
remind it of its own oppression.”   
If there is to be a place of refuge and resistance 
from the modes of national-discourse domination in 
Kyoto, then it is a place that first needs to be imag-
ined, and this imagination is today being produced in 
Kyoto in communities of its resident Koreans.  Here 
are the counter-expressions that would remake Japa-
nese identity into a slippery habitus: one that might 
need active attachment to retain, one that might get 
lost or removed in favor of a habitus form from an 
individual’s own reflexive Umwelt.  A source of these 
counter expressions in Kyoto and in Japan can be 
found in resident Korean literature and in new cultural 
festivals.
Why festivals?  Why not simply take advantage of 
the fact that, in Japan, the state cares little about what 
gets published (as long as this does not concern the 
imperial family or include photos with pubic hair—
although the latter is also now possible ever since 
Madonna book Sex was allowed into Japan uncen-
sored) since it is in firm control of what gets most 
widely read?  Festivals are what I call cultural/political/
spatial local-motives: they occupy public space, they 
articulate identity features, they force the expression  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Local Spaces and Counter-identities—normalcy and the state —175—of passion, and they open to the potential for demo-
cratic participation.  As we will see, it is entirely possi-
ble for the state to co-opt a festival for its own use: 
removing control over the content, and exerting a 
top-down, non-democratic administration.  The event 
still might look festive.  But in a sense I will develop in 
the coming chapter, it has lost its claim to being a fes-
tival. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—waiting for communitas —176—Festival events and new social movements
waiting for communitas
When I first arrived in Kyoto1, in the summer of 
1992, I began that first week on what would be a futile 
year of searching for a local urban Shinto festival that 
would display inclusive, community-building features—
an aspect of these events that was often noted in eth-
nographic and tourist literature as their main, if unin-
tended, outcome.  
1. Kyoto prides itself as a “city of festivals,” and matsuri events in the city are quite common—
some sort of matsuri could be found on any given week.  But even the old family Kyoto people I 
spoke with confessed that Kyoto's festivals were not as lively as those in some other parts of 
Japan.  Emotional display in public was apparently not Kyoto's forté.  Centuries of Imperial 
court oversight and cultural management and a capital city's increased focus on crowd control 
might have served to “domesticate” festivals to an extent greater than in other locales dur-
ing pre-modern times [See: Domestication].  So I have to remind the reader that I am not 
describing “Japanese” festivals here.  I am not even describing a festival that could easily 
reveal similar features in all of the matsuri in Kyoto.  As much as the factors that are chang-
ing festivals in Kyoto are present elsewhere in Japan, I hope this work adds insight to the 
study of similar practices in other Japanese cities.  But I am not and would not suggest that 
my observations of a certain few festivals can possibly critique the entire festival production 
of Japan. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Chounaikai —177—“I took this shot in the morning in 
Higashi-kujo from my flat in Mat-
sunoki public housing.  I see this 
view every day.  
Last spring, I saw the fire that 
happened in 40 banchi.”
©1994 Chinmi Yuu
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
What I did not count on was the simple fact that 
many of the neighborhood communities—or, at least, 
organizations that are said to represent these (choun-
aikai)— had been “preformed” decades earlier, and 
that this original construction was more inflexibly 
durable than I had first imagined, and this duration had 
extended long beyond the springtime of their creative 
formation.   So, today, their original pre-formance is 
no longer per-formable.  In Kyoto, no discussion of 
neighborhood events can begin without some back-
ground on “neighborhood association” organizations.
Chounaikai
Here is my son, Louis, running on 
my chou’s team in the district 
undokai.  With so few children 
living in our neighborhood, my 
son became a valuable resource 
for the child-centered neighbor-
hood events.
Photo by the author
The chounaikai organization of my neighborhood 
had certain annual and other more regular activities.  
While preparing for the Awata Matsuri was its single  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Chounaikai —178—most labor-intensive activity, the organization also par-
ticipated in annual fire-prevention drills, in the dis-
trict’s annual undokai (athletic meet) and in the 
distribution of literature provided by the district office 
(kuyakusho).  Each year the organization also arranges 
a day-trip to some local destination (such as the 
Osaka Aquarium).
But the more regular activities of the organization 
were those that put it into an information-distribution 
role within the city government.  The circulation of 
kairanban notices—official announcements that are 
passed from house to house on a clipboard, with each 
house recording that it has read the notice—the dis-
tribution of the city-published monthly newspaper, 
and many other occasional leaflets, and the posting of 
city announcements and posters on the neighborhood 
bulletin board (keijiban) were the main activities of the 
organization.  
“In a coffee shop near Sanjo in 
Kyoto, I am sitting and writing.  
Even though this looks like lei-
sure time, I’m really doing some 
work.”
©1994 Takeshi Watanabe
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
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The chounaikai maintains an official position as an 
appendage of the city’s district office.  But it does this 
with a certain lack of enthusiasm.  The various duties 
are passed from household to household, and com- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Chounaikai —179—pleted with expected regularity.   As Bestor1 (1989) 
noted, there can be a significant divergence between 
the official position of the chounaikai to the city gov-
ernment, and the attitude of the chounaikai’s members 
to this position and to the city government.  
1. In Bestor’s (ibid) description of the choukai (=chounaikai) in his neighborhood in Tokyo 
there were many features and duties that were not present in my Kyoto neighborhood.   I 
am not certain about whether this is due to an attenuation of a more traditional chounaikai 
organization in Kyoto, or a more straightforward difference between these types of organi-
zations in Tokyo and Kyoto.
In March of every year, the local 
fire station would send a squad to 
check the neighborhood’s fire 
extinguishers and to refresh the 
neighborhood chounaikai on 
their use.  Although women (and 
anthropologists) are mostly the 
ones who are present in the neigh-
borhood at all hours of the day, 
the only persons who were trained 
to use this equipment were men.
Photo by author
One of the benefits of having 
a neighborhood-level organi-
zation in place is the venue 
this provides when a common 
concern arises.   Several years 
back,  a multistory condomin-
ium block2 was proposed 
within the chou, and concerns 
about the effects of this on 
mountain views and television 
reception were voiced through the chounaikai.  At this 
point, if an inadequate response had been made by the 
developers, the chounaikai could have used its position 
to bring this complaint to the city.  
2. As Bestor (ibid) and also Robertson (1991) noted,  condo-dwellers are not actively 
included in the chounaikai organization.  In Higashi-kujo, Korean families and those living 
in apartments or city housing are also generally excluded from neighborhood organiza-
tions.   This adds to a suspicion within the Korean community that these organizations are 
actively antagonistic toward Koreans. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Chounaikai —180—“This old grandmother (harumon 
in Kyoto Korean) came to shop at 
my store.  In the old days, every-
body made kimchi at home, but 
the number of people who shop 
for this is really increasing.”
©1994 Yoni Bekku
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As it turned out, the condomin-
ium developers agreed to place 
a large television antenna on the 
roof and provide the houses of 
the chou with cabled access to 
this.  But the mountain view dis-
appeared in the process.  
Because all neighborhoods have 
these organizations, and 
because they are held responsi-
ble for certain official duties by 
the city, chounaikai are much 
more a venue where the city 
speaks to its citizens than where 
citizens can organize counter-
movements against the city.   
“The Young Korean League meets 
twice a week.  We work on 
Korean language and discuss his-
tory, culture and the current situa-
tion of resident Koreans in Japan.”
©1994 Myung-duk Koo
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They are generally one-way conduits from the 
district office to its constituents.  But they are struc-
turally not limited to this role.  And the history of the 
mis-appropriation of these organizations as a means of 
surveillance in pre-War Japan does not preclude them 
from moving in other directions: as local inputs to dis-
trict policies, or as organizational groups for new fes-
tivals. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Chounaikai —181—Later we will be talking about life 
outside of neighborhood associa-
tions, and how these organizations 
can become gate-keepers in the 
process of exclusion.  For exam-
ple, you can see this in The great 
poster conflict. This incident took 
place at a general meeting of the 
Higashi-kujo Madang organizing 
committee, and it ended up with 
twenty people spending an hour 
inking out the madang’s fund-
raising account number on hun-
dreds of fliers.
In his book, The Great Good Place(1991), Ray Old-
enburg argues that “third-places:” places outside the 
home and outside the workplace (cafes, coffee shops, 
community centers, beauty parlors, bars, etc.) are 
vital to informal social life.  In much the same way, 
“third-groups:”  organizations outside of government 
and work, can be seen as vital to social life, particu-
larly to a social life enlivened by cultural expression.  
This is, of course, where we find notions of “civil soci-
ety.”  
Externality—particularly from the state, but also, 
I would argue, from the capitalist market, and from 
religious paternalism— is the primary feature of civil 
society organizations, and it is through their indepen-
dent position that they offer venues for critical reflec-
tion.  Civil society organizations provide opportunities 
for expressive culture that are not managed in the 
interest of the state or the market.  
However in Kyoto, status is displayed through 
spectacles organized by the city (together with Shinto 
organizations, whose prior connection to the state 
has been formally, but not actually severed).  These 
ceremonial occasions bring into public view the differ-
ential axes of agency that flow from connections to 
official organizations.  The close connection between 
the status displayed in connection with the City’s cer-
emonial calendar and access to resources that are 
managed by the state, creates the disequilibrium of  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Chounaikai —182—allocative and authoritative1 power that characterizes 
the structure of domination in Kyoto. 
1. Giddens (ibid) lists allocative resources as: “1) Material features of the environment (raw 
materials, material power sources); 2) Means of material production/reproduction (instru-
ments of production, technology); 3) Produced goods (artifacts created by the interaction 
of 1 and 2)”  Giddens (ibid) then lists the authoritative resources as “1) Organization of 
social time-space (temporal-spatial constitution of paths and regions) 2) Production/repro-
duction of the body (organization and relation of human beings in mutual association) and 
3) Organization of life chances (constitution of chances of self development and self-
expression)”.   To both of these lists, I would add control over the means and the symbols of 
cultural expression: e.g., the wherewithal to celebrate in public.
“In this daytime picture, while 
there aren’t any people, from all 
of the wash hanging up, you can 
see that this is a crowded place...”
©1994 Yong-suk Ryang
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“The resources which constitute
structures of domination are of
two sorts—allocative and authori-
tative.  Any co-ordination of
social systems across time and
space necessarily involves a defi-
nite combination of these two
types of resources...
(Giddens 1984, 258).”
The link between culturally based stigma and eco-
nomic marginality that is so clear from any examina-
tion of the circumstances of domination of buraku 
dwellers imbricates the call for a respect of heteroge-
neity as a human right with the demand for political/
economic justice, and equal access to jobs, housing, 
institutional affiliation, and social welfare resources.  
And at the neighborhood level, the exclusion of Kore-
ans from chounaikai organizations positions them out-
side the gate of a host of city-led state-sponsored 
events, programs, and institutions. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Chounaikai —183—“At sunset in 40 banchi, grand-
mothers and grandfathers take 
time to relax.  It’s an everyday 
sight in 40 banchi.”
©1994 Min-ho Ou
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 As long as the chounaikai maintain a client rela-
tionship to the district city office (kuyakusho) they are 
unable to provide the space outside of the interests of 
the city and the state.   The organizational presence of 
the city within the neighborhood may enhance the 
city’s public education efforts, but it also occupies the 
place and the time where an alternative, civil-society 
neighborhood organization might exist. 
 We will continue to look at sta-
tus-quo displays of belonging and 
exclusion that form the local 
matrix of civic belonging against 
which Koreans are to building a 
counter matrix, based on the 
notion of heterogeneity.   But we 
also need to look at this counter-
movement as having a goal 
beyond making a space for 
counter-representations.  The 
articulation of a respect for heter-
ogeneity is a call for justice based 
on a democratic politics of redis-
tribution as well as a democratic 
politics of representation.  
 The chounaikai announces itself as the platform 
for democratic participation in the neighborhood 
without providing the most basic task for democratic 
participation: the right to change the organization 
itself.  This appropriation of the neighborhood as an 
organized discursive space pushes dissenting groups 
into other spaces within and without the neighbor-
hood. 
Finding their neighborhoods already “organized,” 
when groups of Kyoto citizens concerned about urban 
circumstances—from quality of life issues to traffic 
concerns—attempt to deal directly with the city, they 
are told to take specific local complaints to the 
respective chounaikai, where the city can demand a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Somewhere else, some time ago —184—near unanimous decision1 before it considers any 
complaint.  
1. For example, to apply the historical protection statute at the neighborhood/district level 
requires the support of 98% of the area’s residents (Kyoto Journal No.27, 86).  Without this 
protection, owners can replace old buildings with newer (usually larger) structures.
“The Japan Railway trains go 
right near my home.  These are a 
familiar sight.”
©1994 Midori Taoka
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In this way, “neighborhood democracy” becomes 
an impediment to the organization and the goals of 
civil-society organizations seeking changes in city poli-
cies.  
And in terms of the role that the chounaikai play 
in local festival production, here too the festivals and 
other events (such as the undokai) are supported with 
regularity and attention to detail.  The events happen 
every year.  However, the events also take space and 
the time (the holiday on the calendar) away from 
events that might offer expressive openings that are 
not permitted in the current neighborhood festivals. 
Somewhere else, some time ago
As I eagerly approached each new festival occa-
sion,  sometimes travelling to nearby towns,  I looked 
for the signs of novelty and inclusivity that would sug-
gest that here was an event which was managed to 
express a cultural sentiment that bespoke of new 
voices.   But new voices were still silent in the events I  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Playing with fire —185—witnessed. 
“This photo is of an Higashi-kujo 
lane (roji ) where I used to live.  
My husband grew up here, so this 
place holds many memories.  
Even now, many Koreans live 
here.  There are children’s voices 
in the street: a haven for safety.”
©1994 Kanja Shin
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But the next summer, I had realized that my origi-
nal expectations were largely misplaced, in the sense 
that I had expected a festival form to embrace the 
potential for renewal or reform.  In festival after festi-
val, there under the ceremonial scaffold, nothing was 
being built, and little remained when the ceremony was 
complete and the decorations and festival apparatus 
returned to their garages.  Scaffold-building, it 
appears, had become the event.  Dis-play had re-
placed play.
Playing with fire
One of the main tourist attractions of Kyoto is 
the night in August when large fires are lit on the hill-
sides surrounding the city.   The lighting of the Dai-
monji (a.k.a. Obon) fires brings to a close a period 
when families in this part of Japan perform ceremo-
nies at family grave sites, and at temples, and at home-
shrines to family ancestors, all of these under the 
guidance of Buddhist officiants.  It is a time when 
there is an alibi to travel away from work for the pur-
pose of performing these obligatory rites, although 
golf courses and tourist hotels also do a brisk business 
at this time. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Playing with fire —186—“The Daimonji festival is pre-
cisely such a means for articulat-
ing, and thereby maintaining,
community identity. Since the fes-
tival acquired a national reputa-
tion, it has grown into an event
too good to abandon.
(Wazaki 1993, 133)”
At the end of this period when the (invisible) 
ancestors are present to receive these prayers on 
their behalf, the time comes to help them back to 
whatever hell (or other other-world locale) they nor-
mally inhabit.  The point is also to get them away from 
Kyoto for another year.  Lights are used to assist these 
invisibles in finding their way back to where the dead 
must remain.  And for three hundred years, various 
groups have been lighting fires on the hills surrounding 
Kyoto for this purpose.   
The Daimonji fires, such as this 
one in the shape of the Chinese 
character “dai” [meaning “large”] 
are lit on the hills overlooking 
Kyoto in the middle of August 
every year.
These fires are actually 
made of many fires that are 
arranged into shapes that 
become visible when they 
are all alight: rather like a 
dot-matrix printer forming 
letterforms on a page, but where each “dot” is a two-
meter square blazing fire.  The effect of this display 
(when it is not raining) is the nighttime pyrotechnic 
equivalent to skywriting... over the lights1 of the city in 
darkening dusk, Chinese characters and other shapes 
emerge in firelight.   
1. Until several years ago, the City assisted in this spectacle by turning off the streetlights for 
a time.  But today the fires compete against a haze of mercury and other lights.
“This is the pacinko parlor where 
I go occasionally.  Recently I’ve 
had good luck, but usually not...”
©1994 Young-ki Yoon
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been practiced, groups have negotiated among them-
selves for the right (and the obligation) to perform 
this service.  Wazaki (1993) looked at one of these 
festival groups.  He also formulated a notion that 
these fires create a strong identification with the City, 
a sense of “citizenship” that is available to all of 
Kyoto’s city-zens.  
“The definite order in which the
bonfires on the five mountains are
lit is a late invention. Previously,
the five holy mountains competed
with each other in the lighting of
big fires at about 8 p.m. without
any formal order. In the late 1950s
and early 1960s, the Japanese
economy began to develop rapidly
and to achieve high growth rates.
The national government intended
to develop cities all over Japan
through tourism. By this policy it
sought to build economic and
social recovery from the impover-
ishment left by the last world war.
As a response to the policy, the
administration of Kyoto 'rediscov-
ered' the nationally famous festi-
val of Daimonji as an economic
rather than as a religious resource.
It tried to adapt the traditional fes-
tival...into a modern capitalistic
form.  The municipal authorities
insisted that the order of firing
should be fixed to become a more
satisfactory event for tourists.
This was made a condition for
granting economic assistance to
the five Daimonji organizations.
(Wazaki 1993, 137-138)”
However, much of his own text reveals that the 
City government has been active in creating this festi-
val as a national space, as a focus for tourism: that is, 
as an event that is appropriatable by non-Kyotoites, 
and also less appropriatable by Kyotoites.  Indeed, 
while in the past (say, fifty years ago) the viewing of 
these fires was an occasion fairly  equally shared by 
the city, in the last couple of decades the construction 
of taller buildings (such as the Kyoto Hotel) have 
made this an event that can only be fully consumed 
through the purchase of a ticket for a roof-top beer-
garden viewing spot.  
Over four years that I watched the Obon fires I 
was never in a position to see them all (there are five).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Playing with fire —188—I did see four one year1, when I made the pilgrimage 
to the top of a hotel, and for thirty US dollars (¥3000) 
awaited the time when the fires would be lit.  The 
roof-top was packed with Japanese tourists, and the 
heat of the day was slowing draining into the evening 
(as the crowd was slowly draining the hotel’s supply of 
draft beer) when suddenly the rooftop lights went 
dim.  
1. There was a time when all five were visible from the grounds of the Gosho (the Old Pal-
ace), but this is no longer possible.
“This is a shot of the Toji Temple.  
I took the bus when I was going to 
adult education classes.  It’s not a 
good photo...”
©1994 Jong-sun Kan
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As the first fire was lit on the 
Eastern hillside, the hotel’s 
sound system cranked up the 
appropriately romantic tune 
(actually, Glenn Campbell sing-
ing “By the time I get to Phoe-
nix”) and in a hush of 
anticipation we watched and 
guzzled our Ebisu beer while 
the “sacred” fires one-by-one 
came into view—except for one 
of them, which was obscured by 
another tall2 building.  
Wazaki (1993) goes to great 
lengths to show how this event 
binds people together into a collective Kyoto identity.  
But he does not question at all the fact that certain 
groups have been given control of the event, and that 
2. The construction of the 30 meter + tall New Kyoto Station effectively blocks all of the Dai-
monji fires for much of Minami-ku and Higashi-kujo.  By allowing such structures to be built, 
the city further distances its citizens from any collective experience of this event. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Playing with fire —189—this control is not in any way shared, as it is based 
upon residential history centered on a few neighbor-
hoods, and on those families with claims to lengthy 
tenure in those neighborhoods.  Newcomers need 
not apply (unless, through marriage, they become 
connected to one of the “old families”).  There is, for 
example, no procedure by which an interested volun-
teer from any neighborhood could gain a role in this 
practice.   
“I work in a hospital pharmacy.  
This photo is at night.  Sitting 
alone in a large room used for 
medical treatments... there is time 
for thinking.”
©1994 Myung-duk Koo
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“By creating the story of ‘a city as
a whole’ which the inhabitants
can share with each other, they
cement their mutual belonging.”
(Wazaki 1993, 138)
The contingencies of festival production in Kyoto 
today also means that the onus of doing this event, 
which, as Wazaki notes, is now “too good to abandon” 
(and which claims resources from the City for its con-
tinuation) is such that the traditional groups are obli-
gated to assure that the practice is performed with 
predictable precision.  The tourists expect no less.   
This, in turn, means that status/labor positions must 
all be filled, even though there are not enough individ-
uals from “old families” to fill these today.  And so a 
number of other families with fictive affiliations to the 
traditional group have recently been included, and 
some of the original group have dropped out, because 
of disinterest or disagreement (Wazaki tells us little 
about these “slackers”).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Playing with fire —190—“Bath time.  It is eleven in the 
evening, the water is hot, and I 
feel very relaxed.  I soak for about 
thirty minutes.”
© 1994 Hideomi Tabata
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Today, the claim to a primordial 
right of membership in this festi-
val organization as the main rea-
son for excluding other Kyoto 
residents from participation 
does not hold up to the facts.  
This right is a pretense that 
serves to maintain a festival sta-
tus (and claims to resources) 
within the city.  What is continu-
ous in this event is not a sense 
of community, even within its 
core group, but rather its logic 
of exclusion; and what is dis-
played is status difference, not 
collective (and certainly not democratic) citizenship in 
this “civic” festival.  
“‘Uchuu’ [space, i.e., outer space] 
Park: a little green in the middle 
of Higashi-kujo.”
© 1994 Midori Taoka
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The ascription of city-wide inclusivity, and nation-
wide cultural stature to this event—either by the city, 
or by anthropologists such as Wazaki—hang the mask 
of communitas on an event where this does not occur.  
However these appropriations of the practice also 
change the contours of the obligation to perform it: it 
must now be done without fail, and without internal 
changes to its content.  Its expected form is now fixed  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Playing with fire —191—within the JTB (Japan Travel Bureau) tourist itinerary.   
Today the Daimonji fires no longer belong to the com-
munities that light them.  
This commodification of a once-local practice—a 
practice with a long history of innovation (e.g., there 
was at one time only one fire) and internal competi-
tion—by the state, for some national interest; and the 
resulting commodity, which is then appropriated by 
the city, show the outcome of a process that accounts 
for the current position of all of Kyoto’s main public 
events.   
“Stopping off at my friend’s shop, 
on the way to the nursery school.”
©1994 Naomi Manabe
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The issues of belonging, and of ceremonial status 
are now imbricated within budgets and interests that 
the city and other national institutions have applied in 
order to appropriate the events for national consump-
tion.   Other festivals in Kyoto are performed in the 
shadow of these national events, their once-cele-
brated localness is transformed into a lack of national 
importance. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Looking for a good time —192—Looking for a good time
Festivals bring out displays of 
Kyoto’s former opulence—often 
in the form of brocades, either as 
the result of local manufacture, or 
as goods acquired from Silk-Road 
trading (Kyoto was the Eastern 
terminus of this trade).  This 
photo shows my neighborhood’s 
festival display.
©Anjali 1993
When my early explorations of Kyoto festivals 
were less than successful, I begin to ask people where 
I could find a festival that was really festive (saireiteki), 
or lively (ikiikina).  Their answers would betray either a 
nostalgia (“things are not like they used to be, you 
know”) or a remembered location unhinged by its 
television source (“I saw just what you’re looking for 
on NHK last week, but where was that?  Kyushu, I 
think, or was it Shikoku?”).  Wherever and whenever 
it was, this festival was not here and now in Kyoto.    
“Here is a photo of a garage bar-
becue.  Barbecued meat is best 
cooked on a chichirin (clay 
grill).  Everybody is helping 
themselves and drinking beer.”
©1994 Yong-suk Ryang
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Later, more professional advice from ethnogra-
phers from the National Museum of Ethnography in 
Osaka confirmed my predicament.  “Why did you 
choose Kyoto?” they asked,  “There’s nothing like that 
going on there.” TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Looking for a good time —193—“In Kyoto there are many old tem-
ples, and you can really say that
everyday, somewhere there is a
festival, big or small.”
Kawabata Yasunari,
Kouou (The Old Capital).
[My translation]
Written in 1961, three years
before the Tokyo Olympics, this
work measures with regret the
changes that were transforming
cultural production in Kyoto.  It is
a story that also chronicles the
yearly conduct of festival produc-
tion.
Kyoto advertises itself as a festival town.  It is the 
hometown of Gion-style festivals, which now occur in 
several other cities.   Certainly the lack of festivity in 
so many festivals was itself remarkable.  Why would so 
many events followed meticulous scripts every year in 
so perfunctory a fashion?  
Many people in the United States, for example, 
might complain about  annual, obligatory family holi-
day gatherings.  But imagine, if you will, that these 
gatherings were also scripted to an extent that the 
arrivals and departures and the table conversations, 
and, of course, the food, were all precisely known in 
advance.  And then elaborate these to a ceremonial 
plateau, and then perform these in public (early 
Shinto, before the state took it over was dominated 
by familial interests), and do so every year.   
“On the way back home from 
dropping off my child (at school) 
I have a nice ‘well-side chat’ with 
a local grandmother.”
©1994 Yoni Bekku
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
As difficult as I figured it might be to maintain and 
reproduce a festival where the energy always threat-
ened to boil over into emotional excess, potential vio-
lence, and predictable property damage, it must be 
even more difficult to manage an event where the 
emotion had cooled to a dispassionate boredom.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Looking for a good time —194—Onlookers at Kyoto’s most 
famous festival, the Gion Matsuri, 
fight against the boredom that the 
event’s current performance (or 
lack) promotes.  With the parade 
stopping and starting to allow 
cross-traffic, and with the absence 
of any performative innovation, 
the event can only succeed in its 
terms by resembling its prior per-
formance.  At least it offers an 
alibi for some hirune (afternoon 
nap).  Here a crowd of ring-side 
onlookers has mostly lost the bat-
tle against boredom.
Caron 1993
In hindsight1, the best outcome of not securing a 
research fellowship before entering the field is when 
the object that was so carefully constructed in 
advance for the proposal turns out to be something 
else in the field.   With no commitment to the study of 
a predetermined event, I was free  to explore others. 
1. Elsewhere I have written about the problem of promoting the preservation of an historic 
event without attention to its original logic  (Caron 1994).  Here I would only elaborate on 
the need to not abandon the logic of one’s research in the middle of the field, even if you 
have to continue searching for the entry point where this logic opens to a reflexive critique.
“...The Shinto shrine brought to
the local society a sacred order;
by gathering at such jinja and
jointly carrying out the festivals
observed there, people gained a
re-awareness of their member-
ship  in that [the primordial rice-
cultivation] community, and
achieved the very power which
allowed them to maintain their
social lives.”
Nihon wa Matsuri no Kuni
Japan, Land of Festivals
Tokyo, Jinjahoncho n.d.
 The search would  take another year.  Each festi-
val I witnessed (three or more a month in the first 
year) turned out—each in their own manner—to be 
an event scripted to look the way it was expected to 
look, which is the way it looked the previous year, and 
the years before that.  But this ceremonial conserva-
tism was not surprising, of itself.   I just had no idea 
about the extent of conservatism within Kyoto soci-
ety.  Once I more fully grasped this, the festivals 
seemed to fit into the antediluvian logic of practice. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Looking for a good time —195—For these events display practices that are 
embedded into longer-term local histories, histories 
that are tended to with some devotion, at least to 
their appearance.   What was surprising was the effect 
of this conservatism, now strategically accomplished, 
sometimes at great expenditures of labor and materi-
als. Given the changing social and demographic cir-
cumstances of the city—the many aspects of the city 
that are not the same—actually keeping something 
from changing promotes change in its relationship to 
its surrounding space.   And so, the more things stayed 
the same, the more they actually changed.
“Here I am making kimchi in my 
shop.  The night before I add salt 
to the Chinese cabbage.  I rinse 
this out in the morning.  About 
noon I mix in the sauce I’ve pre-
pared.”
©1994 Yoni Bekku
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
Time after time I learned that, in 
order to create this performa-
tive simulacrum, people (anyone 
was willing) were  paid to dress 
up and act out the scripted 
roles.  Festival participation had 
become  another arubaito, a 
part-time job that area high-
school and college students 
could take on as they wished.  In 
some cases, companies1 volun-
teered their workers, in others 
these jobs were filled from 
social clubs or university cam-
pus organizations.  The result 
1. There are now festival “sports” teams in Tokyo and elsewhere that carry around omikoshi 
“shrines” as a sort of group aerobic exercise.  In the Kantou matsuri in Northern Japan, I 
sawo mikoshis carried by corporate workers in company costume, where the omikoshi 
bore the corporate logo, and there was no pretense about any divine occupant. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Looking for a good time —196—was a loss of social-geographic focus for the event.  It 
was no longer a festival performed by a certain group 
of residents of a certain neighborhood.
“Matsuri are those occasions on
which the Japanese people behave
in their most truly “Japanese”
manner.”
Nihon wa Matsuri no Kuni
Japan, Land of Festivals
Tokyo, Jinjahoncho n.d.
This appropriation of festivals as
indexical of national identity dis-
embeds local culture in favor of a
putative national culture.
Larger festivals have always relied on the use of 
labor from a large area.  And so the Gion festival for-
merly matched urban neighborhood merchant com-
munities with teams from surrounding villages who 
would supply some of the muscle-power.  These 
arrangements were fixed and continuous.  But again, 
dislocations, including the fairly rapid depopulation of 
agricultural villages after World War II required that 
new sources of festival labor be found, and so the fes-
tival arubaito (part-time job) was born.  
“This is a modern view of 
Higashi-kujo’s ‘zero-banchi’ area.  
I went and took this from across 
the Kamo river.  Here is where the 
basis for the Korean life-style is 
built, but now it is quickly dying 
out.”
©1994 Kanja Shin
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
On another side of the event, the service of pro-
viding street foods and trinkets for the festival crowds 
has become its own industry, and a national commu-
nity of travelling side-show merchants set up stalls 
(yatai) and sell the foods and souvenirs that everyone 
expects to find along the street.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Looking for a good time —197—Festival foods in Japan are domi-
nated by products that offer little 
variety from festival to festival 
(you can count on cotton candy, 
corn dogs, and candied apples), 
but they also maintain some 
genres of street-foods: fried fish, 
bean sweets, and okonomiyaki 
[Lit: “fried what you like to eat” 
shown here] a fat pancake of 
shredded vegetables, meats, and 
unique sauces.  While the cuisine 
has become more uniform across 
the nation, at least street food1 
retains a firm place in these 
events. (Photo by author)
1. Until recently in Kyoto, food would not normally be eaten in the street, even when this has 
been purchased from street vending machines.  And so this festival tradition marked a dif-
ferent sense of the street as a site where normally prohibited bodily behaviors were possi-
ble.  Of late, one can see snack foods being eaten on the street with little opprobrium.
The financial and spatial 
arrangements for these mer-
chants are difficult to deter-
mine, as they are negotiated 
between the Shrines, the fes-
tival organizing committees, 
the local organizations that 
manage all small retail busi-
nesses on the streets (i.e., 
local professional gangs—
yakuza), and the police.  
“Kujou station is the loneliest sta-
tion in Kyoto.  Everybody gets on 
or off up at Kyoto station.  I usu-
ally wait for the train here all by 
myself.”
©1994 Bruce Caron
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
But again, what could also be a source of partici-
pation and of income for local organizations has now 
been acquired by people outside of the neighborhood.   
While rural festivals are occasions that showcase local 
foods, festivals in towns and cities mostly provide a 
“national” festival food menu.  And so festival foods 
and goods also do not carry a flavor of the local2. 
2. The Higashi-kujo Madang food and goods are all locally run, and do provide income and a 
type of participation for the community.  The same is true of other events held within the 
buraku areas, where even the self-professed low-class festival merchants do not set up 
their stalls. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Looking for a good time —198—In promoting civic insideness by
implicitly encouraging the staging
of shrinelike festivals as a style of
citizen participation, the central
government (LDP) and local
municipalities resemble their
Meiji counterparts. But where the
latter created shrine-centered
administrative villages in a con-
certed effort to foster national
spiritual unity, the present govern-
ment is expropriating local festi-
vals toward a similar end. The
outcome is both the cultural and
political appropriation of the local
by the national and the perme-
ation of the national by the local.
(Robertson 1991, 38)
When I would enquire about this practice of hir-
ing performers, I was told, with a certain amount of 
uneasiness on the part of the teller, that it had 
become impossible to keep the event going in the way 
it was supposed to look with only people from the 
neighborhood.  Either not enough people had lived 
there long enough to fully belong to the neighbor-
hood, or not enough families had the numbers of chil-
dren needed to fill all of the roles.  And so other 
arrangements had to be made.  Where prior social 
arrangements were still possible, these were usually 
maintained.  But as the larger practice,  now based on 
expediency, eroded the logic of collective ritual duty/
status/reward for performance, these practices 
became increasingly emptied of significance.  
“In Kyoto’s towns, on every lane, 
you can find a Jizo shrine.  Jizo is 
a God who protects children.  
Adults and children will greet Jizo 
whenever they pass by.”
©1994 Yumi Sakamoto
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
The move to cash rewards cre-
ated a logic of part-time profes-
sionalism that militated against 
stable social-geographical status 
rewards.  The resulting festival 
may be performed in a neigh-
borhood, but it was no longer 
performed by or for the neigh-
borhood.  Usually it was done 
to satisfy a diffuse but requisite 
civic expectation for the specta-
cle.  There was an obligation to 
keep it going, even though there 
was little discussion about what 
“it” was that actually happened  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—The veneer of appearance —199—every year.
The veneer of appearance
Through this overriding devotion to proper 
appearance, these events have became ever more like 
their folkloric records, which have noted in detail the 
appearance and ritual of such events, without examin-
ing their ethnographic complexity.  Today many such 
events no longer hold much underlying complexity to 
be examined.  And, as someone who had arrived in 
Kyoto to explore this very complexity, the discovery 
of its absence was indeed worrisome.  
“Here’s a shot of my girlfriend—
just kidding!  This is in front of 
the labor center.  She’s coming 
back from buying juice for the 
madang rehearsal.  I pretended I 
was shooting in the other direc-
tion and snuck a quick photo.”
©1994 Teir Chin
GO TO PREVIOUS PHOTO
GO BACK TO FIRST PHOTO
But the appearance of the appearance of these 
festivals was also not really what it appeared to be.  
There are aspects of a festival where appearance is 
not enough.  When even the excesses in behavior—
from cross-dressing (at the sagichou matsuri of Omih-
achiman) to male nudity and bravado (at the kenka 
matsuri at Himeji), to public drunkenness at most 
events—are fully expectable, and kept in their place 
within the event, then the simulacrum fails to maintain 
the element of active risk that a performance needs to 
be a performance, and a festival to be festive.  What is 
by all appearances a festival, ceases to follow a festival 
logic.  What remains is pure spectacle. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—The veneer of appearance —200—There will come a time when no one alive 
remembers that the festival used to be different, that 
it used to wander off course or fall down or add new 
features, and that people used to get bloody or happy 
or both at the same time.  Once that time comes then 
the simulacrum will have succeeded in closing with its 
referent and appearances will be all that is expected.  
When the memory of the festival fades, the spectacle 
steps into its place.  And the lack of surprise is no 
longer surprising except to the stranger who came 
looking to be surprised. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—urban matsuri literature —201—The Jinjahoncho in Tokyo pro-
duced this video “Japan: Land of 
Festivals” in the 1980s to be 
shown at a trade fair in Europe,  to 
explain why the Japanese rice 
market should not be opened to 
imports.  A heritage of rice culti-
vation (following a strong deter-
minist ecological anthropological 
reasoning, which claimed that the 
uniqueness of any culture is pat-
terned from its interaction with its 
particular ecology) from pre-his-
toric times is provided as the pri-
mary feature of modern Japanese 
culture.  SOME QUOTES: “Until 
the present day the Japanese peo-
ple have maintained their way of 
life on the basis of rice cultiva-
tion”... “Shinto1 is...the history of 
the Japanese way of life... as the 
basis of Japanese culture, Shinto 
has culturally...supported the way 
of life of the Japanese people up 
to the present day...”
1. I visited the Jinjahoncho in Tokyo through the gracious generosity of the Bamboo Associa-
tion, a lay Buddhist organization.  The video I was given did not even mention the presence 
of Buddhism in Japanese history.  Nor did it mention the recent period in time when Shinto, 
as the official state religion of the Empire, provided a sacred aesthetic for fascism in Japan.
Again, it was not merely a lack of space for sur-
prise—for innovation or improvisation—which char-
acterized these “festivals”, there was also a lack of a 
definite “social space” in the choice of performers.  
Traditionally, the onus of participation falls to/on 
those who represent the “native” population, those 
families with claims to long-term residence (and who 
also maintain close ties with local shrines and tem-
ples).  Today, participation was offered as a paid job to 
people (mostly young men) hired on to do the heavy 
work of pulling and carrying festival objects through 
the streets.  
urban matsuri literature
As with most ethnographies that track a commu- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—urban matsuri literature —202—nity throughout the year, recent ethnographies in 
urban Japanese locales make note of the festival occa-
sion (which is, after all, difficult to avoid), but are else-
where occupied, and generally fail to explore the 
festival’s performative openings.   An exception to this 
is Bestor’s work in a shitamachi (downtown) Tokyo 
neighborhood.   Bestor notes the careful organization 
and the details in planning and execution of the festi-
val.   He remarks on how the event is at the same 
time a reflection of hierarchical social organization 
and egalitarian cooperation.
“The matsuri and the month or so of preparations leading up to it express several important,
though sometimes seemingly antithetical, social themes. Social stratification and ranking in Miya-
moto-choo are expressed and enforced through the assignment of positions on the festival commit-
tee and through public postings of residents’ contributions. Strong distinctions are underscored
between newcomers and longer-term residents in the selection and duties of committee members.
Stratified authority governs decision-making for the festival. Tasks in managing and running the festi-
val, and even the spatial and temporal distribution of activities during it, reflect rigid divisions of labor
by age and gender. Yet despite the social differentiation that plays so visible a role, sentiments of soli-
darity and egalitarianism prevail, and when residents talk of the festival’s meaning, they speak of this
spirit of communal unity as the matsuri’s dominant motif.”      
(Bestor 1989, 235)
Bestor provides in his discussion of the festival 
enough materials to suggest the social dynamics of the 
event (although he was basically unconcerned over 
matters of cultural expression, aesthetics and other, 
performative critiques).  But even his description, as 
the above illustrates, deserves to be explored in much 
greater detail, as it elides the various problems it 
introduces by allowing for a gloss of the festival under 
the rubric of communal solidarity.  
“When residents talk,” suggests that there is an  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—urban matsuri literature —203—unquestionable unanimity1 of opinion, and that this 
would not reveal underlying disagreements if the eth-
nographer were more direct in pursuing this topic 
among various members of the neighborhood.     Of 
all the events that a neighborhood might perform, it is 
the festival that should open up to multiple readings 
and voices because of the decontrol of emotions it 
fosters. 
  His description of the participation allows us to 
see that most of the egalitarian cooperation comes in 
the form of the widespread solicitation of donations 
to the shrine, although these are also limited by an 
appropriateness  that is guided by residential status 
(to give too much would be presumptuous, and to 
give too little would lead to a general disapproval).   
His description of the event, however, shows that it 
retains its performative energy, the combination of 
muscle and crowd and alcohol that makes it danger-
ous.  
1. Does this tacit consensus reveal an effect of the festival, and, if so, has the festival become 
trivial because it can only evoke this one response?  Bestor does not pursue the field of 
festivity as a way to open up a critique of the festival.
“STACCATO WHISTLES, hoarse shouts of “Washoi! Washoi!, and the rhythmic counterpoint of
wooden clappers shatter the late summer afternoon as a seething mass of sweaty men lurches down
the shopping street under a float the size and weight of a small automobile. Brass ornaments glitter
and tinkle in the frenzy. The tassels of the float’s purple lashings spin wildly above the men’s shoul-
ders. Bystanders rush to remove bicycles and other obstructions from the mob’s path. Tiny children
peer out from behind their mothers’ aprons, enchantment and fear in turn playing across their faces.
Strong men push float and mob back, steering them away from a plate-glass window. Chortling
grandmothers gleefully toss buckets of water from second-floor windows onto the steaming backs
of the churning mass of men below. Bus and taxi drivers watch—some with amusement, others with
impatience—as they sit stranded in the midst of the thronging celebrants who clog the streets and
stop the flow of traffic for a few minutes. The mob of men— some clad like old-fashioned craftsmen TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—urban matsuri literature —204—in matching blue and brown hanten (workmen’s jackets), hachimaki (headbands), and haragake (tight-
fitting black vests and leggings), others stripped to the waist—spin and whirl their way through all
corners of the neighborhood during two or more hours of ecstatic exhaustion, almost hypnotized by
the incessant, deafening, pounding rhythms of the cadence, of the clappers, of the whistles.
Miyamoto-cho’s festival is under way, and the O-mikoshi—the palanquin of the tutelary deity of
the local Shinto shrine, the Kami-sama of Tenso Jinja—has taken over the neighborhood’s streets
during the deity’s annual round of inspection.” (Bestor 224-225).   
The sweaty men on the street here, we can only 
assume (as this is not given in the text) are all resi-
dents of the neighborhood.  But how are they chosen?   
It would be interesting to return in 1997, to see if 
there are still enough men to carry the omikoshi, and 
if newcomers have greater access to positions of visi-
ble authority in the event.
Bestor’s ethnography of a Tokyo neighborhood 
with as long-time history of festival production is well 
complemented by Jennifer Robertson’s description of 
festivity in an emerging suburban Tokyo city.  But Rob-
ertson also connects the organization of the new civic 
(shimin) festival in this city to national government 
programs aimed at re-traditionalizing Japanese towns.  
“One can go so far as to assert that
Japan’s current development itself
has been brought about as a result
of this kind of close linking
[through festival practices]
between the Japanese people and
their deities. In short, one can
truly say that Japan is a ‘land of
festivals.’”
Nihon wa Matsuri no Kuni
Japan, Land of Festivals
Tokyo, Jinjahoncho n.d
Festivals in various locales in Japan have been pro-
moted by local and national governments as the quint-
essentially traditional (dentouteki) Japanese practice; a 
practice that brings with it the capacity to anchor its 
communities into a traditional mode of living.   But 
what this national program failed to realize was the 
active residuum of “native” status in locales.   Although 
the festivals were new, they were couched in tradi- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—urban matsuri literature —205—tional1 Shinto forms, attached to long-existent local 
political and social/religious organizations, and so 
organized by existing hierarchically determined social 
groups based on residential tenure.  
These new/old festivals failed to create a sense of 
belonging for newcomers to neighborhoods, who 
were mostly excluded (except for demands for contri-
butions), and disaffected by these events.  Even the 
“native” residents were more indifferent to these new 
festivals, preferring the ones they had long supported.  
Their contributions to new events exhibited the 
unscripted emotional release that was central to the 
older neighborhood events, only now it was all a part 
of the plan.
1. Many Shinto “traditions,” particularly festival traditions, were revitalized, reinvented, or sim-
ply produced ex nihilo during the late 19th century.
“The crowd loved the heaving, squashing, groaning, grimacing, laughing, carousing, yelling, and
shoving. But the best was yet to come. Instead of melting, one by one, to a finish, the shrine bearers
deliberately caused a crushing pileup, sending the delighted bystanders fleeing to the safety of the
guard-railed sidewalk with the shrines in reckless pursuit. The spectators were thrilled by the display
of festival mayhem (matsuri sawagi). This was more like a “really real” festival, raucous and rambunc-
tious! As I groped my way out of the pulsing rush-hour throngs, I overheard one adventurous elderly
woman exclaim, as she pushed and shoved and clutched indiscriminately, “You don’t know whose
hand you’ll come out holding!”      
(Robertson 1991, 64)
In large part, the unscripted openings of Japanese 
festivals were left unscripted to make room for the 
role of the local deity, whose invisible presence was 
both the chief alibi for, and the hidden animator for 
the event.  
“Kodaira natives are aware of the deities’ absence from the mikoshi and consequently refer to
the citizens’ festival as bereft of authenticity, the implication being that a “real” (shrine) festival is con-
tingent upon a supernatural presence. One participant interviewed at a shrine festival remarked that TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—furusato of furusatos —206—“without kamigakari, festivals are no fun” (Matsudaira 1980, 98). (Kamigakari refers to both the pro-
cess of becoming possessed by a kami and the individual possessed.) The same person also remarked
that one “can’t kamigakari at city hall-sponsored festivals” because the deity is not present. At the
Kodaira citizens’ festival, the countless cans of beer quaffed by the bearers at the two half-hour rest
stops apparently compensated for the absence of kami. Historically, alcohol (sake) has been a stan-
dard feature at festivals, especially at the social gatherings following a mikoshi procession. City hall
apparently had considered banning alcoholic beverages but realized that without beer the “adult”
shrine procession in particular would lack the essential zest”    
(Robertson 1991, 65).
My neighborhood in Kyoto lacked the vigorous 
festival participation that Bestor found: there were no 
feasts, little drinking, and hardly any display of emo-
tion.  As the weather was good, some time was found 
to sit and relax.  Small talk and snacks were available 
for those who dropped by.  And the tasks of setting up 
and dismantling and storing the festival paraphernalia 
took some cooperative effort.  
Here the presence of the kami did not encourage 
the trance possession that persons in Robertson’s 
study noted as the core event of a “real” matsuri, 
although the participants in my neighborhood consid-
ered their festival to be both a real festival and a civic 
event with some measure of importance.  But again, I 
had been warned that Kyoto was not representative 
of Japan.  However, this idea certainly did not match 
Kyoto City’s self representation as Japan’s cultural 
wellspring.
furusato of furusatos
As a city busily preoccupied with its own festival 
heritage, Kyoto was not party to efforts by the LDP 
(the Liberal Democratic Party, which has been in 
power [one way or another] in the National Diet  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—furusato of furusatos —207—since the mid 1950s) to create the “hometown” (furu-
sato) nostalgia that Robertson (1991) details in her 
work.  Furusato images were meant to reconnect 
new-urbanites to the villages where most of their fam-
ilies had lived before five decades of urbanization 
brought Japan to it current level (about 85%) of urban 
habitation.  Kyoto openly advertises itself as the furu-
sato of Japan’s national culture, and it historical heart-
land.  
The dynamics of Kyoto’s older (so-called “tradi-
tional”) events comes from the manner in which they 
are managed, and the rapid changes in local demo-
graphics.  Changing demographics and residence pat-
terns in Kyoto have also fostered the same native/
newcomer conflict that Robertson found in a Tokyo 
suburban city.  Increased mobility within Japan1 has 
resulted in many “new” families into Kyoto's neighbor-
hoods, and also reduced the relative number of fami-
lies with claims to “old” status.  The families that claim 
“old” residence maintain their claim in part through 
their position in the neighborhood organization, 
chounaikai, and in part through their status in the local 
Shrine—a status maintained through offerings and 
attention to status-linked duties (in other words, the 
1. I was told that the average time between household moves in Japan is now about 20 years.  
(The average time in the US is only 5 years.)  Kyoto is also the only large urban area that 
has lost population in the last ten years, a trend that is attributed to its lack of an industrial 
base, and its graying population, which has driven up the cost of national health insurance 
in Kyoto city, further encouraging families (particularly families with multiple children who 
pay these extra costs for each child) to move to suburban locations, which then accelerates 
the geriatrification of the city.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—furusato of furusatos —208—status is heritable, but not merely inherited).  And 
these duties are mostly connected to the shrine’s 
annual festival.  But what happens when the popula-
tion of “old families” in a shrine precinct shrinks 
through demographics and/or urban change (such as 
the replacement of old house estates—sometimes the 
only plot of land large enough for this purpose— by 
apartment or office buildings)?
When the children of the old families became too 
few in number to perform the festival activities, one 
solution would have been to share ceremonial stature 
with the new neighborhood families by opening up 
festival participation within the group of newer fami-
lies.  This option, with an alibi of fictive antiquity, is 
precisely what Wazaki (1993) found in the Diamonji 
community.   He called this “flexibility,” but what 
remains inflexible here is the logic of exclusion.   
Another strategy is to reduce the status of some par-
ticipatory roles, while preserving the status of other 
roles.  And so some neighborhoods/shrines reserve 
the visible leadership roles in the festival within their 
“traditional” households while opening up general 
participation not simply to newer families in their 
neighborhood, but to anyone who would work for 
cash1.  
And, as we shall see, even this diminished state of 
affairs may not be maintainable.  For this event, like 
1. However, in my own neighborhood, perhaps out of a lack of festival finances, this second 
option was also not pursued.  Instead, the event replaced human labor with machines: they 
now carry the heavy festival objects on pick-up trucks.  And so, despite its claims to antiq-
uity, this festival can hardly be said to resemble even its own traditions.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—furusato of furusatos —209—some other Kyoto festivals (notably Gion Matsuri) is 
also linked to a form of residential building (the 
machiya or “townhouse”) that is quickly disappearing.
In short, Shinto festivals in Kyoto today represent 
probably the most conservative (in membership and 
action) notion of “community” available to their 
locale.  In their routinized ritual forms, they hold out 
against modernity’s challenges.  The aspects of exclu-
sion and emotional detachment that Robertson 
(1991) noted in the new civic1 festival (shimin matsuri) 
she studied, were in Kyoto also present in its estab-
lished neighborhood events.  
When I had mistakenly predetermined that a 
neighborhood festival would necessarily foster a dem-
ocratic social grouping, a temporary communitas that 
would counter or even reverse hierarchical social 
roles, I was predicting this as a feature of the logic of 
festival practice.  But what I found was actually what I 
might have expected:  those Shinto festivals I exam-
ined in Kyoto do, in fact, reflect and foster the sense 
of community that is there in Kyoto, a community 
without communitas.
1. Robertson observed that the new shimin matsuri in her locale was created to look like an 
“oldtime” matsuri, a goal that was severely critiqued by the natives, who also maintained 
their festival.  Kyoto's new (since 1994) shimin matsuri, the Kyoto Matsuri, abandons the 
Shinto matsuri mode (perhaps because the city's calendar is already filled with these) in 
favor of a grand parade and evening entertainment.  It will be interesting to see how this 
festival further defines both its performers and its audience.  The use of nostalgia in civic 
events in Kyoto is so completely pervasive that even their historical pageant is not just 
about civic history up to the present, but about a prior history of the city—its pre-Meiji, 
imperial past.  What the grand 1200th Anniversary year (1994) showed most of all was a 
limit to the amount of nostalgia even oldtime Kyotoites could stomach. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—failed festivals —210—Kyoto's festivals are “symptoms” of the city's 
social situation.  Matsuri, in this model, is the ritual 
reenactment of “position1” in its geographic and social 
forms.  While they do not create openings within this 
society, they do put the local hierarchy on public dis-
play.  However, the inability of festival organizers to 
marshal enough interest in these events to maintain a 
performative tradition means that even their ritual 
form could become vulnerable to a telling form of 
social and aesthetic criticism: apathy.  Now apathy at 
the voting place is counted as a quiet statistic (per-
centage of voters), but apathy at a festival shouts its 
boredom on the street.  
1. These festivals resembled in many ways the Hindu Utsavam that Appadurai and Brecken-
ridge studied in the 1970s as sites for negotiating elite status claims.  
failed festivals
Many of the “failings” of matsuri as a medium of 
inclusion in Kyoto (assuming, as I once did, that inclu-
sion is integral to a festival logic) can be traced to its 
failings as a festival—its lack of festivity, despite the 
violence, or nakedness, or drunkenness that it might 
inspire.  At this point, I must point out, regardless of 
the social cachet carried by matsuri as a traditional 
event with high visibility and civic support, there are 
aspects of living in Kyoto that have been particularly 
detrimental to the continuation of matsuri as a festival 
practice; for example, the amount of time devoted to 
work and the traffic congestion in the streets.  
The ongoing de-skilling of the population in festi- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—failed festivals —211—val arts, and the lack of spatial appropriation by festival 
events exemplify the central predicament of perform-
ing festivals in that city.  Six-day work-weeks of ten-
twelve hour days leave little time off either for work-
ers or for their spouses to devote to learning festival 
skills.  And then, on the day of the event, the streets of 
Kyoto are rarely completely given over its festivals.  
Even Gion Matsuri now stops and starts to allow 
cross traffic to flow through it.  Apparently, there are 
now too many autos and trucks on the roads to per-
mit the closure of the main North-South arterials for 
any length of time.   
Complete appropriation of the street is a signal of 
festival space.  Like any game, a festival demands that 
its participants disattend from external activities for 
the duration of their performance.  And so stopping 
and waiting for cross-traffic not only adds to the bore-
dom of the crowds, but preempts the festival mood 
among the participants.  At the same time, because 
their customary performance requires an accumula-
tion of physical strength and agility, many Kyoto festi-
vals depend heavily on the voluntary services of the 
community's young adults.  
Festivals may (and for some theorists, must) 
include all ages.  But their most vigorous activities are 
pursued by young adults.  This is the cohort of the 
population in Japan that has recently experienced both 
a decline in its relative numbers, and a massive 
increase in the demands on its time.  With more than 
half of the city’s high-school population attending both  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—failed festivals —212—school and after-school cram schools in preparation 
for the national university entrance examination, 
opportunities for play of any sort are all too rare.  
Indeed the crowds of onlookers at Kyoto’s festivals 
are nearly entirely populated by individuals who are 
retired, female, or of pre-school age.  Without even an 
opportunity to witness the festivals, the chances for 
skilling in their arts become even fewer.
By 1983 Miyamoto-choo had
ceased hiring outside musicians,
and matsuribayashi came on cas-
sette tapes. Mr. Shigemori, who
was in charge of music for that
year’s matsuri, explained that the
festival committee had decided
against hiring live musicians for
two reasons: they were outsiders
rather than Miyamoto-choo resi-
dents, and in the wake of an
expensive drive to purchase a new
mikoshi, they were trying to keep
expenses down.
(Bestor 1989, 239)
The progressive attenuation of the city's festival 
performances, for example the recent (post 1993) use 
f pre-recorded Gion-bayashi music (a locally famous 
genre of festival music) in place of live music ensem-
bles, and the use of trucks to carry or pull festival 
floats, signals more than the a loss of enthusiasm for 
(and in) these events, can only partially be linked to 
structural impediments such as those described 
above.  This process is also the product of a nostalgia 
worn too thin and brittle, of an attitude of reverence 
toward the historical content of these events at the 
expense of their necessary creativity.  Not that some 
reverence may not be due here—there is a heritage of 
festival forms here that should not be ignored.  But 
this attitude is misplaced when it is not linked to the 
festival logic of the event, but rather to the ritual repe-
tition of some spectacular performance.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—failed festivals —213—Although Fukasaku insists that
the people of Japan will begin to
create “a new culture of their
own,” he does not venture any
suggestions about the form and
content of this “new” entity. The
“new” culture—the “authentic”
community—appears as a state-
regulated project in which the
nostalgia for nostalgia is manipu-
lated, on the one hand, to mask
human responsibility for socio-
ecological change and, on the
other, to create a collectivist
mythopoeia predicated on the
reification of the “old village.”
“Old villages” are presumed to
have existed in harmonious tran-
quility until vitiated and transmo-
grified by outside forces—such as
westernization, industrialization,
and urbanization. In the furusato-
zukuri literature, change for the
worse is described as precipitated
by external agents. Change for the
better, on the other hand, is pre-
sented as a wholly Japanese
undertaking, a rallying against
intrusive foreign agents....
(Robertson 1991, 29-30)
Let me provide a somewhat hyperbolic example 
to show where I am going here.  Imagine, for a 
moment, a championship game of baseball, a well-
matched game that moves, play-by-play, through a 
series of remarkable feats of personal skill and team-
work, and ends with a dramatic finish on the final play 
of the game.  This is a game that is later recalled by 
many as one of the best in their memory.  But why 
stop at recollection?  Now imagine that two teams are 
assembled every year to play this game again.  Not to 
play a new game, but to repeat, pitch by pitch, hit by 
hit, and catch by catch, what happened in this now-
famous game.  Of course the pitching must be slowed 
to allow for predictable hitting, and the crowd must 
be coached to respond in a correctly enthusiastic 
manner.   In fact, some of the skills required to pre-
cisely mimic the original event may be as difficult as 
the skills that were displayed originally  (having to  hit 
a home-run on a certain pitch).  The final score is 
never in doubt (apart from a mistaken deviation from 
the script).  
Imagine observing such a game from beginning to 
end.  Admittedly, one does get a fairly accurate repre-
sentation of the original game; however this event is 
nothing at all like a game of baseball.  It only, at its best 
moments, looks like one.  
Here the reverence for one single, memorable 
game has spawned an event that goes against the logic 
of the game itself: for a game is an open-ended agonis-
tic event where the results must never be known in  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—the festival as counter-demonstration —214—advance, and each play is potentially significant to this 
outcome.  It is this very same openness that helps to 
separate festival from spectacle.  And in its lack, even 
were there to be plenty of energetic young partici-
pants and no traffic concerns, a festival will not be 
forthcoming.  
the festival as counter-demonstration
I once mentioned to an organizer of the Higashi-
kujo Madang that several of the current Japanese aca-
demics who study festivals have made a point of 
describing their experiences in the 1960s at universi-
ties in Tokyo, where massive student demonstrations 
took over the streets.  In these crowds they found a 
essential emotional display that they also say they find 
within Japanese matsuri.  
“But a demonstration is nothing like a matsuri,” 
she said.  “They are almost perfect opposites.”
Her pronouncement struck me as a critique not 
of demonstrations or of festivals as these might be 
considered to be forms of performance, but rather of 
the distance between Kyoto’s festivals and the demon-
strations that its Koreans and buraku-dwellers have 
staged in the past twenty years.  She was born only in 
the 1970s, and the Sixties in Kyoto are at least as far 
away as they are, say, in Los Angeles.  
A festival can be very much like a demonstration, 
and a demonstration like a festival.  The question then 
is, what is there about a festival that makes this so?  
And what happens when this is not the case?  I will 
turn now to a festival (it is called a madang) that is  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—the festival as counter-demonstration —215—very much like a political demonstration, and has the 
potential to become more of an overt political event 
(although the organizers have, so far, avoided this).   
This festival and its neighborhood can be found a 
short bicycle ride away from my house, but the festi-
val, like its neighborhood is as much outside of Kyoto’s 
civic-led cultural production as the Awata Matsuri is 
inside this practice.
Like the Awata Matsuri, the Higashi-kujo Madang 
struggles with the underlying features of daily life in 
Kyoto that make festival production difficult: a lack of 
free time, a lack of rehearsal space, and lack of open 
civic places for performance.  But unlike the Awata 
Matsuri, and unlike all other festivals in the region, this 
one is managed independently from the city-lead, 
shrine-centered events that dominate Kyoto’s cultural 
production.
While my interests have moved to the explora-
tion of a festival (the Higashi-kujo Madang) that runs 
counter to the logic of matsuri-as-spectacle that is 
today central to matsuri in Kyoto city, I am still curious 
about the fate of this genre of cultural practice, which 
seems at times so robust, and also so fragile.  The 
combined production of hundreds of matsuri events 
seems far too expensive in terms of time and space 
and labor to continue without increased support 
(both financial and social), and yet these events indi-
vidually seem too well embedded into local social sta-
tus markings to be easily abandoned.  The result is 
perfunctory performances and attenuated meanings:  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—a festival in more than name only —216—festivals in name only.    
After several months of watching these, I heard 
about a neighborhood that was planning to create an 
entirely new festival later that year (1993).  Novelty, at 
least, I remember thinking, would force them into a 
mode of creation: here was an event that simply could 
not resemble by any intention the way it looked the 
year before.
a festival in more than name only
“...it makes sense to think of an
intrinsic connection between
democracy, social movements and
self-help groups, coming in large
part from the fact that (in princi-
ple) they open up spaces for pub-
lic dialogue. A social movement,
for example, can force into the
discursive domain aspects of
social conduct that previously
went undiscussed, or were ‘set-
tled’ by traditional practices. The
feminist movement problematized
female and male sexual identity
through making them matters of
public debate; ecological move-
ments have achieved a similar
result in relation to the environ-
ment”
(Giddens 1994, 120).
We are getting very close to the event that will 
create the counter space of identity in Kyoto;  open 
up to a public sphere on a public street; and show—
not just for the small neighborhood of thoroughly 
marginalized peoples, but for the city and its nation—
an alternative to everyday life as this is now supplied 
by the state.  This event happened as, and still happens 
to be, a “festival.”  Commonly described by its orga-
nizers as a tabunka matsuri (“multicultural festival”) its 
current name uses the Korean term madang (meaning 
hiroba [“commons”] in Japanese).   As a festival it cre-
ates a space of festivity, with various entertainments, 
artistry, drama, games, food, music, dance: a whole 
repertoire of festival practices on display.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—a festival in more than name only —217—On June 6 of 1994, the City of 
Kyoto staged the centerpiece of 
its “festival” in celebration of the 
1200th year of its original con-
struction.  As with most of the 
“public” events staged for this 
year-long “festival” the main 
show was performed for an audi-
ence of ticket holders.  The tickets 
started at 3,000 yen (about 
US$30), but again most of these 
tickets were available only to 
those with connections to the City 
or to the City sponsored commit-
tee in charge of this event.  
This video is from the state televi-
sion (NHK) program.
But in another way this event is also a new social 
movement, as “serious” as any movement, and as 
hopeful for social change as the outcome of its prac-
tice.  
The Madang event program is a 
text that assembles all of the par-
ticipating organizations and indi-
viduals into a document where 
their support for the event is 
acknowledged.  Fifty pages long, 
it contains about 30 pages of 
advertising from local retail and 
service providers, and it also list 
contributors and it describes all of 
the events of the day.  Moreover 
this document codes the event in a 
manner similar to other neighbor-
hood festivals.
I will argue that this coinci-
dence of “festival” and 
“social movement” is not 
coincidental, although the 
organizers may not have 
deliberately planned all of 
the ways in which these two 
might productively inter-
sect.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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was celebrating its anniversary 
with a spectacle of music and 
song, it staged another spectacle: 
the invasion by hundreds of police 
of the offices of the North Korean 
Chosen Sooren organization in 
Kyoto.  Claiming that the group 
had failed to file the proper use 
permit request for some land near 
Kyoto (it turned out that they had 
filed this permit—and anyhow 
that problem could have been set-
tled with a telephone call) the 
police took away all of the organi-
zations files.  Koreans in Kyoto 
have good reason to fear official 
harassment when they organize 
outside of state-sponsored arenas.  
Video is from the local KBS tele-
vision station.
However, once we have taken what we now 
know about Kyoto’s state-sponsored public sphere, 
and then look at the options available for counter-
public demonstrations, we will see that this social 
movement happened—with some prior intention, and 
some later refinements—to find precisely the mode 
of expression that would allow them to shout their 
counter expressions out on the street (or the school 
yard: the streets have been given over to traffic) with-
out creating a space that the state would feel obliged 
to close down, nor in a voice the state would feel the 
need to silence, nor marking individuals the state 
would decide to persecute.  
On June 6, 1994, the same 
day that Kyoto officially 
celebrated its 1200th 
anniversary... TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—a festival in more than name only —219— “Over where it crosses Kawara-
machi street, caught in the tight 
space between the Shinkansen 
tracks and the JR tracks there is a 
temple.  We were climbing the 
stairs on this side when a shin-
kansen train suddenly appeared.”
©1984 Naomi Manabe
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Now the state might, at some point, decide to do 
any or all of the above (and we will see some of the 
state responses in the next chapters). 
“I took this on the way to my 
adult education class.”
©1994 Jong-sun Kan
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For five years now (in 1997) the Higashi-kujo 
Madang has managed to run the only public cultural 
show in town that does not require state approval or 
support.  And with this “show” the organizers achieve 
two objectives: the organization itself—hundreds of 
volunteers and a communication and resource devel-
opment system—and a venue for counter expression: 
a place of protest, where protest is masked in the 
same cultural mode that the state uses to mask its 
nationalist construction of normalcy.  
“There is a little park on a lane 
near Matsunoki Machi public 
housing.  Everybody enjoys this 
place, particularly the beauty of 
the large Ginkgo trees that grow 
there.”
©1994 Yumi Sakamoto
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In order to bring the reader to a point where the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—a festival in more than name only —220—many festival practices within Kyoto—practices that 
now include the Higashi-kujo Madang festival—reveal 
their multiple meanings in the context of Kyoto, we 
first started with a brief history of Koreans in Japan 
and Kyoto, from ancient contacts through colonial and 
post-colonial times, up to the present, where we 
explored the geographies of their exclusion.  
“Going to the nursery school.  
The little rascal likes to ride on 
the bicycle standing up.”
©1994 Yoni Bekku
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“[Jameson’s notion of] Cognitive 
mapping is... also meant to allow 
people to become aware of their 
own position in the world, and to 
give people the resources to resist 
and make their own history. It is 
the logic of capital itself which 
produces an uneven development 
of space. These spaces need to be 
‘mapped’, so that they can be 
used by oppositional cultures and 
new social movements against the 
interests of capital as sites of 
resistance”
.(Keith and Pike 1993, 3)
We then turned to the center, 
to the cultural programs of the 
state-nation, and how these 
inform a national habitus, which 
pervades the everyday life of 
those who live in Kyoto.  
Reflecting this back on the mar-
gins we looked at the lifestyle 
exclusions which combine with 
geographical exclusions (physical 
exclusion) to determine the 
marginal “social space” of 
Kyoto’s “Korean” and buraku-
dwelling residents.   Now we 
are about to see how the deni-
zens of Kyoto’s margins are remapping their city and 
resituating themselves as city-zens within this. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Event-centered solidarity —221—Event-centered solidarity
Like the City and Prefecture of 
Kyoto, the Madang prints and dis-
tributes its own newspaper 
Higashi-kujo Madang Nuusu 
[News] which comes out monthly 
in the season before the Madang.  
From MN 1995 no 2:
HEADLINE “Turning to the Fall 
performance”
Subhead:”... Let’s make the 
Madang Circle ever wider!”
Copy: “As was told in the last 
issue, it has been determined that 
the Third Madang will be held on 
November 3rd at Sanno Elemen-
tary School...
...It’s time we really started to 
make the Madang.  Now we’d like 
to introduce the actual groups that 
be working hard to produce the 
real Madang (apart from the exec-
utive committee):
The planning group; the public 
information group; the advertising 
mobilization group; the finance 
and general affairs group, and the 
public relations group.  We wel-
come new faces to any group.  If 
you can say “OK: I want to be a 
member of XYZ group” please 
contact us right away!
Like many new 
social movements in 
many parts of the 
world, the Higashi-
kujo Madang com-
munity uses the 
event itself  to 
reproduce the com-
munity across time, 
while the group 
also  “performs 
itself” in public.  The 
annual, nearly year-
long preparations, 
and the festival day performance requires that the 
organizers assemble all of the resources for this pur-
pose: and in so doing, they construct an entire social/
cultural movement as well.  For the resources they 
marshal—from symbolic tokens to  practical tools—
are doubly useful.   Whether the Madang is an excel-
lent alibi for organizing a social movement, or 
whether a social movement is a good base from which 
to organize a festival is not the issue here.  As we will 
see, the collective action of the Madang is not aimed 
at some external, particular, instrumental goal.  It does 
not fail or succeed in those terms.  It succeeds only 
on the aesthetic/symbolic terms that the group sets 
up for the event itself.  However, the Madang organi-
zation is linked through the multiple affiliations (and  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Event-centered solidarity —222—desires) of its collective members to a number of 
issue-oriented groups in the area.  And, as a collective 
it has begun to achieve an independent voice of its 
own.
“I went with some friends to eat 
barbecue and kimchi after we fin-
ished working on art for the 
Higashi-kujo Madang.  This was 
really tasty!”
©1994 Chinmi Yuu
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“Collective actors invest an enor-
mous quantity of resources in the 
on-going game of solidarity. They 
spend a great deal of time and 
energy discussing who they are, 
what they should become and 
which people have the right to 
decide that. This on-going process 
of construction of a sense of ‘we’ 
can succeed for various reasons: 
for instance, because of effective 
leadership, workable organiza-
tional forms or strong reserves of 
expressive action. But it can also 
fail, in which case collective 
action disintegrates. The task of 
sociological analysis is to under-
stand how and why the game of 
solidarity succeeds or fails”
(Melucci 1989, 218).
 This proved to be the case in 1995, when the 
great Kobe earthquake leveled the Korean neighbor-
hood of Nagata-ku.  The Higashi-kujo Madang organiz-
ers quickly used the madang collective as a base for 
gathering donations for the victims in Kobe.  That 
year’s madang also included a locally generated cri-
tique of the Japanese government’s failure to respond 
adequately and fairly to the consequences of the 
earthquake.  And so we can see that the event is capa-
ble of acquiring current issues as these occur, and 
then articulating not only an artistic expression, but a 
social/ economic response. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Event-centered solidarity —223—In one of the 1994 Madang plays, 
“Mangiri” is a local Korean man 
who has moved away and made a 
career in real estate.  One of his 
big clients is looking for a site 
neat the station for a new build-
ing.  But when Mangiri (who calls 
himself Matsuyama to conceal his 
Korean background) is showing 
the client around Higashi-kujo 
when a couple of childhood 
friends recognize him and so 
reveal his secret.  His career is fin-
ished the moment they call out 
“Mangiri.”  Combining comedy 
and pathos, the moment resonates 
with the arbitrary injustice of dis-
crimination against Kyoto’s 
“Koreans” who are virtually 
indistinguishable from their Japa-
nese peers until they are forced to 
show their papers, or are hailed 
with their real name. 
However, an artistic expression remains the core 
of the event.  And after the first year’s allegorical play, 
the organizers have been pursuing expressions based 
on “rearuizumu” [realism].   For example, to make a 
drama (a madang geki) about how a career in Japan 
requires passing as Japanese, and how easily a life of 
hard work can fail at the moment of truth, the orga-
nizers create a committee to assemble the story.  
“I am working here on my per-
sonal computer.  Everyday I use a 
computer and a printer.  This 
one’s an NEC.”
©1994 Hideomi Tabata
GO TO NEXT PHOTO
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  From the perspectives of older and younger 
(and male and female) the story is arduously pieced 
together until it has reassembled a predicament that 
the entire neighborhood relates to.  The process 
moves from silence to an articulation that requires self  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—Event-centered solidarity —224—reflection.   
“Some kinds of social movements
and self-help groups pioneer
and...help sustain, democratizing
influences by the very form of
their social organization”
(Giddens 1994, 120)
In building the Higashi-kujo Madang each year, the 
organizers participate also in the removal of their 
bodies and imaginations from a space that is, after all, 
only a remainder—what is physically been left out 
when the city rebuilds itself as a center for world 
tourism, and what has been socially and economically 
left out when the connections and the jobs are distrib-
uted.  
 “The wholesaler at Kyoto’s Cen-
tral Market is putting the goods I 
bought into my van.”
©1994 Jong-sun Kan
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“...new conflicts develop in those 
areas of the system where both 
symbolic investments and pres-
sures to conform are heaviest. 
These conflicts act increasingly at 
a distance from political organiza-
tions. They are interwoven with 
the fabric of everyday life and 
individual experience. The new 
conflicts are often temporary and 
they are not expressed through 
‘instrumental’ action. Contempo-
rary movements operate as signs, 
in the sense that they translate 
their actions into symbolic chal-
lenges to the dominant codes”
(Melucci 1989, 12). 
Out from this remainder, the participants build a 
new center for themselves, a small city, a little culture, 
a new social group.  Tiny and fragile, still it belongs to 
them all.  And its peculiar “strangeness” is something 
made strange not by an exclusionary rule of the cen-
ter, but rather because it is something novel standing 
on its own, marking its own boundaries, and making 
its own rules.  From a cultural strangeness that could 
only be coded within the dominant Japanese Umwelt  
as  “wrong,” [chigau] this community is forging a 
strangeness that cannot but be counted as something 
significantly other: a challenge to the position of the 
dominant code.
The opening of an-other possible significance out 
of the uniformity of the national habitus is itself a 
major task, and the effort to do so and to hold this  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—festival as alibi —225—open against the interests of the state lends this event 
a greatness far beyond its neighborhood scope.  And 
so the particulars of this task deserve some careful 
attention.   But first I want to also make clear the con-
nection between this festival and the social movement 
that is its double.
festival as alibi
“Such general considerations are
important when considering what
is ‘new’ about the recent move-
ments. One of their distinctive
characteristics is the unstable pat-
tern of their membership. The
attributes of the actors are defined
almost entirely by the action
itself. This means that the ener-
gies and resources that actors
invest in the construction of their
collective identity are an essential
part of the action, and not simply
an accessory or ‘expressive’
dimension. The weakness of an
exclusively political view centred
on the ‘instrumental’ dimension
of action is that it considers as
‘expressive’ or residual the self
reflective investments of the
movements. But these invest-
ments in self-reflection are crucial
for understanding the effects of
movements on the political sys-
tem     ”
(Melucci 1989, 73-74).
Again, I want to start by noting that the choice of 
a festival, instead of, say, a parade, a demonstration, an 
assembly, or a riot, was a fortuitous one, both 
because of the location of the community, and 
because of the structural support that a festival form 
can give to this task.  
In Kyoto, city/state run festivals, alongside those 
managed by the hundreds of Buddhist temples and 
Shinto shrines, make the production of some form of 
festival an everyday event with Kyoto.  For this neigh-
borhood of Koreans and buraku-dwelling Japanese to 
make their own festival, in the midst of all the other 
neighborhoods that make theirs, seems at once rea-
sonable and proper.  And so, for the City (through its 
neighborhood associations, or through the PTA of the 
school, or though the district office [kuyakusho]) to 
deny this neighborhood its festival while allowing vir-
tually every other neighborhood in the city their own 
festival, would be to flatly admit an official program of 
cultural discrimination aimed at Koreans and/or Japa-
nese living in buraku areas of the city.   
And as much as the City touts its desire to be 
Japan’s most international city, to then act against the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—festival as alibi —226—only “international” cultural event in the City would 
also potentially damage this image.  The City might still 
manage to shut down the Madang (see also: Dis-associa-
tion Trouble).  But until it finds a way to deflect the sus-
picion of its desire to shut down this festival because 
of who controls it, the event will continue to happen.
“It is obvious that neither social
movements nor self-help groups
are necessarily democratic in their
aims; some such movements and
groups, after all, have been dedi-
cated to discrediting the whole
framework of democratic institu-
tions. Social movements are
sometimes led by demagogues;
such leaders may create a mass
emotional identification that is the
very antithesis of dialogic democ-
racy”
(Giddens 1994, 120).
However, even if this were the only cultural festi-
val in Kyoto, the choice of a festival form offers many 
practical and strategic advantages to the neighbor-
hood as a medium to organize a social movement.  In 
fact, such event-centered social movements are 
becoming one of the more popular modes for social 
movement formation: returning to an embodied, per-
formative community as the basis for identities not 
formed from (or making) an imagined community, but 
rather resembling (and re-assembling) a new, perfor-
mative “village”.   This village is both a local neighbor-
hood and a member of a globalized community. 
Melucci (1989) has noted how new social move-
ments are, in fact, new, in the sense that they have 
acquired the self-reflexive information and member-
ship practices of late modernity:
“What is new about contemporary movements is first of all that information resources are at the
centre of collective conflicts. Conflicts shift to the codes, to the formal frameworks of knowledge,
and this shift is made possible by the self-reflexive capacity of complex systems. The self-reflexive form
of action is thus another specific characteristic of recent movements. The decline of movements as
‘characters’ signifies the dissolution of the ‘subject’ and an increase in the formal capacity for self
reflection. Finally, the global interdependence or the ‘planetarization’ of action profoundly alters the
environmental conditions in which actors are formed and act: the field of opportunities and con-
straints of action is redefined within a multipolar and transnational system.” (Melucci 1989, 73-74)
All of these contours of action are visible within 
the Higashi-kujo Madang: 1) it acts as an information  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—festival as alibi —227—center, and a site for challenging symbolic domination; 
2) it is relentlessly self-reflexive in its artistic produc-
tion, constantly interrogating its expressions and 
search for those meanings that best reveal the forms 
of misrecognition applied by the state to this commu-
nity; and 3)it views itself as a player in a global struggle 
for human rights and civil liberties, and it critiques the 
Japanese state on the basis of global information 
sources.
Madang Dinner Video
NOTE: this is a time-lapse view 
of an entire evening:  Please pre-
view this video by holding down 
the Fast Forward [|>] button.  The 
first 4 minutes show the pre-din-
ner period, when groups volun-
teered to place posters in all of the 
stores of the neighborhood.  The 
remainder is an entire evening of 
talking, eating, reports from all of 
the committees, and an acknowl-
edgment of the cooperation of all 
of the neighborhood leaders.  
While many of the food service 
practices show a gendered separa-
tion of tasks, the leaders of the 
Madang committees are from 
both genders.  The meal was paid 
for from the Madang budget.
September 1994, Matsu no Ki 
Machi Danchi, Higashi-kujo.
In this sense, “madang” is a most appropriate 
term for this collective, as it symbolizes a cultural 
commons,  a place and an activity of shared expres-
sion and collective identity.  After looking closely at 
the festival practices of the Madang in the next chap-
ter, we will explore the forms and referents for the 
identities assembled through this event.  But for now, I  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—festival as alibi —228—want see how a festival1 can be an event at the center 
of a radically democratic social movement.  
There is an entire argument that can be made 
concerning the place of carnival laughter within festi-
val, and festival as a return-of-the-grotesque that 
structurally dismantles social distinctions, and so 
reveals their artifice.  For the purpose of this work, I 
will not be delving into this particular argument.  Such 
an argument would attach in several places to my 
notion that A festival counters the dominant bourgeois life-
style logic, as this logic is precisely that which is punc-
tured by carnival laughter.  
1. I tend to use the term Festival in a more restricted manner than this is commonly used.  
Like “culture” and “community,” “festival” is not a very useful technical term because of its 
expansive uses and referents.  However, I also hope that by restricting the use of the term, 
or by using restrictive adjectives (such as “pseudo-” and “spectacle-”) with the term when 
these serve to front problematic uses of this term, that an increased reflection over what is 
and is not a “festival” might be stimulated among readers. 
“The concepts of efficacy or suc-
cess could be considered, strictly
speaking, as unimportant when
considering this type of collective
action, because the conflicts
within the realm of collective
action take place principally on
symbolic grounds. They challenge
and overturn the dominant codes
upon which social relationships
are founded. These symbolic
challenges are a method of
unmasking the dominant codes, a
different way of perceiving and
naming the world”
(Melucci 1989, 74-75).
Although ludic moments are many within the 
Madang, here too is a festival that has not developed 
all of the creative sides made available to it.  In this 
case, the unveiling of the grotesque has not been a 
central theme.  In part this restraint comes as a 
response to the dominant cultural code: the Japanese 
Ministry of Culture loads its cultural spectacles with a 
great dollop of seriousness, and, by homology, this 
counter event acquires a more serious self presenta-
tion (at this point in the event, parody of Japanese cul-
ture would be politically risky). However, the event 
offers a thick arena of intimacy, and within this there 
are opportunities for a shared social therapy.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—festival as alibi —229—When I propose that A festival is a space of social ther-
apy, I am looking at the Madang in Kyoto as an engine 
for shared intimacy in public, and at this sharing of 
intimacy as the practice that enables a new form of 
membership: a type of emotional commensality (the 
eating together at a common emotional table, so to 
speak) occurs that is the rite of passage for belonging, 
while it also articulates the meaning of membership.  
Again, The festival performs what it proposes.   
“The function of contemporary
conflicts is to render visible the
power that hides behind the ratio-
nality of administrative or organi-
zational procedures or the ’show
business’ aspects of politics.
While visible power disappears
from complex societies, it
expands and is dispersed through-
out the whole society. Even
though power comes to play a
crucial role in shaping all social
relationships, it is difficult to pin-
point it within individuals or insti-
tutions”
(Melucci 1989, 76-77).
Belonging means taking on the work of the festi-
val, and the work of the festival means constructing an 
entire counter-culture against the dominant code of 
nationalized Japaneseness in Kyoto.  The goal is reach-
ing in the performance of the collective action of the 
event itself.  As Melucci noted: “In contemporary col-
lective action, the organization has acquired a different 
status. It is no longer considered as a means to an 
end, and it therefore cannot be assessed only in terms 
of its instrumental rationality. The organization has a 
self-reflexive character and its form expresses the 
meaning (or goals) of the action itself. It is also the lab-
oratory in which actors test their capacity to chal-
lenge the dominant cultural codes. Finally, the 
organization directly governs the visible forms of 
mobilization; the present movements’ pursuit of an 
external objective is no longer separate from their 
internal forms.” (Melucci 1989, 74).  The collective action 
of the Higashi-kujo Madang cannot be evaluated by 
some direct response by the Kyoto government.  It 
succeeds through its performance: liberating its mem- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Festival events and new social movements—festival as alibi —230—bers from being simply subject to the dominant 
code.  They acquire through this cultural laboratory, 
the means to resist being hailed as Koreans in Kyoto 
and a spotlight to shine on the powers arrayed against 
their participation in local society.  
Now we need to look directly at this event... TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—New beginnings... —231—The Higashi-kujo Madang
New beginnings...
“Higashi-Kujo is a part of Kyoto
where many resident Koreans
live. Korean eateries and house-
hold stores line the streets, and the
Korean language is in the air of
this district. Resident Koreans,
who, in 1910, found their farms
stolen by the Japanese colonial
government, and their harvests
confiscated, who were rounded up
and commandeered as forced
labor, wound up living in Japan.
Before and during the War Kore-
ans came to live in Higashi-Kujo
serving as low-wage manual
laborers, working on the Higash-
iyama train tunnel, on the Kamo
River bank-reinforcement con-
struction, on the project to widen
Kujo street, and in industries such
as cloth-dying.”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
Late July in 1993, nearly three months before the 
very first Higashi-kujo Madang in Kyoto, the heat of 
the summer was on the city.  As in other cities, such 
as Philadelphia or Madras, where the hot, sultry sum-
mers have long been viewed to be as unhealthy as they 
are unpleasant, summer hits Kyoto like a plague, pun-
ishing commuters, and pushing shoppers into the 
underground arcades. The air rings with the shrill buzz 
of a progression of species of cicadas, each with their 
own staccato rhythm.   At times, it sounds as though 
an army of insects was trying to set the air on fire, and 
it seems as though they might succeed.  
In my Kyoto neighborhood in 1993, nearly every 
other house has at least one room that is air-condi-
tioned, but we make due with electric fans, and regu-
lar dips in a cold-water ofuro bath.   (The next 
summer, 1994, was even hotter, breaking the big digi-
tal thermometer on the Hankyu Department store, 
and killing millions of fish in the rivers.)  The compres-
sors for the air-conditioners on the roofs of the other 
houses pump heat into the already steaming neighbor-
hood, and the drone of their motors adds an alto cho-
rus to the soprano cicadas.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—New beginnings... —232—As it was our second summer in Kyoto, I had 
already located a favorite air-conditioned coffee-shop 
oasis for the brunt of the mid-afternoon heat.  How-
ever, mad-dogs and anthropologists cannot always be 
happy staying cool.  Today I was on my bicycle, out on 
the street, with a bag of video gear across my back.  
My bike was too old to attract
thieves, but my son’s bike and my
wife’s (twice) were stolen and had
to be replaced.  [While there are
types of crime where Japan’s rate
is much lower than the US, when
it comes to bicycles, Kyoto is no
better than Los Angeles.]   And
when it comes to alternative trans-
portation plans, Kyoto is way
behind the times. The city makes
almost no effort to encourage
bicycling, and it considers the
thousands of bikes that are parked
each day near the train stations as
a public nuisance.  It regularly
carts them off to an impound yard
where it takes $50 US and nearly
a full day of travel and paperwork
to retrieve them.
Here are bikes parked on the
sidewalk near Sanjo-Station.
Photo by author
Bicycling, I had discov-
ered years before while 
living in India, was much 
cooler than walking;  the 
movement of the vehicle 
created its own breeze.  I 
rode  past hundreds of 
cars that were parked,  
many had their engines 
idling softly (and never 
seeming to overheat), 
their drivers slumbered 
in air-conditioned com-
fort, while their exhaust 
choked the already boil-
ing pedestrians, the men 
sweltering in their suits, 
and the women fending 
off the sun with parasols.  
And as I was turned down-hill along East bank of 
the Kamo river,  the river air was slightly cooler.  I 
rode a ramshackle ten-speed, rolled past the Minami-
za kabuki theatre, south, towards the factories down-
river.  Further down the river was Osaka and the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—New beginnings... —233—Pacific, but I was only going as far as Tenth Street, 
where I was to videotape the very first rehearsal of 
the very first drama of the first Higashi-kujo Madang.  
It was a new beginning for everyone, myself included.
It was to be a bicycle ride I would make a hun-
dred times again, at all hours and weather, and in vari-
ous states of exhaustion and intoxication 
(unfortunately, exhaustion and intoxication would 
normally precede my return trip uphill—the lesson 
being that one should try to find a dwelling downhill 
from one’s site of study, particularly if this study 
includes festivity).  
“After the War, many Koreans
from outside Higashi-Kujo came
here to live close to Kyoto Station
in preparation for repatriation,
hailing the liberation of their
homeland. However, in the
Korean homeland, the growing
opposition between the North and
South solidified in the severing of
the nation at the 38th parallel, and
so many resident Koreans came to
reside permanently in Japan with-
out returning to their homeland.
The first generation of resident
Koreans were extremely robust
people who safeguarded their eth-
nic pride under what were very
difficult historical circumstances,
and they devoted their energies to
the ethnic/cultural education of
their children and descendants.”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
There was a bus that ran nearby, but it stopped 
running at 11:20 P.M., and too many times I watched 
that last bus leave without me.  My only option in that 
case was to run to catch the final subway train of the 
day, otherwise I was forced to walk all the way back 
home: few taxis would pick up a foreigner at that time 
of night.   Besides, bicycling is still the only reasonable 
mode of travel in Kyoto.  For a year I biked all the way 
across town, quicker than the cross-town bus, to 
teach at a university on the north-west side of Kyoto. 
It was by bicycle that I found my way to the East 
Ninth-Street Labor Center, where volunteers were 
preparing to begin their rehearsals for the madang-
geki: the street drama.  I came with a simple introduc-
tion from the chairman of the organizing committee, 
whom I had meet a few days before.  The production 
organizer, a member of Hanmadang, was too busy to 
consider whether or not I should be there.  And so I  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—New beginnings... —234—took a seat with the others who were there to tryout 
for a part.  
I had decided that I would be as inconspicuous as 
possible on this first day, and so I found a corner in 
the room where I could acquire video without much 
notice and without disturbing the meeting.  
HANMADANG MEMBER:
“We started Hanmadang in 1986.
At first it was just Madang-
geki.[street theater]”
ME: “What was that first play
like?”
“At the time the US had begun to
export pork products to Korea,
and the farmers there, who relied
upon the [local] price of pork,
could no longer sell to the market
at the prices of American pork.
So we did a play about this situa-
tion.  And we performed this in
several places, and then, instead
of disbanding we continued to
study Korean music and theater...
In those years we were continu-
ally busy with performance.  We
couldn’t think about a career or
marriage or school... We did hun-
dreds of performances.”
The room was the size of a large two-car garage, 
with a cracked linoleum floor and fluorescent lights 
overhead.   Perhaps thirty people1 were trying out for 
the play and half a dozen children amused themselves 
for the next three hours or so in the room which had 
no air-conditioning, but only a couple of standing fans.  
Between the electric fans and the kids and hum from 
the  fluorescent lights, my video of this first meeting 
sounds like it was taken in a busy bus station.  
That entire first year (the months leading up to 
the first madang event), I attended every possible 
meeting and workshop and rehearsal, listening and 
videoing as was possible, but not yet interviewing.  
Asking questions at this point—since the event had 
not even happened yet—would not be very produc-
tive, and might raise issues about the event that could, 
1. One curious thing I noticed at this time was that all of the prospective actors (except for 
those who had come directly from work) wore blue jeans.  In fact, all of them wore Levi-
brand blue jeans.  And in fact all of these Levi-brand blue jeans were model 501 Levi-brand 
blue jeans.  During a break, a documentary photographer from Osaka greeted me outside 
and noted that I was wearing Wrangler jeans, and so was he.   I tried, in my nascent field-
worker mode to think of anything significant in this, and failed.  But I would later remember 
other signals of the uniformity that groups achieve in Kyoto. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—New beginnings... —235—or should not have been raised until later1.   As this 
was the very first year of the Higashi-kujo Madang, I 
was, perhaps, hyperconscious about not wanting my 
presence to have any determinant affect on the plan-
ning and performance of the event.  I was also consid-
ering that this very first year would be an exceptional 
time, and that as complete a record as I could assem-
ble would be of incalculable value for any long-term 
study of the event, and for later reflection by its orga-
nizers.
1. In the second year, they asked me if I wanted to volunteer to help in the organization, but 
again, I was more comfortable as an observer.  Even so, they gave me a place in the street 
drama (as an obnoxious videographer) and they allowed me to organize the photo display.
“Today, the resident Korean soci-
ety is centered around its second
and third generation members,
and is preparing to welcome its
fifth generation. Lately, as mar-
riages with Japanese people are
now the majority of marriages,
there are many children being
born of mixed (or double)
Korean-Japanese ancestry. Also,
for a variety of reasons more than
160,000 Koreans were obliged to
become “naturalized” in Japan.”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
I was also improving my facility with the local vari-
ety of Kyoto Japanese (Kyoto-ben) that was used in 
this neighborhood.   An historically conservative form 
of what used to be the court-inspired (aristocratic) 
city dialect,  it is thick with non-standard grammatical 
markers and vocabulary.    The irony is, of course, that 
this once-privileged variant of Japanese is being pre-
served in the city’s under-caste buraku areas where 
the residents may live their entire lives without ven-
turing more than 100 kilometers from their homes, 
even though these homes are built in the shadow of 
the shinkansen bullet-train tracks.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —236—Many of the play rehearsals were 
held at a local non-profit center 
for day-laborers.  When the drum-
mers practiced, the Roudou Cen-
ter spilled this music into the 
neighborhood.
 The madang-geki, the street theater, the center-
piece of the entire event, was also the arena where 
the most acrimonious debates occurred, particularly 
in the second year, when the participants decided to 
abandon the more traditional rural-allegorical form 
for a mode of street-realism that more directly spoke 
to the conditions of Higashi-kujo.
Allegory and realism
“The term madang refers to a
space where communal activities
take place. The reinvested mean-
ing of this space, however,
invokes a utopian plenitude of the
imagined non-periodized prelap-
sarian past and alludes to the
advent of a postcapitalist unity in
which the division between pro-
duction and consumption col-
lapses.”
(Choi 1993, 92) TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —237—The first madang play (madang geki) was a drama-
tization of a rural allegory, where an old village widow, 
always kind to everything and everyone, is being 
threatened by a tiger, who has eaten her son and is 
coming to devour her as well.  But each of the things 
(mountains, and flies, and trees) with which she had 
been gentle comes to her aid.  Together they kill the 
tiger, releasing her sons from its belly, and dancing on 
its pelt.   
The 1993 Madang Geki was an 
allegorical tale of victory 
over domination. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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dancing in one great circle...” This 
was the prescription that the 
Higashi-kujo Madang organizers 
gave for their first festival.  It 
would show—the city, and also 
the participants—that Japanese 
and Korean residents in Higashi-
kujo could find a common ground 
(madang) upon which to put aside 
their differences, and recognize 
their commonalities.  And it was 
this image of dancing together 
that came about in the final decon-
trolled emotional state that sig-
nalled the presence of festivity in 
this festival.  Much of the descrip-
tion of this madang is the back-
story that leads to this moment.
It was this final dance of victory that crowned the 
madang with its joy, and sent the first event into a 
maelstrom of dancing and emotional release.  But the 
play itself was not what many of the actors had hoped 
it would be.  Even before the event, there were argu-
ments over its tone and content.   But in the abbrevi-
ated time-frame of that first year, no one could 
imagine creating a new play, that task would have to 
wait until the next year. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —239—The antagonist in the first 
Madang’s madang geki (drama) 
was a tiger.   It has been reported 
that tiger’s were used metaphori-
cally in events in Korea as a sym-
bol of Japanese oppression, and of 
its antecedents: oppression under  
Korean military/U.S. backed capi-
talism.  But the members of the 
Kyoto madang took this as a 
straight allegory.
Photo by Anjali
The climax of the 
first year’s Higashi-
kujo Madang was 
the tumultuous 
dance that crowned 
its final hour.  Begin-
ning as the triumphal 
dance when the 
tiger-character was 
killed in the drama, 
it swelled uncontrol-
lably to include 
every person present in a whirling circular celebra-
tion.  
“Because ethnic discrimination is
so firmly rooted in Japanese soci-
ety, we must press this very issue
all the more. Having failed to hold
on to our own identities, we are
now a people who are shunned in
society. This we must over-
come—we must reassert our own
independence and restore our eth-
nic identity.”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
Within this, one could sense an exaltation over 
the successful completion of this first event, and, in 
equal measure a release that was linked most specifi-
cally to the site—to the school yard as a disciplinary 
space—and to its successful appropriation as a festival 
place.  This was the site of mundane schoolyard humil-
iations, of the pubescent terror of exclusion and ridi-
cule, but today there was only joy, and a joy that was 
enabled and articulated as, of all things, Korean.   
This counter-display, powerful in its expressive 
load, and pivotal in its re-imagination of the space and 
for this crowd, was the first moment in Kyoto where I 
could fully say that a festival had taken place.  But I 
could not yet, within the theoretical apparatus that I 
had taken to Japan, account for what it was I had seen.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —240—The backyard of the Uribunken 
Center was the site of much of the 
artistic production for the first 
Madang.  An outdoor space about 
the size of a two-car garage, it 
also served for impromptu parties 
and meetings.
In this scene, my son, Louis, plays 
Gameboy to escape the boredom 
of having been included in his 
father’s work,
I was watching three (even four) generations of 
people, Japanese and Koreans, physically disadvan-
taged and physically nimble, devout Christians and 
devout Maoists, and they were gamboling in the dusk 
with arms linked and with a collective laughter that 
could not, within the realm of imagination, have come 
from this neighborhood.  
“My grandfather and grandmother
came to Higashi-kujo from Korea
in 1920.  He worked in a metal-
working factory.  [One day he was
injured and] blood came out. ‘Red
blood comes out of Koreans too’ a
Japanese [worker] said.  And he
[my grandfather] got mad and
quit.”
Hanmadang member, 3rd genera-
tion Resident Korean.
For this was a neighborhood that was riven by 
internal disputes and embittered by the dire reality of 
active social discrimination.  Today that reality paled 
before a greater desire, and the daily load of worry 
and hatred was set down for a time.  The realization 
that this load could be set aside was just one of the  
ccomplishments of this first-year event.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —241—The tiny Uribunken center was the 
only place where the group could 
freely gather on their own.  Its 
small rear asphalt yard served as 
the focus for many meals where 
the Madang’s performers and 
organizers tackled the issues 
raised by doing this event.
A week later there was a post-event party at the 
Uribunken Center.  Over sizzling barbecued pork and 
tripe and cold beers, I played back the raw video from 
the event.   
“All of us in the Korean commu-
nity want to make a madang for
ethnic/cultural ex change, and so
foster this type of exchange. What
we mean is that the festival is a
splendid and joyful event which is
dedicated to the unity of the
Higashi-Kujo area. On behalf of
the young resident Koreans, we
want this festival to provide great
encouragement and to be a place
that restores their ethnic identity
and pride.”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
People came and went, commenting on the vari-
ous scenes.  But when the final dance began, they 
s opped their conversations, and watched, and 
remembered.  The older crowd had departed early, 
and the younger, mostly third-generation Korean vol-
unteers began to reflect on the event.  I was surprised 
by their tone of disappointment, (although this might 
have been in part the result of reviewing the look of 
the event on the unedited videotape).  
Despite the enormous effort that went into its 
production, it could not compete with the spectacles 
that the city produced, in part because its budget was 
comparatively meager, and in part because it did not 
participate in the professionalism that money allows, 
but which also excludes everyday participants.  Its 
drummers were mainly drummers who had started 
drumming two months before.  Its artists were volun- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —242—teers with more enthusiasm than accomplishment.  
The resulting event looked as home-grown as it felt.  
But this appearance did not satisfy them.
One of them said to me, “I bet you wish you were 
back studying matsuri.” 
A variety of non-official housing 
is found in Higashi-kujo.  This 
abode, built near the Takasei-
canal sports an array of personal-
izing artistic touches.
From a video by the author
It was a bet he could only lose.  For as the 
evening wore on, it became clear that these young 
organizers were only beginning to imagine where this 
event could lead them.   
“Madang guk, [drama] then, is
seen as a site where this utopia is
to materialize through a carni-
valesque communal festival and
through a collective struggle
against the ruling bourgeoisie as
the commoners of the pre-rupture
period are imagined to have car-
ried it out.”
(Choi 1993, 92)
They were conscious that they had not achieved 
the kind of critical artistic expression that they had 
hoped for, even though the triumph of simply doing 
the Madang was still evident.  From the T-shirt designs, 
to the drama, to the artwork, satisfaction gave way 
unease.  They wanted to make an event that was real, 
that spoke their anger. 
 The first year had been too tame.  Like the cat in 
the drama, it was only a paper tiger.  The first year had 
shown that the madang could be done, but now they 
were ready to push the event up a few critical levels.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —243—The challenge was no longer to simply, physically man-
age the event,  but to carry this to its expressive lim-
its.  
“As there are few [Kyoto] people
who feel comfortable mixing
freely with the residents of this
district, it is up to these residents
to build up this area themselves.”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
In that circle, in the dark, with the embers of the 
barbecue fading at our feet, and the shinkansen train 
howling by, nearly overhead, everyone was given a 
time to speak, and every observation made was 
granted a space to grow into dialogue.   And I was not 
certain if this space of enclusion was the result or the 
cause of the madang.  But certainly it was a signal that 
the next year would be well worth the wait.
From allegory to realism
“The enthusiasm of the madang
participants, who moved through
the madang [space] without dis-
crimination, created the feeling
of the joy of ‘living together’
[kyousei]. Young folks, wanting to
take a small step towards the
peaceful reunification of the
North and the South beat the
chango drums.”
The Second Madang Report
For the second year drama, a committee was 
formed to write an original madang geki, one that 
spoke more directly to the audience.  I want to spend 
some time with this play, for it shows the early matu-
ration of the event as a mode of counter-expression 
and cultural critique.   It displays the hesitation of 
direct criticism against dominant institutions.  And it 
seeks to make the play into a space that resembles the 
space where it is performed.
“The students’ use of popular cul-
ture as an instrument for raising
critical consciousness or mobiliz-
ing the masses...resulted from the
students’ engagement with the
lives of rural Koreans...”
(Choi n.d. 8)
And it also announces the willingness of the orga-
nizers to abandon an attachment to existing forms of 
Korean madang productions, and to innovate new 
forms using a logic of local action and social-political 
engagement.  Madang plays as a genre historically 
determined by their performances on Korean univer-
sity campuses in the1970s, were mostly based upon 
rural allegories,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —244—The Higashi-kujo center for day 
laborers was the main site for 
practicing drumming or rehears-
ing for the drama.  Because of the 
volume of the sound produced by 
drumming practice, the organizers 
attempted to move this between 
several venues, but not near the 
schools where the Madang would 
take place.  Spatial concerns were 
nearly as grave as those of the 
timing for practices.
From a video by the author
Before we look at the content of the second-year 
three act play, I want to look first at some representa-
tive spaces for the various rehearsals and organizing 
meetings.   
This rehearsal at the Kibou no Ie 
(Hope House) nursery school was 
one of many that the madang-geki 











of the event’s social actions occur.   It was here where 
the internal democracy of the event was enacted 
within discussions, quarrels, decisions, and reviews of 
prior decisions.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —245—Monthly meetings of the working 
committee (jikkokiinkai) such as 
this one in August of 1994, kept 
the individual committees (art, 
drama, music, food, fund raising, 
etc.) in touch with one another.  
The meetings ran for about three 
hours, and were held at a Catholic 
Church run school facility in 
Higashi-kujo.  Women were in 
charge of the majority of the com-
mittees for the Madang in its first 
two years, however, the executive 
committee, which also managed 
fund raising, was dominated by 
older men, many of them second-
generation Koreans.  
Beginning with the second year, the play would be 
written, staged, directed, and acted by volunteers who 
brought enthusiasm, but few credentials to this task.  
Learning from their own short history of producing 
plays, they are building their own community theatre.  
The give-and-take of the rehearsals betrayed both the 
pervasive uncertainty of the group as to what was 
“right” in terms of upholding their desire to bring 
realism to the play, and also what would work dramat-
ically.   But they will acquire their own skills in this 
practice as the years progress.
“We want to make this a madang
that is filled with joy in the recog-
nition of our mutual livelihood: a
place on which Japanese people
can build their own lives and find
the meaning of living as a com-
munity by meeting with each
other; and a place where resident
Koreans can hold firmly to their
ethnic pride in this madang.”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
Here is where I learned to look behind the event.  
Milton Singer’s work on cultural events (1958) first 
sparked my interest in festival events as windows to 
the workings of culture.   But what he did not realize 
was how much more there was to learn from rehears-
als and other aspects of cultural events.  I began my 
observations of festivals with some idea that culture is 
event-full, but I was slowly drawn into an appreciation 
for the simple fact that events are also culture-full.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —246—And this fullness is most apparent in rehearsals.  
Planning the madang The planning for each year’s madang begins with a 
call for volunteers.   Volunteers who come to the ini-
tial meetings may serve on one or more of several 
committees.  Volunteers are welcomed at any time, 
and in all aspects of the event, including participation 
in the executive committee.  The Madang’s openness 
was encouraged by its goal, and facilitated by its need 
for many more unpaid workers (and no one was paid) 
than it could attract.   The various committees: for the 
drama, the music, the art, for logistic support, and for 
the food booths, were each headed and filled through 
an open call for volunteers.
‘“We want to make a festival for
everyone, so that Koreans and
Japanese in Higashi-Kujo can be
united” with this thought whole-
heartedly in mind, colleagues
active in Higashi Kujo have been
gathering since last year, holding
many meetings in preparation for
the festival.’
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
These committees manage all of the activities for 
the Madang, although the Madang executive commit-
tee (i’inkai), which is responsible for fund raising and 
budgeting, also connects with neighborhood commu-
nity leaders who have been enlisted to secure institu-
tional resources in the district (e.g., access to facilities 
for rehearsals).   This pivotal committee was first peo-
pled by those individuals1 who had the initial idea for 
the madang.  Most of them were Second generation 
resident Koreans, but a few were Japanese living in the 
local buraku areas, and others were from the local Jap-
anese Center for Independent Living (JCIL) a group 
1. After the completion of the Third Madang in1995, I was told that the original members of 
the i’i turned over this committee to a group of young volunteers, most of whom are young 
adult, third generation resident Koreans.  This early “changing of the guard” at the top is 
another example of an event that attempts to keep its positions of authority in the hands of 
the people who are creating the event’s most expressive content.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —247—that advocates the rights of physically disabled individ-
uals.
Rehearsals Rehearsals/workshops for music/dance, costume/
art production and drama were necessarily numerous, 
as the madang also recruited volunteers for these 
skills, and arranged for basic and advanced training.  
From the middle of the summer until October the 
evenings and weekends were filled with these rehears-
als.  Over ten weeks a new play would be written and 
produced, new drummers (adult and child) would be 
trained and then coordinated into choreographed 
dances, and enough artwork to disguise an entire 
school building would be designed and painted.  
This montage of photographs 
shows scenes from the various 
practices that led up to the 
Madang day.  The drumming here 
was that done at the Avanti build-
ing in 1993.
Costumes and masks were also made, as well as 
all of the other necessary arrangements for food, 
trash handling, seating for the elderly, advertising and 
fund raising.  Continuing meetings of sub-committees 
and general meetings of all volunteers were held to  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —248—keep everyone informed and maintain the event’s 
focus and direction.  
Finding time for rehearsals, and then acquiring 
space, were tasks that most often verged on the 
impossible.  Mostly, the time problem was caused by 
the kinds of occupations that the volunteers held.  
Many times a volunteer could already have three or 
more part-time jobs.  Working odd-hours on week-
ends, and sometimes 12-15 hours a day left few hours 
open for festival rehearsals.  Quite often, volunteers 
would arrive at a rehearsal directly from work, and 
then depart for another job after a couple of hours of 
practice.  
These types of scheduling conflicts created frus-
tration and sometimes anger—when a time was fixed 
that most people could attend very often this meant 
that some people were excluded by their schedules 
from participating in the manner they would like.  
None of the committee leaders were keen on making 
the decision that would force volunteers out of the 
event, and so the scheduling meetings were the 
event’s most rancorous and least productive, until 
finally some decision was made against the silent 
knowledge that was no other way out.  
It was the drama that suffered most from the lack 
of free-time in the neighborhood.  The original cast 
would be supplanted and revised many times as work 
schedules shifted in the months before the madang.  It 
was not unusual for a new cast member to be put into 
rehearsal in the last week.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —249— During the rehearsals, the volunteers acquire a 
mutually social-intimate knowledge about each other.  
They enter into a process of active trust within the 
tasks they must, together, accomplish.  While these 
volunteers are from the same district of Kyoto, they 
come from families with divergent and sometimes 
antagonistic social affiliations, but here they must set 
aside their differences.
Public relations It was the task of the executive committee to 
secure the approvals for the use of the school yard.  
The first executive committee devised a plan to alter-
nate between four district schools.  This plan was 
advertised as a means to share the excitement of the 
event across the district, but it also served to 
decrease any effect the event might have on a single 
neighborhood.  For each school had its own PTA and 
every school neighborhood had their own chounaikai 
(neighborhood association) and a serious complaint 
from either of these could give the school administra-
tion a reason to reject the madang’s use of school 
property.  Since the event would only be held at any 
one school every four years, the nuisance it might cre-
ate (through noise, traffic, or litter) would not be as 
noticeable in any one area.  Taking the madang out to 
the public schools is a means of taking control, if only 
for an afternoon, of a space outside of the buraku.  It 
also makes the madang available for those citizens 
(perhaps a majority) in Kyoto who would not know- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Allegory and realism —250—ingly enter1 a buraku space. 
The public schools in Minami-ku (and, I would 
imagine in all of Kyoto) were not built inside buraku 
areas.  This makes them relatively inconvenient for 
buraku-dwelling children, while it avoids having non-
buraku-dwelling children enter these areas for school-
ing.  
There are some open spaces within the buraku2 
where the Higashi-kujo Madang could be held, but 
that would signal a reduction in the socio-geographic 
scope of the event.   The logic of this event requires 
that a public (non-buraku) space be appropriated as a 
sign of the right to perform in public.  This is one rea-
son why the first year the pre-event parade, a practice 
1. I was walking to a restaurant one day with a friend in Kyoto, who had lived near a local 
buraku for all of his life.  I had found a shortcut path to this restaurant, a path which avoided 
the crowded front street in favor of some quiet alleys.  As I was leading him on this path, we 
turned a corner where he suddenly chose to go in a direction away from the restaurant.  
“This way,” I insisted, pointing ahead.  He paused and then with measured reluctance, 
came with me.  As we ventured into a space that I knew was a buraku area, my friend’s 
reluctance increased to a point of near panic.  People on the street recognized him, and 
greeted him, and he them with bows and polite responses.  They were people he had gone 
to school with, people who knew him well.  But he mopped his forehead of sweat and 
seemed about to faint as we progressed through an opening in a public housing block and 
out the other side.  Then I realized that in forty years of living not two blocks away from 
where we were, he had never before set foot in this place.  It was as foreign and foreboding 
for him as if it were a nuclear waste dump we were casually strolling through.  The stigma 
of the place was a physical blow to his body, a dank hand that touched him in a way I could 
not really imagine.  Here he was, as nice a person as one could find anywhere, but his 
body was directly responding to a lesson it had learned despite his own tender predilec-
tions.  Through this display I also learned the effect of buraku ideology.
2. There are other madang that are held in local buraku areas and these have an entirely dif-
ferent quality about their performance.  Since non-buraku-dwelling Japanese would not 
normally venture into these events, they maintain an in-group, back-region mood, at the 
same time more relaxed, and also less focused.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —251—designed to advertise the event locally and to gener-
ate enthusiasm, moved out of the buraku housing 
project, up the main street, to the only public shop-
ping mall in the area, the Avanti Building next to the 
Shinkansen entrance to Kyoto Station.  
Dancing with the dog
“...In Frantz Fanon and the Psy-
chology of Oppression (1985),
Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan pro-
poses a very useful outline of
what should eventually become a
full-fledged psychology of libera-
tion based on Fanon’s ideas.
...Bulhan finds the ultimate state
of freedom in what he calls maxi-
mum self-determination: ‘Self-
determination refers to the pro-
cess and capacity to choose
among alternatives, to determine
one's behavior, and to affect one’s
destiny.  As such, self determina-
tion assumes a consciousness of
human possibilities, an awareness
of necessary constraints, and a
willed, self-motivated engage-
ment with one’s world.... Without
the right of self-determination, we
are reduced to rigid and automatic
behaviors, to a life and destiny




must also address and overcome
the misrecognition that others
apply to marginalized groups.
The Higashi-kujo Madang organizers looked to 
create an event that showed a seamless decorum, 
while promoting emotional display: not an easy task.  
One way they did this was to not allow alcohol at the 
Madang.  Another way was to avoid the stigmatizing 
stereotypes that were all too familiar to the organiz-
ers.   Here, the avoidance of alcohol also played a role: 
the stereotype of  “the drunken Korean” was a display 
to be avoided, even though madangs held in the buraku 
(and virtually every Kyoto festival) served alcohol 
without much thought that an overconsumption by a 
few would be conflated with a group identity.   
The avoidance of externally attributed character-
istics left the organizers with a reduced inventory of 
symbols, and neutralized some of the expressive pos-
sibilities of the event.   Un- and under- employment,  
for example, was eliminated as a topic, as it could also 
be construed as a result of “the lazy Korean.”  Under-
employment is perhaps the most serious chronic eco-
nomic feature in Higashi-kujo, but mainstream 
Japanese perceptions of the national economy may 
not include the notion that social circumstances (such 
as cultural domination) could be responsible for a lack 
of employment.  After decades of virtual full-employ- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —252—ment (for the great majority of middle-class Japanese), 
the recent economic slow-down, the continuing trend 
to off-shore manufacturing and the discourse of eco-
nomic “rationalization” (i.e., downsizing), will bring un- 
and under employment to thousands of young Japa-
nese workers.  
But in 1993, unemployment was perceived by the 
Higashi-kujo organizers as a stigma attached to those 
who, by a lack of talent or upbringing, are not deserv-
ing of employment.  And in fact, “under-employment” 
for many in Higashi-kujo did not mean that educated 
individuals had no jobs, but rather that they were 
forced to work at several part-time, low-wage jobs: 
jobs that others preferred not to do.
“To the extent that permanent res-
idency in Japan might be said to
be voluntary, these people are still
following a divergent path from
the normal Japanese life, for their
way of life is dependent upon
national/ethnic and generational
factors. Mainly starting with the
second generation, the conditions
for those who do hold on to their
ethnic pride get very difficult at
times, they cannot profess their
real names, they are inundated
with negative images of Korea,
and there are no school assem-
blies about their history, language,
and culture.”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
Cross-cultural marriage was another topic that 
was out-of-bounds, but this time because it raised so 
many issues at the same time that the organizers felt a 
need to avoid the complexities of this topic.  For a 
Korean woman, marrying a Japanese man solved many 
of the administrative problems of being Korean: the 
woman would acquire the man’s official residence and 
name, and the children would be Japanese.  But for a 
Korean man marrying a Japanese woman, the result 
was a complex morass of identities, cross-tied by gen-
dered and ethnic notions.  Because of recent interpre-
tations in the law, the children of such a marriage can 
claim Japanese citizenship.  But the woman would give 
up her prenuptual family residence (kosetsu), and so 
the child would not have an official residence.  If the 
Korean father’s residence was in the buraku, the child  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —253—would become a buraku-dwelling Japanese.  The lack of 
symmetry between these situations has created a dif-
ferential perception of Korean/Japanese marriage, and 
the entire topic is loaded with emotions that the 
Madang organizers did not wish to explore.
The original artwork for the sec-
ond madang poster showed a cir-
cle of dancers of all ages with the 
Korean word “madang” in the 
middle, and scenes of Kyoto 
(notice the needle-like Kyoto 
tower on upper right).  On the left, 
a dog joins the dancers, its tongue 
wagging as it happily circles.  In 
the circle an ocean is surmounted 
by a Rose of Sharon (hyacinth) 










mis- or counter-interpretation by the Japanese pub-
lic.  No expression that would admit easily to a ste-
reotypical reading of “Koreanness” in Japan was 
allowed.  And so the resulting picture of “Koreanness” 
was self-constrained in ways that some of the organiz-
ers regretted, but had little success in providing alter-
natives.  As this was the only opportunity to create a 
visible source for collective resident Korean identity in 
Kyoto, it was too precious to risk an outcome that 
might be easily dismissed.  A simple, graphic example 
of the care with which the organizers vetted the con-
tents of the festival to eliminate potential stereotyping 
arose with the design of the poster for the second 
Madang.  
The original design showed a dog dancing (or run-
ning) with a circle of humans linked arm-in-arm in a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —254—madang circle.  This design was circulated at an orga-
nizing meeting, and one of the organizers said, “You 
know what they will say: ‘We’ll dance with the dog 
today and then eat him for dinner.’  We’ve got to get 
rid of the dog.”  
The final poster for the second 
madang was carefully crafted to 
include Korean type and Japa-
nese lettering.  And the original 
artwork was modified: the dog 
was replaced by a seagull (“sea 
cat” in Japanese [umineko]).  
When I showed this to an audi-
ence of Korean specialists, they 
also noted that the hyacinth flower 
had been removed from the cen-
ter.  This is the flower that repre-
sents Korean royalty (as the 
chrysanthemum represents Japa-
nese royalty).  Also changed was 















is a seasonal 
food, eaten 
for health 
reasons, just as Kyoto people eat eel.  And so the Jap-
anese call us ‘Dog eaters.’  But here in Higashi-kujo we 
don’t eat dogs.”  
Here is the same artwork done 
large to cover the school building 
at the madang.
Photo by author
Because the group 
was raised in Kyoto, 
the idea of eating 
dogs was as foreign 
to them as it was to 
their non-Korean  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —255—neighbors, but they knew it was a common practice 
on the Peninsula.  And so this hailing of them as “dog 
eaters” affirmed and denied their claim to Korean-
ness.  
The care with which the organizers crafted the 
content of the festival was directed, in part, to deny a 
stereotypical Japanese response.  But despite an obvi-
ous need to maintain civil relationships with school 
and neighborhood organizations outside of the buraku 
areas, there was never any discussion on reducing the 
amount or the volume of drumming at the event.  The 
Madang was and is performed at a decibel level that 
few events1 in Japan can match.
1. I have been to summer fireworks (hanabi) festivals which were as sonicly impressive as 
they were visually.  Some of the explosions in these events are not visual at all, but merely 
black explosions that shake the earth, and press against your face and clothing.
Arts meetings
“Bakhtin’s recovery of linguistic
heterogeneity extends beyond
sociolinguistics into the realm of
social dialectics. Dialogism, in
this sense, not only relativizes the
universal claim of being the norm
but also rescues the people whose
voice has been silenced due to
their non-normative “low” lan-
guage, the language of the mar-
gin. As such, madang guk is a
language which represents the life
of the oppressed. “
(Choi 1993, 93)
The Uribunken Center is a small, one-story, two-
room building tucked in between commercial proper-
ties on a narrow lane just south of Kyoto Station.  
Behind the building is an open space of concrete and 
asphalt, and a littering of broken glass, just big enough 
to paint a garage-door sized sign in, or to barbecue 
some meat for a dozen or so volunteers.  Operated 
by resident Koreans as an office to distribute informa-
tion about their various social and political actions, 
the building became the central site of madang activi-
ties.   It was here that a group of volunteers met to 
write the play for the second Higashi-kujo Madang.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —256—“What is madang geki
[drama]?...They say that the first
time the term ‘madang drama’
was used was at...Seoul Univer-
sity in 1976.”
(Yan 1988, v)
The first meeting of the madang geki-in (the com-
mittee that would write the play) ended in discord and 
consternation, and an agreed time for the second 
meeting.  The feelings of artistic frustration with the 
first year’s play, which had followed the pastoral alle-
gorical mode of madang guk in Korea, had led many of 
the committee members to look to an alternative 
mode, one that used realism (rearuizumu), and that 
connected directly to circumstances within Higashi-
kujo.  
The poster for the 4th Higashi-
kujo Madang shows how the 
event is moving away from older, 
pre-existing images of Korean 
cultural forms to the creation of 
its own “look.”
From the Higashi-kujo Website
Yan Mingee, a published authority on Korean 
Madang,  a long-time Han-Madang volunteer, and a 
director of the first year’s Higashi-kujo Madang geki,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —257—argued that the play should still fit into a recognizable 
madang play genre.  But here he was more concerned 
about the interaction between the players and the 
audience than about the setting of the play.
The importation of Korean stu-
dent protest theater (madang guk) 
into Japan included its counter-
colonial position on moderniza-
tion and urbanization in Korea.  
The processes of urbanization 
were seen to include, at their core, 
metropolitan practices and desires 
that ignored and debased (or dis-
embedded) local, small-scale 
social practices in favor of those 
imported from the U.S. and Japan.  
And the availability of cheap 
goods and commodities on the 
international market jeopardized 
the livelihoods the farmer and the 
artisan, and worked against orga-
nized labor.  But madang plays 
did not (as Japanese television 
announced, and as Yan [1988, and 
personal communication] asserts) 
start in villages, but rather on uni-
versity campuses.
The key to the madang play, he asserted, was that 
it abolished the distance between the audience and 
the players.  In this he was making a distinction 
between “drama” as a spectacle, and madang drama as 
something else, as a particular space between actors 
and the audience.  “In traditional folk drama in our 
country [Korea], the actors and the onlookers were 
not divided.” (Yan 1988, ix).  The result, he claims is 
that voluntary participation by audiences creates a 
theater that is a different sort of art than Western 
theater.  This difference between madang theatre and 
western theater was also noted by Choi (1993):
“The dramaturgy and aesthetics of madang guk animate this counter-memory. Madang guk
reaches beyond the Aristotelian tradition in Western drama, which purports to create an illusion and
separates the play from its audience, and even beyond Brechtian theater, in which the spectators are
informed of the theater's double yet delegate analytic power to the actors.  Madang guk rather pos- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —258—its itself as a rehearsal of revolution, as Augusto Boal has suggested (91-92).”
“With two secret service men sta-
tioned in a car across from his
home, Hwang Sok-yong told me
that madang theatre is the only
kind of political theatre that is
able to evade censorship because
it is performed underground. The
South Korean news media are sys-
tematically censored and most
newspapers actually have a
Korean Central Intelligence agent
in their editorial offices. ‘Every-
thing that goes into the newspaper
has to pass through his hands.
Censors are everywhere. There is
a so-called Cultural Officer in
City Hall who controls all scenar-
ios for theatre performances.  All
scripts have to be submitted to
him first.’  Madang1 is the public
mouthpiece of the people’s cul-
tural movement and its perfor-
mances are often linked with
political demonstrations.”
(Erven 1992, 104-105)
1. The ongoing political conditions on the Peninsula (both North and South), the long period 
of separation from the Peninsula with the concomitant loss of Korean language ability, and 
the attachment to life in Kyoto despite  a lack of attachment to “Kyoto” itself were the main 
reasons why the Higashi-kujo Madang exhibited little nostalgia for a return to a Korean 
“homeland.”  But the political conditions in Kyoto also precluded the first Madang from 
becoming a political demonstration.
Higashi-kujo’s madang drama also connects this 
form of “staged” drama with the everyday “drama” of 
the street.  And indeed, the three “acts” in the second 
Higashi-kujo Madang all take the street as their point 
of departure.  As a “rehearsal” for an everyday life that 
counters the lifestyle that Koreans in Kyoto can only 
partially acquire, but not control, the Madang drama 
twists the mundane world into a self-parody that 
reveals its hidden currents.  
Young Korean men, denied access to Japan’s high-
school tournament, still fantasize about hitting the 
winning run in the ninth inning.  Young Korean women, 
doubly disconnected from the job market, dream of 
marriage to a salaryman, and life on the up-scale side 
of the tracks.  These dreams are shared with the Japa-
nese majority, but access to their possible realization 
is not.   A fuller recognition of this imbalance in life-
style resources was the thematic thread that tied 
together the three acts in the second year madang 
drama.   
Before new dreams can be imagined, the old 
dreams need to be discarded (devalued, demystified).  
The first step in discarding an old dream is to appro-
priate it discursively.   This is the beginning of therapy.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —259—The next step is to revaluate other ideas, notions that 
are external to the old dreams.   Here the need arises 
for novelty, for invention and improvisation.   Instead 
of substituting another variety of the same old dreams 
(provided by the market-state) this dramatization 
looks to local resources, to friendship and to the 
madang itself as a practice, to inform new dreams. 
“The opinions of  JCIL (Japan
Center for Independent Living)
members differ person by per-
son.  One person described his
impression [to me] like this: ‘why
is that even though I participate in
the meeting, I have the feeling
like there are words, expressions,
and circumstances that are under-
stood by everyone [else], but
when we describe our sense [of
the situation], because it is said by
a handicapped person, they don’t
listen, and once it is said, [the
room] acquires a tension, like the
mood that comes about when a
stranger speaks.’ I have to think
that if it [the situation] is like this
for the Madang Executive Com-
mittee, what can I say about the




   But the madang is itself still tied to the circum-
stances of its founding.  The madang has not yet 
become a site where counter-life-styles are assem-
bled.  It promotes a positive relationship to the locale, 
and an awareness of how inexpensive—and how valu-
able—are kindness and companionship.  It offers 
counter memories that recode the official stories in 
the very site where the latter are acquired (the 
national school).  But if the final goal is not to make 
local poverty more palatable, the madang must move 
from parody to urban planning.  Let’s look now at the 
event itself.
I want the reader to remember here that this is 
an event in its own creative infancy.  At this time, the 
organizers are at least as concerned with establishing 
the event in the neighborhood without tripping any of 
the signals that would lead the event to an early obliv-
ion (e.g., by privileging a single political position within 
the event).  Once the event has found its legs, once it 
has created the institutional inroads that would make 
it more difficult for the city to refuse to cooperate, 
the expressive possibilities should open up.  Also, the 
experience of being in the event is too new for it to  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —260—have informed the life-styles of its participants.  It is 
only after five or more years that the lessons and the 
skills of doing the event begin to show their effects 
within the event and within the lives of those who are 
committed to it.  
“Thank you for letting us partici-
pate in the 3rd Higashi-kujo
Madang.  Parents and children
spent a pleasant day together.We
could feel how everyone brought
all of their emotions into this fes-
tival.We were surprised how very
powerful a spirit there was, and
that here was a place where peo-
ple could meet and touch one
another without consideration of
national differences.  Entering
into this place together with
friends was a wonderful experi-





I will be 
tracking the 
ongoing cre-
ation of this 
event over 
the next 
ten years.  
Already, 
there are 
movements within the organization that show how it 
is acquiring more self assurance: the executive com-
mittee has been taken over by third generation resi-
dent Koreans and younger Japanese organizers, and 
the third Madang included a Philippine dance troupe 
under the label “huuman karuchyaa baraitei guruupu” 
[Human Cultural Variety Group].  
At the same time, in 1994 the City, which had 
previously exhibited little enthusiasm for such events 
in South Kyoto, decided to sponsor a “Fureai Matsuri” 
[contact festival] in Minami-ku and to hold this on a 
weekend in October—in direct conflict with the tim-
ing of the Higashi-kujo Madang.  Madang organizers 
were not invited to participate in the organization of 
this festival, which will use city monies and the neigh-
borhood organizations to appropriate a street for a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —261—day of entertainment, possibly with some Korean per-
formers.   One can only suspect that the City plans to 
push the Madang back into the buraku, by holding the 
cultural space (claiming to offer a multicultural event) 
and time (an October weekend) that the Madang had 
appropriated for its own use.
At some point in the future, the Madang will 
probably be asked to fold its event into the City’s 
event, in the “spirit of cooperation.”  At this point the 
Madang would either give in and cease to be an occa-
sion where counter-city/state expressions are possi-
ble, or it will face an increasingly hostile, City led 
opposition that probably will close out any use of 
school grounds.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Dancing with the dog —262—There are occasional Madang 
events staged in a small park in 
the buraku area of Higashi-kujo.  
The one I attended, called a Toitsu 
(unity) Madang was much differ-
ent in its mood from the Higashi-
kujo Madang.  It was an entirely 
Korean event, much smaller in 
size and number of participants, 
with alcohol on sale, and a street 
theatre that was more directly 
aimed at a counter-capitalist topic.  
The video on the left (speeded up 
to save space) shows the main 
character, (cross)dressed as 
Uncle Sam, bringing peace and 
cheap rice to Korea, with the help 
of capitalist businessmen from 
Japan.  The local citizen (dressed 
in a yellow shirt with the word 
bunmin (civilian) written on it, is 
pulled between the glitter of 
Uncle Sam’s promises, and the 
money dangled in front of him by 
the businessmen.
At that point, the Madang will have to go under-
gound—staging its events in various places without 
prior publicity.  Or it will simply retreat back into the 
buraku areas where the city has little interest in com-
peting with its expressions, but where it will have little 
exposure within the larger public arena.  And so, dur-
ing these first years, the Madang organizers are 
extremely careful about maintaining a positive rela-
tionship with as many local residents as possible.  
This need to please all the people all of the time 
results in self-censorship of potentially divisive con-
tent, and so, in a sense, the City has already asserted 
its power to monitor and moderate counter expres-
sions within the City.  But still the organizers and par-
ticipating artists can feel the potential opening that the 
madang—and only the madang—provides in Kyoto.  It 
is an event that is too important to risk a counter-
counter response, but it is also an event too demo-
cratic to close out artistic expressions that will run  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the event —263—against the discourses of the state in Kyoto.
the event
The evening before the first 
Higashi-kujo madang, the pre-
parade ended up at the Avanti 
building, where they appropriated 
the building’s “public” circulation 
space for an impromptu concert.  
This appropriation of a public 
space by the madang marked the 
only time in two and a half years 
that I witnessed a public space in 
Kyoto being taken by a public 
group without prior permission/
management by the city.  The next 
year the group did not repeat1 this 
tactic, although it might return in 
future years.
1. One of the general tactics of the “Madang game” is to not repeat its appropriations as an 
annual event.  It moves its location between four school yards, and it maps out different 
routes for its parade.  In the second year, the parade did attract police attention, and it was 
followed and warned not to interrupt traffic.
 The madang officially starts the day before.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the event —264—Once the parade had acquired the 
space in front of the Avanti Build-
ing, they created a concert that 
attracted the attention of many 
who happened to be passing 
through this circulation space.  
But mostly they played for them-
selves, reclaiming this space that 
had been a part of Higashi-kujo 
long before it was developed as a 
shopping center convenient to the 
Shinkansen (bullet train) station 
across the street.  Before the Shin-
kansen station was constructed 
(through the forced removal of 
many Koreans from apartments 
and houses that were destroyed to 
make room for this) a wall 
removed the view of Higashi-kujo 
from passengers at the station.
A parade of drummers wends its way through the 
neighborhood announcing the next day event.  The 
first year, this parade began at the public housing 
block and ended at the small circulation plaza on the 
north side of the Avanti Building, adjacent to Kyoto 
Station.  Here, without prior permission, the drum-
mers set up in a circle for an impromptu concert.   
“Areas in the southern part of the
city where urbanization is to be
actively sought hereafter will be
considered as ‘region of concen-
tration of new urban functions’.”
Outline of the New Master Plan of
Kyoto City 1993.
While other parts of the city are
slated for upscale residential and
commercial use, Higashi-kujo’s
future is a “concentration of new
urban functions” which primarily
means the following: industrial
zoning and arterial road widening.
The importance of this appropriation of a “public” 
space as a right of the festival community was not so 
much discussed, as it was assumed.  “They don’t hire 
from Higashi-kujo” one organizer told me, speaking 
about the management of this department store.  The 
store literally turns its back on Higashi-kujo, with its 
only entrances toward the North, it faces the station 
and is connected to the station through an under-
ground pedestrian walkway.  It was a clear target as a 
destination for their parade.  Besides, it provided the 
only open public space of any size in the area. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the event —265—Here is the map drawn by the 
organizers for the route of the sec-
ond prior-day parade.
The second 
year, the parade 
was held dur-




dren, and it 
made a circle 





ing).  The prior-
day parade is echoed on the day of the Madang, as the 
han-madang drumming group parades to the Madang 
site, arriving to announce the opening of the event.  
Meanwhile, at the site, from early morning, food stalls, 
and sound systems, and other fixtures of the event are 
have been prepared, with the main tents being set up 
the night before.  
Artwork The artwork committee has the task of creating 
an alternative space from a Japanese school yard.  This 
is both a task of masking the yard’s disciplinary ambi-
ance with more playful motifs, and of creating visually 
Korean artwork to symbolize the appropriation of the 
space by a non- “We Japanese” cultural event.  
The artwork is provided in three scales: murals 
that drape over large surfaces, displays that mark  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the event —266—areas, and costumes and small art objects.  
The mural art at the first madang 
reflected an attachment to Korean 
madang performance.  Here we 
see a display of a Korean madang, 
with drummers and masked char-
acters.  Other elements include 
Korean carved gate posts and the 
figure of a tiger.  The tiger, used 
allegorically to represent the 
threat of oppression and the use of 
violence, can symbolize arbitrary 
authorities of any sort: from pre-
colonial royalty, to colonial over-










tee, as it 
requires 
the most 
labor, and as it provides the main symbolic media for 
the event.  
The mural artist would work off a 








up at certain 
times, giving 
as much time 
as they could 
(sometimes their lunch break, other times a break 
between jobs).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the event —267—This mural depicts a utopian 
vision of people and animals 
dancing together.  When I asked 
the artists if this was a vision of 
the future, or of the past, he said 
“both: it is our hope and our 










d from a Korean motif in order to symbolize an aspect 
of Kyoto life that Higashi-kujo residents rate as 
strongly imbedded of their neighborhood and life: the 
nearby Kamo river.  In part, this is because many 
Koreans live in 40banchi, an illegal residential neigh-
borhood within the flood-plain of the Kamo.
The second Madang produced a large mural depicting the relationship between the Higashi-kujo
community and the Kamo River, which defines the eastern edge of this district. [Photo by author]
Originally, the mural was going to include the 
wide variety of objects that are found in the Kamo 
(which gets more than its share of casual dumping, 
from old appliances and bicycles to the detris of Mac-
Donalds and empty Coke cans).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the event —268—Here we see uses of the Kamo that 
are no longer present: cloth dyers 
washing their products, women 
doing laundry.  
But here too, 
“realism” gave 
way to a desire to 
promote the posi-
tive, and to relate 
to a history of use.  
And while the 
river in the mural 
teems with fish, 
fishing in the Kamo is today limits to children and 
egrets pouncing on minnows in the shallows.  Still the 
Kamo plays a large role not only in the imagination 
and daily life of Higashi-kujo, but in Kyoto, as its river-
course provides the city with its largest public open 
areas.  
City-run fairs use the built-up 
riparian works north of 4th street 
(Shijo).
photo by author
The city uses its 
up-town (and 
up-stream) river 
property as a 
site for annual 
fairs.  High-school and college students frequent the 
river as a place to meet and drink, and couples find it 
a romantic spot to sit together.  In the summer, chil-
dren wade in its ankle-deep coolness, netting fry and 
searching for anything that moves. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the event —269—Playing music while lounging by 
the Kamo is one of the advantages 
that this river brings to a city 
where house construction does 
not provide sound proofing.  Up 
toward Kyoto University, the 
entire band will be found on the 
river banks practicing together or 
alone. 
Photo by author
But the Kamo is also a 
reminder of the out-
sider history of Korean 
and other Japanese in 
Kyoto, for this river 
was for centuries the 
environs of actors, 
beggars, and makers of bamboo artifacts and cloth 
dyers—occupations that were summed up by to term 
kawaramono: river people.  
Look again at this bit of video 
from Yomiuri Television.  When 
they introduce Higashi-kujo, they 
start at the river and pan over to 
Yonju banchi before showing a 
street sign and the old grandmoth-
ers putting out laundry.  The 
images are familiar visual signs of 
poverty and residential stigma.
Down in this end of Kyoto, the river has not been 
acquired by the City as a quasi-park space.  Here it 
becomes a neighborhood space, and very few people 
from outside of the area visit the river along this 
stretch.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the event —270—The banks of the Kamo are not 
everywhere maintained by the 
City for recreation.  They are also 
acquired as a residence, and they 
can become fatal, when the sea-
sonal floods bring the river up 
from its usual trickle to a cascad-
ing fury.  Those who live in the 
40banchi area below Kujo (9th 
Street) are alternately endangered 
by flood and fire, as the cold win-
ters and a lack of adequate insula-
tion and electrical safeguards 
make the illegal dwellings dan-
gerous to keep warm.
These shots, taken on the evening 
of the 40banchi natsu matsuri 
(summer festival), show the inti-
mate relationship between this 
neighborhood and the Kamo 
River.
There are those who 
claim that the pebble gar-
dens of Kyoto’s Zen tem-
ples were once the river 
gardens of kawaramono 
(which seems to be only a 
convenient notion, with-
out much evidence).  But 
the use of the river for 
pleasure goes back many 
centuries.  One of Kyoto’s 
still-active pleasure dis-
tricts (now a restaurant/
bar district), Pontocho 
abuts the Kamo.  And the 
origins of Kabuki theatre 
have been traced to the 
theatrics of women actors 
who did shows on the 
riverbanks. 
The symbolic appropria-
tion of the Kamo River as 
a site of local Korean cul-
ture recodes the river, for 
which the city has made 
its own claims.  And the 
use of this as monumental 
art project also displaces 
the Korean symbolism 
that dominated the first  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—photography —271—madang.  Indeed, the second madang had opened a 
new face for this event: bringing the struggle back 
home—to Kyoto.
photography
“I can’t say I hate them, but you
know those places that are only
souvenir shops (miyage noya san)
mainly for the school excursion
[trade]?  Their only meaning is
sightseeing. People come from
schools in groups and buy souve-
nir trinkets.I don’t even consider
walking in those places.
...I don’t go to the festivals [in
Kyoto].  Just once to Gion Mat-
suri, I came when I was a college
student in Kobe.
....since [Higashi-kujo] is a place
that nobody knows about, people
here want to make lots of
friends.  Of course this is the
place where I want to live.”
Higashi-kujo Madang organizer,
Resident Korean.
My own contribution to the 2nd Higashi-kujo 
Madang was to coordinate a day-long photography 
shoot, which I called “Higashi-kujo no Ima.” The 
project grew out of my own frustration in acquiring 
information about the emotional attachments to place 
that local residents made or did not make to places in 
Kyoto.   While I was constantly hearing about 
“Higashi-kujo” as a place, I was not having much luck 
finding out what locations, or what spatial attributes 
of Higashi-kujo gave it its “placeness.”  What my inter-
views did show was a widespread disdain for Kyoto’s 
tourist locales and events, and a singular positive valu-
ation on social life in Higashi-kujo.  
“Higashi-kujo isn’t just a place,” one Madang orga-
nizer (a Japanese person living in a buraku area) said to 
me.  “The name itself is a symbol of discrimination.”   
He wanted to be sure that the words “Higashi-kujo” 
stayed prominent in the Madang’s title.  “Why is there 
no ‘Kujo-sushi’?” One person asked me.  “Every other 
[numbered] street in Kyoto has a sushi bar [named for 
it], but not Kujo.”  The picaresque quality of the neigh-
borhood—its notorious outsider image—is played up 
in these conversations.  But talking about and living in 
a neighborhood are not the same.  I wanted to know 
where the emotionality that came out in their conver-
sation found locations in the neighborhood. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—photography —272—“You did a good job,” one of the
Madang organizers says to me.
“It’s done!” I reply.
“It’s done, really.”
“The photos are all beautiful and
interesting.”  I say.
“I’m glad...”
The photo exhibit took up one
side of the school yard.  The next
year there were two photo exhib-
its: one was a history of 50 years
of Higashi-kujo, and the other
was a tribute to Tabata Hideomi, a
Madang “pioneer” who died the
year before. This use of photogra-
phy to document the locale
increases the discursive availabil-
ity of spatial features of Higashi-
kujo for its residents.
And so I devised a simple project: with a gener-
ous donation of twenty panorama cameras by the Pix 
Panorama Camera Corporation, I was able to supply 
cameras to individuals in the region.  
Tabata Hideomi was a
Madang organizer who was
also a quadriplegic.   He
was active in the Madang
drama committee, and a
member of the working
committee.  Every evening
he returned to his room
on an upper floor of the
Matsunokimachi danchi (public housing) where a helper (or friends) would arrange his futon bed so
that he could sleep for the night.  He had no overnight help (there was no money for 24 hour care),
and once in bed, he had no way of signalling anyone.  His radio was set for a station that would sign
on in the early morning, and he would wait until his day helper arrived.  One night, very late, after
drinking together, I helped to get him into bed.  When another friend and I left, we turned out the
lights and shut the door behind us.  At that moment I sensed a bit of the terrifying isolation that
Tabata-san must have felt every night.  One morning, the year after I returned to California, his day
helper arrived and found him dead.  He died alone in his dark room.  But he died surrounded by the
thoughts and the memories of hundreds of people in Higashi-kujo.  In this photo from his work in
the Higashi-kujo no Ima project he showed how he prepared for sleep. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—photography —273—I distributed these through meetings of the 
Higashi-kujo Madang organizing committees, and also 
through the 40Banchi Kodomo no Kai (Children’s 
Club).  The instructions I gave were simple: photo-
graph what you like and do not like about the neigh-
borhood, or what seems to be most representative of 
“Higashi-kujo,” of your everyday life.   On one Sep-
tember day, more than 600 photographs were taken, 
and then 32 were chosen (by the photographers) to 
be exhibited at the Madang. (go to photo exhibit)
What emerged from this experiment was a 
clearer picture of the spatial topography of the dis-
trict.  The noted physical features of the area included 
its small lanes (roji) which were fondly remembered, 
and its many fences which were greatly abhorred.  The 
lanes provide a safe environment (no cars) for chil-
dren, and a shared space for adults to meet and con-
verse.  
The pre-teen photographer, a resident of 40banchi took this photo of the area because of all the
fences.  She hates the fences, she said.  And they are everywhere. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—masks —274—A street shot in the evening in Higashi-kujo.  Photos such as this display qualities of the area that
inform the connections that the residents make to the neighborhood, and they are scenes that are
not easily available to outsiders.  Here a couple of friends are “hanging out.”
The content of the photos ranged from close-up 
shots of stuffed animals, to distant shots of the entire 
district.  But most of them included people in places, 
in the street, in stores and restaurants, and in the 
housing blocks that dominate the neighborhood.  
masks
Masks, which were borrowed by 
Korean madang-gut (madang 
geki) from shamanic rituals, and 
from other theatrical genres that 
used masks in Korea, became dec-
orative in their translation to 
Kyoto’s madang.  In other Japa-
nese madang (such as the Kobe 
madang in Nagata ku), the masks 
and their roles are maintained in 
the performance of now-tradi-
tional madang geki.  So the use of 
masks in Japan can have differen-
tial referents to an earlier Korean 
mode of masking.
Photo by Anjali
Masks were also made by volun-
teers, from paper maché and tem-
pera paints.  The masks were 
modeled after a collection of 
Korean masks in a large book with 
color plates.  But the specific mean-
ings that originally attached to the 
masks were not consciously main-
tained.  Here was an instance when looking “Korean” 
(i.e., instead of “Japanese”) provided enough of a 
meaning for a practice.  This truncated importation of  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—masks —275—festival materials signals the lack of traditionalism (and 
of tradition as providing meaningful information) and 
an awareness of a need to re-place Japanese festival 
activities with others.  
This need to accomplish an artistic “critical mass” 
of expressions was not discursively available to the 
organizers, but was addressed through multiple inputs 
into when a threshold amount of artwork and music 
and drama was attained.  And in large part, this per-
ception of where a festival gained its look and feel of 
festivity, was gained through the experiences of Japa-
nese festivals (public and school) in Kyoto.
Music
Children from the Catholic-run 
preschool in Higashi-kujo, Hope 
House (kibou no ie), show their 
colorful Korean costumes, and 
dance in a courtly style to drums.  
While their parents dress in a 
peasant style dress, the style of 
costume is not provided with a 
consistent social message.  There 
is little to suggest a straight-line 
socialist bent to the event.
The music of the madang is drumming.  Loud, 
louder, and loudest: these are the three volumes in 
which it is available.  Outside at the madang the drum-
ming is noisy.  Inside, during rehearsals, it becomes 
philharmonic.  The drumming practice that we’ve 
already listened to  (GOTO: Kamo river drumming practice)  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—masks —276—represents the more accomplished playing of long-
time Han-madang members.  At the madang these are 
joined by as many volunteers as the organizers can 
find drums for.  
The drumming is most intense when the entire 
ensemble gathers for a grand circling punmaru 
(“farmer’s music”) performance.  At this time the 
entire open area becomes a dancing ground.
The actual movements have been choreographed at a 
great dress rehearsal at the gymnasium of Kyoto’s 
South Korean high school (one of only two such high 
schools in Japan).   
PLAY Samul Nori Music Other Korean drumming at the Madang included 
samul nori: a percussion quartet that has become quite 
popular in Korea as a modern variant of a traditional 
folk ensemble.  Samul nori uses two types of drum, a 
gong, and a hand-held cymbal to create a pattern of 
rhythms and syncopation that uses changes in tempo 
and volume to create an accelerating effect that is  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—masks —277—emotionally charged.
The performance of a taiko drum 
band created a visible “Japanese” 
presence in an event that is domi-
nated by Korean coded practices.
As the years advance and people in the area begin 
to have a multi-year experience with such voluntary 
performances, the coordination of this part of the 
event should get easier.  But in the first two years, the 
rehearsals (and the performances) failed to meet the 
aesthetic designs1 of the organizers.
1. This disenchantment with the products of amateur art production is one of the effects of 
spectacular art production either by the state or the market.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—masks —278—LISTEN TO THE MADANG SONG
“Madang, Madang, Madang, 
at last its our Madang.  
Let’s come and make the Madang.  
We’ve gathered everybody’s 
dreams,
Higashi-kujo is full of smiles!”
The chorus to the madang theme 
song.  AT RIGHT: 
“Tap the cymbals; 
beat the drum; 
strike the chango (hourglass 
drum); 
bang the gong...” NOT In Video:
“everyone has come to hear,
Bodies and hearts dancing...”
The Madang also 





was sung several 
times at the first 
and second 
Madang.  The song has a bright melody, and is played 
as a pop tune.  It was made to dance to.
The ‘Pore Pore band” provided 
another musical interlude at the 
Second Higashi-kujo Madang.
Besides Korean drumming, there were many 
other musical moments.  The central microphone was 
rarely silent, and the central open space was occupied 
in sequence by several musical groups.  A group 
formed by members of the Japan Center for Indepen-
dent Living played a kind of inspired Jazz, and a local 
Taiko drum group also showed how Japanese drum-
ming sounded. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—participation by physically challenged individuals —279—participation by physically challenged individuals
Higashi-kujo has a relatively large number of indi-
viduals with various physical difficulties, due to 
chronic, and sometimes congenital physical prob-
lems.  The reasons for this population in Higashi-kujo 
are multiple: the most obvious being the presence of 
low-income housing.  Other reasons may have to do 
with older histories of prejudice against those with 
physical characteristics that made them distinctly dif-
ferent—and the marking of difference in terms of dis-
tance away from a shared, genetic, Japaneseness1.  I 
would be very interested in seeing how the discourse 
on genetic disease was articulated in Pre-War Japan.  
1. I do not, at this point have enough information to make a claim that connects the spatial 
aggregation of physical challenged individuals with buraku segregation or with the dis-
courses of nihonjinron.  But I would suggest that any discourse that begins with the nation 
as a single, pure blood-connected unit (and with a royal lineage as its physical trope) may 
also carry a concern about the presence of anomalies in this bloodline, a concern that 
might be discursified in terms of externality.  Anomalies would derive from external impuri-
ties, and the response to anomaly would be to re-externalize the persons so marked, but 
physically segregating them. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—participation by physically challenged individuals —280—Yabuki Fumitoshi is the Secretary 
general of the JCIL in Kyoto.  In 
1994 he was also a member of the 
Higashi-kujo Madang Executive 
Committee.  He organized the 
“wheelchair course” corner of the 
Madang, where individuals could 
see for themselves how difficult it 
is to maneuver a wheelchair with-
out ramps and adequate turn 
space.  
Here I chat with him about the 
availability of wheelchair ramps 
on Kyoto’s public buses.
“[There are only] six,” he replies.  
“And there are a thousand 
buses.... It is inconvenient.... [And 
the reason for this is simply] 
money.  It’s [one of those] ‘after 
due consideration’ matters. Out of 
this year’s consideration they 
decided there will soon 
[mamonaku] be nine lifts.  At this 
rate it will only take 330 years [to 
fix the situation].”
But then the fear of physical disability, the dis-
crimination against those who are physically chal-
lenged, and the lack of public awareness of issues of 
physical access to modes of transportation and com-
munication, and to public amenities, and to jobs, is 
found in many places outside of Japan.  The Japan Cen-
ter for Independent Living in Kyoto, like its counter-
parts in other cities (including Berkeley, California 
where this movement began), can list a variety of 
issues that are of everyday import to its members, all 
of which lack popular understanding, political support, 
and effective resolution.  The Higashi-kujo Madang is 
an event where physically challenged individuals make 
contributions to and participate in all of the main 
activities: music, dance, theatre, food (selling and eat-
ing); and they also find a space to relate directly with 
others and to respond to political inaction and popu-
lar misperceptions about their circumstances.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Cultural activities —281—Cultural activities
The afternoon was also filled with activities that 
were cultural presentations, and opportunities for 
participation by a variety of ages.  There was an ongo-
ing sale of Korean and festival foods: barbecued meats, 
cotton candy, fried noodles, Korean pancakes (shijimi: 
a batter of bean flour with many spices and french 
onions [negi] fried and served with a special sauce [a 
Korean variant on Tonkatsu sauce]), tako yaki (fried 
octopus “hushpuppies”), cakes and cookies, and of 
course, several varieties of homemade kimchi (Korean 
cabbage pickle), and juices and coffee—but no alco-
holic beverages.  The food stalls, and other stalls that 
sold Korean handicrafts, or books, or shoes, or other 
clothing, were run by local Higashi-kujo organizations1 
who paid a small fee for the space, and collected the 
proceeds as a way to raise money.   Organizations of 
both North and South Koreans, church groups, school 
groups, Japanese buraku organizations: the list of 
groups operating the demise [stalls] showed the 
breadth of cooperation that the Madang organizers 
had assembled.
1. One of the complaints made by the neighborhood organization was the impact of the food 
and good sales on commercial enterprises in the neighborhood.  This type of complaint, as 
far as I know, is not commonly made about Shinto or City-run festivals, although there the 
food stalls are mostly run by professionals from other cities who make a donation to the 
local Shrine.  Many of the vendors at the Higashi-kujo Madang operate as non-profit orga-
nizations within local buraku areas, and so the moneys will go to benefit those living in 
buraku districts. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Cultural activities —282—The signal food of a Korean event 
in Japan is Yakiniku (barbecued 
meat).  And there was plenty of 
barbecue at the Madang.
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The amount of 
money raised in this 
fashion was usually 
modest (a few hun-
dred dollars US), but 
there was also an 
opportunity to net-
work with other 
groups and to adver-
tise the organiza-
tion’s operation and 
goals.
The problem of how 
to allow, and yet not 
encourage, and avoid conflict between persons who 
wanted to offer political books and pamphlets was 
settled at an executive meeting by providing one large 
table without any payment, letting first-come first-
served space, and encouraging cooperation between 
participants. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Cultural activities —283—A variety of books about the Resi-
dent Korean situation in Japan, 
about the history of Koreans in 
Japan, and about other matters 
that are of political concern for 
residents in Higashi-kujo are sold 
at a table provided free—and 
unmonitored— by the organizers.  
Many of these books are not readily available in 
area bookstores (sometimes because of their small 
audience), and so the Madang creates an arena where 
marginalized ideas can be brought to public view.  Dis-
putatious discussions were not encouraged at the 
madang, as this space was described as a politically 
neutral ground—a de-politicized zone—open to all 
ideas, but not available to an attempt to monopolize 
the space of discussion.  There was also few 
announcements with any political content—these few 
were reserved to applaud the cooperation of various 
institutions, including the City and the regional neigh-
borhood associations, and the PTA, and the school, 
and its principal, etc.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—Cultural activities —284—making rope
Woman’s voice on the video:
“...I can’t do this!”
“...It’s a part of the rural lifestyle.”
“...Lots of people can’t do this
now.”
In a matter of minutes contestants
wove ropes several meters long
using only their hands and straw.
This is a reminder too of the rapid
pace of urbanization in Japan and
Korea, and the differences in
memories and lifestyle skills
between older members of the
community and its young adults.
One of the activities that fascinated many people 
at the event was a contest where individuals made 
ropes from straw.  This skill, which harkens back to an 
agricultural past in the lives of many older, first-gener-
ation resident Koreans.  
There is no sport in Japan that is 
more coded as uniquely and even 
sacrally “Japanese” than sumo 
wrestling.  The seasonal grand 
sumo matches are broadcast only 
on state television, and employ a 
panoply of religious symbolism.  
That Koreans do sumo differently, 
and that their sumo may be as old 
a practice as the Japanese form, is 
a feature of Korean society and 
history that many Japanese may 
not be aware of, or may not 
choose to accept.  But then, I have 
spoken to Japanese who tell me 
how they wept when a foreigner 
was made grand champion.
Other activities, such as a great tug-o-war, were 
designed to include as many people as possible.  While  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —285—other activities were included to show Korean vari-
ants on practices that are locally coded as “real-Japa-
nese:” such as Sumo Wrestling (ssirum in Korean) and 
karaoke.   
The standing teetertotter dance/
jump is a Korean practice (called 
noruteigi in Kyoto Korean) per-
formed by women only.  The ver-
tiginous thrills of this were 
apparently joined by the view that 
the height provided over the walls 
of compounds where women were 
sequestered in pre-modern Korea.
Still other activities highlighted Korean cultural 
practices with marked cultural value: such as Taek-
wondo martial arts, and the sight of two women 
jumping in turns on a seesaw.
The penultimate event at the Madang was the 
Madang drama, and so let’s turn now to this, the cen-
terpiece of the entire event.
the madang drama
The madang drama was finally cobbled together 
as a three-act tragic comedy about national identity 
and local life-styles.  
The madang drama begins with a 
dance that defines the circular 
stage area.
The three acts were evocative of the main prob-
lematics of life in Higashi-kujo: living in a place no one 
else wants to live in; living in a time when generation 
gaps are profound;  living with an identity that must be  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —286—hidden when dealing with the world outside.  The play 
also featured some of the gendered aspects of these 
situations, although it purposely avoided the issue of 
marriage.  It also avoided issues that were exclusive to 
only Japanese buraku dwellers or to resident Koreans.    
Specific legal issues, and specific complaints against 
government organizations were not included.  The 
play was political without engaging in a confrontational 
politics.  
the play begins... The madang geki begins when the players define 
the circle by dancing around this slowly.  The dance 
marks out the time and the space of the drama.  This 
dance also introduces all of the players that will be 
participating in the drama.  The curtain between the 
players and the audience is opened both up (announc-
ing a beginning) and out (starting a player-audience 
interaction that will last throughout the drama). TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —287—Madang One: places, 
homes, and kitchens
The first madang geki brings in a character whose 
role is to represent the aging, first generation Korean 
resident, or the aging buraku dweller.  The main theme 
is that of the desires of those who have been left 
behind, or tossed aside by decades of change that have 
not touched Minami-district’s Higashi-kujo area.   
“The issues before my grandchil-
dren today are the very same
issues we faced so long ago.
Nothing has changed.  Perhaps
nothing will change.  That is what
is so difficult: watching the young
face the same problems we have
worked so hard to resolve....The
Japanese government has offered
us hope so many times without
result.  We have no hope left.”
First generation Korean grand-
mother. (in her late sixties, she
still does house cleaning)
For the sadness of the elderly in this area, a sad-
ness that I noted in several conversations, is the sad-
ness of waiting for promises that never seem to 
happen.  Every time a problematic situation comes to 
an apparent closure, the results are disappointing as 
they are managed to reduce their effects on existing 
priorities.  For example, for many years, resident 
Koreans have protested the practice of fingerprinting1 
that the Japanese Government insists upon as a part 
of the registration of all foreign nationals (but largely 
of Koreans).  Finally, after years of unsuccessful court 
challenges, mass refusals and the potential for interna-
tional attention if refusers were jailed or deported 
convinced the Japanese government to compromise 
and to not keep fingerprinting those Koreans who had 
previously gained permanent residency in Japan.  But 
then the Koreans learned that the Government had 
computerized archives of their fingerprints, and had 
no need to fingerprint them again.  And so a new 
1. The fingerprinting dispute is at the center a dispute over the status of resident Koreans as 
special community in Japan, a community made special by the history of colonization and 
enslavement during the War.  The act of fingerprinting, which is seen by many Koreans as 
a way of identifying them as criminals, also marks the continuation of pre-War police con-
trol over the community (even though the fingerprinting takes place at the district City 
office).  The mark of the fingerprint is appropriated by resident Koreans as a symbol of their 
discrimination, and also as a marker of official sanctioning of this discrimination. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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these existing records1.  
At the same time, there is a sadness of watching 
affluence touch so many others, while knowing it will 
never find its way to Higashi-kujo.  Kyoto is not at or 
near the center of Japan’s Post-War economic/cultural 
efflorescence—that is Tokyo’s place—and the stories 
of life before, during, and after the war in Kyoto, by 
Koreans and Japanese alike, are often stories anchored 
to a common, desperate poverty.  Times were bad for 
many, and very bad, in particular, for Koreans in 
Higashi-kujo.  What money was to be had in the 
decade after the war was made on the black market2 
in rice and other goods.  But mostly families did what 
they still do.  They work as hard as they can for what 
little they get.  In the meantime, other parts of Kyoto, 
particularly the northern reaches and suburbs, have 
become up-scale middle-class neighborhoods, where 
the effects of economic growth become visible in real 
estate and consumer goods (automobiles, fashions, 
etc.).  
In this act of the madang geki, two women happen 
to meet an elderly woman on the street, a woman 
1. But then the record of Japanese Government agencies destroying records because of out-
side pressure is not clear.  Apparently, American Occupation officials ordered the destruc-
tion of the lists of buraku locations, and these were ceremoniously destroyed.  But later, 
copies surfaced, and these were somehow copied and quietly distributed to corporations 
and other institutions.  It is perhaps more difficult to ensure institutional forgetting as it is to 
demand institutional reform.
2. And Higashi-kujo, as a space abandoned to its own fates, was also a place where black-
market activities were more possible.  Its proximity to all of the train lines and to the river 
enhanced the possibilities. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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but rather in time.  She is looking through a chain-link 
fence at her old house, on the other side of an aban-
doned urban lot, where grass grows deep and wild.
The younger women recognize this old woman as 
the person who used to deliver rice on her bicycle.  
“Look, how tall the grass
grows...”the young woman
remarks,
pointing to an abandoned lot.
“and look over here, there’s a big
sign. (reading)
‘Let’s beautify South Kyoto.’
“Well, how about that!”
They engage her in conversation.   
Apart from some vestigial Korean conversation 
markers, even the old woman speaks in Japanese.   
The language of her childhood and  young adult years 
has been left behind in her decades of residence in 
Kyoto, as she has been left behind by her children.
“Look,” one of the young women says, “how tall 
the grass grows here.”  Stepping up to the fence, she 
reads a large sign in a nearby building:  “Let’s beautify 
South Kyoto.”  
“How about that!” She exclaims.   The erection of 
signs like this is the only visible effort that the city has 
made toward this goal. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —290—The actual long-range plans of the city include 
increasing industrialization of the south side (Minami-
ku) as one way to preserve the non-industrial charac-
ter of the central and northern areas.  But again, one 
can suspect that buraku boundaries would play a part 
in the location of new industries (and their hiring 
practices).  
The last major south-side construction was the 
erecting of the Avanti department store and building 
across the street from the shinkansen (“bullet-train”) 
station.   This building was created on the site of the 
main bus terminal, and still serves that function.  Sev-
eral of the madang members complained that they and 
their friends could not find jobs in this building.
Empty lots in Higashi--kujo are 
usually fenced off to prevent 
squatters from building illegal 
houses.
©1994Higashi-kujo no Ima
The old women looks out at the shacks that line 
the narrow lane where she lives.  Her daughter has  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —291—married a Japanese man, and moved away1.   
1. Although the madang geki did not focus on the issue of intermarriage, 
which is perhaps the most widely  felt issue among area families, this issue 
showed through in the plots of the play.   Both the engendering role 
expectations and the gendered job market in Kyoto are displayed in the 
drama.  However, this display is not given a reflexive critique, and so we 
can point to gender domination as one of the practices in Higashi-kujo 
that would deserve more attention for the Madang drama to be both 
“realistic” and self-critical
The old woman (“harumoni” in 
Korean) remembers the wonders 
of her daughter’s house... a house 
outside of Higashi-kujo.
Korean and buraku women can leave their fami-
lies—and their lack of social standing— behind them, 
by marrying outside the neighborhood, and thus 
acquiring a different name and official residence.   
Young men in Higashi-kujo have expressed their envy 
of this gender-determined escape route.  This escape 
is often total, the daughter leaves and severs connec-
tions that might reconnect her former stigma to her 
new situation.  But this severing of ties with the old 
identity does not necessary succeed in Kyoto, and 
forming new ties to new neighborhoods can be very 
difficult.   A Korean woman I spoke with who lives in 
another part of Kyoto said that her loneliness was the 
payment for her children’s future happiness.  But in 
this it is also the grandparents who suffer from the 
distance created between them and their children and 
grandchildren. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Kitchen” where everything works
at the touch of a button...
What the television shows and the
catalogues display are dreams
made real in plastic and wood.
But where the household is not
capable of acquiring these fantasy
objects, they still remain dreams.
“You push a button and water
comes out (of the toilet),” the old
woman exclaims, pointing to her
derriere.
The younger women sigh.
The auto-bidet on the heated toilet
keeps Japan at the forefront of
lavatory science, but only a few
can afford it.
 It is the house of the daughter that the old 
woman is thinking about, a place so far away, and to 
which she is not regularly welcomed.  In that house 
there are modern appliances that seem to be marvels 
to the old woman.  The toilet has a built-in bidet.  In 
the kitchen there is hot and cold water at the push of 
a button, and the heat pump keeps the house warm in 
the winter and cooler than an electric fan in the sum-
mer.   Their description of the labor-saving devices of 
the “system kitchen” brings into relief both the unnec-
essary extravagance of these consumer items, and 
their fetishized commodity values for those who can-
not afford them.
The old woman’s wonderment is shared by the 
younger women, who have seen these on television 
commercials.  Their consumer desires are better 
informed, but no less intense.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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often puts non-Japanese (and cer-
tainly non-Korean) faces into 
interiors that are borrowed from 
Europe or the US.  The ad above 
is for utensils and containers for 
use with microwave ovens.
Verger 1994 catalog
“System kitchen,” one of them exclaims when the 
old woman describes this magic house. 
Later, in the second act, two other women will 
dream about finding a life somewhere else than 
Higashi-kujo.  Dreams of escape, the desire for mobil-
ity, are commonly expressed in this neighborhood.  As 
much as people find ways to cope with being here, 
they also know that their residence here can only be a 
negative factor in their children’s lifestyle hopes.
I invited a resident Korean woman 
who lives in the Kita-Shirakawa 
district of Kyoto to do her own 
“day-in-the-life” photo shoot.  
She agreed, but wished to remain 
anonymous.  She is married to the 
owner of several pachinko parlors, 
and their house is opulent by 
Kyoto standards.  They use a Jap-
anese name, and their daughter 
goes to an expensive private 
school and to ballet lessons.  
Here she has taken a photo in an 
expensive Kita-Shirakawa food 







New York’s Upper-East Side district.)  Hers is a dream 
of movement, of escape.  But to get out of Higashi-
kujo requires a husband with a position in a large, 
prominent company.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —294—Up river, when the Takaseigawa 
was allowed to run dry (see 
below) in Higashi-kujo, the City 
was sponsoring art exhibits in the 
rivercourse north of Shijo (4th 
street).  Here where tourists play, 
the City has spent considerable 
funds to upgrade the pedestrian 
sidewalks, and to maintain a pris-
tine urban watercourse.  The 
neglect that residents of 
Minamiku (South Kyoto) includ-
ing residents of Higashi-kujo feel, 
as an attitude that the city has 
toward its southern district, is 
only enhanced by the attention the 
City pays to selected regions, 
such as this.  
Photo by author
“Kabushiki kaisha (a company listed 
on the Tokyo stock-exchange),” her 
friend agrees.   Finding employment 
in one of the leading larger Japa-
nese companies is difficult for any 
young person in Japan, and these 
difficulties increase for those with a 
social  or economic disadvantage.  
Job discrimination is illegal in Kyoto, 
but enforcement is far from rigor-
ous, and review by the courts is 
lengthy (several years) and not pre-
dictably satisfactory, as women in 
Japan also have recently discovered.  
At the end of the first madang geki the young 
women invite the harumon (grandmother) to come 
with them and eat, promising her that they will not 
serve her the mild, sweet Japanese sauce, but authen-
tic, spicy, Korean-style sauce.  Their dreams are not 
realized, but they can open up a space of consumption 
at a scale they can afford, and with a flavor they have 
acquired a taste for.
Madang Two: baseball 
dreams and summer 
days
The second madang play is a meandering street 
scene on a summer day.  It begins with a pair of young 
men recounting an exploit at the Japanese national 
high-school baseball tournament, an annual event with 
a broad popular following.  The young men come 
across the two young women (see above) who have 
been conversing about their plans to move away.   
Quite obviously, these two men do not qualify as  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —295—future husbands.  The four are met by a man in a 
wheelchair being pushed by another man.  
“The Takasei river goes by the
Labor Center.  It’s become a
dump.To me its strange to think
how easy it has become to toss
things [there] without a second
thought [heiki de poi poi suteru].
‘Why do they gotta toss it
here?’[nande koko ni suterenne-
yaroo] I ask you.”
Third generation Resident Korean
They meet on the banks of the Takaseigawa,  a 
waterway that was once a canal that carried goods to 
and from North Kyoto to the south towards Fushimi 
and Osaka.  The canal boats have long since passed, 
but the canal remains the one feature of Higashi-kujo 
that physically and symbolically connects this area with 
the more posh northern districts.  
In 1994, for the first time in mem-
ory, the Takaseigawa canal was 
completely dry.  For some resi-
dents, the bleakness of this empty 
canal was another symbol of  dis-
crimination (or, at least, of indif-
ference) by the City.
In 1994, for the first time in memory, the city, fac-
ing a prolonged water shortage, decided to shunt the 
canal’s trickle of water back into the river at Gojo (5th 
street), well North of Kujo (9th street).  For the first 
time the canal was completely dry.  
   photo ©1994 Higashi-kujo no ima.
Because there were no beneficial consequences 
to the City for shutting off the Takaseigawa water (the 
shunted water simply flowed south via the Kamo 
river) residents of Higashi-kujo, and of the buraku area 
south of Gojo complained to the city that they were 
being punished for a situation they did not cause and 
in a way that made no sense.   After all, the City con- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —296—tinued to allow the water to flow through the more 
affluent tourist quarters of Pontocho above Shi-jo (4th 
Street).  And so, the Takaseigawa canal became 
another character in the madang geki.  
Baseball dreams, summer glory at 
the High school national tourna-
ment.  
The second madang geki shows 
us street life on a summer day in 
Higashi-kujo.  Korean high-
schools in Japan are not allowed 
to compete in this tournament.  So 
these dreams of summer glory are 
made ironic by their administra-
tive impossibility.  So many ave-
nues of access to social and 
cultural achievement in Japan are 
closed to resident Koreans simply 
by administrative fiat.
For decades, the Takaseigawa was a working 
waterway, but its presence, in the sound of its slow 
running water,  in the foliage it promoted, and in its 
annual crop of fireflies (hotaru), was also valuable as a 
local urban resource.  
By turning off the summer water, the locals fear 
that the firefly larvae along its banks may not have sur-
vived.  Whatever constructed urban ambiance there is 
in Higashi-kujo is linked to its connections with the 
Takaseigawa and the Kamo river.  And the Kamo was 
also one main reason why Koreans lived in Kyoto 
before World War II:  they were hired in large num-
bers to labor on the riparian works, cementing the 
banks against flood and erosion. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —297— 
This Meiji era (turn of the cen-
tury) photograph shows boats 
along the Takaseigawa... here on 
the great curve near Seventh 
Street.
From Meiji Kyoto
It is beside the Takaseigawa that the six characters 
of the second madang geki cross paths on a hot sum-
mer day.    They know one another, and begin to plan 
to go somewhere together when an object in the 
water attracts their attention.  Someone has dropped 
a wallet, and now all it takes is for one of the group to 
go in and retrieve it.
The entryway of the house of the 
Korean woman living in Kita-
Shirakawa shows the influence of 
Western domestic architecture 
and the means for conspicuous 
consumption.  She told me she 
would never go to Higashi-Kujo, 
and would not care to meet or 
know the people there.  “You 
really should avoid that area,” she 
advised me.  Her own story was 
dominated by the bitterness of the 
many times her “friends” had 
used her Koreanness against her.
With some reluctance, one of the 
group steps into the ankle-deep 
water and pulls from this a wallet.  
With great anticipation he opens 
this and announces “Hundred-dollar 
bill!” (man satsu), but then he revises 
his announcement... “Ten-dollar bill” 
(sen satsu).  He counts out all of the 
money (about sixty dollars) and they 
begin to think of ways to spend this,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —298—when he looks in a packet in the wallet and finds a 
photograph of a woman from the Philippines.  
“Philippines?” The others exclaim?  
They cluster to get a look, and one of the women 
reports that she has seen this Filipina working in a 
local market.  She’s the one who has recently moved 
into the public housing block.   Now they know who 
the wallet belongs to.   With reluctance,  but no hesi-
tation, they decide to return it, and its money, to its 
owner, whom they know would need this.  Together 
they wander offstage, contemplating a stop in a local 
noodle eatery.
The video on the right shows the 
opening of a wallet found in the 
Takaseigawa.  The wallet turns 
out to belong to a woman from the 
Philippines who has moved into 
the neighborhood.
The episode of the Filipina  was one of the topics 
at the play-writing meetings that could have long-term 
impacts on this event.  At that meeting, one of the 
participants remarked that he had heard that a Filipina 
had moved into the local public housing block (Mat-
sunoki-machi Danchi).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —299—Locating multiculturalism “The neighborhood is getting more multicultural,” 
he said, and that started a discussion about changing 
the festival in name and in mood to a multicultural fes-
tival (tabunka matsuri).  In fact, in the third Higashi-
kujo Madang (1995), a Philippine dancing group joined 
the event.   The future of this event will probably 
include embracing and articulating multiculturalism 
inside Kyoto but outside its government-run agencies.
The inclusion of a reference to the Filipina brings 
out a desire to situate the circumstances of the local 
resident Korean community within an international 
context.   The Madang organizers point to the simple 
fact that they are at the front edge of non-Japanese, 
and equally important, non Japanese-government man-
aged, cultural production in the area.  The city’s efforts 
at kokusaika (“internationalism”) manage to avoid hav-
ing international persons (even those who were not 
born in Kyoto) as equal participants in decision--mak-
ing at any level.  
At one point in 1994, as a part of its 1200th anni-
versary, and as a project in its self-proclaimed goal of 
becoming Japan’s most “international city”, the city 
government put together a meeting to discuss the 
future of kokusaika.  It was billed as an idobatakaigi (lit-
erally, a well-side chat).  But most of the chatting con-
cerned the general but sometimes significant fear that 
some Kyoto residents have of foreigners, and the vari- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —300—ous exclusions and administrative difficulties1 that for-
eigners regularly undergo.   There were no new 
initiatives announced to close the gap between these 
two groups of local residents.  And the local Korean 
community was conspicuously not invited to attend.
Counter movements to the city- and national 
state-run programs to “internationalize” Kyoto society 
are bound to run against the  logic of these programs, 
which attempts to manage the style and the content 
of what is imported, claiming to adjust this to unique 
Japanese tastes and circumstances (the consumerist 
end of Nihonjinron), but domesticating this in the process.  
1. My wife’s purse was lost (presumed stolen) on the train, and so we had to visit the local 
police box (koban) with a letter of apology for her losing her foreign resident identity card, 
before we could go down to the city office and apply for another card.
ABOVE:  at a forum on the traffic 
in women at the Kyoto YWCA in 
1993, a Filipina NGO organizer 
from Tokyo discusses the prob-
lems that the sex industry creates 
for all Filipinas who live in Japan.  
The Higashi-kujo madang’s inclu-
sion of a Filipina in the neighbor-
hood stands as a counter example 
of the potential for multicultural 
understanding in Kyoto.
Making foreign goods and ideas safe for local con-
sumption falls easily on the shoulders of the various 
government ministries2 and their “public” corpora-
tions, agencies that assume a paternalist control 
whenever possible.   Part of this process of “domesti-
cating the foreign” involves the need to create an 
atmosphere of negative apprehension about the for-
eign.   Products and people who are foreign are 
understood to be dangerous as these are produced or 
in the way that they live outside of Japan, and it is only 
prudent that such dangers are not permitted to enter.   
[See: fear of the foreign]  With foreign people, this has 
2. The routing of funds through government organizations makes even (so-called) non-gov-
ernment organizations in Kyoto very much concerned about government perspectives.  
And so the idea that a group completely external to government control and oversight 
might acquire legitimacy as a source for internationalization would threaten the efforts of 
the government to manage this process.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —301—long involved attitudes of superiority and also of fear, 
and thus a form of racism that is linked also to terror.   
A few examples are in order:   As the Filipina NGO 
organizer described to the audience at the Kansai 
Forum on crimes against women, the more than 
100,000 Filipina1 women who are working in the Japa-
nese sex industry,  and working under conditions that 
most resemble a form of slavery, bring to Japan a ser-
vice that supports the masculine appropriation of the 
public sphere.   Their sexual services—their bodies—
are offered to Japanese men as commodified and 
domesticated exotic objects.    Their exoticness 
derive from their foreignness, and their submissive-
ness (the role they must take, unless, of course, the 
customer wants to be dominated) marks their domes-
tication.   Their presence in Japan can only be sus-
tained through the complicity of silence by Japanese 
women.  
The madang geki did not address the sex industry 
in Kyoto, again avoiding a topic specifically focused on 
gender issues.  But this particular Filipina was pre-
sented in the Madang play not as a “Japa-yuki” prosti-
tute, but as a neighbor who happens to hail from the 
Philippines.  And so the play incorporated another call 
for a respect of local cultural heterogeneity.
1. Add to these women from Thailand and Taiwan, and other Asian, and more recently Latin 
American countries, and the total has been suggested to be more than 250,000 women, 
most of whom have outstayed their visas and are illegal immigrants... working in a nation 
where every citizen is required to maintain an official residence, subject to regular police 
verification.  And so it is quite obvious that this industry enjoys government support. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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and betrayal
In the third madang, the circumstances of both 
the spatial and social marginality of the neighborhood 
is portrayed through the depiction of practices of hid-
ing and uncovering.  The third madang introduces us 
to Mangiri/Matsuyama, a young executive in a real 
estate firm (Rakuraku Fudousan) who has been scout-
ing properties for a commercial customer.    The cus-
tomer is looking for a cheap spot build a hotel, and 
Mangiri, hopefully, but foolishly (as it turns out), has 
led him to Higashi-kujo.  
As they walk through this district, Mangiri points 
out all of its good points (it is close to Kyoto Station, 
and it has ample properties for sale, and so the poten-
tial for later expansion).  The boss cannot help but 
pick out signals of the region’s dubious ambiance 
(including the looming public housing), and worries 
about his company’s image.  They run into three young 
girls who are practicing their music for the Higashi-
kujo madang (a play within a play) and Mangiri has to 
do some quick spin control to belay his boss’s suspi-
cion about the neighborhood.  
After that there is a brief episode of comedy 
relief about a mother who sends her child out to bor-
row some salt and then punishes him when he returns 
empty handed.  The comedy relief is for the crowd, 
but the additional figure of the character of the Japa-
nese real estate client, who watches the scene with 
visible disapproval, moves its referent to the neighbor-
hood itself.  Higashi-kujo, we are being told, is the 
kind of place were such public displays are found, here  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the madang drama —303—in a city where public displays of emotion are rarely 
made.
Then it happens.  Two women wander by (one of 
them steps on the foot of the boss), and they recog-
nize Mangiri, and call him by his name.  With that he 
must acknowledge that he is, in fact, Mangiri, and so a 
Korean.  The client will have nothing more to do with 
him, or with this section of town, and Mangiri is left 
with the women, and his anger, and humiliation.
“MANGIRI,” she cries out.
“Long time no see!”
And with that she uncovers his
hidden Korean identity, and spoils
his chance at business success.
but then business life had not been
so good to Mangiri.  And the third
act reminds the audience that
being locked out of the Japanese
economy has its up-side.  Without
the enormous mortgage (and later
death taxes) to pay, life is far
sweeter.
“Why did you shout my name out like that,” he asks.
“That’s how we talk in Higashi-kujo.  Our voices 
are big.” She replies.  
They learn that Mangiri managed to move away 
15 years before, and, after completing an accelerated 
course on real estate, he had begun to prosper.  But 
then the bad economy began to drag down the real 
estate market.  He was buying himself a house, but  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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about Higashi-kujo.  
The woman reminds him:  “Life here in a tene-
ment house (nagaya) is happier than that (alone) in a 
big home out (there).”
He gestures his agreement, and the women hatch 
a plan on how he can get a bank loan on his house and 
move back here.
“Everything I earn today goes into that house.  
But before I go broke, I’m coming back to Higashi-
kujo.”
There is a notion of the picaresque quality about 
life in Higashi-kujo that is here consciously used as a 
emotional counter to the generally dire economic cir-
cumstances.  Having reached the bottom of the local 
economy, locals have little fear of falling.  And while 
the work they do is low-paying and often distasteful, it 
is also plentiful.  And their children are released from 
the Japanese school “examination hell.”
Exclusion is also a release, and with mutual coop-
eration they can even manage to create positive alter-
native life-styles (such as the Higashi-kujo Madang 
festival) and to tactically reappropriate their situa-
tion.   However, as much positive value as they can 
mine from their conditions, it is precisely these condi-
tions that they seek to change.  They are not looking 
to create a sentimental attachment to their poverty 
and marginal status.
They seek an end to exclusion through a direct 
attack on the cultural underpinnings of the institution- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Their aim is to show how a local neighborhood can 
establish a respect for heterogeneity, and use this 
example as a lesson for the larger Kyoto public 
sphere.
To end the third madang, a final character is intro-
duced.  A “foreigner” (gaikokujin, or “gaijin”) wanders 
into the scene with a video camera.  
“HELLO! (konnichiwa)” I called
out.
It was my first line in the play.  A
month earlier they had surprised
me by writing me into the
madang, as a cameo part... I
would play the obnoxious for-
eigner with the video camera. So,
I was playing myself.  But I was
also playing an allegorical part: I
was “internationalization,” (koku-
saika)—just another foreigner,
like the Koreans, but not Korean.
And my interest in the madang
appropriated its performance in a
manner that the organizers
enjoyed and would themselves
reappropriate.
“Hello,” he calls out, startling the women, who 
protest this intrusion.
“I hate this (kind of thing),” one woman says, 
“besides, I’m not wearing my makeup...” TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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kujo Madang Report.  (Also note the inclusion of body hair on the back of my hand).
“I’ve been walking around here and there taking 
pictures,” the foreigner relates.  “I’ve taken so many 
photos and video.”
“(To one of the women.)  I took a shot of your 
daughter dancing, (and to the other) and your’s too.  
They were all very charming.”
“What about me?” One of them asks?  “I’m her 
mother.”
“Ah, yes, well, you’re certainly very charming 
too...” And he takes a shot of them dancing, to show 
that he really does consider them to be charming, but 
he excuses himself then and moves along.
the final dance
The end of the third madang comes as soon as 
the foreigner leaves the circle.  The old woman enters 
from the first madang, and they invite her to join them 
for some barbecue.  All of the other join in an 
impromptu dance, and the crowd is encouraged to 
enter the circle.  The madang drama is complete only 
when the audience and the actors dissolve the circle  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
The Higashi-kujo Madang—the final dance —307—that was created by joining together in a collective cel-
ebration.
As the climactic moment of inclu-
sion, the mass dance at the end of 
the first year’s madang exceeded 
the expectations of even its orga-
nizers, who had simply planned 
for the joyful dance of the end of 
the madang play to open up to the 
audience.  Here the audience took 
this opening and pushed it to a 
limit of decontrolled emotional 
control.  Exhaustion, rather than 
scheduling, finally brought the 
crowd back from this limit.  
NOTE: much of this video has 
been edited into slow motion to 
reveal the embodied display more 
fully.  You can run this at near 
real-time by selecting and holding 
the fast-forward button.
This circle dance, which further erases the actor/
onlooker distinction, will continue until it wears its 
itself out.  
The celebrations would continue 
into the night, as I discovered 
after the 1994 madang: See: 
Madang night
Basically unorganized, it erupts from the end of 
the drama, and, as I have noted earlier, it creates a 
space of shared intimacy, both of bodies and emo-
tions.  Here is where newcomers and organizers also 
find themselves dancing together, it is another space 
of ENclusion, a place and a time when all who are 
here are welcome, and where all who are here are us.   
This experience is also a threshold through which 
first-year onlookers become madang “veterans”.  
Here is laughter.  Here is joy.  Here are micro pro-
cesses of mutual recognition and acceptance that cul-
tural anthropology has only begun to explore.  
 Next I want to focus on the goals of the madang 
organizers, on how the event might succeed, and  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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toward its goal.  For one festival—and festivity itself— 
is not some democratic universal solvent that can 
wipe clean a history of real and symbolic violence.  It 
is, rather, an available tactic, an opening, a chance for 
that those who have few of these, to push back against 
the representations that have shoved them into the 
margins. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Public spheres/public spaces —309—Celebrations in Cities
Public spheres/public spaces
This chapter is a short step back, 
and up into the field of cultural 
management as this is controlled 
by city/state governments.  The 
self-conscious management of 
history in many cities is centered 
upon the following: the city’s 
position as a national cultural site; 
the privileging of a single narra-
tive thread, an historical tale that 
reduces the contests that occurred 
in spaces throughout history to a 
domesticated historical represen-
tation of space; and, the selling of 
this story to middle-class visitors 
(tourists).  Each of these features 
has consequences for City-run 
festivals, and for those events that 
are staged as counter-events to 
open up urban spaces to multiple 
appropriations.
Having taken a look at more widespread neigh-
borhood festival practices in Kyoto, and then at the 
organization and performance of  the Higashi-kujo 
Madang, we are ready to begin to reflect upon the 
field of festival organization/performance in public 
places. In order to outline the tactical concerns and 
maneuvers that such counter events make, we must 
first understand the conditions that are presented by 
and in their cities.
It is also important to critique the interventions 
of government and other expert systems into local 
cultural production, a critique that can be based, in 
part, on the expressed goals of this intervention, and 
in part on a reappraisal of the potentials for and the 
limitations of “managing” cultural production.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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It manufactures its field, its equip-
ment and its rules.  It trains its
players, empowers its officials.  It
sets its time to start, and programs
the timing machine for its own
breakdown.  The game happens in
this space, in the street, at this
time.  The players know what to
do.  They cannot say what they
know, but the doing gets done.
No one is watching but the game
machine.  Next year it must be
different, and it must be the same.
The game machine recodes its
own future.”
Deleuzions
For example, a festival (qua festival) cannot fully 
manage its own production.  It is, at the time it 
occurs, a field of expression that is necessarily open 
to unexpected results.   The presence of festivals 
shows an ability to “let go” of the street.  It is a letting 
go, a letting loose, of expression.  The circumstances 
that promote this ability are complex.   The process of 
letting go requires that the space of letting go is 
bounded and transformed from its mundane coding 
into something completely different.  There are vari-
ous skills that need to be acquired, and the content 
that results is locally determined and highly singular.  
For example: Imagine the festival as a building.  The festival 
is the act of construction.  The resulting edifice is the 
neighborhood as a festival community.  
space at stake
“I start by imagining.
I imagine a street, lined with
buildings, buildings filled with
businesses, and in back and
above, apartments filled with peo-
ple and consumer electronics.
The street is also peopled.   Apart-
ment dwellers depart for the day,
enter the street, produce a flow.
Retail shops open and receive
customers, offices fill their desks,
small factories clatter with
machinery.  Machinery.”
Deleuzions
We are looking closely at spatial practices—at 
practices where space is not simply a “container” of a 
practice, but rather, one of its “stakes.”   Much of the 
discussion that follows will focus on how the practices 
express personal and group identities.  But from the 
beginning I want to look at their sites: at the city, the 
streets, and the ways that these spaces are trans-
formed through various events.   
Above, we talked about the Public Body, and about 
the everyday coding of bodies and places.  This coding 
is also accomplished through punctuating events that 
can either reinforce or disrupt the everyday coding of 
the street: or do both, as with the festival.  The festi-
val’s disruption of the everyday street reinforces the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—margins move to centers —311—public body as a festival body.
“...To speak of ‘producing space’
sounds bizarre, so great is the
sway still held by the idea that
empty space is prior to whatever
ends up filling it. Questions
immediately arise here: what
spaces? and what does it mean to
speak of ‘producing space’? We
are confronted by the problem
how to bring concepts that have
already been worked out and for-
malized into conjunction with this
new content without falling back




In order to bring into perspective some of the 
transformative effects that urban festival practices 
lend to places, we need to know how places are 
made, and how this making can be refashioned.   And 
one focus for our study of this refashioning is on how 
a place might be remade as the property of those 
whose lives are most intimately connected to it.  
And today, the peoples who have the greatest 
need to acquire a hold on the spaces to where their 
lives have taken them are those people who are fur-
thest from the places they once made claims over—
the peoples whose former places, in other nations, 
are now forbidden to them.  These diasporic popula-
tions are refugees from a variety of dangers, from 
genocide and war, from social oppression and from 
economic marginality.   
margins move to centers
“The street is a conducting
machine.  It conducts electricity,
relays messages, brings water,
carries away shit.  The street
codes linear interactions.  A code
for the sidewalks: nods of the
head, ritual greetings, facework
among neighbors.  A code for the
gutter: spittings and hosings and
the rakings of dust, the night vom-
itorium, logjams of cigarette
butts.  A code for the vehicles:
keep to the left, keep moving, do
not interrupt the flow.
Parking is not permitted.”
Deleuzions
The circumstances that generate global migra-
tions will be an increasingly central topic for social 
anthropology in the coming years.  In the space of this 
work, I will concentrate on the circumstances not of 
leaving—of expulsion from, or nostalgic attraction to 
former homelands.  I will focus on the circumstances 
of arrival—of access to local social/cultural/spatial 
resources: of homecomings.  For even where their 
leaving, their expulsion, has been physically accom-
plished, and with some emotional closure, the issue of 
their arrival, and of the means for them to fully enter 
into their new places, also begs our attention.   So  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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new homes brings into relief the spatial circumstances 
that affect every resident in this space.  And what 
these newcomers learn about the public sphere and 
the public spaces they encounter can become a civics 
lesson for us all.
“ It occurred to me that here was
another moment to the day's festi-
val, a moment not less significant
by its intimate scale—the entire
year of festival preparation and
then today's festival performance
were also rehearsals for this
moment.  This party was not the
end of this year's event, but the
budding communion that would
assure the next.  Here was fecund
moment drenched in body sweat,
and sweetened by a heady aban-
don.”Madang night
We need to explore how these strangers create 
the links to their new homes, and how these new 
places (through state institutions or by attitudes 
within the public sphere) attempt to manage this 
homecoming.  The formalities of becoming recognized 
by local institutions (schools, banks, employers, the 
police) represent only one level of access to 
resources.  There are other levels where this access 
must also be negotiated before the newcomer, the 
stranger, is no longer marked as being “strange.”  
where migration stops
“It is beyond dispute that relations
of inclusion and exclusion, and of
implication and explication,
obtain in practical space as in spa-
tial practice. ‘Human beings’ do
not stand before, or amidst, social
space; they do not relate to the
space of society as they might to a
picture, a show, or a mirror. They
know that they have a space and
that they are in this space. They
do not merely enjoy a vision, a
contemplation, a spectacle—for
they act and situate themselves in
space as active participants”
(Lefevbre 1991, 294).
The location where this negotiation “takes place” 
is the place where the migration ends up.  It is hap-
pening, for example, in every major city in the world.  
It happens in rural towns and districts as well, but 
here I will focus on urban contexts.  This entire work 
is about the process of movement.  The Higashi-kujo 
Madang is an expression of this movement.  The 
movement represents what I have just been describ-
ing: the final arrival of a diasporic group to a new 
home. 
The discursive space of this movement is cen-
tered on the demand that the social/cultural center 
grows large enough to accommodate diversity.  The  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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sphere to those who are now locally marginalized by 
their heterogeneous place of birth or by physical dif-
ferences.  Their only options are to tolerate the limita-
tions imposed on their lives locally, or to move 
elsewhere (i.e., out of Japan), or to change the locale 
where they live.  
“...The street is a desiring
machine.  It creates desires it
offers to diminish.  It arouses
excitement in order to quell it
through commodity fetish
exchange.  It overcodes as it sells
itself.  It is a zero sum desiring
machine.
The street is a panoptic machine.
It watches for strangers, monitors
their passing, silently wishing
them on.  It listens for disorder,
for the window broken, for run-
ning steps.
It has a thousand eyes and ears.
The office help depart.  The apart-
ment dwellers return.  The street
hails its own.  It inscribes their
pathways.  They find food and
drink, they enter back into its full
body.  The shops close.  The traf-
fic stops.  In the darkness behind




This final option transforms a diasporic commu-
nity from one organized by its movement in space to 
one organizing itself by a movement within a place and 
within a society: that is, from a immigrant group into a 
social movement.  And here they share the streets 
with other social movements.  At the same time that 
trangers-from-elsewhere are becoming more numer-
ous in the streets of every major city, strangers-from-
within are also more numerous: the boundaries of life-
style behaviors are now productive sites not only of 
avant-garde expression, but also of diverse popular 
cultures.   
Demands for public acceptance and public-sphere 
representations of alternative or multiple cultural 
expressions bring gay/lesbian activists and migrant 
community activists to the same field of cultural 
action.   And the feminist struggle to unmark gender 
as an organizing feature of the public sphere adds both 
new theoretical insights and counter practices to the 
picture.   Books and magazines bring these features of 
late modernity into discursive arenas centered mostly 
on university campuses and majority-minority neigh-
borhoods (such as the Castro district in San Fran- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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street.
Space and time
Space and time have mutually enfolding conse-
quences for cultural practices.  Together, they deter-
mine a dynamic that is usually lost when social 
scientists attempt a description that ignores either 
one of them.  But this dynamic is also lost when social 
sciences mistake the notions of space they bring to/
with their studies for those spaces where people 
live.  Lefevbre calls the former “representations of 
space:”
Representations of space: conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, tech-
nocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent—all of
whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived.... This is the dominant
space in any society (or mode of production).... (Lefevbre 1991, 38-39)”
The dominant space of Kyoto: 
this city’s iconic self-representa-
tion of space, is the Heian Shrine, 
built in the form of the original 
imperial palace.  In this video too, 
we see the most dominant identity 
space of Kyoto: the geisha.  So 
entirely dominated by her repre-
sentational role—each geisha 
resembles all geisha, and as syn-
ecdoches, she represents all 
Japan—that she is allowed no per-
sonal expression whatsoever.
Video by author.
Representations of space fill the space of theories 
about space, and so these theories end up talking 
about the spaces that are produced at a level of the-
ory.  However, out there in the street, expressive cul-
tural practices, such as festivals,  architecture, and 
public art, color their spaces with other representa-
tions, constructing what LeFevbre called “representa- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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“Representational spaces: space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and
hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’, but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a
few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe.  This is the
dominated—and hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and
appropriate.  It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects. Thus representational
spaces may be said, though again with certain exceptions, to tend towards more or less coherent
systems of non-verbal symbols and signs (ibid, 39).”
One of Kyoto’s few emerging rep-
resentational spaces is the 
Higashi-kujo Madang.  Here a 
troupe of dancers from nearby 
Utoro join in the festival.
Video by author
But are we then caught by some irreducible dis-
cursive/practical divide?  Are spaces of representation 
never built into places where they then inform repre-
sentational space?  Of course they are, and where 
Lefevbre is leading us in this discussion is to question 
just how and where these two spaces intersect, and 
from which side we should be grounding our ideas of 
the city.   To begin with, we need to stop privileging 
spaces of representation over representational spaces: 
planning should be informed from the manners and 
Residents from nearby Utoro, 
a small district south of 
Kyoto joined in the Madang. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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“...as I intend to show in the anal-
ysis of Brasilia, a counter-dis-
course would have to demonstrate
that the delirium of power in mas-
ter planning itself creates condi-
tions over which the planners
stumble and consequently condi-
tions for its own subversion.
Indeed, my objective is to produce
such a counter-discourse, one pre-
cisely grounded in the tension that
an anthropologically critical study
of modernism creates between the
normative ethnographic task of
recording the natives' intentions in
their own terms and the aim of
evaluating those intentions in
terms of their results.
(Holston 1989, 8-9).”
Lefevbre, by overstressing this distinction1, per-
haps hopes to show that planning from a space of rep-
resentation results in spaces that cannot be lived as 
representational spaces.  He puts this limit on the use 
of planned space, in favor of spaces that have arrived 
at their use through the work of users over a long 
duration of use.   The planner should take their lesson 
not from Garnier’s (1989) “Cité Industrielle” paper 
drawings of perfectly rational cities, but from the 
streets of Quebec or Old Delhi and the piazzas of Flo-
rence or Venice.  
  Indeed the hubris of planning a city despite its 
history of use, what Holston called the “delirium of 
power,” develops spacial notions that are most liable 
to the exercise of planning.  This results in the design 
of places that are made so as to conform to what 
LeFevbre calls the “illusion of transparency” (Lefevbre 
1991, 27-28).  These offer the spatial forms of what Fou-
cault noted was the “confessional” practice of moder-
nity—from paper to concrete and back into 
discourse—the spaces tell their planners what the 
planners want to hear: that life itself can be planned, 
shaped by the space that contains it.   
1. The disjunction between representational spaces and spaces of representation is nowhere 
more evident than in “planned” cities such as Chandigar or Brasilia.  Even in these cases, 
however, local residents find ways to remake the built spaces of representation into lived 
representational spaces, although they do so against the will and the plans of the architect 
and the institutions that favored this plan.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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represented—literally re-pre-
sented—as cognition and mental
design, as an illusive ideational
subjectivity substituted for an
equally illusive sensory objectiv-
ism.  Spatiality is reduced to a
mental construct alone, a way of
thinking, an ideational process in
which the ‘image’ of reality takes
epistemological precedence over
the tangible substance and appear-
ance of the real world.  Social
space folds into mental space, into
diaphanous concepts of spatiality
which all too often take us away
from materialized social realities
(Soja 1989, 125).”
Indeed, the idea of (transparently) connecting the 
original drawing to the discourse on planning and 
architecture—often without the inconvenience of hav-
ing to construct anything (as with Garnier’s plans, 
which were never built)—was a comforting confes-
sion for the modernist planner.  Renderings and mod-
els of future cities, such as Le Corbusier’s Plan Voisin 
for the rebuilding of Paris (1925) were judged, cri-
tiqued, and copied without, or before, they were real-
ized.  The act of rendering buildings and cityscapes 
became the primary skill that separated the architec-
tural super-stars from those who were simply good at 
making plans that worked.  These drawings were 
reproduced in magazines and became the media 
through which modern planning ideas spread across 
the globe.  Few people cared to ask about the built 
results.
Modern planning used its own rational spatial 
logic to inform the cities it would create:
“In this vast urban place, if one followed the dictates of Le Corbusier, space itself became a focus
of social concern and an object of investigation and control. Everywhere the architect and city plan-
ner cut the fabric into discrete units and recomposed them into a structured and utopian whole: dis-
order was replaced by functional order, diversity by serial repetition, and surprise by uniform
expectancy. These cuts and insertions, by imposing their ideal model of scenic unity in which solids
dematerialized into transparent and interpenetrating forms and structures filled in or hollowed out
space, decomposed the city into a random array of homogeneous sites, emptied of historic refer-
ence and ignorant of building types and city places specific to each location. Because this was a city
where there was no need for tradition, only for documentation, history books were banished from
architectural lessons, the picturesque urban schemes of the nineteenth century were ridiculed, and
the cruel beauty of orthogonal grid-iron street patterns, elevating glass skyscrapers, and shocking
modern mobility was celebrated. And so proliferated in the disciplined City as Panorama the mirror-
ing curtain-wall skyscrapers in which today we see reflected the City of Spectacle. (Boyer 1994, 46).” TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Space and time —318—Tony Garnier’s “Une Cité Indust-
rielle” urban drawings in the 
1920s were early examples of the 
notion of a city (or a building) as a 
“machine for living.”  His influen-
tial ideas included single-use zon-
ing to separate industrial, 
commercial civic and residential 
districts, and a rationalization of 
movement based upon the auto-
mobile and mass transport.  Many 
of these notions are apparent in 
the plans and the built environ-
ment of cities such as Kyoto.  
Kyoto, on the other hand, is 
aggressively moving toward its 
own vision of the industrial city, 
and its own history of mixed 
use—streets filled with shops and 
small-scale factories are being 
replaced by residential quarters, 
industrial zones, and shopping 
malls.
Such rejections of modern urban planning as an 
answer to spatial concerns, are centrally a rejection of 
the insertion of a uniform, ahistorical rationality, and 
of the creation of a single rational space as the goal of 
urban planning.  
In Lefevbre’s words: 
“We have seen that the visual space of transparency and readability has a content—a content
that it is designed to conceal: namely, the phallic realm of (supposed) virility.  It is at the same time a
repressive space: nothing in it escapes the surveillance of power.  Everything opaque, all kinds of par-
titions, even walls simplified to the point of mere drapery, are destined to disappear.  This disposition
of things is diametrically opposed to the real requirements of the present situation. The sphere of
private life ought to be enclosed, and have a finite, or finished, aspect. Public space, by contrast,
ought to be an opening outwards. What we see happening is just the opposite (1991, 147).”
The rationality that might be of some use in the 
public sphere, has been (mis-)applied uniformly to 
include private spaces.  The underlying critique is that  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Space and time —319—the over application of planning creates a repressive 
space, a space that can belong only to the planners 
and their benefactors.
“...if modernism and anthropol-
ogy share certain critical inten-
tions to shake the values of
Western civilization, what makes
their linking problematic is that
both types of subversion are
largely failures—or at least unful-
filled promises. That modernist
architecture and city planning not
only failed in their subversive
aims, but often strengthened what
they challenged will be demon-
strated in the case study of Bra-
silia (Holston 1989, 7).”
This is very much the same critique that post-
modern planners and architects have made about 
modernist design.  But much post-modern architec-
ture, in its mannerist “playfulness,” seems to have 
learned not from cityscapes but from movie set 
designs.  And the result is an enforced playfulness that 
is not any more accessible to be appropriated by their 
users than is Garnier’s industrial city.  To enter some-
one else’s completely designed fantasy world is not 
much different from entering someone else’s factory.
“The last condition [the ability to
know friends from enemies] is
not, however, met in modern
urban environment. The latter is
marked by the divorce between
physical density and dense socia-
bility. Aliens appear inside the
confines of the lifeworld and
refuse to go away (though one can
hope that they will in the end).
This new situation does not stem
necessarily from the increased
restlessness and mobility. As a
matter of fact, it is the mobility
itself which arises from the state-
enforced ‘uniformization’ of vast
spaces—much too large for being
assimilated and domesticated by
old methods of mapping and
ordering deployed by individuals
(Bauman 1990, 152).”
Neither the modernist space nor its post-modern 
alternative is planned with an aim toward facilitating a 
distributed ownership of the design of the space.  
Both are pre-designed to a level that can preclude 
later creative appropriations.   And both are commis-
sioned at a scale that is too large to be adapted to 
local conditions of sociability, as Bauman notes.  The 
scale of the modern city, not just its size, but the size 
of its internal zones, have become too large to acquire 
familiarity though use.  They are, instead, designed to 
be familiar by their similarities—however this can have 
the reverse effect, as uniform similarity is never as 
familiar as something singularly distinct.
 
 TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Space and time —320—The City of Kyoto’s “planning 
map for construction of interna-
tional sight-seeing city, Kyoto” is 
a good example of modernist 
urban planning, where zoning dis-
tricts create “use ghettos” that 
separate homes from workspaces 
from stores.  In this case, the 
southern area of Kyoto has been 
targeted for additional industrial-
ization, and for high-density 
(high-rise) commercial and resi-
dential use.  The larger map of 
city shows the northern portion 
being reserved for low-density, 
exclusive residential use, and for 
aesthetic and scenic preserva-
tion.  The object is to hold the line 
on the degradation of cultural and 
scenic parts of north Kyoto, as a 
destination for the tourist trades.  
But this overall city plan carries a 
policy of concentrating the “nega-
tive” aspects of the urban mix on 
the south side to protect the north 
side.  There are no plans for aes-
thetic use of the many open 
spaces (the empty lots) in 
Higashi-kujo.
Apart from the features of the built-space, what 
precludes new appropriations of space are those 
notions that hold the imagination of a space, as these 
are supplied by expert systems/institutions in and out 
of government. Impinging on the spaces that are lived 
are the spaces that are presented through the media: 
through television and film—spaces that occupy the 
life-style imagination through their link to the market 
for fashion-ability.  
Certainly in Kyoto there is no lack of images of 
spaces presented through books, magazines, and 
other media, information provided about how space 
might and perhaps should be organized.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Space and time —321—“Mediated experience, since the
first experience of writing, has
long influenced both self-identity
and the basic organization of
social relations.  With the devel-
opment of mass communication,
particularly electronic communi-
cation, the interpenetration of
self-development and social sys-
tems, up to and including global
systems, becomes ever more pro-
nounced.  The 'world' in which we
now live is in some profound
respects thus quite distinct from
that inhabited by human beings in
previous periods of history.  It is
in many ways a single world, hav-
ing a unitary framework of experi-
ence (for instance, in respect of
basic axes of time and space), yet
at the same time one which cre-
ates new forms of fragmentation
and dispersal.  A universe of
social activity in which electronic
media have a central and constitu-
tive role, nevertheless, is not one
of 'hyper-reality', in Baudrillard's
sense.  Such an idea confuses the
pervasive impact of mediated
experience with the internal refer-
entiality of the social systems of
modernity—the fact that these
systems become largely autono-
mous and determined by their
own constitutive influences
(Giddens 1991, 4-5).”
These mediated spaces of representation: televi-
sion programs that showcase the homes of the “rich 
and famous,” and magazines that portray idealized life-
style spaces, create both a desire to apply these 
spaces of representation to one’s lived (representa-
tional) space, and a felt lack (for most) because the 
ideal is maintained as a distance between actually lived 
spaces and those that only a few can afford.  One of 
the main outcomes of visual media is a disenchant-
ment with spaces that are actually lived, but that can-
not compare with the spaces available in magazines 
and on television. 
The other problematic that mediated spaces add 
to late modernity is their lack of locatedness, and 
their ability to travel great distances.  They are every-
where and nowhere, and they bring this every/
nowhere with them into places, into homes and 
streets alike.  And our ability to theoretically appre-
h nd the locus of what we studying is consequently 
confounded.   As Jody Berland notes;  “In theoretical 
terms, we need to situate cultural forms within the 
production and reproduction of capitalist spatiality.  
How does one produce the other: the song, the car, 
the radio station, the road, the radio, the town, the 
listener? What does it mean to conceive of producing 
a listening audience this way, to imagine it as mainly 
not temporal, not really subjective, not simply the 
expression of something called taste? Why is the liter-
ature on pop music, like that on other genres, other 
media, so often empty of cars, not to mention eleva- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Space and time —322—tors, offices, shopping malls, hotels, sidewalks, air-
planes, buses, urban landscapes, small towns, northern 
settlements, or satellite broadcasts? (Berland 1992, 
39).” 
“....something, something free...” 
The space of representation of 
consumer desire is coded as the 
space of freedom: here visually 
coded as well as mostly a space 
outside of Japan, in this self-pro-
motion by the Association of Jap-
anese Commercial Broadcasters.
Today the larger part of studies of the public 
sphere are now centered on the media.  And these 
studies will, hopefully allow us to achieve a purchase 
on the spatial consequences of electronic media. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—from media to management —323—from media to management
“When the Man from Earth pre-
pared to leave, he looked back
once more at the Green Star city
that had seemed to be so much
like the life he knew at home. But
now he saw the different levels all
at the same time—the modern
factories inspired by earth, yes;
but also the fields of golden rice
and the diligent people, between
the onslaughts of storm, affection-
ately caring for their land and its
produce. And he knew they would
be singing in their festivals as
long as the towns bred new towns,
just as the pollens renewed the
cycles of the plants. “
The Green Star is Japan, and
Earth is the Earth—outside of the
archipelago.
And festivals inform a naturalized
(literally) national narrative of
continuity in this piece of fanciful
Nihonjinron from a book written
for foreign visitors from Earth to
the Green Star of Japan:
 Here is JAPAN.
 Here I wish to focus not on the representations 
of space in commercial media, but rather on the role 
t at city/state government plays in generating spaces 
through programs that are designed to memorialize 
certain spaces and practices.  For it is against this type 
of monological historical imagination that the festival 
communities under study construct their central1 tac-
tics.  In Lefevbre’s term, these festivals counter state-
sponsored representations of space through the cre-
ation of novel spaces of representation.  
Festivals too, are lived spaces, ongoing works that 
occupy the memories of those who first entered them 
as children.  The familiarization of festival representa-
tions is rarely stable (a common complaint of older 
festival goers is how different the event was in their 
youth).  Indeed, the current velocity of changes in 
material cultural practices, and in the media available 
for expressions, means that people in Kyoto and most 
other modern cities, live in spaces that are almost 
completely representations of spaces—simulacra of 
places that are largely unfamiliar, or familiar only in 
that they resemble so many other spaces.  Most adults 
have experienced learning that their childhood spaces 
have either been remodeled or completely altered.
1. The Madang festival does comment on capitalist representations of space, but it is more 
focussed on countering the official nationalist stories of local places. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—from media to management —324—The participation of children in 
festivals opens these up to early 
attempts at self expression and 
public participation.  Here they 
dance a “may-pole” dance, and 
also see how difficult life is for 
those in wheelchairs.
From the 1993 Higashi-kujo 
Madang
Video by author.
While I will also submit that a Practice creates its 
place and reproduces this creation when it is repeated, 
there are also other preexisting inputs to the con-
struction of the space.  There are built-in features of a 
place that make a space available to be reimagined—
or that close this down to new imaginings.  And one of 
the important representational aspects of a place is its 
self-professed historical imagination. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—from media to management —325—ON THE RIGHT: Kyoto’s Gion
Matsuri as this was portrayed in
the NHK TV special on Kyoto’s
1200th Anniversary Celebration.
“Kyoto hates Kyoto. It is probably
the world's only cultural center of
which this is true. The Romans
love Rome. Beijing suffered
greatly during the cultural revolu-
tion, but most of the damage was
wreaked by outsiders, and the citi-
zens of Beijing still love their city.
But the people of Kyoto cannot
bear the fact that Kyoto is not
Tokyo. They are trying with all
their might to catch up with
Tokyo, but they will never come
close. This has been going on a
long time....the people of Kyoto
never for gave Edo for usurping
its place as capital. When the
Emperor moved to Tokyo in 1868,
that was the final blow to Kyoto's
self esteem. While Nara and other
cities have also been uglified, this
was mostly the result of thought-
less city planning. In Kyoto, how-
ever, the destruction was
deliberate.”
(Kerr 1997, 158)
The main civic celebrations in Kyoto are meant to 
be simultaneously current and historical—a desire 
that leads to certain practical dilemmas.  The imperial 
pomp of the “Big Three” Kyoto festivals (Gion Matsuri, 
Aoi Matsuri, and Jidai Matsuri) has become ironically 
pomp-ous because of the prolonged, intentional 
absence of the emperor in Kyoto.   For in 1868, the 
emperor did not simply leave: he moved the entire 
capital, and all of its attendant cultural and administra-
tive services to Tokyo.   (The resulting acephalous 
leadership condition might, at some level, explain the 
City’s failure to capitalize on the wealth of historical 
architectural and urban facilities over the last hundred 
years.) Today, he (now the emperor Heisei) rarely 
returns to Kyoto, although various organizations cling 
to their tenuous hold on a claim of former court con-
nections. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—from media to management —326—“It is changing so swiftly, this
mid-twentieth century Japan that
you, the visitor will see.  For the
Japanese themselves, the pace of
change is so swift that they some-
times wonder what they have lost,
what they have gained, and what
the final balance will be...”
Introduction to the Visit to a Green
Star in the book Here is JAPAN,
1964, n.p.
History is said to imbue the places where they it 
is also, occasionally, celebrated and paraded. Kyoto 
relies on the residuum of its many religious and impe-
rial buildings and monuments, almost none of which 
re managed by the city, although they are protected 
by national historical preservation measures.  
The city parades an image of its (constructed) his-
torical continuity.  Kyoto’s civic spectacles are said to 
portray 1200 years of continuous, unbroken tradition, 
even though all three of its main tourist events have 
been refashioned in the last 100 years for this pur-
pose.  
The Byoudo-in is the only build-
ing of any size still remaining in 
the Kyoto area (it is in nearby Uji) 
from the Heian period.  Mysteri-
ously it survived through eight 
hundred years of abandonment 
and neglect, until post-War Japan 
rediscovered it.  Now it is also on 
the reverse side of the one-yen 
coin.
There are other historical discontinuities that get 
elided in the official presentation of civic history.  It is 
also against these celebrations of history that counter-
celebrations have been organized.  And so it is this 
practice of presentation of history where I will focus 
my next argument. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—histories of histories —327—histories of histories
There are many volumes of histories written 
about Kyoto, and even volumes of histories of pre-
cincts in Kyoto (although Minami-ku—Kyoto’s South 
District—has not been honored with its own histori-
cal tome).  As the thousand-year long home of the Jap-
anese imperial family, Kyoto is mindful of its national 
historical stature.  Within its boundaries there are 
numerous sites that are officially acknowledged as 
national treasures, and several places that are still 
managed by the Japanese imperial household.  It also 
contains several major religious landscape/architec-
tural sites, due again to a desire for proximity to the 
emperor.  History in Kyoto is, in fact, almost entire a 
site-centered commodity.  There are only a few small 
areas of the city that have maintained an ambiance that 
recalls some earlier mode of use.  
In the 1980s, Kyoto’s leaders attempted to add 
international platform to its self promotion as the 
“hometown” (furusato) of Japan’s culture.  They con-
vened the Conference of World Historical Cities in 
Kyoto, and this conference has grown into an organi-
zation that still cannot replace the subsequent, and 
obvious absence of Kyoto as a city on UNESCO’s list 
of historical cities1.  At the last convening of the Con-
ference of World Historical Cities, held again in Kyoto 
to mark the City’s 1200 anniversary, most of the 
reports from other member cities showed an appreci-
1. UNESCO does include “the temples of Kyoto” on this list, thereby signaling the lack of an 
historic cityscape in Kyoto. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Re-savaged streets —328—ation for large-scale preservation and a continuity of 
general social and cultural skills that are conspicuously 
lacking in Kyoto’s token attempt at “Heritage manage-
ment.”  
Re-savaged streets
The party that has begun on the city street when 
the Higashi-kujo Madang steps out from the curb 
marks the process of recoding the street against its 
mundane “domesticated” construction (See also: 
Domestication).  As much as the street in its modern 
mode represents a space where collective emotional 
and bodily control is assumed, the decontrol of the 
body and emotions constructs a break, a moment 
from which other rules and other behaviors become 
possible.  While the festival in its annual enactment 
might not express a revolutionary plan, it cannot 
escape its revolutionary potential.  
In part because The festival performs what it proposes, 
festivals work to decode the street-as-product even as 
they recreate the street-as-work.  A festival is one 
occasion where we can see spaces of representation 
being torn down and reconstructed into representa-
tional spaces.  Here is where historicity meets the 
present, and manufactures the works of art and life 
that can become the patrimoine for heritage manage-
ment.   But it is also a heritage beyond the grasp of 
any official narrative of state or ethnic communalism.  
Here the performance is the narrative, and those in 
authority would do well to learn to read this.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Re-savaged streets —329—“In contrast to those, largely late-
nineteenth-century theories,
inspired by notions of the ratio-
nalization, commodification and
modernization of culture, which
exhibit a nostalgic Kulturpessi-
mismus it is important to empha-
size the tradition within popular
culture of transgression, protest,
the carnivalesque and liminal
excesses (Easton et al., 1988). The
popular tradition of carnivals,
fairs and festivals provided sym-
bolic inversions and transgres-
sions of the official ‘civilized’
culture and favoured excitement,
uncontrolled emotions and the
direct and vulgar grotesque bodily
pleasures of fattening food, intox-
icating drink and sexual promis-
cuity (Bakhtin, 1968; Stallybrass
and White, 1986). These were
liminal spaces, in which the
everyday world was turned upside
down and in which the tabooed
and fantastic were possible, in
which impossible dreams could
be expressed. (Featherstone
1991, 22)
Because of its physical and symbolic proximity to 
the government, a civic plaza is liable to become a site 
for revolutionary action, so too the festival, by its 
expressive openings and appropriation of public space, 
is liable to counter-practices that overflow its artistic 
representations, and articulate political and social 
demands.  In part this is because the festival creates a 
link to the body which is oblique to the disciplinary 
bond that the state might prefer.  Intimacy is first a con-
nection to the body, we might remember here, and in 
many festivals this connection is made through an 
applied eroticism.  
The festival re-savages the civic space by reaching 
deeper into the intimate space of the body than does 
the state.  It is the spectacle of these savage bodies in 
public that pulls back the hidden curtain of a con-
structed civility.   Festivals managed by the state to 
celebrate state occasions might present an appearance 
of the un-domesticated body (usually through the use 
of intoxicants), but the difference between this simula-
tion and a festival is not difficult to perceive—assum-
ing that the perceiver has a memory of other festivals.
This is precisely why festivals were themselves 
hegemonically domesticated—(mis)-appropriated by 
the state—at various times and places in Europe and 
Japan.   The effect was to replace the memory of festi-
vals with a memory of these state-sponsored events.   
But even then, the return of an imagination of festival 
space and practice renews this counter-expressive 
moment.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Re-savaged streets —330—Mona Ozouf (1988) finds this appreciation for the 
festival form in Michelet’s accounts of festivals of the 
French Revolution:
‘"Not to have had any festivals”: that, for Michelet, was a truly impoverished childhood. “My
childhood never blossomed in the open air, in the warm atmosphere of an amiable crowd, where the
emotion of each individual is increased a hundredfold by the emotion felt by all.” And yet in Paris
there was a splendid festival for each great imperial victory, when the wine flowed freely and flares lit
up the sky. For the young Michelet, taken there by his father and mother, these were wonderful
spectacles, but nonetheless depressing. Why? As a child Michelet did not yet know that a festival
made to order inevitably has something sad about it; but the presentiment that he had of this is
enough to explain the passionate attention that he was later to give to the festivals of the French
Revolution. Indeed, what strikes one in his account of them—especially in comparison to the alter-
native accounts—is the absence of exclusion, derision, or anathema. We read of no secret festivals,
no mock festivals, no condemned festivals. Even the enthusiasm aroused in him by the Festival of the
Federation (in the case of almost all the other historians, this enthusiasm implies contempt for the
festivals that followed) does not make Michelet indifferent to less successful festivals. One certainly
senses this in the 1847 preface to his Histoire de la Révolution Française (Ozouf 1988, 15).’
The sadness of the made-to-order festival, is the 
sadness of an occasion that fails its own logic.  And the 
logic of the festival is one that counters the practices 
that “domesticate” the street.  In a larger sense, this 
relates to the theory: A festival counters the dominant bour-
geois lifestyle logic.  But here I want to look at  the pro-
cesses of domestication, re-savage-ation, and re-
domestication.   As this is practiced in many cities 
today, including Kyoto, heritage management is cen-
tered on the domestication of the past.  And the 
emergence of counter-events, such as the Higashi-
kujo Madang, marks the return of repressed and  “sav-
age” histories.  However, these events are themselves 
a mode of heritage management—a form of living his-
tory and performing culture.  And they would make 
their own claim, as Michelet (above) did: not to have  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—Domestication —331—an festivals—that is impoverishment.
Domestication
Domestication is a discursive practice that produces 
notions of the exotic and the grotesque, even as 
“taste” includes the notion of “disgust”, as Bourdieu 
reminds us.  Today, the globalized market for lifestyle 
products uses simulated diversity and fashion to lend 
temporal movement to the consumption of domesti-
cated objects, so that those objects that were pur-
chased yesterday become disconnected to the 
constructed life-style imagination.  Today we learn to 
be disgusted with whom we were (or, at least, what 
we purchased) only yesterday.  The past is coded as a 
land of rejected choices and faded favorites.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—place and ideology —332—“The polymorphous pleasures of
erotic ideology become the norm,
rather than the transgression of
the established order, and the full-
est possibilities of sexual life take
concrete form in the play of
human bodies:
‘During the carnaval everything is
permitted in terms of sex or drugs.
The carnaval balls are, in certain
places, a true orgy. Everything is
permitted. You understand? There
is no censorship, and the unre-
strained exhibitionism and the
desire to expose oneself are very
common in the carnivalesque
atmosphere. During this period,
sex is present every-
where....Within a society full of
ups and downs, the permissive-
ness of the carnaval is not inter-
rupted by anything, and bodies,
souls, and semen are left at their
will, giving to everyone the free-
dom to do what they really desire.
It is a good period for prostitution
and the buyers of pleasure. Every-
thing is sold, everything is
bought, everything is given,
everything is received with a lewd
and inviting smile on the face. ...
The streets become completely
given over to the beat of samba
and the frenzy of sweaty bodies
having sex. (João)’
(Parker 1991, 147)”
Local festivals serve as counter-venues against the 
market-state’s desire to represent our interests, these 
events play at dangerous games in the face of domesti-
cation.  Festivals not only de- and reconstruct cultural 
representations and personal identities, they also 
attempt to transgress the boundaries of domesticated 
space—by opening up a “savage” arena on the city 
street.  Transgression of the limits imposed by market-
state domestication is only one moment in the re-
domestication of the space as a work authored by the 
participants of the festival.  This re-domestication of 
the locale as again local is the starting point for emerg-
ing local tastes, desires and cultural practices.  Those 
places (such as Venice) where “locality” remains a cen-
tral feature of cultural production add local cultural 
value to everything they make.  They achieve the pri-
mary goal of heritage management.
Domestication is never complete.  For, as taste 
produces the grotesque object of its associated dis-
gust, domestication creates its own savageness.   In 
some later work I will explore the practical logic of 
domination and of festival play.  But now I wish to 
return to the state in places like Kyoto, to see how 
domesticated national spaces resist re-appropriation 
by local neighborhoods, and where festivals can create 
a tactical opening in these spaces.
place and ideology
The erasures of locales in service of the nation-
state or the market becomes an evident problematic 
for anyone engaged in the study of situated cultural  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—place and ideology —333—practices in East Asia, simply because it defines the 
“context of situation.”  I am not suggesting that we 
valorize an unqualified nostalgia for the local in favor 
of the national.  But we do need to pay attention to 
locality as a feature of the articulation of culture, and 
at the role of place in the creation of the nation and 
the market.  





Having made the rounds of the
four primary/junior high schools
in the Higashi-kujo district, the
Higashi-kujo madang had become
a completely established event.
After a heated discussion about
making a new feeling for the fifth
Higashi-kujo madang, the
exchange committee had decided
to make a change.  At this time,
for the first time four members of
the Resident Korean Association
of Hearing Brethren attended and
two persons dispatched from the
Kyoto City Hearing Language
Center provided sign language
translations, and a lively sharing
of opinions and appeals was
made....
More than a change of place and
culture, the Higashi-kujo madang
is a festival for everyone who
shares the joy of living together.”
Throughout the Pacific Rim, various organs of the 
region's state governments have taken on the role of 
reinscribing local sites of culture as national sites of 
culture.  The geographical rereading of local culture as 
national culture is probably the most pervasive source 
of change for locales throughout the region in the last 
several decades.  (The same organs of the nation are 
today the most vocal in their alarm over international 
cultural influences: decrying everything from Levi 
jeans to ideas of feminism and democracy.)  Nation-
creation erases local traditions in favor of refashioned 
national histories, and makes cultural traditions the 
property of the state.  
At the very same time, state programs encourag-
ing industrial modernization remake the workplace to 
international specifications.  And state intervention 
into the household and education, an intervention 
instrumental for what Foucault  called a “pastoral” 
governmentality, redefines domestic spaces for 
national interests.  And also at the very same time but 
from another source, the marketplace, within and 
without attempts at control by the state, refashions 
culture-scapes and media-scapes, and collectivizes life- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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inputs.  
All of these processes act to homogenize and 
unitize local spaces of cultural production.  The effect 
is a reduction through a process of erasure and uni-
form reinscription.  The resulting sameness of places 
across the state creates an even plane upon which 
national identity is applied as though the sameness 
were the product of a long history of common 
national culture.  (This is described in some detail by 
Benedict Anderson.)  In the marketplace, a very simi-
lar process results in the uniformity of products and 
services, but the sameness is then overlaid by a simu-
lated diversity, offering the consumer the image of 
choice.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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space to which it refers, a space
which it describes, whose vocabu-
lary and links it makes use of, and
whose code it embodies?  What
would remain of a religious ideol-
ogy—the Judaeo-Christian one,
say—if it were not based on
places and their names: church,
confessional, altar, sanctuary, tab-
ernacle?  What would remain of
the Church if there were no
churches? The Christian ideol-
ogy...has created the spaces which
guarantee that it endures.  More
generally speaking, what we call
ideology only achieves consis-
tency by intervening in social
space and in its production, and
by thus taking on body therein.
Ideology per se might well be said
to consist primarily in a discourse
upon social space.”
(Lefevbre 1991 [1974], 44)
Ideologies, we are reminded by Henri Lefevbre 
(1991), require their own spaces.  We need to look at 
how these ideological spaces, not just ideological dis-
courses—how streets and buildings, not simply 
texts—are created, maintained, and internally cri-
tiqued within a region.  Place is nowhere innocent, 
nowhere external to the power relationship that 
maintains it, nowhere the product of unreflective tra-
dition: particularly those places that are managed and 
advertised as traditional.   
The state and the market, often in concert (see: 
market-state),  but increasingly with oblique goals, offer 
up cultural desires that share a common power 
aspect:  they are beyond the control of the residents 
of the city, who are all treated the same as tourists: 
welcome to watch and spend, but not to act on their 
own to invest other meanings to the space.  A domes-
ticated national cultural place cannot be appropriated 
by local residents, it has already been reduced to a sin-
gle meaning, and is closed to dialogic intervention.
national spaces of domestication
So, it is not only the foreign, exotic space that is 
subject to domestication by the marketplace.  Domes-
tication also describes a process that produces places 
of the state from a former landscape of local spaces.  
The state domesticates local histories (which are dan-
gerous to national “unity”) into a single national his-
tory.  But why do we tend to allow the state this 
process as a feature of its own production?  And what 
are the tactics (in de Certeau's  sense) that can re- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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words, how do we bring  processes of domestication 
to a local, civil-democratic, practical level? 
The center of this critique of the notion of 
domestication is largely a critique of the scale at which 
this is done: the nation-state is far too large a space to 
be domesticated as a single place.  And the institutions 
required to perform this task at the national level can 
neither incorporate conflicting local demands for cul-
tural distinctiveness, nor provide the intimate scale of 
assurances required for individuals to accept their fel-
lows (the national citizenry) as co-domestics, although 
Japan, perhaps more than any other nation-state has 
approached this latter goal.  
Domestication is best done close to home.  If we 
look at a positive aspect of domestication—as this 
promotes a sense of closeness and familiarity: the 
mutual recognition between neighbors—we might see 
where this can be beneficial as a local practice. 
The routinization of interaction between friends 
or daily acquaintances is a form of localized domesti-
cation for these relationships, which develops within a 
mutually negotiated frame.   But here as well, daily 
routines may tend to reflect inequalities in status with-
out allowing for any venue where this inequality can 
be resisted, as feminists have long noted.  And so here 
is where the festival works also to lubricate the frozen 
junctures of those routines that might otherwise rig-
idly reinforce hierarchical social relationships.  But to 
do this, the festival must create a de-routinizing  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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space on a public street.
The nationally domesticated space is an unimagin-
ably large (apart from, say Singapore) space where the 
imagined  “national family” lives and works.  In state-
nations this tends to become simultaneously a priva-
tized public space, and a publicized private space, in 
the sense that it codes public interactions as private 
relationships (within the nation-as-family; see also Pri-
vate public sphere) while it also intrudes into the private 
spaces (and the lifeworld) of its citizens.  By this, it 
overcodes local public and private spaces.  And so the 
spatial counter-action to this dominant space is to 
recode both local public spaces (e.g., create a local 
public sphere) and local private spaces, by rebuilding a 
shared intimacy that is kept hidden from the state.  
The ability to hide from the state is essential for any 
form of democracy.  This “civil right” to privacy does 
not carry a reciprocal right for the state to hide from 
its citizenry.  civic privacy is a right only for individuals.
privacy and intimacy
Festivals play with the boundary between private 
and public in a manner that opens up both spheres to 
democratic rearticulation.  The emotional release of 
festival arts is also a form shared emotional dialogue: a 
non-verbal articulation of dialogic democracy.  To under-
stand how this works, let us now look at notions of 
“private” and “public.”
Most places one encounters everyday that are 
“private” are not private as sites of civic privacy, but  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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avoiding visibility/audibility for the purpose of 
rehearsal, or for “private” acts.  Lavatories, bedrooms, 
closets, doctors' examination rooms, and executive 
suites are all backstages for later public behaviors, or 
places for secret decisions, or sites of actions that are 
not allowed “in public.”  These spaces form a sequen-
tial space of individual privacy that make up the places 
where a “personal life” or a “private sphere” is con-
structed and lived.  
These “back spaces” can be used as retreats from 
the visibility of public spaces, but they can also be 
places where certain activities are sequestered from 
public attention.  But coding certain practices and 
spaces as “private only” has other, unintended, and 
also undesirable consequences for the public sphere. 
The sequestration of emotional display from the 
public street is the most problematic, I believe, as this 
leads to a diskilling in emotional expression in public.  
As bell hooks noted:
“I think about how privacy is to connected to a politics of domination.  I think that's why there's
such an emphasis in my work on the confessional, because I know that in a way we're never going to
end forms of domination if we're not willing to challenge the notion of public and private... if we're
not willing to break down the walls that say, 'There should always be this separation between domes-
tic space/intimate space and the world outside.'  Because, in fact, why shouldn't we have intimacy in
the world outside as well? (hooks 1994, 224).”
hooks's call for a re-joining of private and public 
points to the domination of “the private” and “the 
domestic” by “the public.”  This is another reading of 
the sequestration of women into the domestic 
sphere, and it also notes the impoverishment of “the 
world outside” when intimacy, confession, and general  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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incommunicable in public.
“Once solidarity becomes reflec-
tive, we can no longer establish
once and for all the expectations
of solidary groups. How we
understand ourselves as a “we,”
the expectations we have of our-
selves and others, changes over
time, varying with respect to our
needs, circumstances, and under-
standing of what is necessary to
secure the integrity of our rela-
tionships. What it means to stand
by and take responsibility for
another differs according to the
context”
(Dean 1996, 40)  .
Here I want to note that most of the recent work 
(following Habermas) on the problems of the public 
sphere stress the return to a communicative public 
sphere.  While in general agreement with the thrust of 
these arguments, I also feel that communication has 
been both instrumentalized and verbalized/textualized 
in the process.   Are we really to suppose that the ges-
tures which communicate our solidarity with others in 
public must be only or centrally verbal ones?  I would 
also add that a continuing problem with our under-
standing of the public sphere is a lack of knowledge 
about its performative aspects.  To be sure, Intimacy is 
first a connection to the body.  Everything flows from this 
connection.   Dean (1996) reminds us that:
“what has been lacking is an emphasis on communication as a primary
vehicle of social integration. In the liberal tradition, achieving a “we” has
been conceived as taking place in a founding moment, behind the backs of
members. For classical republicans, the “we” is merely given, viewed in
terms of a preexisting ethical consensus. In contrast, the communicative
notion of “we” conceives the achievement of solidarity as an ongoing pro-
cess of engagement and critique. This thus allows reflective solidarity to
embrace the universal ideals necessary for democracy as it urges us to
strive communicatively to engage with and recognize each and all as part of
our “we.” (44). 
This lack, as she only alludes to here, concerns 
the performance of achieving a “we.”
“Intimacy” and “confession” are also central to 
Giddens's (1994) description of lifeways in late 
modernity, and he is concerned about how the con- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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izing the male gender and naturalizing of emotional 
skills of the female.  The resulting un-natural imbalance 
in the skilling and the appropriateness of emotional 
expression loads obstacles to attempts at intimacy 
between genders.  hooks's public confessions are 
admissions not of additions and obsessions (as Fou-
cault's [See: 1990, 19] are), rather they are expres-
sions of self-empowered feelings1, and the sharing of 
these is very much implied in what Giddens2 called 
“pure relationships,” which are the, for him, a hallmark 
of a new turn to intimacy in late modernity3.  
Pure relationships are also what Dean (1996, 40) 
calls a conceptual “court of appeal”, and the most 
immediate one of several levels of potential social 
relationships.  They form the ground for the most 
1. An internet message I ran across recently carried this quote, “Never apologize for showing 
feeling. When you do so, you apologize for truth.” Attributed to Benjamin Disraeli.  I think 
hooks would agree here.
2. “At one pole of the interaction between the local and the global stands what I call the 'trans-
formation of intimacy'.  Intimacy has its own reflexivity and its own forms of internally refer-
ential order.  Of key importance here is the emergence of the 'pure relationship' as 
prototypical of the new spheres of personal life.  A pure relationship is one in which exter-
nal criteria have become dissolved: the relationship exists solely for whatever rewards that 
relationship as such can deliver.  In the context of the pure relationship, trust can be mobil-
ised only by a process of mutual disclosure.  Trust, in other words, can by definition no 
longer be anchored in criteria outside the relationship itself—such as criteria of kinship, 
social duty or traditional obligation.  Like self-identity, with which it is closely intertwined, 
the pure relationship has to be reflexively controlled over the long term, against the back-
drop of external transitions and transformations. (Giddens 1991, 6)”
3. This particular feature of Giddens's thesis about the shape of “late modernity” needs to be 
empirically examined in Asia Pacific locales.  Pure relationships interrupt the types of hier-
archical (paternalist or patriarchal) relationships I found to be quite common in Kyoto.  
Does this imply that Kyoto is not a part of “late modernity?” TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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ships that ignore (while they replace) all other family, 
class and occupational (i.e., paternalistic, hierarchical, 
status derived) relations as the basis for shared identi-
ties.  
“...Friendship is mutual, social,
and quasi-public.  It is ecstatic in
that its practice draws one out and
towards a friend.  Philia primes
the bond, the among and the
between.  Marilyn Strathern has
insisted how rare it is in modern
Western societies to conceive of
anything other than individuals
and contractual relationships.
Philia is based on trust.  Trust is
another virtue that has been
almost entirely ignored in Western
philosophy (with the exception of
Hume)...  Among other things,




A pure relationship is built on a sharing of the 
strengths, skills, and emotions of the individuals 
involved, and is vulnerable to either a lack of sharing (a 
lack of intimacy) or to a failed expectation that all par-
ties are worthy of trust.  Such relationships resemble 
a certain ideal notion of “friendship.1”  So I will use 
the term “friends” to speak of participants in a pure 
relationship (hereafter, a “friendship”).
Privacy, as a way of hiding unworthiness, or of 
avoiding intimacy, is not allowed in these friendships.  
It is this requirement of an ongoing (continually 
unfolding) publicly available, mutual confession that 
makes friendships a type of minimal public “sphere.”  
And the process of formation of these friendships has 
interesting parallels with the formation of larger civil 
1. The near absence of studies of friendship in anthropology or sociology is not surprising, 
but needs some rectification.  Once in Japan I confused an entire room full of strangers at 
a party when I introduced my spouse as my “friend.”  When it later came out that we were 
(also) married, one visibly angry guest scolded me, and said, “your wife can never be your 
friend in Japan.”  The idea of a modal form of friendship at the center of the individual's 
relation to the processes of late modernity has many problems, mostly in its univocality.  
But, as a probe into the amount of “democracy” in interpersonal relationships, it may have 
useful applications in Asia Pacific circumstances.  Certainly “intimacy” or rather its lack is a 
major feature of the discourse over adult relationships in Kyoto.  And, within the Korean 
community, the general practice of “passing” as Japanese alienates the Korean adult from 
achieving such a friendship with Japanese adults, or even with other Koreans (who hide 
behind their own Japanese masks).  Profound memories of broken trust and a longing for 
intimacy are commonly heard within the Korean community. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Friendship is a relationship built between strang-
ers.  For each potential friend is first estranged from 
any outside status, and made to show a voluntary 
desire for intimacy, which reveals a self that is worthy 
of continuing trust.  For example, a friendship 
between a daughter and her mother is possible only 
when their relationship as child/parent can be ignored 
(not an easy chore).  The main rule in this relationship 
is a simple one: “No Secrets.”  And the intimacy that 
results from friendship does not generate a need for 
privacy, there is no need to hide, everything can be 
discussed with (confessed to) others without shame.  
So we've now returned full circle to hooks's idea 
of emptying out privacy into the public sphere.  I 
would take this a further step and propose that we 
can imagine shared performances of confession in 
public as a means of consolidating a wider social 
friendship as an alternative to social movements based 
upon essentialized (imagined) commonalties.  These 
events are themselves the commonalties, and shared 
participation provides both a time of intimacy and 
proof of trustworthiness.
There is a place for intimacy in public, and this I 
will call (trying to be consistent) “civic intimacy.”  Civic 
intimacy is a practice that occurs when a certain type 
of crowd event allows for members of the crowd to 
temporarily achieve a controlled-decontrol of their 
emotions, and to speak (or yell) their minds in public.  
It is precisely the sort of event that Foucault (1979)  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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illustrate the power of the crowd.  And it is also this 
type of event, or rather the level of democracy within 
such events that E. P. Thompson (1993) describes in 
the crowds of early modernity in England.  Against the 
dark fantasy of “the crowd” turned mob, running 
amuck down Main Street, we need to imagine a crowd 
of friends, using the street to consolidate their friend-
ships, and using their friendships as a basis for dialogic 
democracy.
Emotions in public
Emotions are important to public spheres.  For 
Kluge, it is the failure of cementing and verifying a 
consonance between emotional content and rational 
discourse that led to “1933.1”  But not only have emo-
tions been subtracted from the face of the public 
space, but this subtraction in the public sphere then 
proceeds to rationalize the “private sphere,” as Hab-
ermas concluded in his critique of Weber, and in his 
theory of the transformation of the public sphere: 
1. “Since 1933 we have been waging a war that has not stopped. It is always the same 
theme—the noncorrelation of intimacy and public life—and the same question: how can I 
communicate strong emotions in order to build a common life? (Kluge 1988, 33)”
“...It is not the irreconcilability of cultural value spheres—or the clash of life-orders rationalized
in their light—that is the cause of one-sided life-styles and unsatisfied legitimation needs; their cause
is the monetarization and bureaucratization of everyday practices both in the private and public
spheres. This places Weber's critical diagnoses in a different light. 
To the degree that the economic system subjects the life-forms of private households and the life
conduct of consumers and employees to its imperatives, consumerism and possessive individualism,
motives of performance, and competition gain the force to shape behavior. The communicative prac-
tice of everyday life is one-sidedly rationalized into a utilitarian life-style; this media-induced shift to
purposive-rational action orientations calls forth the reaction of a hedonism freed from the pres- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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is the public sphere by the administrative system. The bureaucratic disempowering and desiccation of
spontaneous processes of opinion and will-formation expands the scope for engineering mass loyalty
and makes it easier to uncouple political decision making from concrete, identity-forming contexts of
life. Insofar as such tendencies establish themselves, we get Weber's (stylized) picture of a legal dom-
ination that redefines practical questions as technical ones and dismisses demands for substantive
justice with a legalistic reference to legitimation through procedure (Habermas, 1989 [1981], 325).” 
civil intimacy
Civic intimacy as a common and ongoing practice, 
brings people to express their own emotions in the 
crowded street (or in a public school room, or on a 
public television program).  After chasing public opin-
ion/practice into private spaces, we have little choice 
but to go in after this through bureaucratic interven-
tion.  We cannot verify the presence and quality of jus-
tice in the “private” lives of people who are deskilled 
in expressing feelings in public.  The absence of venues 
for emotional display in public creates a legitimation/
information gap that opens up to a call for legal proce-
dures to enforce practices that should be voluntarily 
monitored.  
As Cohen and Arato (1992, 545) note, these legal 
interventions do not increase the availability of inti-
macy or the building of relationships, quite the 
reverse, they substitute client/expert relationships 
(with the courts or social workers) for interpersonal 
relationships between strangers—which is another 
term for “friendship.”  Like fences with neighbors, laws 
make poor friends.
But where Habermas would strengthen both the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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them, hooks would bring intimacy into public, and 
evacuate the private/domestic sphere.  For her, (ibid, 
225) privacy is an alibi that covers up something 
shameful.  But the only —but overlooked (misrecog-
nized)—reason for shame in this situation is the domi-
nation that supports the separation of the public 
sphere from private/domestic spaces.  From these 
two perspectives, the engendered aspect of “privacy” 
becomes apparent.  Probably nowhere on the globe is 
the public sphere more “masculinized” than in certain 
locales in the Asia Pacific region.  
democratizing the national domestic
A civil democracy is realized 
through actions taken by its citi-
zenry.
The role of intimacy in public, and of “strangers” 
in the public sphere and “friends” in civil society are 
aspects of the study of democracy in late modernity 
that I will be pursuing directly in my own work.  
Mostly this line of inquiry takes me away from the 
well-traveled paths of anthropology and sociology.  
But I think that there may be no more important 
sociological work today than that which can bring us 
to understand the place of strangers in our cities, and 
no better ethnography that of friendship.  
Let’s now return to the festival, and to the move-
ment of people across national boundaries, and how 
festival production can loosen the grip that the nation-
ally domesticated space holds over the city.  A civil 
democracy is realized through actions taken by its cit-
izenry.  This use of the street for demonstrations of 
civic belonging and collective celebration or protest is  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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The protest in Belgrade is a prime 
example of democracy’s “sweat-
equity.”  When thousands of peo-
ple will volunteer their time and 
their bodies every day for as long 
as it takes, they can push the gov-
ernment out of the buildings and 
into the streets.  Take another 
look.
Simply consuming the spectacles of the state is 
not nearly sufficient to reproduce the ground for a 
democratic nation, and this ground—spatially and dis-
cursively—must be reproduced regularly.  In particu-
lar, there must be room for the collective voice of 
crowds.   We need to reimagine the street as a place 
of and for crowds participating in a variety of actions.  
The fear of crowds in a democracy marks a fundamen-
tal distrust of the public sphere.  This lack of trust pro-
motes the delegation of authority to representatives 
(or to unelected government officials)—authority that 
has to first be removed from venues such as crowds. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Headline: PLANNING:
“The next planning committee
meeting will be Monday August
21 at 7pm at the Sanno day nurs-
ery school.
We are now looking for advice
about the contents of the festival
program.  Up to now we have had
five meetings with over 100
(really!) people gathered. “What
do you think about a Kimchee roll
making contest” “Won’t it be dif-
ficult to cook that much rice?
We’ll need 20-40 liters” “Yeah,
right.”... “People expect to the
rope competition this year, lots of
people.”   “That’s right, we’d bet-
ter do it this year too.” These
kinds of discussions went on for-
ever.  Now we need to get into the
really interesting task of doing the
actual planning.  More and more
we need to gather people who can
do this together.”
Democracy is never easy
Places and crowds fill the histories1 of democratic 
revolutions.  Civic festivals are the reenactments of 
hese founding moments, and civil societies are their 
offspring.  Because there were crowds that used vio-
lence to protest social and economic circumstances, 
crowd control became another feature of the modern 
street.  And again, this constraint was said to be aimed 
at others, at anarchists and gangs, but its effect was to 
preempt the crowd event as a regular forum for civic 
participation.  By and large we can today track the dis-
appearance of crowds on the streets of our cities.  But 
then what are the effects of this absence on democ-
racy and on the public sphere?
One effect is to separate the “founding moment” 
of civil rule as a uniquely special time, and so to forget 
that democracy is a primarily performative form of self-
government.   The heritage that needs to preserved is 
not the spectacle of some reenacted historical event, 
but the actual reenactment of democratic rule in 
everyday life.  This is where the street becomes a site 
for democratic and public sphere participation.  
The ongoing performance of democracy is per-
haps most important to those who have only just now 
arrived from some other place, but who will be mak-
ing their home here.   Here in the street, in the events 
that reproduce democracy as a collective perfor-
mance, newly landed immigrants enter into the public 
1. From Boston to Philadelphia, to Paris and London, to Moscow and Warsaw and Tienanmen 
in Beijing:  the places where the public acquires its legitimate claim to its self rule are 
places defined by crowds and by protests and festivals.  Note here the absence of such 
events and such memorials in Kyoto. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Celebrations in Cities—democratizing the national domestic —348—sphere not as spectators at someone else’s party, but 
as bona-fide players in this festival of democracy.   
Inclusion in democratic life, a voice in public debates, a 
place in the public square, a part in the festival pag-
eantry: these are signs of true arrival.  So too, a histo-
ricity that opens to the retellings of old narratives by 
new voices leverages new lodes of local culture and 
history into the popular imagination.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—performance is the goal —349—Dancing toward a dialogic democracy
performance is the goal
“Our wish is that Higashi-Kujo
might become a town where there
is active, person-to person contact
between the various peoples who
live here. Think of the madang as
encompassing this wish, which is
the desire of various people to
work together and make this festi-
val a success. We want to make
this a madang that is filled with
joy in the recognition of our
mutual livelihood: a place on
which Japanese people can build
their own lives and find the mean-
ing of living as a community by
meeting with each other; and a
place where resident Koreans can
hold firmly to their ethnic pride in
this madang”
MADANG STATEMENT OF PUR-
POSE
So now the festival is over for the year, the 
schoolyard is back in the hands of the Ministry of Edu-
cation, the drums have been stored away, and the 
question lingers: what, if anything is different in the 
neighborhood, in Kyoto, in Japan?  The goals 
announced by the organizers of the Higashi-kujo 
Madang (See: MADANG STATEMENT OF PURPOSE) include 
the transmission of cultural knowledge between gen-
erations of Koreans, the acknowledgment of the need 
for all neighbors in the area to recognize their com-
mon problems and provide mutual support, and the 
recognition by the city and nation of heterogeneity as 
the basis for the respect of human rights.   The festival, 
through its organization and performance, demon-
strates the first two goals, creates a public space that 
supports the third goal.  The festival performs what it pro-
poses is the operating concept here. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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nity, what is established is meant
to be universally the same, an
identical basket of rights and
immunities; with the politics of
difference, what we are asked to
recognize is the unique identity of
this individual or group, their dis-
tinctness from everyone else”
(Taylor 1994, 37-38).
To an important extent, the performance is the 
goal.  The cultural content of the festival offers 
younger community members an opportunity to learn 
and perform cultural arts that are different from those 
taught in Japanese public schools.  The coordination 
between the various groups that bring the Japan Cen-
ter for Independent Living in contact with South and 
North Korean social/political groups, and the Catholic 
Church in contact with the local Communist Party, 
and factions within the buraku together with each 
other: this cooperation is not only a goal of the 
madang, but also a precondition—without it the festi-
val dissolves into acrimony.  And so, on the morning 
after, the community knows that this symbiotic coex-
istence is not just a dream, but rather it is now a 
demonstrable fact, something real that will happen 
again next year. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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“Democracy is instituted and sus-
tained by the dissolution of the
markers of certainty. It inaugu-
rates a history in which people
experience a fundamental indeter-
minacy as to the basis of power,
law, and knowledge, and as to the
basis of relations between self and
other, at every level of social life
(at every level where division, and
especially the division between
those who held power and those
who were subject to them, could
once be articulated as a result of a
belief in the nature of things or in
a supernatural principal). It is this
which leads me to take the view
that, without the actors being
aware of it, a process of question-
ing is implicit in social practice,
that no one has the answer to the
questions that arise, and that the
work of ideology, which is always
dedicated to the task of restoring
certainty, cannot put an end to this
practice (Lefort 1988, 19)”.
What is less certain is the impact that this one 
event can make on the conditions that hold sway for 
Kyoto’s public sphere.  How can one event push hard 
enough to displace, even for a moment, the ocean of 
r presentations flooding the city every day?  Given the 
firm grip that institutions such as Dentsu and Mon-
busho hold over time and space and media inputs, 
where does one counter-event make a difference?  
Unfortunately, most of the writings about the 
public sphere are not helpful in evaluating or position-
ing the role of festivals.  In large part this is because 
the history of the study of the public sphere has been 
dominated by reference to Western Europe, where 
festival production was waning during the formative 
period for the modern nation-states.   And so, again, 
the necessity arises to create an expanded notion of 
modernity to include the place of festivals within the 
public sphere.
A critique of the notions of, and the evidence for, 
“public spheres” and “civil societies” is fundamental to 
a larger critique of modernity.  My own work within 
this larger critique focuses upon performances in pub-
lic, and most importantly, on the specific locales 
where modernities are assembled, recursively coded, 
paraded, challenged, and ridiculed: i.e., reproduced 
and deconstructed.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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totalizing system of late capital-
ism with its global reach and
administrative rationalizations,
however, the indeterminacies and
undecidabilities of our postmod-
ern stance offer no virtuous solu-
tions with which to confront
contemporary crises, nor allow us
to oppose and resist the increas-
ingly uneven development of our
cities and nations”
(Boyer 1994, 3).
Mostly this public panorama is dominated by the 
spectacles of the state and the market (usually in a 
friendly duet).  The first task then is to critique the 
formations of this spectacular display and to locate 
openings and counter discourses within it and exte-
rior to it.  One immediate goal is to determine where 
and also how democratic action is (or needs to be 
made) possible within the public sphere under circum-
stances of late modernity.  
First I want to reexamine some theoretical prob-
lematics within the study of civil society and public 
sphere, and look again as these as they are found in 
Kyoto, Japan.
Asian modernities and European models
The first point of engagement between those 
who mainly do theoretical work on social theory and 
those who are looking empirically at Asia/Pacific1 
locales is to question the origins of theories and their 
application to sites in this region.   Notions of a civil 
society and the public sphere were first articulated in 
describing features of emerging modern institutions in 
Western Europe and North America.  To use these 
notions in the description of modernities in other 
places we need to determine what would allow these 
ideas to describe features of “other” modernities.    
We have already discussed the major modal difference 
between nation-state- and state-nation modernities 
(See: State-nation modernity).  Now we have to ask, in 
1. This term includes the Asian mainland and various island nations from Indonesia to Japan. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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those that inform current theories about the public 
sphere?  In particular, what are the features of govern-
mentalities in the Asia/Pacific region that might help us 
to see where current theories may apply or need 
modification? 
Looking at states in this region, including Japan, 
some general features are apparent, features that 
show mostly an overlap between the discourses of 
modernity East and West:
 • 1) most states in Asia/Pacific represent them-
selves as democratic (or “democratizing”) states, and 
so they are liable to empirical and theoretical critiques 
of the scope and qualities of democratic practices 
within their governments and social institutions;
• 2) most states in Asia/Pacific participate in the 
formation of institutions for military, cultural, educa-
tional, and economic control, and these institutions 
have a reflexive awareness of their counterparts in 
other nations in all parts of the world1.  So there are 
commensurable logics in the governmentalities in place 
within government institutions between Asia/Pacific 
states and also with European states.  These logics 
permit a general critique of these institutions.  As 
state institutions commonly compare and contrast 
their own operations with one another on an interna-
tional scale, they are also open to external critiques 
1. I have spent the last two years working as a consultant to the Ministry of Culture and 
Sports of the Government of the Republic of Korea.  The Ministry actively researches the 
programs of similar ministries in other nations. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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not prefer;
• 3) most states in Asia/Pacific participate in 
international agreements on human rights and other 
matters, which implicates them in global discourses 
about social welfare and human rights.  These states 
cannot then avoid critiques of internal practices that 
affect the global environment, the risk of military 
action, the treatment of workers and children, the 
equality of women, and the quality of life;
• 4) the governments of most states in Asia/
Pacific welcome transnational corporate interests and 
are now interlocked into transnational flows of capital 
and cultural products.  This makes a critique of the 
consequences of these flows an issue for most locales 
in Asia/Pacific; and,
• 5) For many decades now the various engage-
ments among states and peoples in Asia/Pacific, and 
between these and other (e.g., European/North 
American) have been integral to the creation of what 
is now a global modernity.  To claim a regional unique-
ness today is to deny a history of external engage-
ment—including engagements in Asia that informed 
the creation of modern nation-states in Western 
Europe1.
In any case, much of the current rethinking of 
1. The colonial experience of European nations in Africa and Asia was not a simple one-way 
conduit of ideas and influence.  For example, the requirements of governing under colonial 
circumstances created opportunities for programs that had later application within the colo-
nizing nations.  The modern nation-state cannot be studied without some appreciation for 
the amount of self-colonization that it uses on its own population. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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displacing notions linked to early, Euro-centric mod-
els,  and is already drawing from empirical sources 
from Asia/Pacific nations.  Moreover, this theorizing 
remain fixed to ideal and potential visions and theo-
ries of civil society and the public sphere that find lit-
tle evidence in existing societies—for here we find 
discussions about the failure of modernity, and the 
need to rethink this, or to move on to a post-modern 
condition.  This means that we are faced not with an 
issue of the application of an empirically derived 
model from Europe into Asia, but with the lack of any 
empirical model to apply anywhere.  Modernity to 
date is nowhere as wonderful as this might be con-
ceived of (or we'd all have moved there).
“The theory which Negt and I are
trying to find has to do with the
problem of 1933. ...It is never
necessary to have National
Socialism. We now feel confident
of being able to predict such
movements much earlier, and we
know how to organize counterbal-
ances. National Socialism is the
problem, the problem of our
youth, that Critical Theory
worked on”
 (Kluge 1988, 45).
And so, at the more general level of national 
“governmentalities” there is reason for confidence 
that current theories about the public sphere and 
about civil society have useful application in the Asia/
Pacific region—but not, however without serious 
attention to local circumstances.  For although these 
are commensurable with local critiques, they are not 
usually directly applicable.  Their value comes in re-sig-
nifying the local debate within a larger, transnational 
discourse.  This may help to deconstruct the codes 
supplied by the state.  There remain some caveats of 
which we should be mindful:
• A) Most importantly, we have to step back to 
gain a purchase on the field of interests that the state 
manages locally, and to remember that the potential  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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state-nations are fundamentally different from those in 
nation-states.  Instead of a “public-sphere” we may 
need to talk about openness within the state, and about 
radical reform of the state to bring internal state dis-
courses into greater public view.   Counter-public dis-
courses may need to be reformulated as counter-state 
discourses, which look for tensions within the state 
apparatus that might result in openings and change.  
• B) It is important not to conflate the ideal con-
cept of a “public sphere” or a “civil society” with any 
one of the existing empirical examples.   All examples 
are liable to critiques that explore fundamental con-
cerns—such as privatization of the public sphere and 
the appropriation of civil society organizations by the 
state; and each is seen as offering local practices that 
may be locally justifiable;
• C) We need to both examine the real evidence 
for “public spheres” and “civil societies” in many 
locales while we also rethink the ideal potential for 
these concepts in alternative future modernities. 
Alexander Kluge (1988) starts his theory of the public 
sphere with the failure of this to prevent “1933” (i.e., 
the National Socialism's colonization of the public 
sphere in Germany).  And so we need to imagine pub-
lic spheres that are not liable to “1933s.”   (NOTE: 
1933 also marked the year when Japan left the League 
of Nations instead of responding to the critiques this 
group had about Japan’s policies and practices in Man-
churia.) TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Burma.  Notice how the street is 
the arena where civil crowds and 
battalions of police each make 
their own moves to appropriate 
this site.  The use of house arrest 
removes leaders from the street.  
And the presence of tanks on the 
street reinforces the govern-
ment’s monopoly over the means 
of violence—but also it signals a 
lack of legitimacy, as such visible 
reinforcement marks a move 
back to a metaphor of “war,” 
which includes to possibility of 
defeat.  This CNN report reveals 
the importance that global visibil-
ity holds for local political move-
ments—but the street is the site 
where this visibility is performed.
The possibility of (re)emerging “1933s” in the 
Asia/Pacific—neo-nationalism in Japan, for example—
gives our work some urgency, particularly after 
Tienanmen.  But we need some direction to our imag-
ination.  One example would be to construct a model 
for a “utopian realist” (See: Giddens, 1994) vision of 
modernity.
• D) We need to look for modes of participation 
in the public sphere where locale is at stake.  This is a 
corrective to current studies that are media-centric, 
and that ignore the potential for embodied action as a 
site of democratic practice.   Festivals and political 
demonstrations are examples of this type of localized 
practice. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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““Utopian realism, such as I
advocate it, is the characteristic
outlook of a critical theory with-
out guarantees. 'Realism' because
such a critical theory, such a radi-
cal politics, has to grasp actual
social processes to suggest ideas
and strategies which have some
purchase; 'utopianism' because in
a social universe more and more
pervaded by social reflexivity, in
which possible futures are con-
stantly not just balanced against
the present but actively help con-
stitute it, models of what could be
the case can directly affect what
comes to be the case. An outlook
of utopian realism recognizes that
'history' cannot simply be reflex-
ively grasped: yet this very recog-
nition adds weight to the logic of
utopian thought, since we no
longer hold fast to the theorem
that greater understanding of his-
tory means greater transparency
of action and thus greater control
over its course”
(Giddens 1994, 249-250).
The futures of modernities throughout the Asia/
Pacific region seem to be inscribing themselves in the 
present at an accelerated rate.  The just-emerging big-
picture of the scope of the collapse of economic 
growth and confidence in Japan, for example, and the 
pace of change (at times both faster and slower than 
anticipated) within China are today forcing transfor-
mative changes in the relationships between govern-
ment, economic corporations, and civil groups.  
Not only is this a time when we need better tools 
to understand civil societies and public spheres, it is a 
time when we should be offering better tools to 
groups who find themselves disadvantaged in the 
negotiations for inclusion in these arenas.  The anthro-
pology of cultures of/in democracy needs to engage 
the public sphere of the site of study.  This engage-
ment proceeds reflexively when local communities 
appropriate anthropological studies about their cir-
cumstances, but is also possible and desirable for the 
anthropologist to assist in this reflexive appropriation.
communities and publics
Anthropology has a long history of working with 
small communities, communities that were bound 
together by a shared “culture.”  Cohen’s description of 
the relationship between culture and community, as 
this became the basis for anthropological study, shows 
the underlying tautology at work:
“Our emphasis upon culture focuses upon the diversity beneath the mask. It seeks interpreta-
tions, and the means by which they are made, rather than objective form. 'Community' can no longer TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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to which its various adherents impute their own meanings. They can all use the word, all express
their co-membership of the 'same' community, yet all assimilate it to the idiosyncrasies of their own
experiences and personalities” (Cohen 1985, 73-74).
In the days (not so long ago) of symbolic anthro-
pology, symbols were as communal as communities 
were symbolic.   Fieldworkers went out in search of 
collective symbols and returned with symbolic collec-
tives.  Culture was something like “everything you 
needed to know to belong to the group,” and its 
transmission reproduced the group.
The fact that ideas were shared seemed enough 
to make these the glue that held together tribes, 
sects, castes, and classes.  Language was the central 
feature of such systems of symbols (and also of such 
communities).  Most of the small groups that anthro-
pologists have studied show dialectal or linguistic 
boundaries that are central to the group’s self-defini-
tion.  
Of course, what was under-theorized in all this 
was the amount of knowledge/power (and the differ-
ential access to this) at work in the process.  Structur-
alism in particular was neutral to the instrumental 
outcomes of the symbols it described1.   
1. This was mostly due to the linguistic underpinnings of structuralism.  Language at its pri-
mary levels (syntax, phonology, semantics) was viewed as a power-neutral for two rea-
sons: it was acquired in early childhood, presumably before political consciousness, and its 
mechanisms are not reflexively available to the user, and when they become available 
(through linguistic research) they are still not power-laden.  It makes no difference if an 
English speaker knows that she aspirates word-initial unvoiced consonants but not word-
initial voiced consonants.  Post-structuralists, working from literary criticism, see rhetorical 
and other (e.g., psychological) potentials in language use that implicate this at all levels 
with power relationships, first between parents and children, and then in the public sphere. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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ideas constitute a community is that this opens up an 
interest in how ideas and imaginations are managed to 
inform life-style behaviors and social participation in 
modern nation-states.   The formation of the 
“national” community resembles that of the formation 
of small-scale communities, but because of the novelty 
of its “national” scale it places an added burden on the 
imagination.  
“...I propose the following defini-
tion of the nation: it is an imag-
ined political community—and
imagined as both inherently lim-
ited and sovereign. It is imagined
because the members of even the
smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow-members,
meet them, or even hear of them,
yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion”
(Anderson1983, 5-6).
The move in scale from the local communal expe-
rience to the imagin(ed n)ation,  Anderson would 
point out, did not replace an older, “true” community 
with a new, “false” one.  Communities at the local 
level were just as imagined.  But what Anderson did 
not explore was how this sharing of an imagined com-
munion might interrupt the formation of a nation as a 
democracy that included people who were not (or did 
not care to be) included within its communal 
embrace.  
The formation of the nation may have initially 
borrowed the metaphor of “community.”  But this 
does not require nations in late modernity to repro-
duce this earlier borrowing.   The idea of nations as 
imagined communities leads one to consider the pub-
lic sphere as community property: an idea that posi-
tions the nation much too near to 1933.  As we shall 
see, public spheres contain necessarily anti-communal 
notions.
struggle for the present
Before I continue, I want to first dislodge a couple  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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the reader.  The first is that what one find in places 
like Kyoto, Japan are vestiges of authentically old com-
munities that must today compete with very modern 
public sphere formations.  Quite the contrary.  Public 
spheres and local communities in many places (includ-
ing Kyoto) must today be equally considered as local 
outcomes of available modernities.  They are each 
constructed in and through institutional measures and 
modalities that are themselves the products of recent 
articulations.  This is much less a battle between “the 
now” and “the past,” and much more a contest for the 
present.
Still, communities and public spheres are not 
equally “modern” in the sense that they may not share 
the modern impulse toward institutional reflexivity.  
The use of authoritarian control practices within 
some communities limit reflexivity and reform.  And 
so, while a “public sphere” is a hallmark of a moderniz-
ing society, the articulation of ethnic communal identi-
ties can also resemble a “return to the past”, a 
revitalization of pre-modern practices and associa-
tions.  But this return is mostly accomplished (to 
whatever degree it is successful) through modern 
agencies and instrumentalities.  
It is in part due to the presence of a public sphere 
that an actual return to the past is now structurally 
impossible—unless the public sphere is itself appropri-
ated as a primordial communal space.  Even then, as 
with the Nazi colonization of the German public  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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institutional logics undermines the goal of reauthenti-
cating some pre-modern social order.  And so even 
the most traditional communal organization cannot 
escape the modern practical logics (such as those of 
global markets) that inform the ways in which all orga-
nizations are now formed.  This brings me to my sec-
ond point.
“...In investigating democratiza-
tion in these spheres it is worth
keeping in mind the conventional
association of democracy with
deliberative assemblies; but it is
the aspect of being open to delib-
eration, rather than where it
occurs, which is most important.
This is why I speak of democrati-
zation as the (actual and potential)
extension of dialogic democ-
racy—a situation where there is
developed autonomy of commu-
nication, and where such commu-
nication forms a dialogue by
means of which policies and
activities are shaped”
(Giddens 1994, 115).
The second notion I want to displace is the one 
that points to the public sphere as, at certain times 
and places, being in danger of being misappropriated 
by the presence of ethnic communities and their “spe-
cial” interests.  This is certainly possible (as Nazi Ger-
many reminds us), but we also have to look the other 
direction: at the way the public sphere intrudes into 
communities.  Here I am saying mainly that we can 
locate a modernizing process within the interaction 
between public spheres and ethnic (and other) com-
munities, and that this interaction works generally 
toward a penetration of the community by processes 
acquired from the public sphere, rather than the other 
way around.  
While we need a public sphere that cannot be 
colonized by any one community, we should recognize 
and find some agreement on the consequences that a 
public sphere has over the interests of ethnic or reli-
gious communities.  I want to introduce a term here: 
the “active public sphere.”  Instead of viewing the dis-
cursive space of the public sphere as a place where 
opinions gather like flamingos on the Etosha Pan (or  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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first written very late at night: and were left here for 
your amusement]),  we need to consider a public 
sphere where opinions arrive, are discussed, and are 
worked into the precursors for policy decisions.  We 
need to look at the public sphere as a frame that adds 
significance to expressions, and as a game where hid-
den meanings are exposed.   
In his notion of a “dialogic democracy” Giddens pro-
motes the idea that democracy is not well repre-
sented by looking primarily at “deliberative bodies” 
but rather needs to occur through “the spread of 
social reflexivity as a condition both of day-to-day 
activities and the persistence of larger forms of collec-
tive organization” (1994, 115).  He goes on to distin-
guish his notion of dialogue from Habermas’s “ideal 
speech situation.”  He concludes his description of this 
dialogue by promoting the idea of mutual tolerance 
instead of consensus as the desired outcome.    I will 
be applying Giddens’s notion of a dialogic democracy with 
particular attention to the intersection between per-
formance, identity, active trust, festival events (and 
their organization), community formation, and the 
public sphere.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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ated than to be killed, as Pasolini
was. But it would be better still to
make reference to one's marked
particularities without being spec-
ified thereby as less than public.
As the bourgeois public sphere
paraded the spectacle of its disin-
corporation, it brought into being
this minoritizing logic of domina-
tion”
(Warner 1993, 240).
Where Giddens is pointing to the need to avoid a 
univocal outcome to a dialogic process, I can agree 
fully that tolerance is beneficial, but I would take the 
idea of “tolerance” far beyond its “threshold” level 
(i.e., being aware of difference and deciding not to 
react unfavorably to this) to a point where the differ-
ences that are found in and that emerge through this 
dialogue are desired outcomes.  This need to go 
beyond liberal tolerance is also central to what Dean 
(1996) has called “reflective solidarity”:
“...many people would probably accept the idea that contemporary, plu-
ralist democracies should aim toward including the excluded and enabling
persons and communities to develop their differing life plans and express
their cultural values, provided that these plans and values incorporate a
respect for those who do not share them. In this regard, some might say
that reflective solidarity seems like another term for liberal tolerance.
However, although reflective solidarity and liberal toleration are clearly on
the same side of the fence, both rejecting positions that seek to establish
one particular notion of the good as valid for everyone, reflective solidarity
resists claiming neutrality, arguing instead for accountability. For instance,
liberals might urge us to tolerate abortion and sodomy. But this “us” is pre-
determined. It explicitly positions those who perform or require abortion
and those who practice “sodomy” outside the boundaries of “our” commu-
nity. Moreover, such an appeal to toleration denies “our” accountability
toward those others outside our boundaries. It suggests that so long as we
do not deny the right of women to have an abortion or the right of homo-
sexuals to engage in particular acts, we have fulfilled our obligations as citi-
zens. Finally, liberal tolerance seems to adopt a just-add-it-on perspective
toward inclusion. In other words, by denying our responsibility to displace
those crystallizations of meaning constructing women and homosexuals as
“other,” it fails to examine the oppositional and exclusionary interpreta-
tions of rights as they have become embedded in our legal system. The dif- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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essentially one of attitude—reflective solidarity replaces complacency with
critique and engagement” (178).
Solidarity is negotiated within a civil crowd by an 
open armed acceptance of difference, but not as 
something other people are, and “that’s OK”, but as 
who we are and where we are going together—and 
different.   In the process, difference is not elided. 
The public sphere is too often seen as a place 
where differences—of opinion, desire, and taste—are 
arbitrated to the point where difference is itself dis-
solved away to produce a synthetic agreement.   Nov-
elty is incorporated into the center of aesthetic 
judgement by fitting into its pre-existing expectations 
(which means that only the forms of “novelty” that 
already fit this judgement are allowed).  For example,  
“outsider art” produced by artists with no connection 
to cultural institutions becomes the latest artistic 
commodity by being framed and shown in the most 
prestigious galleries.  
The normalization of difference is not unusual to 
the (bourgeois) public sphere, the assimilation of out-
side influences has occurred in every cultural group.  
This is precisely the point here: assimilation is a pre-
modern practice that modern institutions have not 
sufficiently interrogated, until recently.
Part of the reflexivity of late modernity is a 
reflection on difference and plurality, often presented 
as “multiculturalism” or “personal choice.”  This dis-
course produces a different notion of difference in the 
public sphere, one that promotes the experience of  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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ence in the outcome of any dialogue.   
This discourse is performed today by counter-
public groups, such as gay and lesbian activist organiza-
tions, and it claims that difference itself is a desired 
quality in the public sphere.  Within this notion of the 
public sphere, the experience of difference must lead 
to an appreciation for difference as an aesthetic fea-
ture of and as a formative contour for participation in 
the public sphere.  One outcome is a cultural “misce-
genation” that will replace those forms of difference 
(gender, race, age) currently used as modes of domi-
nation, while opening up to the creation of new differ-
ences.  Difference will be dislodged from its inherited 
position and become available to expressive interven-
tion.
“Each separate sphere of modern-
ist identity politics has typically
mobilized its version of radical
subjectivity around a fundamen-
tally epistemologic critique of the
binary ordering of difference that





(Soja and Hooper 1993, 185-186).
At this point, a dialogue can begin to support indi-
vidual singularities—differences at the level of the indi-
vidual body—a perspective that allows individuals to 
escape a politics of identity that necessarily ties them 
to a communal group.  At this individuated level, dia-
logic democracy can focus on other identity issues, 
such as consumerism and workplace concerns.  And at 
this level the binary differences of gender, class, and 
race become liable to a general critique of exclusion 
based on any putative “difference.”  As it turns out, we 
are nowhere as different and not anywhere as similar 
as these “group imaginations” would have us believe.
  But what is an active public sphere?  Fraser 
(1992) uses the term “strong” public sphere to indi- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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liaments).  Strong public spheres produce decisions 
rather than simply generate opinions.  An active public 
sphere is the extra-governmental correlate to the 
strong public sphere within the government.   An 
active public sphere is where civil society operates as 
an external check on governmental and market insti-
tutions.   This is where guarantees of speech and 
assembly are exercised and where dialogic democracy 
(outside of government) is performed.
However, an active public sphere is also active 
internally.  At its most democratic limit permits no 
exclusive enclaves, no a priori group memberships into 
its internal debate.  And so it displaces traditionalistic 
communal imaginations and interests, and inserts 
those of individuals1.  
Like a festival, the active public sphere is expen-
sive.  It is shaped by thousands of individuals providing 
a voluntary commitment of time, labor, and resources.  
The individuals and groups that in aggregate activate 
the public sphere do so with an aim to oversee the 
decisions and decision-making process of representa-
1. The question about individualism and democracy (a question that is mostly raised by gov-
ernment mouthpieces as a complaint over the imposition of a “Western” democratic ideol-
ogy on an non-Western social order that has no history of, nor desire for, individual 
freedom if this means the freedom to be disobedient to superiors) is usually poorly consid-
ered.  Individualism is not the issue at all.  What is at issue particularly in a dialogic democ-
racy is the question: who gets to speak?  Democracy requires collective, voluntary 
participation by individuals as individuals with the interests of the collective firmly in mind.  
“Non-Western” (or Confucian or some other, national version) democratic theory is usually 
a blind for paternalism, for the delegation of public expression to those who are older, “bet-
ter born,” and more masculine than anyone most people around here know. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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aim they monitor government and market organiza-
tions and they interrogate the discussions happening 
within ministries and parliaments.  The result, if this is 
successful, is a type of mirror government.
Today it is almost as difficult to 
underestimate the role of mass 
media in the active public sphere 
as it is to imagine how today’s 
transnational mass media corpora-
tions can be expected to “live up 
to the public trust”—this situation 
is compounded in nation-states 
(such as Japan) where mass media 
is state-operated or under state 
“administrative guidance”.  
When the Yomiuri Television 
crew came to watch the Madang 
play practice the producer’s con-
cern was that this story would not 
be seen as “newsworthy” on its 
own. He needed an angle, he fig-
ured, if he was to sell this one to 
his boss.  I could see the bitter 
anger of the madang organizers, 
and I offered to refuse to cooper-
ate.  But more than they despised 
this lack of respect for their work, 
they needed to use television to 
show a wider audience what the 
madang was about.
I would submit that there can be no strong public 
sphere within government unless this reflects the 
active public sphere outside of government.  The latter 
is a social/discursive arena that contributes to the gov-
ernance of the society by articulating opinions as 
potential public decisions.  The use of the initiative 
process to pass laws or to recall politicians is a good 
example of an active public sphere1.  Here is where 
1. And then we can also say that the active public sphere relies as well on the more general 
public sphere as an arena for information exchange, dialogue, and opinion building.  Japan 
is notoriously weak in all aspects of public sphere formation, mostly because this has been 
colonized by government ministerial and corporate PR interests.
Koreans and Japanese
jointly overcome racial 
barriers to create... TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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laced.  Civil society, yes, but not communalist social 
groups, for as Alexander Kluge noted, public spheres 
must not be communally based.  The public sphere 
cannot be some underlying traditional community in 
modernist dress.  
anti-communities
Community formation and public sphere partici-
pation are mutually incompatible at their ideal limits, 
because of conflicting demands for exclusivity and 
inclusivity.  Communities link their members through 
exclusive affective ties to imagined commonalties, 
such as religious belief, heredity, or place of origin.  
However, public spheres are not (or should not be) 
communally based—this is the first lesson of 1933.  
An arena of democratic participation within the 
modern nation-state, the public sphere resists appro-
priation by any “private” interests, whether by the 
marketplace or by governmental organizations, or, in 
fact, by any one community: as long as the interests of 
which are defined as exclusive.  As an actual or discur-
sive “space” the public sphere links its participants 
through a mutual desire for access, that is, for public-
ity.  
Public spheres require that individual participants 
retain a sense of individual choice, that they act inde-
pendently of other corporate interests.  And so, the 
extent to which individuals are able to “look beyond” 
the interests of the groups with which they feel a 
shared commonalty, is precisely the extent to which  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—unimagined publics —370—their participation in the public sphere is legitimated 
as an expression of “public” sentiment.  
unimagined publics
But is the nation/state at its core a community or 
a public sphere?  Benedict Anderson's (1983) work 
locates an imagined community as the logic of the 
early nation-state formation, and we can see evidence 
of this logic in current national discourses.  But a dem-
ocratic state can no longer see itself in these terms 
alone, as we shall see.  It is precisely the public sphere 
that challenges (or fails to do so) the monological 
imagination of a nation as a national community.  This 
is particularly true today as mobile populations, goods, 
imaginations, and even locations (such as European vil-
lages being constructed in Japan) bring strange per-
sons, objects and ideas into cities and towns.  But 
strangeness is not itself strange today, and “strangers” 
play pivotal roles in public spheres.
Communities may seek to locate friends and 
strangers, binding the former into imagined kinship 
based on residence, language, or common heritage; 
and marking the latter as potential enemies.  But pub-
lic spheres work within an opposite logic: they 
demand that individuals find a commonality1 with 
strangers who occupy the same territory, and, if nec-
essary to speak and act against their imagined or real 
1. Affirmative action programs are based on this concept: on placing the good of the public—
as a place of inclusion—above the privileged interests of any one gender or ethnic group.  
It takes an active public sphere (backing up a strong public sphere within the government) 
to summon the participation of those who would abandon privilege in favor of inclusion.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—I don’t know you —371—kin group and its interests.  
Warner (1993) calls this distancing from commu-
nal identity “disincorporation,” and he notes that is it 
somewhat easier for those whose bodies are already 
“unmarked” in the public sphere (e.g. in Kyoto, male 
college-educated ethnic Japanese not living in buraku 
areas) to abandon collective identity politics as a fea-
ture of the public sphere.  He notes, “the rhetorical 
strategy of personal abstraction is both the utopian 
moment of the public sphere and a major source of 
domination” (Warner 1993, 239).  But he fails in this argu-
ment to see that an alternative solution to this situa-
tion is to re-mark the unmarked bodies.  It is unjust 
that those who have achieved recognition and accep-
tance in the public sphere fill this with a “public habi-
tus” that they control, as this reflects their tastes and 
desires.   
The Domestication of cultural expression in public is 
a major obstacle to wider participation by groups who 
are not already accepted in this arena.  Cultural domi-
nation in this fashion needs to be countered by what 
Nancy Fraser (in a 1997 talk in Santa Barbara) called a 
“politics of recognition.1”  The public sphere is the ongoing 
arena for this political struggle.  In this process the 
imagined community of the nation is re-imagined in 
hitherto unimaginable ways.  
1. A term she borrowed from Charles Taylor.
I don’t know you
In order for a public sphere not to collapse into a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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imagined and reproduced during nation-state forma-
tion, the public sphere must remain a place of, by, and 
for strangers.   This is most important.  At the moment 
when voices are heard in public, each voice must not 
be identified with its body, it must speak for all bodies.  
But it must also be heard, and so barriers that remove 
certain voices from the public must be removed, and 
not permitted to be reconstructed in some other 
fashion.  The politics of recognition looks at the ways in 
which the ken of individuals is managed, and it interro-
gates this mis-management as a source of symbolic 
violence.   As citizens must become strangers within 
the public sphere, any stranger—expatriates, refugees, 
guest workers, international tourists, and even 
anthropologists—has access to this sphere.   There 
are no privileged positions in an (ideal) public sphere, 
even as there are no public spheres that currently 
meet this ideal.  But the recognition of the place of 
strangers within the public sphere moves this toward 
its ideal condition.
“For instance, the unforgettable
and hence unforgivable original
sin of the late entry: the fact that
he [the stranger] had entered the
realm of the life-world at a point
of time which can be exactly
determined. He did not belong
‘initially’, ‘originally’, ‘from the
very start’, ‘since time immemo-
rial’. The memory of the event of
his coming makes of his very
presence an event in history,
rather than a fact of nature”
(Bauman 1990, 149).
Each stranger is a diaspora of one, a nomad of 
democracy.  A stranger is someone who has entered 
into a locale at a certain time, and has not, as yet, 
gone away again.  The stranger cannot make a primor-
dial claim of residence.  Her presence is dated, and 
potentially ephemeral.  This presence interrupts the 
naturalizing features of nation-states as imagined com-
munities.  To allow strangers to become citizens, and 
to demand that citizens act as strangers in the public  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—denaturalizing citizenship —373—sphere—to assume that they ignore their identifica-
tion with family and community—is a fundamental 
aspect of dialogic democracy in late modernity.
denaturalizing citizenship
“Citizenship” is promoted by the state to 
strengthen the sense of shared commonalty at the 
national level, to strengthen the idea of the nation as a 
community, and to thus naturalize obligations to civic 
duties, including warfare.  And so, one might also 
argue that, at this limit, citizenship also works against 
the logic of the public sphere, which must remain 
“above” all communal interests—including an imag-
ined national community.  
We have to look critically at practices that seek 
to limit public sphere access within a nation to citizens 
of that nation, and/or that require or encourage citi-
zenship to be emblematic of a single “naturalized” 
national community.  For a public sphere to remain 
open to counter-state expressions, there can be no 
fixed one-to-one correspondence between the 
nation-state, its formally recognized citizens, and the 
public sphere.  
Minority/diasporic groups who recognize a lack of 
access to the public sphere are often the first to bring 
issues of citizenship and exclusion into public view.  
But the manner through which the community brings 
this message to the public sphere is actually quite 
important.  For any group to operate as a legitimate 
voice within the public sphere, the group must articu-
late issues that are within the “public” interest.  For  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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group opens itself up to a moment of reidentification 
with the larger “public.” 
Class and publics
One reason why private interests are not legiti-
mated, is class1.  Class, specifically the notions of an 
“upper-class,” with its corresponding  “lower-”  is a 
clear example of potential for the “privatization” of 
place and power.  Class is also a good example of 
“community,” of the “alibi” (in Barthes's sense) that 
(even imagined) shared heredity can provide as a basis 
for group identity.  
1. The public sphere, as this emerged, for example, in Great Britain, was the result of conflicts 
between the landed (and politically active) gentry and workers in the new manufactories 
who sought to bring democratic pressure to bear on issues of access to political power (As 
Negt and Kluge noted).  The issue of access was potentially to be fought in the streets, with 
the potential (and, at times, imminent) result being a physical defeat (and then death or dis-
placement) of the gentry.  Public sphere agencies: newspapers, courts, parliaments—in 
each case subject to reflexive reforms to make them more open, more public—allowed the 
conflict to be concluded in other, discursive, arenas, and the resulting compromise favored 
neither the gentry nor the general worker, but rather, the emerging middle-class of literate 
professionals and urban skilled workers, who claimed also to speak for “the workers,” but 
whose interests were coincidental with those of the gentry.  The resulting bourgeois public 
sphere occupies the center of information production in Great Britain, and through similar 
circumstances, in most Western European and North American states. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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1819, the movement reached its
high point and turning point. A
chain of mass rallies carried out in
a disciplined manner raised the
morale of the movement and, at
the same time, disturbed the
establishment. “The peaceful
behavior of so many thousands of
unemployed is not natural,” com-
mented General Byng, incensed
by the phenomenon of the work-
ing classes having begun to solve
their organizational problems.
The “transformation of the rabble
into a disciplined class” was due
not least of all to the experience of
failure with underground and
revolt actions. The mass demon-
strations, with their hundreds of
group leaders, bands, banners,
and so on, revealed an organized
exploitation of the traditions that
stood available to the movement,
in the form of army veterans,
trade unions, auxiliary classes,
and Jacobin rituals. ’”
Michael Vester, Die Entstehung
des Proletariats als Lernprozeß.
Frankfurt am Main, 1971. 174ff.
Quoted in:
(Negt and Kluge 1983, 189).
One can say that public sphere formation in the 
Western Enlightenment period in Europe was at one 
moment, a counter-class practice, although it has sub-
sequently assumed and promoted the desires of those 
who prowl it most effectively.  This slow but thor-
oughgoing appropriation of the public sphere by and 
for corporate1 interests gets noted more often than 
critically addressed in critiques of the public sphere.  
Gupta and Ferguson note: “The production and distri-
bution of mass culture—films, television and radio 
programs, newspapers and wire services, recorded 
music, books, live concerts— is largely controlled by 
those notoriously placeless organizations, multina-
tional corporations. The ‘public sphere’ is therefore 
hardly ‘public’ with respect to control over the repre-
sentations that are circulated in it” (1992, 19).   But 
how is this situation liable to change2?  
A public sphere is not immune to the presence of 
inequities of capital and status.  Instead, over time, it 
tends to articulate (and to mimic and diffuse) the insti-
tutional practices and pre-established priorities—the 
complex social topology—that forms its ground.  
There is no mechanism internal to it to prevent it 
1. The role of corporations in the bourgeois—is there anything more bourgeois than 
Microsoft?— public sphere needs much more attention.   My notion of the market-state 
attempts to describe the latest movement in this global process.
2.  Habermas (1989, 1989a, 1992) outlines the progressive degeneration of the public 
sphere, but offers inadequate advice on how this might be reversed: inadequate because 
of the deficiencies of his linguistic theorizing, and also weak, I would say, because his pic-
ture of the degeneration of the public sphere is so formidable that it is very difficult to imag-
ine a solution.  But the current condition of public spheres in various places may be less 
severely “degenerate” and more tractable than he first allowed.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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mechanism to it at all, it is merely the total of available 
institutional and organizational practices).  Without 
reflexive attention, a public sphere can become the 
quasi-property of those who manage its information 
flows, as Habermas noted: “The public sphere, simul-
taneously prestructured and dominated by the mass 
media, developed into an arena infiltrated by power in 
which, by means of topic selection and topical contri-
butions, a battle is fought not only over influence but 
over the control of communication flows that affect 
behavior while their strategic intentions are kept hid-
den as much as possible” (1992, 437).   
Current critiques of the bourgeois public sphere 
are usually aimed at opening up rival configurations, 
counter-publics that can recode the bourgeois logic of 
the public sphere into something more inclusive and 
heterogeneous.  And so the current problem of the 
public sphere in Asian/Pacific places begins not with 
the issue of bringing private (marginalized, communal) 
interests into the public sphere/space, but removing 
privileged/privatized access to this sphere.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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long drilling of peaceful demon-
stration forms, a mass demonstra-
tion was staged on the St. Peters
Field in Manchester consisting of
60,000 to 100,000 workers, who
were bloodily scattered by the
cavalry units known as ‘heroes of
Waterloo.’ The slaughter, since
designated as ‘Peterloo,’ resulted
in 11 dead and over 400 injured.”
Michael Vester, Die Entstehung
des Proletariats als Lernprozeß.
Frankfurt am Main, 1971. 174ff.
Quoted in:
(Negt and Kluge 1983, 189-190).
Absent in Kyoto are similar fields
of Peterloo, missing is a history of
the public struggle for the appro-
priation of place and power.
This double movement of evacuating entrenched 
privatized interests from the public sphere while artic-
ulating the right to heterogeneity within the public 
sphere is emerging as the central counter-public dis-
course within the Korean diaspora in Japan.  I would 
suggest that this discourse has applications in other 
parts of the Asia/Pacific.  But where can we locate the 
connections between civil society, civic spaces, and the 
public sphere?  And how can we further examine 
these connections?  
Three notions are particularly helpful here:  Henri 
Lefevbre's notion of the “appropriation of space;” 
Nancy Fraser's use of “subaltern counterpublic;” and 
Michel deCerteau's idea of “tactics,” that is, of strate-
gies behind enemy lines.  
The Higashi-Kujo Madang festival is, I would sug-
gest, a tactical maneuver that appropriates a public space 
and constructs a subaltern counterpublic event.  Looking 
at the festival in this manner allows us to understand 
how local practices of resistance can anchor a tran-
snational diasporic group to the city where it dwells.  
Appropriation
Lefevbre's1 notion of the appropriation of space 
can be used in a critique of those urban places that 
acquire the label “public.”  A common definition of a 
public space is something like the following: “a space 
devoid of private interests and controlled by the state 
1. See Henri Lefevbre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1991). TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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define a space as “public.”  
What we find using this notion is that a public 
space tends to be a place where surveillance and 
police control delimit, from among the various possi-
ble common uses, those uses that are supported by 
the state and/or by the marketplace.  And so the pub-
lic street of a city under modern totalitarian regime 
resembles—and often exemplifies—the bourgeois 
ideal of a modern public space: safe, sanitary, orderly.  
Clearly, we need to rethink our notion of the public 
street.  And the sudden appearance of a festival in this 
space puts a new contour into the street and for the-
ories that would describe this.
The question here is this: what legitimates the 
right of a crowd, particularly a noisy subaltern coun-
terpublic crowd, appropriate a public place for its own 
interests?  By arguing that the notion of the public 
sphere must be opened up to multiple publics, includ-
ing subaltern counter-publics, Nancy Fraser calls for a 
new perspective on the public sphere.  
Fraser notes, against Habermas's argument, that 
the “question of open access cannot be reduced with-
out remainder to the presence or absence of formal 
exclusions. It requires us to look also at the process 
of discursive interaction...” (1992, 118).  Even today, 
discursive interaction occurs mostly in specific  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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the creation of public spaces, i.e., of physically avail-
able, inclusive discursive arenas, in and out of the gov-
ernment.  
Such access is accomplished within a city by the 
creation and maintenance of public places: but only 
where a public place is a place that is freely appropri-
atable by a multiplicity of groups.  And so a more use-
ful definition of a public place would be a place where 
all groups can negotiate access: where they contest 
for inclusion in a definition of the public.  The ongoing 
civic “festival” of democracy is this self-expression of 
inclusion.  
In practice, as Fraser notes, public spaces and the 
groups that vie to appropriate these, have multiple 
moments of articulation: “...subaltern counterpublics 
have a dual character. On the one hand, they function 
as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the 
other hand, they also function as bases and training 
grounds for agitational activities directed toward 
wider publics. It is precisely in the dialectic between 
these two functions that their emancipatory potential 
resides...” (1992, 124).
This “dual character” of counterpublics requires 
that there be two necessary moments for the practice 
of achieving inclusion within the public sphere, and 
1. Of course, from the perspective of subaltern groups, inclusion in the bourgeois public 
sphere is a self-defeating tactic as long as the logic of this sphere remains bourgeois.  
Demanding inclusion in this sphere represents the de facto desire to become bourgeois: a 
tactic that feeds the hegemony of the bourgeois camp.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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lic spaces are those made for the internal use of the 
subaltern group—as a part of the community-building 
process that redefines the group as having shared 
interests.  The second space occurs when this internal 
public space is then opened up tactically within the 
public sphere of the nation-state.  
The tactic here is one of decoding and recoding, 
as Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 244-245) have noted, 
in order to break the unmarked flow of the memory 
of traditions of exclusion and insert a new memory, 
start a new chain, and begin the history of a new 
future for the space.  Demonstrations of identity, of 
protest, of solidarity and complaint, festivals of cul-
tural politics—this multiple re-coding opens up the 
street as “public” space.  These moments accumulate 
in a fashion that relativizes dominance: spectacles of 
the state are thereby forced to march the same route 
as the annual madang crowd.  The more times, and 
more groups that take (to) the streets in this fashion, 
the less room there is for the everyday articulation of 
a dominant narrative for the street.  Because the state 
has a long-term1 interest in supplying its own story, 
counter-articulation can not be a one-time action.  
In Higashi-kujo, the Madang community continues 
to work toward an annual event that builds on its own 
history of articulation to wedge itself deeper into the 
1. One long-term counter-strategy is for the state to re-appropriate celebrations of resistance 
to the state, transforming revolutionary memories into worker holidays, and filling these 
with its own displays. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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foray into the heart of the factory of mono-cultural 
Japanese identity—into its public schools.  Taking con-
trol of the schoolyard where they were disciplined as 
children by a government that disowned them at 
birth, and where their outsider status as Koreans and 
buraku-dwellers was forged into bitter memories and 
anger, the community has created its own cultural 
plaza: a space that not only announces their presence 
within the ancient capital of the Empire, but also 
makes their claim as legitimate citizens in the city that 
shuns them daily.  
It it through this festival that they mark their 
arrival as local city-zens.  They are, by this, no longer 
simply disenfranchised foreigners, but the producers 
of a variety of local culture, a culture that is done 
within and for themselves and their neighbors.  But 
this is not the moment where the Madang stops.
The Madang has challenged the City of Kyoto to 
incorporate “a respect for heterogeneity” within its 
announced plans to champion the call for “world 
human rights” as a part of its 1200th Anniversary pro-
gram.  Heterogeneity here applies to persons with a 
wide range of “otherness,” most specifically other eth-
nicities (Koreans, etc.), other bodies (the physically 
disadvantaged), and other residences (persons 
assigned to live in buraku areas).  Certainly, sexuality, 
gender, and age concerns would also fit within this 
call.  But what is also interesting is the tactical nature 
of this counter-proclamation. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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their members, and then to agitate for inclusion 
within the public sphere, are fundamental to the con-
tinuance of a truly public public sphere.  In many 
states today, diasporic communities are at the front of 
a new wave of democratization.  And their methods 
must, by a necessary logic, by different than those that 
are used to deny them access.
Tactics
Strategies, de Certeau (1984) reminds us, are the 
privilege of the strong.  For the subject, for the subal-
tern, there are only tactics.  The appropriation of a 
public space by a subaltern counterpublic group for its 
own interests tells us several things;  This appropria-
tion moves the counterpublic into the center, geo-
graphically, and, by various proximities, socially.  For 
the time of the event, in the memories of all who are 
there, the spectacle of diverse bodies, and of words 
shouted in public reminds the state that a public is 
constructed from diversity.  
The counterpublic event succeeds from a position 
of externality.  It must avoid reflecting the tolerance of 
the bourgeois public sphere, which, as Michael 
Warner noted, masks its unmarked intolerance under 
the generalized rubric of “we the people,” (1993, 241) 
or, in this case, “We Japanese...” thereby enclaving all 
subgroups.  
The Higashi-Kujo Madang is not an example of 
multiculturalism or internationalism as this is paraded 
by the Japanese state, but rather it disrupts the notion  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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alternative readings of cultural properties and identity.  
In Kyoto, the unmarked exclusive identification of 
its Japanese (non-buraku) citizens into a univocal, 
mass-public reduces this public to silence.  It is pre-
cisely this silence that is commonly presented to the 
world as a “consensus” of agreement with govern-
ment policies.  For when everyone speaks (or remains 
silent) as one, no one person can speak at all.  It also 
reminds the city that more than three quarters of so-
called “international” population of Kyoto was, in fact, 
born in Kyoto.  Even more so, the event tells the city 
that its international community belongs there.  
Kyoto's Higashi-kujo Koreans display what Paul 
Gilroy  (1991; quoting Richard Wright) calls the 
“dreadful objectivity” of being inside and outside.  This 
perspective, all too rare in Japan, makes their dramatic 
performance of their marginal circumstances a valu-
able critique of the city's social order.  But the 
1. Once again, it is difficult to gauge the depth of the unmarked quietus surrounding the 
notion of “we Japanese” in Kyoto (a place which, after all, is famous for excluding even 
other Japanese from its self-determined identity: “we Kyotoites”).  It is easy to find people 
who complain about the presence of “foreigners” (gaijin) in Kyoto.  But one can also find 
persons who are ready to converse on the problematics of Japanese national(ist) identity in 
an age of increasing “internationalism.”  Indeed, Kyoto City has “vowed” to become the 
Japan's most “international city,” although its planning here seems mostly aimed at reduc-
ing the level of irritation between locals and foreign tourists and residents (See: Kyoto Dec-
laration).  This recent gesture towards “internationalization” (kokusaika) by the City has met 
with overt ridicule by the resident Korean community (again which makes up more than 80 
percent of the City's “foreign” population) particularly in Higashi-Kujo, a district marked by 
decades of official neglect.  Several Koreans I spoke with in Kyoto are also very knowl-
edgeable about international human rights discourses, and about changing rules for citi-
zenship in Europe. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Kyoto can be opened up to public participation by a 
diasporic group outside of the incorporation regimes 
of officialdom.  And if “even” Koreans and buraku Japa-
nese can work together to forge an opening in Kyoto's 
public sphere, then such tactics must be available to 
other civil-society organizations.  
National(ist) Identity Trouble
Public spheres don't just happen, not in Kyoto, 
nor in Los Angeles; and they are not all alike, although 
I have tried to suggest some basic properties they may 
share.  Similarly, public places don't just happen, they 
are constructed by the groups that put bodies on the 
street, into the plaza, or into parliaments, to demand 
open access, to perform a celebration of heteroge-
neous identities, and thereby to become the architects 
of public spaces, and of the public sphere.  
Japanese national(ist) identity; a condition thrust 
upon Koreans during Japan's colonial rule of the pen-
insula; a promise of eventual equality and citizenship (in 
exchange for conscription and virtual slavery during 
World War II); a status that was withdrawn without 
compensation when defeat severed Japan's colonial 
authority; a privilege now denied to thousands of peo-
ple born and living in Kyoto; and a discourse that today 
binds together the mass Japanese public: it is this iden-
tity, in its unitizing, essentializing subjectivity, that the 
Higashi-Kujo Madang resists.  And this resistance, 
couched as a call for a respect for heterogeneity, 
seeks to remake the entire public sphere into a space  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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by the city, and will not soon find a spot on the Japan 
Travel Bureau's tourist calendar, it does raise a small 
clamor in the usually silent street.  From this noise, 
the voice of alternative identities in and for Kyoto is 
heard.  
Today, the Higashi-Kujo Madang clings to its right 
to exist.  Each year it performs that first moment of 
inclusion, bringing together the many feuding strands 
of the local neighborhood into a common, embodied 
community.  And every year it attempts the second 
moment of inclusion by presenting itself to the city on 
equal terms.  
The tactic of opening up this one tiny window of 
heterogeneous culture within the old Imperial capital 
of Japan can succeed only when this opening is seized 
by others who find the uniform of “We Japanese...” too 
constraining on their own identities.  For when multi-
ple groups learn similar tactics, these become a single 
strategy, and the small tactical openings coalesce into 
a new openness.  This is the intended outcome of the 
type of “culture trouble” the Madang organizers are 
making.  But admittedly, and unfortunately, the possi-
bility of this happening in Kyoto seems remote.  
It is more likely that the city will find a way to 
shut down the Higashi-Kujo Madang, or force it back 
inside the buraku.  Already, the city government has 
started up a city-run, city-funded festival in the same 
district, timed to roughly coincide with the Madang.  
Probably the City will attempt to enfold the Madang  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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ist) control.  
As of today, the Madang organizers are deter-
mined to maintain the independence of their event, 
but should the city actively oppose them, they may 
find themselves without a place to perform in—
except the street.  But as long as the Higashi-kujo 
Madang gets performed, then there will be one space 
in Kyoto where a public public space can be found.  
Apart from this madang, crowd activities allowed 
on the streets in Kyoto are controlled and managed by 
the nation, the city, or by Shinto shrines in collabora-
tion with city authorities.  What is made clear by the 
opening of this one multivocal space, is the wide-
spread closure of so-called public spaces within the 
city1.  The ubiquitous role of the state in Kyoto's pub-
lic events points out a fundamental lack of spaces 
appropriatable by civil society organizations, and it 
marks the present as a result of a genealogy of state/
imperial spectacles and monuments.  
1. Absent also in Kyoto are sites of a history of public participation.  For example, there are no 
plazas marked by the memories of prior public demonstrations.  Instead, the city is multiply 
inscribed by its connections to Japan's imperial past, a past that lingers in the felt absence 
of the current emperor, and in the imperial pageantry of the civic spectacles.  It is a city of 
palaces, and tombs, and imperial temples and shrines.  
Korean counter-publics
Let’s review what the Higashi-kujo Madang offers 
to Kyoto’s public sphere.  Since 1993 when the 
Madang was first performed, Kyoto residents have had 
the rare opportunity of seeing (or participating) in the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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mance that can tactically appropriate a public space 
for a counter-public event.   After openly recruiting an 
all-volunteer staff, and after months of democratic 
public meetings, the Higashi-Kujo Madang assembled 
the efforts of many local groups to bring food, music, 
dance, song, contests, and, finally, drama, into a com-
mon cultural venue.  
“West's black prophetic frame-
work includes the oppositional
moment of the externally desig-
nated “we.” This reminds us that
the importance of the "exclusion
of exclusion" appears at the level
of sexuality, ethnicity, and interest
more strongly than at any other:
identity politics has been moti-
vated in part by a struggle against
those persons and practices ex
cluding us because of our differ-
ences, a motivation which has
called into question those exclu-
sions operating within identity
groups themselves. When differ-
ences are self-affirmed rather than
results of labeling or traditional
spatial and cultural boundaries,
they provide “a standpoint from
which to criticize prevailing insti-
tutions and norms,” helping to
anchor a sense of involvement
with the plurality of others in our
communities, societies, and the
world. Unlike ascribed identities,
achieved identities provide us
with a critical strength”
(Dean 1996, 42).
At the center of this production is the madang 
geki, the street drama.  In this drama, local volunteer 
actors use a self-scripted play to explore the predica-
ments of their everyday lives.  The end of the drama 
signals the beginning of a final dance in which every-
one joins in.  As twilight deepens, the dance twirls to a 
final drum beat, and the madang collapses into itself, 
returning the schoolyard to its normalized state.
By design, this Madang is an event where the 
internal boundaries within the community are con-
spicuously ignored.  It is a therapeutic space, a place of 
communal healing, a zone where conversation is pos-
ible between adversaries (and Kyoto's Korean and 
buraku Japanese neighborhoods house several adver-
sarial social groups).  Standing in the crowd at the first 
madang, one of the Madang organizers directed my 
attention to two elderly men holding an animated 
conversation.  “See those men.  They live close to one 
another, but I've never seen them talk before.  I 
thought I never would.  It's incredible (shinjirareinai)!"  
The Madang opens up an internal arena of active, dis-
cursive social negotiation and collective embodied  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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the entire neighborhood.
The visibly inclusive aspect of the Higashi-kujo 
Madang festival and the generalizable notion of heter-
ogeneity (“ishitsusei”) translates the community 
demand for inclusion into a demand for a public 
sphere open to all people residing in Kyoto, regardless 
of gender, origin, occupation or physical ability.  At this 
moment, the Korean community establishes the right 
of its members for inclusion in the public sphere, by 
articulating a message that is already accepted as part 
of the self definition of the public sphere in “demo-
cratic” Kyoto.  The tactic points to the discontinuity 
between legal guarantees of access and common prac-
tices of exclusion.
unmarking
Too often we see the reproduction of all commu-
nity as requiring moments that mark inclusion and 
moments that mark exclusion.  Our idea of a “collec-
tive imagination” needs these reminders of who is 
allowed in and who is kept out.   We look for bound-
ary conditions as integral to community self-identity.  
Many times these boundaries are articulated spa-
tially.   The community clubhouse has its locks, gate-
keepers, and its annual invitation-only affairs.   But one 
unintended result of such practices is the privatization 
of the ethnic community: belonging goes both ways, 
and the group is no longer open to public member- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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of “traditional” practices to reproduce internal exclu-
sions based on age, or gender, or social status.  Com-
munity membership may be a “package-deal” where 
the member is not given the authority to propose 
alternative practices within its boundary.
Spatially exclusive gatherings generally do the task 
of sorting out the others, and the right of admission 
displays the privilege of membership.  These are 
events where solidarity is built as a boundary condi-
tion that marks the differences between the commu-
nity and others.  As long as a community's regular 
practices are only of this sort, the community remains 
“private” in its self-definition.  And many communities, 
ethnic or social, do today mark their exclusiveness 
through spatialized practices of exclusion.  However 
we also need to see how a community might make a 
practice of excluding exclusion.
1. I am well aware that it may seem odd to note that group membership which is presumably 
based upon some inherited circumstance is thereby “private” to those who claim to share in 
this inheritance.  Here I am simply opening up to the politics of recognition, away from the 
politics of identity.  For the transformation of putative ethnic/gender identity into a self-
inscribing identity does not create a place of resistance to the original “hailing.”   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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groups attempt to contest the
hegemonic discourses that posi-
tion individuals within the strait-
jacket of normal identities to
liberate the free play of differ-
ences. In any society. Discourse is
power because the rules determin-
ing discourse enforce norms of
what is rational, sane, or true, and
to speak from outside these rules
is to risk marginalization and
exclusion. All discourses are pro-
duced by power, but they are not
wholly subservient to it and can
be used as ’a point of resistance
and a starting point for an oppos-
ing strategy’... Counter-discourses
provide a lever of political resis-
tance by encapsulating a popular
memory of previous forms of
oppression and struggle and a
means of articulating needs and
demands”
(Best and Kellner 1991, 57).
Ethnic communities that imagine and articulate 
their sense of identity and the tasks and privileges of 
membership through practices that operate through 
this moment of exclusivity have acquired the logic of 
the dominant discourse: a logic of exclusion.   But 
other logics are also available to them.  Meetings, 
marches, and media discussions can articulate the 
contours of membership above that provided exter-
nally: above the stereotypes and the slurs.  These 
practices can transform an external ethnic designation 
into a shared ethnic imagination.  But they can do so 
only when the group also transforms the logic of 
external designation by refusing to design its own 
boundary conditions.  Ethnic “pride” and self-marked 
identifications may result if there is a voluntary com-
mitment to the community.  
exclusion and de-legitimacy
Here is the most important outcome, in terms of 
the public sphere.  A community that stops its own 
logic at a moment of exclusion announces its exter-
nality to the public sphere.  It positions itself not as an 
alternative public sphere, but as an alternative to the 
existence of a public sphere.  Such a group chooses 
not to participate in the critiques that are internal to 
the public sphere.  Given the means, it would replace 
the public sphere with something else—with its own 
practices of exclusion.  And so it can only provide an 
external critique: such as the critique that the Klu 
Klux Klan offers occasionally, when this group parades  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—exclusion and de-legitimacy —391—its vision of a “racially pure” community.
It is all to easy to conflate events 
in public places with public 
events... that is, with events that 
offer a public sphere arena of dis-
cussion and decision.  However, 
once we start to ask questions 
about the controls placed on 
expression during an event, we 
can begin to see where a “public” 
place has been appropriated for 
the private interests of those with 
the means to exert these controls.
The ability to recognize practices 
that constrain expression in a 
“public” event needs to be 
informed by a sociology of such 
events and expressions.  Most 
events in public are scripted to the 
extent that the constraints on 
expression are fairly easy to see.
Look at this particular video 
sequence as a private event, and 
imagine what role a stranger 
would find in it.
Even when this parade steps into the public 
street, it does not by this spacial move become a legit-
imate counter-critique; it still does not offer an alter-
native public sphere.  This may seem to be a fine 
distinction, but it is one that is well worth remember-
ing.  Although we may see such communal spectacles 
in public places, they do not, by their spatial availabil-
ity, thus acquire legitimacy1 as counter-public events.  
But then how does a community achieve this legiti-
macy? 
1. The current debate about multiculturalism generally overstresses the hostility between 
communities and the public sphere, because it lacks an understanding of the process 
through which plural ethnic communities can all add their own unique flavors to the “public 
pie” while preserving their own traditions.  Stuck in the “politics of identity” this debate fails 
to see that communities can surrender exclusivity while maintaining traditional practices. 
Of course there are many groups, such as fundamentalist religious groups, that may prefer 
their exclusions to internal participation within the public sphere.  The conflicts between the 
active public sphere and these groups are real conflicts where the outcome requires the 
elimination of either the public sphere or the communal group. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Kyoto uses Korean cultural forms—notably, dress, 
music, and food— to mark what I call an “ENclusive” 
group identity.  An enclusive identity has abandoned 
exclusion as a moment in its formation and reproduc-
tion: it practices the exclusion of exclusion.  An enclu-
sive community welcomes strangers into a common 
identity based upon mutually articulated desires.  All a 
stranger needs for membership is to want in.
The Korean neighborhood festival, the Higashi-
kujo Madang is most visibly “Korean.”  It speaks most 
directly (although in Japanese) to the conditions of 
being Korean in Kyoto.  But it is not at all exclusive to 
Koreans, and it does not make a claim that Koreans 
have a privileged counter-public argument to make. 
Many of the “Koreans” coming out in traditional 
Korean costume are not, in fact, Korean1.  They may 
be Japanese, they may be people from other nation-
states.  
1. The community has opened up the semantics of “Korean” to include anyone who feels the 
effects of exclusion in Kyoto.  Anyone who sees the injustice of the continuing urban dis-
grace that the presence of a buraku makes of Kyoto can be “Korean”.  Anyone who finds 
the exclusion of physically disabled from mainstream Japanese society to be offensive can 
be “Korean.”  Anyone who sees the Japanese emperor as a figurehead for an essentializ-
ing Japanese national community that would exclude all others can be “Korean.”  Even the 
odd ethnographer with a video camera can be “Korean.”   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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dressed up in stylized peasant 
clothing are actually “Korean” by 
their family history?  Many of 
them are, but others are members 
of the neighborhood and of the 
city who have voluntarily 
“become” Korean to show their 
commitment to the neighborhood 
and its demonstration against eco-
nomic and social injustice. Being 
“Korean” is a metonym for all 
people who feel excluded from 
Kyoto.  Korean is the lowest of all 
local identities.  Celebrating this 
celebrates the grotesque (dirty, 
dangerous, and most of all differ-
ent) bodies that Koreans are sup-
posed to have.  
To be visibly, audibly, gustatorially “Korean” is to 
reject a claim of Japanese cultural superiority.  These 
festival moments of Korean-ness in Higashi-kujo 
Kyoto are moments when the group unburdens itself 
of the everyday load of Japanese cultural representa-
tions.  To be Korean and laugh, to be Korean and 
speak out, to be Korean and have a life: this denies 
their exclusion from social life in Kyoto, but it does 
not, by this, affirm any traditionalist position on being 
Korean.  
Internally the event also learned to be its own 
public sphere, its own radical dialogic democracy.  The 
event is entirely run by openly recruited volunteers.  It 
receives no funds from the city.  It operates in a man-
ner that is consciously oblique to other social organi-
zations in the neighborhood, organizations that would 
reflect various historically embedded status differ-
ences.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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by contrast, refers to a specifically
modern phenomenon, contempo-
raneous with, and responding to,
bourgeois and industrial-capital-
ist publicity. It offers forms of sol-
idarity and reciprocity that are
grounded in a collective experi-
ence of marginalization and
expropriation, but these forms are
inevitably experienced as medi-
ated, no longer rooted in face-to-
face relations, and subject to dis-
cursive conflict and negotiation”
(Hansen 1993, xxxv-xxxvi).
Within the madang organization, women, men, 
Japanese, Koreans, physically-disadvantaged people, 
and any others who want to help are given positions 
of authority and responsibility.  Each meeting is an 
open meeting.  All comments were fully discussed.  
Precious hours are spent not on the details of the 
vent, but to permit other voices their chance to 
speak.  Marathon meetings are held where little was 
decided apart from the time and place of the next 
meeting.  Still, there are times when decisions are 
made without full discussion, but these are later dis-
cussed for future procedural correction.  The organi-
zation of the event is itself a three-month long event, a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—exclusion and de-legitimacy —395—showcase of democratic, inclusive1 decision making.  
Here, then, is a community where the moments 
of ENclusion interrupt moments of inclusion/exclu-
sion.  These are events where the commonalities of 
the group with the wider public are marked, where 
the internal differences between members are 
accepted, and where an internal democracy is built 
from which a critique of internal exclusions becomes 
possible.  The organization is acutely aware of criti-
cisms about its own inclusivity.  In part because its 
central message is a respect for heterogeneity in the 
1. Here is an example.
In 1994, I had volunteered to manage a photographic exhibit of the results of a project I had 
just initiated to encourage a collective expression of place-attachment (positive an nega-
tive) within Higashi-kujo.  “Higashi-kujo no ima” (Higashi-kujo Today) was one of those “Day 
in the Life” projects where several photographers take photos on the same day.  Only this 
project was done not by professional photographers but by 20 volunteer residents of 
Higashi-kujo, using donated panoramic cameras.  At one of the organizing meetings, I sug-
gested that an exhibit of some of the photographs from this project could be shown at the 
Higashi-kujo madang.  The idea was well received, but some of the members from the 
executive committee went along with me later to a local tavern to nail down the specifics 
before the next meeting.  
Most important for them was the issue of editorial control.  There are many areas within 
Higashi-kujo where people just do not ever take photographs, and where people do not 
want to be photographed.  The area's unmarked (but precisely known locally, and available 
nationally) stigmatized boundaries run like sulfurous streams through neighborhoods and 
even through buildings.  Outsiders would not know these places, and might edit the show 
inappropriately.  Also, in terms of the flavor of the event, it would not be appropriate to bring 
in outside editors, even if they had some sort of credentials in photography. 
“Who would select these photos?” They asked me. I shared their concern, and had been puz-
zling over this question for some time.  “Why not have the photographers pick their best 
shots?” I suggested.  I found it a little curious that they had not themselves thought of this 
idea.  But as soon as I said it, it was clear that there could be no other choice.  With that, 
the photo exhibition was approved.  Several of the outside visitors to the festival replied to a 
questionnaire that the photographs added content to their understanding of the neighbor-
hood. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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rule within its own organization.  Again, The festival per-
forms what it proposes.  
One feature of festival organization and perfor-
mance (and these are all one practice) that is different 
from that of other events, but similar to most “games” 
is that the festival is what it does, and it can only do 
what it is.  To perform “heterogeneity” the festival 
encourages this internally.  And to do this better next 
year, the festival finds new ways to foster this.  The 
Higashi-kujo Madang creates, recognizes, and sup-
ports heterogeneity. Even though it consciously uses 
art forms that are labeled “traditional,” the Higashi-
kujo Madang festival community does not consider 
itself to be a traditional1 community.  
The Higashi-kujo Madang community is an exam-
ple of what I call a “public community.”  Communities 
such as this have learned a lesson from the public 
sphere, they have internalized an active “public” 
sphere for their own decision process.    This civics 
lesson may not be welcomed by those who desire 
elite status within the group,  because it gives space to 
other voices.  But it is a lesson that, when applied suf-
ficiently, effects the community's claim to legitimacy 
1. There are pronounced differences in the perception of “traditionality” as a feature of this 
event, differences that are most marked from the standpoint of generational position.  Many 
of the original organizers are second-generation Koreans in Kyoto, and they were moti-
vated by a desire to pass along a heritage of specifically Korean culture and history to their 
children.  But the use of the event for outright cultural transmission is also open to critique 
internally, and several second-generation organizers admitted that the event’s goals were 
multiple and focused more on the local situation than on Korean culture per se. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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New, reflexive communities
A public community is a group that has reflexively 
acquired its own dialogic democracy, and that is 
engaged in the active public sphere.  Such groups usu-
ally do the former in order to do the latter.  Other 
groups (including most religious, and many ethnic 
groups) have little interest in the former, and so they 
have limited success in the latter.  Unmonitored lists 
on the internet are a weak example of a public com-
munity (weak because identification with the group is, 
and should only be, weak, although the internet may 
also serve and one of many information media for 
public communities).  Activist movements for the envi-
ronment and for human or animal rights may acquire 
public community status.  But this is also available to 
more “traditional” groups, providing they acquire the 
(above) reflexive “post-traditional” membership and 
decision-making practices1.   This is the real question 
facing many communities today: what are the conse-
quences of internal democratic reform?  Fundamental-
ism is a negative response to this potential change, 
and so groups may split on this issue into a fundamen-
talist revitalization movement that seeks to undo 
1. Granted, such groups are rare today.  The Higashi-Kujo Madang community is, in this way, 
quite remarkable.   And one might ask why would a traditionalist group would care to do so.   
What is more likely than an established group transforming itself in this manner is for a new 
group to be formed that competes with the old group for membership.  Change will come 
about when the older group fails to reproduce its membership, and so loses its ability to 
maintain its “traditional” authority.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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traditional authorities and a reform community that 
seeks to complete the transformation of the commu-
nity into something more or less like a public commu-
nity, although vestiges of traditional authority may 
prove recalcitrant against these reforms.
 The lessons that a community internalizes from 
the wider public sphere also show the penetration of 
the community's own logic by that of the public 
sphere.  One could argue that this penetration—this 
recoding of the traditional order—is an illegitimate 
intrusion into the community's traditional culture.  
And here is where cultural essentialists and critical 
social theorists are bound to have some disagreement.  
For example, those who look at this process as 
leading to the loss of unique cultural traditions might 
be forced to overlook (equally unique) critiques of 
cultural groups as sites of social inequality.  The pres-
ervation of practices that promote inequality (such as 
female genital mutilation) as a right of some tradition 
further silences those voices that have already been 
silenced within the community.  To say that these so-
called traditional practices cannot be critiqued 
because such critiques are not, themselves, tradi-
tional, means that those subject to this are silenced in 
the face of their own domination.  
public sphere and multiculturalism
Taking the side of cultural essentialists, one could 
argue that a strong public sphere, particularly in the 
current global world system, would simply erase cul- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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ticulturalism.  Why talk about cultural differences 
while the public sphere promotes global cultural uni-
formity?  In answer to this argument, I would again 
return to Kyoto.
A public community like that of the Higashi-kujo 
Madang—where traditional cultural practices have 
been subjected to internal critiques that make them a 
part of the community's reflexively organized reper-
toire of cultural articulations—provides us with an 
alternative form of community, one where still-unique 
cultural practices are actively promoted but also 
actively critiqued internally.  
It is this internal dialogic that opens up the com-
munity without surrendering its own unique logic and 
practices.  In the process, these practices and their 
logics are stripped of their legacies of exclusion and 
inequality.  This means that some “traditional” prac-
tices may not be preserved1.    What is abandoned are 
those practices that do not survive this internal 
reflexive critique.  What remains are cultural contents 
that serve the entire community, and that the commu-
nity can use to both articulate its uniqueness and its 
place in the larger public sphere.  
One might be tempted to say that a public com-
munity is a relatively weak social group, in that it does 
not, and will not, rely upon some essentializing narra-
1.  For if the preservation of a community's cultural practices is also an alibi for maintaining 
gender or other inequalities, then the stage is set for a confrontation between a strong pub-
lic sphere and the interests of those in the community served by the maintenance of these 
inequalities. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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exclusive right of membership.  It lacks the rigid iden-
tity boundary that other, traditional, communities 
spend so much effort maintaining.  In fact its member-
ship will be more of a voluntary association, even 
where membership is predicated, in part, on a well-
defined claim of heritage.  
“Koreanness” means many things in Kyoto.  
Within the Higashi-kujo community this no longer 
connotes an essential blood-tie to Korean ancestry, 
although many individuals in the community can make 
this claim.  It is the public desire to be “Korean” in 
Kyoto where this desire seems so improbable, that 
marks this community and its counter-public event. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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Take a final look at the climax of 
the first Higashi-kujo Madang.  
Remember that the participants 
are all volunteers, and that the  
dance is spontaneous, although it 
realizes one of the goals of the 
event.  This climactic reversal of 
the disciplinary space of the Japa-
nese public schoolyard by a group 
of people who live literally on the 
margins of Kyoto shows the 
strength that a public community 
can have.  Nothing like this had 
happened in Kyoto in as many 
years as people could remember.  
And if the event had been sup-
pressed after this one perfor-
mance, it would still have 
achieved its goal.  For here we can 
see how The festival performs 
what it proposes.  It is through 
these moments of performance 
that a public community builds, 
and reflexively knows its strength.
I would submit that the Higashi-kujo Madang 
community, and public communities in general, are 
not weakened by their voluntary membership.  They 
are strong enough to not make any boundary claim for 
membership, strong enough to welcome internal cri-
tiques, strong enough to open up to competing articu-
lations, and strong enough to add its own cultural 
content and an additional critical apparatus to the 
public sphere.  But again, the question would arise, is 
this still a “community” or has it become something 
else, say, a social movement?   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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production, which in its own way 
exhibits the pinnacle of modern 
mass spectacle, and of communal 
terror.  Here uniform obedience, 
and rigid conformity is used to 
show the strength of “the commu-
nity” in order to further intimidate 
its own population and others.  
But strength here is a simple 
equation of armed might and 
enforced discipline.  Such a group 
remains strong only as long as 
discipline can be enforced.  And 
like a pyramid scheme, it pro-
motes the interests of insiders by 
demoting the lives of others, a 
strategy that slowly uses up the 
resources of potential alterity.  
There is no possibility for enclu-
sion in this  community.
Something of both, I would say, returning to the 
moments that define the community's practices.  
There is a moment when it celebrates its becoming a 
community, the moment of ENclusion.  This is the 
time when it most resembles a traditionalist commu-
nity.  At this moment the group may front the same 
historical, ethnic practices as other, traditionalist com-
munities.  It may thus resemble a tradition-bounded 
group.  However, by including strangers, it avoids the 
exclusionary logic of traditional communities.  And in 
the next moment, when it opens up to an internal dia-
logic, when it creates the ground for inclusivity within 
the public sphere, it becomes something like a social 
movement.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—Strong communities —403—Hundreds of hours of meetings, 
rehearsals, and conversations are 
all a part of producing the 
Higashi-kujo Madang.  Before 
and after the event the conduct of 
these meetings and the perfor-
mance of the festival is open to a 
variety of critiques.  The potential 
for novelty is always present, and 
changes in the madang geki and 
other elements of the event are 








practices through ongoing internal critiques, and also 
by evaluating these critiques not from the perspective 
of traditional authority, but rather by applying notions 
of equality either directly from the public sphere1 or 
out of an experience of exclusion from the public 
sphere.  
The combination of these two moments give a 
public community the cultural coherence of a tradi-
tionalist community and also democratic legitimacy 
within a public sphere.  The place for ethnicity within 
the public sphere finds added legitimacy when ethnic 
communities choose to add this second moment of 
reflexive critique.  In part this is so because it enables 
all individuals in the community to speak out, instead 
of reserving this right for a delegated few.  And in part 
this is so because the resulting internal discourse has 
already become a “public” discussion within the group, 
and is now focused on concerns that are relevant to 
the wider public.  The lessons that the group acquires 
from the public sphere are advanced through this 
internal discourse and so become lessons of value to 
1. This brings up the larger problem of a bourgeois public sphere.  What people learn from 
this type of public sphere are logics of fairness and equality that may be critiqued as exclu-
sionary.  The most visible example is gender inequality. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—Strong communities —404—the public sphere.  The student, often by painful neces-
sity—the lack of justice teaches a harsh lesson—out-
paces its tutor.  The problem then becomes that of 
teaching the tutor to listen.  And here is where festival 
performance becomes a tool, a tactic for reversing the 
lessons of exclusion.
The call for diversity within the public sphere is at 
once an opening to multiple voices and a demand for 
reflexive democratic processes that extend from the 
state to communities to the family.  Through their 
own internal democratic struggles, public communi-
ties legitimize their collective voice within the public 
sphere.
something to say Through their call for the respect of heterogene-
ity (ishitsusei) as a fundamental aspect of human rights, 
the Higashi-kujo Madang community opens a counter-
public critique of Kyoto's (and Japan's) exclusively 
“Japanese” public sphere.  Out of their experience of 
social, political, economic, and cultural exclusion from 
lifescapes in Kyoto, they have acquired a keen sense 
about practices that create exclusion while professing 
equality.  The lessons they learned from the public 
sphere were lessons about what not to do when form-
ing their own community.  I would say that they 
learned these lessons very well, and the resulting 
Higashi-kujo Madang event and community is a civics 
lesson from the margin, a lesson of real value to other 
communities in Kyoto, Japan and elsewhere.  
There remains a question that is large in the con-
text of this work: why did the community organize  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
Dancing toward a dialogic democracy—Strong communities —405—itself around a festival?  And how did the festival create 
the space of the community?   Above, I mentioned 
that Habermas’s solution for the “degradation” of the 
public sphere was impaired by his inadequate (actually, 
it was more outdated) linguistics.  So too, current the-
ories of the consequences of modernity require a 
more adequate model of public spaces and public 
events and the expressive practices that put these two 
together in time and space on the street.  
The practices and the lessons of Higashi-kujo are 
not only performing what they propose, and creating 
new expressive openings and counter memories for 
this neighborhood, they are useful in reflecting on 
how democracy requires its own performances.   The 
above ex-position, like its festival object, is only the 
beginning of a longer, multi-site study of festivals in 
public—a topic from which cultural anthropology, cul-
tural sociology, and cultural studies would all benefit. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY SEND COMMENT
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commentarium—Here is Japan —1—commentarium
Here is Japan
Here is JAPAN 1
Here is Japan is a guidebook that 
was produced by the Asahi Broad-
casting Company to “orient” for-
eign visitors to the Tokyo 
Olympics in 1964.  Its editorial 
committee contained several of 
Japan’s most noted scholars and 
cultural analysts.  The text is, of 
course, targeted not to the Japa-
nese population, but rather with 
an aim of explaining this popula-
tion to others.  Again, within 
Japan, the most populous and 
durable “others” are the resident 
(zainichi) Koreans.  
Here is JAPAN is a “native-ethnography” of Japan 
that was written from a desire to encapsulate the 
entire nation as a unique cultural place—a nation-
state so unified by blood, history, and climate that its 
peoples live and think as one.  It is filled with statistics 
and stories that seek to capture the essence of a Japa-
nese mood of modernity.  Thirty-two years later, 
these stories (in updated versions)  still inform the 
Japanese school curriculum, and also governmental 
programs aimed at directing the  self-projects of Japa-
nese citizens.
One story speaks of the harmonious transforma-
tion of the nation from ancient farming to modern 
industry:
“We sow new seeds in ancient soil. 
For the secret is hidden in nature's seasonal change of foliage. 
Wooden temples yield to baseball grounds; 
Castles bow to glass and concrete; 
Rice-fields embrace busy factories; 
And Noh masks peer into television sets. 
Forest creepers envy electric wires carrying power across the land, 
While huge trees are in awe at the soaring steel towers. 
Aged Buddhist statues still smile benignly 
At the age of movie stars.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Here is Japan —2—All are Japan, the one no more an illusion than the other. 
We grew with nature, we Japanese, as pliant as the cheerful trees. 
Now we look upon what time has wrought—the fourth greatest industrial nation on earth.”
(n.p.)
The natural “flowering” of industrial moderniza-
tion, through the careful husbandry of the Japanese 
state is seen here as bridging the contradictions that 
would otherwise attend this process:  the trees are in 
awe of the steel towers, and the Buddha smiles (per-
haps through a Noh mask) into the Trinitron TV tube.  
Its prose and poetry offer up the Japanese islands 
as a nation-village-family-individual: a fractal Japan uni-
form and unique at all levels, bound by a single spirit 
and philosophy:
“The Japanese philosophy is deeply embedded in our individual consciousness, and it is a way of
life we preserve through all the revolutionary changes of time...  In a big family—whether of the
nation or the individual—one’s own share necessarily is small.... Virtue is expressed in mutual conces-
sions.
The family feeling is continuous... Yet the concept is larger than the individual, and the family ulti-
mately embraces the home, the place of work, society in general, the nation, and the geography of
Japan itself.
...
Our houses are small.  Yet even the humble family knows delicacy in food.  Husbands work, cele-
brate a little with male friends, return to the love of the family circle.  Wives bear and warmly rear
the sweet children, chat with neighbors, study the arts or enjoy television.  Small gifts express the
appreciation of each other....” (n.p.)
This vision of an hermetically sealed island nation/
family with a single national philosophy/heredity takes 
the imagined-nation concept described by Benedict 
Anderson (1983) to a level of detail rarely found in 
other nation/states.   Those enabled to subscribe to 
this concept, through dint of birth, language, and edu-
cation (Japanese public schools), are expected to 
inscribe its message on their bodies and practices. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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“She astonishes us, the modern
young girl who is our Sister.
Breathing the air of democracy,
she wants to be ‘more equal’ than
anyone. Fiercely, she pursues uni-
versity studies, or starts a career
in offices, department stores, fac-
tories, and the professions. Her
earning career usually begins ear-
lier than those of young men, so
her whims have great power over
manufacturers. But the old virtues
live in her; she is also tender,
warm, accomplished in the grace-
ful arts. Youth in its golden fling
sometimes worries us. Yet we
know our Sister is growing into
the sensible wife and devoted
mother who is the virtue of our
Japan.”
(Here is Japan, 1964)
 This nationalization of life-
style contributes greatly to 
the lack of available individ-
ual lifestyle imagination.  To 
fit into this national imagi-
nation—this second skin of 
nationality—not only 
requires assuming the epic 
history of the nation as 
that of one’s own past, but 
also, subscribing to a life-
time of practices, from 
cram schools and national 
exams, to drinks and sex 
out with office mates, or 
classes in ikebana (flower arranging) with “the girls.”  
Japan's Mr. Average:
the White-Collar Man:
We understand him, and love him,
our representative White-Collar
Man. The visitor might find him
baffling: well-educated, even
sophisticated, open to new ideas
and new ways, yet suddenly curi-
ously naive and sentimental. He
aspires, through a company
career, to the full life in the mod-
ern sense. For this, he will endure
the wearying crush of the over-
burdened commuter trains twice a
day. Dutiful husband—he often
defers to his wife—good father,
hardworking, he still has extra
vitality for active leisure.
(Here is Japan 1964, n.p.)
Daily practices thus 
acquire a (curiously) 
patriotic cachet, and 
so commuting for 
three hours a day 
with half a million 
others is not just a 
personal circum-
stance, but a collec-
tive—national—
duty.  To refuse, to  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Here is Japan —4—complain,  to  allow the shadow of dissatisfaction1 to 
cross one’s face, is to also step outside of the national 
circle.    
1. Dissatisfaction is expressed, but in private, or when drinking, as the drink becomes an 
excuse for shifting the frame of conversation beyond the limits of self control.  In Kyoto, 
drinking is a ready alibi for raised voices, exaggerated expressions, and behaviors that 
would usually be frowned upon in public—anecdotally this includes punching out your 
boss.  Getting drunk means never having to say your sorry.  It is an extremely useful social 
solvent in Kyoto, but its use as such is restricted to males. 
Japan's Hope: the Student:
The Student is our future. He is
complex and uncertain today. The
moods and rebellions of young
people all over the world are
known to him through his studies
and growing international con-
tacts. The Student feels responsi-
bility for his country. When
moved to political protest, he may
resort to mass demonstrations.
But we have faith in him. He stud-
ies harder than most of the world's
young people; great personal sac-
rifices are made to meet the chal-
lenge of severe examinations. The
Student knows his life is still to
come. He prepares for it thor-
oughly.”
(Here is Japan, 1964, n.p.)
What is missing from 
this national family 
are the governmen-
tal and corporate 
institutions and 
executives who 
make the big and lit-
tle decisions about 
its course and future.  
This vision of a 
homogeneous 
national community 
hides  “Japan’s father:  
the bureaucrat.”  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The Housewife is the heart of our
world. As bride, mother, and wise
grandmother she is the warm link
between many generations. Her
ways changed with equality in
modern Japan. The voice of the
Housewife today is an economic
force, influencing consumer
prices. Desire for privacy with her
own husband and children accel-
erates the trend toward living in
apartments. As new appliances
free her from pre-war drudgery,
the Housewife, too, influences lei-
sure patterns. Fashionable, intelli-
gent, in formed, she is even more
vital in the lives of husband, chil-
dren, and grandchildren amid
today's changing Japan.
Here is JAPAN 1964, n.p.
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Japan's Brother: the Worker:
“When Japan began to industrial-
ize, our Brother, the Worker, had
two great inherited assets: the
Farmer's diligence and a magnifi-
cent tradition of handicraft dexter-
ity. Today, the Worker builds
mammoth ships faster and
cheaper than anyone else. The
Worker stood in the ruins of
defeated Japan, bent his back, and
rebuilt the industrial structure to
current heights astonishing the
world. Today, too, he raises his
voice through the trade union
movement, and contributes his





The model Japanese roles described in Here is  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Here is Japan —6—JAPAN are now a generation old,  and wearing thin, 
even among those who might have been the most 
eager to acquire them thirty years ago.   “Japan's 
Mother: the Housewife” as an image of the modal life-
style goal is not simply removed from the daily reali-
ties of working women in Kyoto, but that the 
conditions of their employability further push them 
into circumstances where the imagination of a chaste, 
dutiful housewife becomes exotic to the life-style 
imagination.
“...they [the Japanese] were not
earthlings, but native to this star
[Japan]. Faces were kin to each
other in a gentle absence of
expression.”
Visit to a Green Star 19641.
1. “Visit to a Green Star” is a short story that was included in Here is Japan, as an allegory of 
a visit to Japan.  The self-distancing of this place, this Japan/Green Star, from the Earth 
narrativizes the nativist movement in Japan, that has in many ways tried to separate the 
archipelago from the Chinese mainland, and then from the West.
Korean youth in Kyoto can only fail if they try to 
be “Japan’s Hope: The Student,” or even “Japan’s 
Brother: The Worker.”   If we center these positions 
according to entrance into Japan’s universities or the 
workforces of its major production companies—these 
are goals that young Koreans learn not to desire.  
Only “Japan’s Sister: The Girl” remains available to 
young Korean women, and then only because these 
positions are already reduced to the dominated gen-
der2 in Kyoto.   
The gendered aspect of each of these roles is not 
superficial.  The Student is male; so too The Worker.   
Women in Kyoto face a life where public life and pub-
lic space is still coded by, of, and for men.   But these 
spaces and lives are also coded as Japanese, and 
2. There is no “Japan’s Brother: The Boy.”  A male who does not achieve a career as a skilled 
worker, or better, a salaryman (white-collar) position, has failed to enter into a valued posi-
tion within the national family. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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But then it is not also easy for Japanese youth to 
acquire these same positions within the “national” 
family today.  Jobs are scarce, and competition for uni-
versity entrance has become a mind-numbing struggle 
with few winners.  Many more students and their fam-
ilies cope with a life of  expectations that has suddenly, 
and unalterably, become diminished1 by a disappoint-
ing outcome in the competition for school admis-
sion.  But enough Japanese youth do acquire the 
positions so revered in the national narratives of life-
style success that this success—for all of its continuing 
difficulties (the life of a salaryman or his housewife is 
not an easy one)—gets reproduced as a general goal.  
And outside of these generalizable, but ultimately per-
sonal life-style paths, Japanese youth can also count on 
continual reminders of their responsibilities to com-
munity and the state.
This comment threads into the next, another 
portion of Here is JAPAN.  Visit to a Green Star
1. More than half of the students in my classes in fairly prestigious private Japanese universi-
ties (Ritsumeikan and Doshisha)  were profoundly disappointed in their failure to be 
accepted to their first-choice level universities (such as Tokyo or Kyoto universities).  By the 
time they were sophomores, they knew precisely which companies would be recruiting 
them, and for what type of jobs.  Their future life-styles were fixed beyond their control.   By 
1994, however, most companies were cutting back on hiring, and so a proportion of these 
students would soon find themselves in the limbo of having graduated and not being 
employed. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Visit to a Green Star
by Sakyo Komatsu
in Here is JAPAN, 1964.
Asahi Broadcasting Corporation, Osaka. n.p.
[COMMENTs follow the text of the story.]
  The shock of the landing had made him breathless. It had been a long journey from earth.  Now,
for the second time, he had landed safely on what he remembered as the “Green Star” isolated on
the frontiers of solar civilization.   
There will be, he thought, the quiet villages beside their crystal streams amid the neatly-culti-
vated fields. Only the birds twittering will disturb the music of the people enjoying their old dances
and folk songs when the day’s work is done. The shrines to the ancient gods will be fresh with flow-
ers, and the immemorial rhythms of an agricultural race will leave the mysteries of nature unviolated.   
But it was not to be like that this time. As he stepped to the ground from his space vehicle, he
saw the tall buildings challenging the blue skies. Traffic hummed beneath a network of monorail
trains; automatic conveyer systems threaded in and out of factories. He was looking at a passing heli-
copter when the Old Man came up to him, and said:   
“How nice to see you again, my friend from earth”.   
The Man from Earth gestured helplessly. “What has happened”, he said. “What are all these
changes?”   
“New seeds were brought from earth”, the Old Man answered. “Thanks to them, we now have
prosperity, as you see”.   
“Seeds?” The Man from Earth was puzzled. “What seeds? Wheat? Or maybe sunflowers?”   
The Old Man only smiled as he guided the Man from Earth into the fashionable lounge.   
“Where is the lovely and peaceful green star I knew before?” the visitor asked angrily. “Where is
the beauty of sunlight on the golden seas of ripening rice? Have you thrown away the exquisite fab-
rics of your festival robes? Does the festival drum no more call the people to their simple and happy
pleasures?”   
The Old Man was still smiling. “All these things we still have”, he answered gently. “At home, I
take off the earthling's clothes and go back to the comfortable old ways”.   
“Then I will find the tranquil atmosphere I appreciated so much on my last visit?”   
“Of course”. 
  “Where, in all this concrete, glass, and busy machines? How can the old customs not wither and
decay under the smoke and grime?”   
The Old Man gestured at the window. “Look outside, and you will see all the things you desire,”
he said.   
The Man from Earth sneered. “You are joking”, he said. “I see only the same sights of industrial- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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“You cannot see”, the Old Man mumbled sadly. “Because you are so new from earth, you cannot
see there is no difference between the old and new. Stay a little longer than you did before. Then you
will come to understand”.   
The Man from Earth did not answer. But as the days went by, he began to see the details in the
streets far below his room on the fourteenth floor of a new hotel.  The people came into focus; they
were not earthlings, but native to this star. Faces were kin to each other in a gentle absence of
expression.   
Change, too, was so much faster in the city about him.  As a plant mushrooms in a hothouse, the
city was growing faster than his eyes could record. Where there had been one factory, now there
were two. His hotel had been 14 stories; now it had silently risen to 15, and atop the new height
sprouted a roof-garden where there had been only a roof.   
Perhaps the whole city was a growing entity, threatening to swell and expand until it floated,
freely, skyward. Already the breezes played among the higher buildings.   
When the Old Man came back to visit, he spoke with amusement “Soon Will come the season of
wind and fire. You will understand everything soon”.   
For the Man from Earth had not noticed the brief mention in his guide book of the season of vio-
lence. He knew it when the typhoon-like winds howled about the city, dumping their freight of rains
until floods raged through the streets The ground began to shake as volcanoes spewed aloft their
fiery rocks and white hot lava rained down on the Green Star city. In flood, fire and earthquake, the
city shook like a tortured ship in merciless seas. The Man from Earth killed his fear with sleeping
pills....   
Twittering birds were the sound of the morning. He was no longer in a luxurious hotel room.
His bed was the grass beside a humble hut. “What fantasy is this?” he wondered, as he stood up to
look where the city had been. There was only fire seared earth between the beds of solidified lava
and flood-borne mud.
   “Now what do you think?” The voice was that of the Old Man, smiling at him from nearby.    
“This is awful”, the Man from Earth said. “Can such things happen?”    
“Awful?” asked the Old Man. “We shall see”.   
The full warmth of the sun touched the earth. More birds sang, and tiny plants began to sprout
from the ravaged land. People appeared, seemingly from the naked earth itself. They bent their backs,
working the land. Their songs rose to mingle with the music of the birds. Between each blink of his
eyes, the Man from Earth saw first the fields turning golden with ripening rice; then the simple vil-
lages building in the valleys; and after, the colourful costumes of the people at a gay festival to cele-
brate the success of their labour.   
“This is what you saw five years ago, isn't it?” the Old Man asked. “It had not really disappeared,
had it?”   
The Man from Earth made no reply. He watched the rice harvested, and the land plowed anew,
and fresh seeds sown. Villages grew into towns, and from some of the buildings came the sounds of TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ural seeds yielded foods, the mechanical seeds gradually sent out new ribbons of roads; conveyer
belts once more ran among the factories; and through the air flew machines to rival the traffic hum-
ming along the ground. Once more the great city lived, served by the people.   
“Perhaps you understand now”, the Old Man said. “This sight is no different from the previous
ones, either”.   
The grass hut beside which the Man from Earth had awoken from the night of violence already
was a cement and glass luxury hotel. He was back on the fourteenth floor.   
“It must be fantasy”, he muttered. “Is this repeated every year?”  
“We are not repeating”, the Old Man said. “The storms, the pastoral scene, and this urban com-
munity are all the same. Our civilization encompasses all the fundamental elements you have just
experienced. Our world is an agricultural community, and our civilization is like that of flowers. I do
not say which is better, your civilization of earth or ours. I only say that this is our way...”   
When the Man from Earth prepared to leave, he looked back once more at the Green Star city
that had seemed to be so much like the life he knew at home. But now he saw the different levels all
at the same time—the modern factories inspired by earth, yes; but also the fields of golden rice and
the diligent people, between the onslaughts of storm, affectionately caring for their land and its pro-
duce. And he knew they would be singing in their festivals as long as the towns bred new towns, just
as the pollens renewed the cycles of the plants. 
COMMENT We are given a tour of the Green Star (Japan), a 
planet separate from, although at times and places 
resembling, the Earth.  A traveler returns.  He had vis-
ited this place in year’s past, and is, perhaps, also impli-
cated in the bringing of the “new seeds” from earth.  
With these seeds on such soil, the flowers that blos-
som are factories and high-rise hotels, which, as all 
flowers do, reproduce themselves as seeds, when the 
storms (typhoon) and the earthquakes rock the 
planet.  And the peoples themselves, in touch with the 
same land, grow their rice as joyously as they labor in 
the factories.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Visit to a Green Star —11—“It is changing so swiftly, this
mid-twentieth century Japan that
you, the visitor will see.  For the
Japanese themselves, the pace of
change is so swift that they some-
times wonder what they have lost,
what they have gained, and what
the final balance will be...”
Introduction to the Visit to a Green
Star in the book Here is JAPAN,
1964, n.p.
Who are these people?  “...they were not earth-
lings, but native to this star. Faces were kin to each 
other in a gentle absence of expression.”   Their com-
mon immutable, and non-transferable status has left 
them with the same face, and a face characterized by a 
collective absence of expression.  
And the visitor (perhaps something of an anthro-
pologist) longs to see the village festivals:   He asks the 
Old Man, “‘Where is the beauty of sunlight on the 
golden seas of ripening rice? Have you thrown away 
the exquisite fabrics of your festival robes? Does the 
festival drum no more call the people to their simple 
and happy pleasures?’"  
The idea of discarding the past to accommodate 
the present is presented as a flawed strategy, where 
what is tossed out is more precious than anything that 
can be acquired.  And so the epic history of the place 
does not and cannot give way to a novelistic time of 
modernity.  
Here is a tale of  an peculiar form of modernity 
that grows as naturally as flowers from the soil and 
from the soul of this place and its kin-connected peo-
ple—a modernity that is at once ancient and new.  The 
myth of a shared agricultural lifestyle of mutual suffer-
ing and the shared joy of a good harvest is presented 
as fully transferable to the construction of cities and 
the nation itself.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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“...Our civilization encompasses
all the fundamental elements you
have just experienced. Our world
is an agricultural community, and
our civilization is like that of
flowers. I do not say which is bet-
ter, your civilization of earth or
ours. I only say that this is our
way...”
“...I only say that this is our way.”  The traveler 
must remember his place.  He cannot know fully the 
unified but hidden philosophy that drives the locals to 
do what is bred in their nature to do.  And so he, and 
they, cannot bring this philosophy and its consequent 
practices into a discursive arena of judgement and 
potential reform.
The myth of nation thus seals itself and its people 
into a silence that cannot easily be fractured.  Note 
here that the buildings and the helicopters are from 
seeds brought from Earth, although on the Green Star 
they do not create the troubles and the discontinuities 
that modernity brings to Earth.  Here they are liable 
to the ravages of nature, and to the seasons that all 
seeds obey.  
‘"You cannot see”, the Old Man mumbled sadly. 
“Because you are so new from earth, you cannot see 
there is no difference between the old and new....’  The 
naturalizing influences of Japan’s racial/cultural heri-
tage is presented as strong enough to change without 
changing.  And so to alter change itself, from the dis-
continuities of modernization into a change that only 
reasserts the unchanging nature of the place and its 
people.  Because of its (unique) soil, climate and peo-
ple, Japan is the place that changes without changing. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Kyoto’s Sex industry
Women in Kyoto from an early age can earn many 
times the minimum wage through work in the local 
sex industry.   In Kyoto the sex industry is filled with 
part-time  female workers who also may be students, 
office workers or housewives.   Ms. Jones1, one of the 
Madang organizers (a woman who teaches at a night 
school, and whose students, she offered, sometimes 
talk to her about their experiences in the sex indus-
try) said to me, “I hear that in the US there is a huge 
gap between women who do this and women who 
don’t.  That is totally unrealistic.   Everything is all 
mixed up when it comes to sex.  So why not make 
some money, too?”  
 The growth of the sex industry within Japan and 
organized sex tourism to other countries is a feature 
of modernity in Japan that deserves much more care-
ful attention.   A brief history of the sex industry in 
modern and premodern Japan is available in Positions 
5:1. 1977;  a special issue, “The comfort women: colo-
nialism, war, and sex.”  
Of course, the above type of response moves the 
problematic of sexual services into economic terms, 
where the definitions of opportunity and exploitation 
1. The names used to designate local persons who advised me or participated in the event 
and who desired to remain anonymous are chosen randomly from English names.  Why 
English names? I have avoided using Korean names as these tend to be few in number 
(Kim, Lee, etc.) and might resemble an possible name.  Many of the Koreans I worked with 
in Japan have a Japanese name they use when this is convenient.  But these names are 
also loaded as signifying the inability to use the real, Korean name.  English will have to do. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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sexual worker should share in, and the rights of the 
worker to determine the conditions of their labor 
(and to say” no” at times).  It also points to the lack of 
such sexual services for (instead of by) women in 
Kyoto, and to the use of commodified sexuality as one 
of the markers of the public sphere as a male and mas-
culinized space.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Kyoto Genkan
Entry into a Japanese home built on the pre-mod-
ern plan requires that the visitor open the door, 
announce their presence and wait inside in the entry-
way (genkan).   The Kyoto genkan entryway has great 
metaphorical utility, as it symbolizes both social and 
economic status. To be invited up into the house from 
the entryway is to assume a status equality (at least) 
with the house’s owner. I was told more than once 
that in Kyoto a new neighbor may not get past the 
genkan of their more established neighbor for three 
or more generations. In a discussion over the plan 
devised by Kyoto University for the city of Kyoto, a 
plan to tear down the illegal structures in 40 banchi 
and replace these with an public housing apartment 
complex, the architect spent several minutes describ-
ing the aesthetic qualities of the new structure, stress-
ing the fact that they all have balconies. “Take away the 
balcony,” one 40 banchi resident responded, “and give 
us a genkan!” TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Projects of the self/Projects of the state
Governmentality
“As already mentioned several
times, it is very important to culti-
vate a sense of justice and fairness
that is impressed by good acts and
repelled by bad ones, an attitude
of willingness to put this sense of
justice into practice, a sense of
consideration for others, a sense
of respect for life and human
rights, a spirit that is moved by
beautiful things and a willingness
to engage in volunteer activities.
In addition, in the context of
school education, there is a partic-
ular need to activate the qualities
required for group living and to
make still further efforts to culti-
vate an ethical perspective as
embodied in basic social morality
and social awareness expressed
in, for example, the acquisition of
rules for the formation of desir-
able human relationships or social
living...”
(MONBUSHO 1997)
The connection between the cultural imagina-
tions and the bodies of persons residing in a nation-
state with the social programs of the modern state 
has become a key area of debate about the qualities of 
and changes within modernity itself.  Foucault (1991) 
used the transformation of this connection via a 
change in what he called “governmentality” to mark 
the advent of modernity.  The invention of modern 
“populations” and of a “pastoral” governmentality 
informs his description of modern nation-state cre-
ation.   
In this perspective, the state is the shepherd that 
watches over his (gender marker intentional here) 
national population flock, with an eye to maximal pro-
ductivity including the reduction of maverick individu-
alities.  The techniques required to perform this state 
function were provided by instrumental advances in 
statistics and surveillance, and the development of dis-
ciplinary regimes (in barracks, factories, schools, and 
prisons).  These instruments work to the advantage1 
of the state and against the interests of a collective, 
public (democratic) control over the state. 
It is not at all unusual in current nation-states for 
governments and corporations to offer advice about 
1. The advantage that these modern instrumentalities provide to the state is one of the princi-
pal reasons whyState-nation modernity is as durable as it seems to be.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Projects of the self/Projects of the state —17—and models for the social behavior of their citizens/
workers.   In 1996 in the United States a new think-
tank was created to ponder a decline in “civility” 
within the nation’s population.   The Penn National 
Commission on Society, Culture and Community at 
the University of Pennsylvania focuses the talents of 
several dozen experts on issues of uncivil public 
behavior, the failure of leadership and the fragmenta-
tion of communities (See: www.upenn.edu/pnc).  Its 
findings are meant to inform public policy at the 
national level.  
The agencies of mass,  popular education in virtu-
ally every modern state have been seen as venues 
within which to teach basic social values.   In Japan, 
the Ministry of Education (monbusho) takes the lead 
role in pursuing this use of the national public educa-
tion system.  As in many other nations, social values 
are also then described as proper to the citizens of 
that nation: the individual is taught how to behave 
within a national community of fellow citizens.   
At the same time, as Walter Lippmann pointed 
out back in 1937 (262-263),  education in a democ-
racy must also take place outside of government-con-
trolled schools and market-led journals in order for 
the citizenry to avoid the tautology of trying to govern 
the state and the market with only the knowledge that  
the state and the market provide to them.  A 
“...democracy,” he noted, “must have a way of life 
which educates the people for the democratic way of 
life” (Lippmann 1937, 263). TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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the stylization of life, suggests
that the practices of consumption,
the planning, purchase and dis-
play of consumer goods and expe-
riences in everyday life cannot be
understood merely via concep-
tions of exchange value and
instrumental rational calculation.
The instrumental and expressive
dimensions should not be
regarded as exclusive either/or
polarities, rather they can be con-
ceived as a balance which con-
sumer culture brings together.  It
is therefore possible to speak of a
calculating hedonism, a calculus
of the stylistic effect and an emo-
tional economy on the one hand,
and an aestheticization of the
instrumental or functional rational
dimension via the promotion of an
aestheticizing distancing on the
other.  Rather than unreflexively
adopting a lifestyle, through tradi-
tion or habit, the new heroes of
consumer culture make lifestyle a
life project and display their indi-
viduality and sense of style in the
particularity of the assemblage of
goods, clothes, practices, experi-
ences, appearance and bodily dis-
positions they design together into
a lifestyle”
(Featherstone 1991, 86).
What distinguishes the nation-formation pro-
grams in state-nation modern societies is an additional 
magnitude of imagined national commonality; an inti-
mate, normalized, national lifestyle.   Lifestyle patterns 
in nation-state societies tend to be distributed among 
and informed by non-governmental societal groups or 
by the (increasingly transnational) marketplace [see 
also: State-nation modernity].  
Under nation-state modernity, the state (central 
and/ or local) may inform popular instruction in “social 
values.”   By this, the state provides inputs to social 
behavior,  or supplies social/legal constraints that hedge 
in social behavior.  Under conditions of state-nation 
modernity,  instruction extends from lessons on social 
morality, to actual lifestyle behaviors—informing the 
behavioral outcome itself.  Proper behavior becomes 
unmarked as correctly learned, nationally coded—and 
naturalized—and normal(ized) behavior. Individual 
variations in behavior become marked as both unnatu-
ral, and un-national.   The potential level of behavioral 
uniformity is much greater than that possible under 
conditions of nation-state modernity, where compet-
ing group identities mark conflicting behaviors.  The 
central state under state-nation modernity has avail-
able to it the instrumentalities of what Foucault called 
“biopolitics,” which first combined in the  
“endeavor...to rationalize the problems presented to 
governmental practice by the phenomena characteris-
tic of a group of living human beings constituted as a 
population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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behavior” as this is linked to populations.  Issues of 
the margins of population behavior, that is, of criminal-
ity and insanity, can be shunted to penal and medical 
expert systems, but the problem of informing the 
norms for behavior still remain, and the remaining 
question becomes that of territory: should the state 
monitor, control and inform a normative behavior for 
the nation’s population?  
lifestyle and state-nation 
modernity
One of the features of State-nation modernity, a fea-
ture that is only an extension of the state-nation gov-
ernmentality in this area, is that the state takes upon 
itself the task of training the social behavior of its pop-
ulation.  Mass public education is pursued not simply 
to provide social and cultural literacy, but also a moral 
education.   And a central task of this training involves 
interactions within the economy: i.e., lifestyle.  
“Schools should develop a form
of education in which there is an
appropriate balance between
knowledge, morals and physical
health and should aim to cultivate
people who are imbued with a
rich sense of humanity and a
strong and vigorous physique”
(Monbusho report 1997).
The state under conditions of state-nation 
modernity will articulate its plans for national life-style 
goals (a notion that would not even occur to states 
under conditions of nation-state modernity) through 
state programs for the environment, sports, the arts, 
leisure, education, health and welfare, etc.  National 
costumes and traditional forms of music and dance 
also receive state support.  
Such fine-scale control over individual lives and 
life-styles have been reported in the former Soviet 
Union, and elsewhere, and have been accomplished in 
various degrees in all nations where state-nation 
modernity has developed.  In fact there is no better  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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where the spaces and times and practices of individu-
als at work, at home, and at play become interests of 
the state.   
There are also places where such projects of the 
state are mostly absent.   Spaces where state govern-
mentalities do not penetrate into the intimate spheres 
of life.  But if the state does not exert control in these 
areas of life, what and who will govern the self?
Projects of the self
In Modernity and Self Identity, Anthony Giddens 
explores the connections between globalized (and -
izing) processes of modernity and an emerging politics 
based upon lifestyle choices, rather than on broader 
social change.  His writings about “life politics” 
describe the emergence of this under conditions of 
what he calls “late-modernity.”  In fact, this emergence 
is one of the hallmarks of late- (he prefers this to 
post-) modernity.  In the following, he lays out his 
notion of life politics, and links this to practices cen-
tered on “the reflexive project of the self.”
“Life politics presumes (a certain level of) emancipation, in both the main senses noted above
emancipation from the fixities of tradition and from conditions of hierarchical domination.  It would
be too crude to say simply that life politics focuses on what happens once individuals have achieved a
certain level of autonomy of action, because other factors are involved but this provides at least an
initial orientation.  Life politics does not primarily concern the conditions which liberate us in order
to make choices: it is a politics of choice.  While emancipatory politics is a politics of life chances, life
politics is a politics of lifestyle.  Life politics is the politics of a reflexively mobilised order—the sys-
tem of late modernity—which, on an individual and collective level, has radically altered the existen-
tial parameters of social activity.  It is a politics of self-actualisation in a reflexively ordered
environment, where that reflexivity links self and body to systems of global scope.  In this arena of
activity, power is generative rather than hierarchical.  Life politics is lifestyle politics in the serious TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ical issues which flow from processes of self-actualisation in post-traditional contexts, where global-
ising influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes
of self-realisation influence global strategies” (Giddens 1991, 214).
Giddens contends that the interface between the 
individual (person) and the global is now the primary 
locus for identity politics, a situation in which the 
nation-state is no longer a key player.  In part this is so 
because individuals have been reflexively re-imagining 
their locales away from the nation (and so, living in 
and identifying with cities and neighborhoods instead 
of nations), and in part this is because the effects of 
modernization have eroded nation-state sovereignty 
and boundedness.  Present-day concerns about the 
environment, human rights, disease, and gender equal-
ity do not admit to national boundaries, and global 
flows of ideas and cultural artifacts re-place national 
varieties in most locations. 
However, while Giddens here refers to modernity 
in the singular, and seems to be comfortable with the 
idea that life politics has a currency and a positive 
valence at the global scale, I would argue that the 
emergence of a life-politics in any locale can be corre-
lated to the presence of nation-state modernity at 
that locale.  In those places under state-nation moder-
nity conditions, the state remains the dominant cul-
tural institution, and the nation its dominant idiom.   
And in those places, a “reflexive project of the self” as 
a group phenomenon would be liable to a critique that 
this is interfering with the state’s ability to plan for the 
lifestyle futures of the nation. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Insurance and Festivals
Curiously, insurance is one area where both risk 
avoidance and participation in risk become possible. In 
Japan, and so in Kyoto, government and corporate 
responsibility (and thus economic liability) are far less 
well acknowledged in laws and in the courts. This 
means that individuals (citizens and consumers) gener-
ally assume a greater share of the economic/physical 
risk of their relationships with the government or cor-
porations. There are festivals in Japan (none like this in 
Kyoto, however) where physical risk is extreme, and 
where serious bodily harm or death is not unusual. 
For example, there are a number of kenka matsuri 
(“fighting festivals”) in Shikoku where massive porta-
ble wooden shrines (omikoshi) are lifted by dozens of 
carriers and then smashed into one another in the 
street.   Physical injury and even death is not uncom-
mon.  Voluntary participation in such events requires 
that the individual participant acknowledge and accept 
this risk.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Aesthetics, modernity and postmodernity
Actually the issue of the place of aesthetics is cen-
tral to the entire modern/post-modernist debate. Let 
me lay out only a brief overview.  There are two radi-
cally competing images of modernity at work in the 
theory.  The first is tied to Weber’s description of the 
modern project as one which divides knowledge in to 
three spheres: scientific, juridical and artistic.  These 
three are then the fields for three types of expert sys-
tems (science, courts, and cultural/artistic).  One 
result of this is the monopoly of aesthetic “taste” in 
the hands of cultural-knowledge experts, and its 
removal from popular culture (Habermas 1983, 8-9).  In this 
way, modernity also creates types of knowledge 
expert (and forms of knowledge) that are artificially 
limited each to only one sector.   It is this description/
prescription of modernity that Habermas uses as a foil 
to revive modernity as a project that can unify all 
fields of knowledge.   But if the future of modernity as 
a project requires a fundamental revision of its 
description, is this not a kind of post-modern moder-
nity?  Or did Weber get it wrong in the first place?
This brings up the second view of modernity, one 
in which the “forgotten masses” reemerge, both as 
consumer targets of the culture industry and as low-
rent aesthetes on their own.  For, while science and 
law have been relatively successful in managing their 
expert cultural production, when it comes to art, 
everyone is an expert (in their own minds).  And aes- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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a second life, not of people, but of objects.    
The “peopling” of the lifeworld with aesthetically 
charged objects brings the “cultural dimension” to the 
fore, and the cultural capital invested into the “games” 
of distinction becomes a major stake in everyday life-
style planning.  Here the danger is from the institu-
tions of cultural production that find themselves in an 
avant-garde position not only for their own internal 
game, but also vying to stay in the forefront of mass 
cultural commodity production; coupled with a global 
availability of cultural products.  The stakes involved in 
the aesthetic “wing” of modernity threaten to over-
ride the rationality available from within science and 
law, creating a population obsessed with their rela-
tionship to aestheticized objects--including their own 
bodies.  For identity with and through the body is 
itself colonized in this process (as it is also for the 
expert aesthete, who at least makes a career of this).  
Claiming that aesthetic reason trammels moral 
and instrumental reason in the individual, Daniel Bell  
[see (Habermas 1983, 6-7)]--and also David Harvey (Harvey 
1989, 18-19)--conclude that modernity has gone beyond 
its own limits.  It has become a type of postmodernity, 
which, depending upon who is doing the critiquing, is 
either a dangerous wrong turn or a runway to 
another mode of modernity.  In either case the engine 
taking us down this tarmac is capitalism.  And whether 
to  disengage moral and aesthetic reason from capital-
ism (say, by reinventing religion or by reinventing  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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individual) with enough  (also reinvented) rationality in 
order to recenter modernity as a project of enlighten-
ment--this is the crux of the modern/postmodern 
debate. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The Street
In Santa Barbara, and in Kyoto, and in Cambridge, 
and Irvine, and elsewhere, we live in a “post-war” 
street, a street marked by the measures required to 
win the final battle (by armed police, health workers, 
sanitation crews, meter maids, ‘no loitering’ signs, ‘no 
sign’ signs, traffic signals, etc.)—a battle over disorder, 
disease, and discomfort.  
In 1997, the City of Santa Barbara 
created a new law which prohib-
ited sitting on the main city boule-
vard (State Street).  Promoted by 
merchants on this street, the law is 
intended to push homeless per-
sons away from the center of the 
downtown tourist destinations.  
In this photo: during its first week 
of enforcement several protests 
were made to create a legal chal-
lenge to the law.  Here a Santa 
Barbara police officer prepares to 
cite a protester.
Photo by author
Today, the goal of an orderly, disease-free, and 
comfortable boulevard is now at hand.  But this street 
is also marked by a lack of people using it in diverse  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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phalanx of uniformed soldiers with a marching band, 
but rather from out of the silences of what is not 
seen, and not heard at all.   It is the loudness of the 
silence that makes the marching band unnecessary.
The task in front of us, as anthropologists and 
participants in the public sphere is to recognize the 
contours of the street in modern places, and to imag-
ine moving beyond the restrictions that underpin the 
bourgeois coding of the street (i.e., the order and 
safety that is vouchsafed through the above agencies) 
into a space that may not appear or be as orderly or 
safe—for some—but which opens up to multiple 
forms of expression and representation.  The role of 
festivity in articulating alternative uses for public 
streets cannot be understated (see: A festival counters 
the dominant bourgeois lifestyle logic).
The job required to create an inclusive, multicul-
tural public street, is to make a place for difference.  
Not the pastiche of difference that Disney’s Epcot 
Center shows us, where everything is similarly differ-
ent, but a difference that arises, in part, from the ves-
tiges of separate histories, and which is created, in 
ever greater numbers by processes of modern cultural 
production based on a late-modern logic of disparate 
desires.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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On the Web
I am looking ahead to a time, perhaps months 
away, when works such as this will be published 
directly to the World Wide Web. This then makes 
them public resources. Each reader can add new 
observations to an ongoing dialog that begins with an 
encounter with such a text. At this point, the original 
“publication” achieves its etymological meaning: to 
make public. Publication, which has been mainly a 
point of closure for a work, can now, instead, 
announce its opening. For this reason, I am experi-
menting with a format of electronic publication that 
can be translated into an internet-readable form.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Heritage Management for Kyoto TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Fear of the Foreign
The U.S. continues to provide a good share of the 
international popular cultural imagination in Kyoto.  
Films, fashions, television, music— sometimes the 
presence is comically ironic, as when a supermarket 
plays the latest “gangsta rap” as muzak, or when a pre-
teen girl wanders down the street with a T-shirt that 
reads “The Devil sucked me off.”  But more often the 
marketplace has made conscious efforts to manage 
and promote images and products licensed from the 
U.S.   The marketplace increasingly works at odds to 
the governmental interest in domesticating these 
products, as it sells them as original and thus “raw.”   
This conflict of interests seems to be tilting in favor of 
the market.  The government may even play into this 
when it fronts the dangerous differences between the 
US and Japan.  
The dangers of the American lifestyle are a daily 
fare on NHK (the government-run TV/radio channel), 
particularly violent crimes and the lack of gun control.  
Japanese school groups that plan to travel abroad have 
been encouraged to go to Canada or Australia. 
As a reverse example (i.e., making dangerous a 
foreign import), the government managed to enhance 
the dangerous and inferior qualities of foreign rice.  
When foreign rice imports were necessitated due to a 
terrible harvest in 1993, the Japanese government 
bought a cheaper quality of the long-grain Thai rice 
(which is, in any case, not suitable for making sushi)  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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cook it in order to get rid of its bad odor.  They also 
insisted on mixing this rice with the Japanese-style 
rice they imported from elsewhere, so that the con-
sumer never had the opportunity to taste Japanese-
style rice from only one source outside of Japan.   
Reports of the pebbles and other matter that people 
discovered in their rice made regular news features.
A last example.  When Japanese companies pre-
dicted a need for additional labor in the late 1980s the 
Japanese government began a program of recruiting 
foreign workers who could prove their “pure” Japa-
nese ancestry.  Most of these were from communities 
of agriculturalists who had expatriated to Brazil or 
Peru earlier in the century.  The idea was to re-social-
ize persons who were already biologically similar to 
the local population so that their continuing resi-
dence, and their resulting lack of “foreignness” would 
not be so disturbing.  The realities turned out to be 
much more what one could predict:  the Brazilians 
were often less than enthusiastic over the lack of life-
style amenities and the rigid constraints of the Japa-
nese workplace.  And the locals were even more 
frightened by the rumors that there were groups of 
people who looked Japanese but who might be more 
prone to acts of violence or crimes.  At least with 
Europeans one could see them coming.
1. The Japanese government food agency made a reported profit of more than US$4 billion 
on the sale of foreign rice at greatly inflated prices.  They succeeded in reducing the 
demand for Thai rice to the point where they had too much on hand when the next harvest 
proved bountiful, so they exported this rice as a part of their ODA to African nations. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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lar prejudice, a generalized terror about their poten-
tial for being different (in anti-social ways) that their 
ability to pass as mainstream Japanese only increases.  
A Japanese friend of mine was certain that it was 
Koreans who bullied her in her primary school days.  
After the great Kanto earthquake in the Tokyo region 
seventy years ago, vigilante groups massacred thou-
sands of Koreans when rumors circulated that they 
were setting fires and poisoning wells.   Even after the 
1995 Kobe quake, which destroyed much of the 
Korean/buraku area of Nagataku in Kobe, there were 
rumors circulated as far as the National Diet, that the 
Koreans had set some of the fires. 
Various polls in Japan periodically rank peoples of 
foreign nations in terms of their “trustworthiness,”  
polls in which the Koreans invariably rank last, close 
behind “Africans.”  But even without attaching national 
groups to such a list, there is the more general idea 
that foreigners may not be trustworthy.   It is such an 
attitude of mistrust that forms the ground for the rac-
ism that most affects “foreigners” residing in Kyoto.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Private public sphere
“Privatization as an approach to
social conflict would appear to be
well suited to a political system
and social order characterized by
an emphasis on hierarchy and a
tradition of benevolent paternal-
ism.”
(Pharr 1990, 211)
At the center of Susan Pharr’s (1990) very valu-
able work on conflict management in Japan is a notion 
of “privatization.”  Privatization is a strategy that 
removes discourses of dissent or counter-expressions 
from the public sphere, inserting them into a realm of 
private (lifeworld) concerns and interests.  The dis-
course becomes a “conversation” between individuals 
who are in a hierarchical relationship: which means 
that the conversation is mostly one way—top down.   
And resolution of conflicts is made outside of any 
legitimizing discourse of dissent.  As Pharr describes it:
“The Japanese approach thus is aimed fundamentally at privatizing social conflict. When faced
with a social protest, authorities tend to respond by ignoring it; if avoidance fails, they work to con-
tain the conflict, to keep it outside existing channels of resolution, and to discourage others from
joining in. They strongly prefer to deal with conflicts case by case, and their favored methods are
informal rather than formal. Whenever possible, they skirt solutions that might extend legitimacy to
the protesters, which would have repercussions in the future on how problems of a similar nature
should be resolved. Avoided also are solutions that generate principles having broad applicability
across cases. As a result, outsiders remain outsiders and any gains achieved by protesters in a specific
conflict episode have only a limited chance of becoming general.” (Pharr 1990, 208-209)
Only persons who have been elected (by vote or 
by selection to a position of authority, say within a 
governmental or corporate bureaucracy) can voice an 
expression that is legitimated as representing a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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note (they become eraihito, “bigwigs”).  Other individ-
uals (such as “citizens” or “residents”) who are not in 
a position to speaking for an established institution 
(and the establishing of institutions is itself managed by 
government agencies) can only speak for themselves.  
Their ideas, complaints, or advice acquire whatever 
legitimacy they do through the personal circumstances 
of the individual’s life.  
A paternalist relationship is a type of group deter-
mined by this hierarchical role structure.  And as this 
sort of “one-to-several” relationship is maintained in 
many different settings in Japan: in the home, in the 
school, at work, in relationships to expert systems, 
etc., a person is simultaneously involved in many of 
these.  And in each of these relationships, the “infe-
rior” members are bound by an expectation of defer-
ence to the person and the decisions of the superior, 
while the superior member is, in turn, bound by a 
duty to protect the interests of the inferiors—as this 
is seen by the superior.
Pharr describes an ideal model of how conflict, 
such as conflict that might elsewhere become a public 
issue, is contained within such groups, and “resolved” 
1. Before WWII, the emperor spoke on behalf of the Japanese people, and the position of the 
emperor as synecdoche for Japan as a nation and a people was far stronger than what sur-
vived Japan’s defeat and subsequent occupation.  But where the emperor’s discursive 
position was vacated, a democratic public sphere did not emerge to acquire this position.  
There is a discursive vacuum today at the top, and even the Prime Minister will refuse to 
claim to speak for the Japanese public: as Hosokawa after offering apologies for Japanese 
aggression in WWII on a state visit in Beijing returned to Tokyo and stated that his apolo-
gies were his own, and not meant to represent Japan. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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“Implicit in these choices [of possible protest] is an ideal model of how conflict is to be avoided
or resolved in a hierarchical society, with the following key tenets: 
   1. Superiors have the initiative in the relationship: ideally they anticipate an inferior's grievances
and address them in the interest of preserving harmony. 
   2. Collective pressures, such as from the community or company, act as a check on unaccept-
able behavior by superiors toward inferiors. 
   3. Homogeneity (based on shared experience, attitudes, language, and so forth) operates to
insure that superiors understand the vantage point of inferiors and take their position into account. 
  4. A long-term perspective in social relations means that it is in the superior's interest to make
accommodations now in order to insure good relations in the future. 
  5. An inferior may let the superior know that the latter's behavior toward the inferior is unac-
ceptable so long as the methods of relaying this information are consistent with the goal of maintain-
ing social harmony. 
  6. When the various correctives on a superior's behavior fail to bring about a desired result, the
inferior must adjust to the situation—and there are payoffs for doing so.”
(Pharr 1990, 30-31)
“By the nineteenth century, pat-
terns of social hierarchy coexisted
in England with a highly devel-
oped moral code based not on rule
by status, as in contemporaneous
Japan, but on individualism and
rule by law. Thus, as groups on
the lower rungs of society began
to seek redress from the disloca-
tions and inequities of industrial-
ization, both features of the
system were before them: on the
one hand, they faced authorities
who harbored a strong belief,
which society widely shared, in
their own natural superiority; on
the other, they had at their dis-
posal a well-entrenched value sys-
tem, one fully accepted by those
same elites, based on individual-
ism, the rule of law, and the rights
of man.”
(Pharr 1990, 212)
The final consequence of this form of “protest” is 
that the inferior has to live with whatever response 
the superior agrees to as being adequate to the situa-
tion.  This consequence is the direct result of the infe-
rior person accepting his inferior status.  The more 
general problem is that, as public discourse becomes 
channeled into these privatized arenas, deference and 
duty preclude the articulation of conflict or of even 
the possibility of a plurality of interests within the 
group.
Throughout all of Pharr’s work, there is little to 
suggest that there is a conflict between the wide-
spread “inferiorization” of the great majority of people 
nearly all of the time in matters of presumably public 
interest in Japan, and the “ideology of democracy.”  
She does note that in Britain and Germany—nations 
with a history of social inequality—at some point a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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population as being “inferior” to those that had 
acquired (by heredity, wealth, or means of access) 
positions of authority.  But she does not see how 
Japan, by failing to gain this threshold, has failed to cre-
ate the basis for public, democratic participation.
inferior is as inferior does
“Ideological shifts occurring over
the last century, then, have laid
the groundwork for major
changes in protest behavior in
Japan. Even if democracy and
egalitarianism lack full accep-
tance as principles governing
social relations, they have rela-
tively strong support in the cul-
ture, and thus have become an
important counterideology for sta-
tus inferiors who wish to improve
their position through protest.”
(Pharr 1990, 28)
The failure of democratic reform in modern Japan 
to create a public sphere where open public debate 
and the voicing of counter-opinions informs govern-
ment policy is often linked to pre-existing cultural 
conditions: to a tradition of paternalist control, or to 
residual feudalism, or some other local circum-
stance.   Japan lacks the cultural wherewithal for real 
democracy, this story goes.  The lack of open demo-
cratic governance is also linked to the strength of 
bureaucratic agencies, and to the economic emer-
gency of the post-war period, in which the bureau-
cracy acquired political and popular support for 
(presumably short-term) programs that put economic 
growth ahead of democratic practice.  Elsewhere I 
present the notion that Japan shares a mode of mod-
ern governmentality with many other nation-states, 
several of these in the immediate region (see: State-
nation modernity).   
When Pharr presents the presence of an “ideol-
ogy of democracy” in modern Japan as making a 
major—if not yet fully realized—shift in the ability of 
protest groups to legitimate their counter-public 
expressions, she is suggesting that Japan may be at a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Private public sphere —37—point of abandoning its current governmentality.   
However, I see little evidence of this, even though the 
state in Japan faces many challenges in adjusting to 
changing global circumstances.
Pharr’s work adds to our understanding of how a 
central state under conditions of state-nation moder-
nity can maintain its control over a population without 
the legitimation of a public sphere.  Japan’s privatized 
public sphere—channelled through thousands of for-
mal and informal paternalist relationships—multiply 
intersects the lives of each citizen.  Again, the fractal 
image appears, as membership within the nation is 





“With my friends, or in a class discussion, sometimes there were times when I said
something about ‘Japanese people,’ you know?  The thing is that I called myself Japanes
(nihonjin), and although in fairness, I shouldn’t say so.  I would say ‘We Japanese  [war ra
nihonjin ha] such and such’...Of course my best friends knew [what was going on], but still
I really felt the burden of deceiving everybody by not really being Japanese.”
Higashi-kujo resident and Madang organizer
The “official version” of why “We 
Japanese” are like they are is pro-
vided in capsule form in this 
video produced by the Jinjahoncho.
Expousing an unbroken heritage 
from prehistoric society, informed 
by a “spontaneously” generated 
native religion (Shinto) and 
reflecting the unique (in the facile 
sense that all geographic locations 
are unique) influences of climate 
and agriculture—modern Japan is 
simply, and without an accommo-
dation for modernity, the result of 
social, cultural, and racial evolu-
tion on the Japanese Archipelago 
from “time immemorial.”
 For the last two decades it is Japan’s singular eco-
nomic triumph on the world stage that has bolstered 
internal arguments about the benefits of belonging to 
“Japan, Inc.,” i.e., to “We Japanese.”  But still, there is a 
need to secure the message of this triumph as a 
national achievement, to implicate (if not reward—
most life-style markers in Japan are far lower than the 
per-capita GNP would predict) the national popula-
tion as the source and the means to continual success.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—We Japanese... —39—“To ask that Japan be portrayed as
a multiracial, multicultural soci-
ety is only to ask that the artist,
journalist, and scholar be objec-
tive and humanistic.  For Japan
has never been a country for
which the description “homoge-
neous” or “mono-ethnic” would
be appropriate except as a reduc-
tionist, holistic caricature. During
the one-and-a-half millennia for
which we have reasonably accu-
rate historical accounts of Japa-
nese society and its population, it
is clear that Japan has never been
without ethnic minorities and eth-
nic conflict.
(Wetherall 1981, 203).”
For decades various messages given by the 
state—from those during the pre-War days that 
linked the citizenry to its sovereign Emperor, a link 
that was legitimized by blood ties and informed by 
“nature” (the monsoon climate of Japan); to the more 
recent refrains about Japan’s total lack of minority 
groups (eliding entirely groups such as the Ainu, Oki-
nawans, resident Koreans and Chinese, the distinc-
tions used against those who live in buraku areas, and 
the growing number of foreign workers in Japan)—
have had one central theme: the Japanese population 
is one homogeneous group.  
“...Similarly, the cultural homoge-
neity of Japan is an important
asset to authorities in carrying out
their mandate. In a society where
elites are not expected to be
directly responsive to the public
and where the direct articulation
of grievances by social subordi-
nates is discouraged, this homo-
geneity enables elites to
understand and anticipate the
needs of those subject to their
authority.
(Pharr 1990, 222).”
From the far north to the sub-tropical south, and 
from seacoast villages to mountain pass hamlets, from 
the great cities to the small towns: at all places and 
levels, what is presumed to hold in common is so 
much greater than what could be used to divide, that 
all persons (of Japanese descent) are equally (and 
unavoidably) members of the national “We Japanese” 
cohort.  And so, when a politician starts his speech, 
“We Japanese...[warera nihonjin ha...]” everyone knows 
precisely  for—and to whom—he is talking. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—We Japanese... —40—“Consider ‘paternal construc-
tions,’ the rather large class of
deceits and fabrications that is
performed in what is felt to be the
dupe's best interests, but which he
might reject, at least at the begin-
ning, were he to discover what
was really happening. The falsity
is calculated to give him comfort
and render him tractable and is
constructed for those reasons
(Goffman 1974, 99).”
What is most suspicious about this discourse of 
underlying homogeneity, which has also been acquired 
by many social scientists looking at modern Japan1, is 
that this seems so blatantly to be used in the service 
of inequality.   What the Japanese public holds most in 
common, it seems, is that it is collectively obligated to 
all of those elevated (erai) individuals (the new pater-
nalist nobility, including one’s parents and teachers) 
who are said to be in a position to know, and have the 
facilities to understand, and [one can only hope] the 
integrity to act on behalf of the Japanese public.   
1.  Susan Pharr’s (1990) work on conflict management in Japan is a very good case in point.  
Her arguments are most convincing when they point to specific programs and instances of 
status conflict and state responses to this, and much less credible when she credits blan-
ket cultural bases for these actions.  
“...Where organisational and deci-
sion-making structures remain
centralised, the consequence of
socialisation is only a shift from
the private control of knowledge
by the corporation to the monopo-
lisation of knowledge by the state.
The position of the majority of the
population continues to be one of
‘subalternity’, a situation (similar
to that criticised by Hidaka in
contemporary Japan) in which
individuals regard themselves as
‘little people’, lacking all power
to influence the wider society, and
therefore devoid of all responsi-
bility for the outcome of social
change
(Morris-Suzuki 1988, 206).”
In the same way that deference to one’s “betters,” 
i.e., to elders, to men (if you are a woman), and to 
anyone with a higher position in an organization, or 
with any job in an organization with higher status, is 
taught as “manners,” in Kyoto, an entrenched lack of 
equality2 is passed off as “homogeneity.”  What is 
shared here is a common, limited ken, a mutual lack of 
perspective on a situation.  This lack is both an out-
come and input to the delegation of authority and the 
relinquishing of opinion that so marks the public 
sphere in Japan, and which is central to a governmen-
2. One of the primary referents to democracy in Kyoto is “equality” as exemplified by a com-
monly held notion that the range of affluence between the rich and the poor in Japan has 
narrowed appreciably since the 19th century.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—We Japanese... —41—tality often termed  “paternalistic1,”  although this 
term does not adequately reveal the dynamics of the 
situation.
1. Paternal “games”, as Goffman (1974, 99) noted, requires the management of the subject’s 
ken in a way that hides the mechanics of this management.   The “dupe” is told what the 
pater believes is good for him to know, and is shown what the pater believes is good for him 
to see.  But at a more subtle level, paternalism is also a delegation of expression.  The 
pater speaks for the family: for that socius over which his authority has been granted. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Four years of heaven —42—Four years of heaven 14
Four years of heaven
Because the idea that Japan is a singularly homo-
geneous nation is one of the central notions that 
Koreans in Kyoto wish to interrogate, I looked in vari-
ous places to see where and in what fashion this 
notion can be found.  One of the places where this 
idea has some currency is in universities in Kyoto.
Going off to a university marks the first time 
when many young adult Japanese find a period of rela-
tive independence and a lack of demands on their 
time.  It is a time when personal, cultural and other 
pursuits are available and expected.  College years are 
remembered by many as the best of times.  The col-
lege lifestyle in Japan has been called “four years of 
heaven” for its lack of pressure and surplus of free 
time.   It is a pivotal period in the skilling of the 
emerging adult in the adult skills of consumer capital-
ism: a time when preferences and attitudes congeal.  
And so I would often inquire of the students in the 
university classes I was teaching about the types of 
activities they were pursuing (this was mainly a ploy to 
encourage them to respond about topics of interest). 
 Two pronounced outcomes emerged from these 
discussions: a sharing of common interests through-
out the class (a near unanimity of tastes), and a lack of 
interest in any of the forms of “traditional” Japanese 
cultural practice (such as tea ceremony, flower 
arrangement, Kabuki or Noh theater).  Such practices 
did not fit into the age-group repertoire of shared  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Four years of heaven —43—interests—and just at what age and within what group 
they will, in the future, fit is another interesting ques-
tion.  Karaoke, on the other hand, was favored by vir-
tually all students.
“In the case of Japan, its very
homogeneity—the common lan-
guage, shared history, and
extraordinary sense of “we-ness”
that Japanese people feel—creates
a strong basis within inferior-
superior relationships for status
inferiors to believe superiors
capable of understanding their sit-
uation, a basis that is often miss-
ing in societies with major
language, religious, ethnic, or
other differences.
(Pharr 1990, 30)”
Virtually none of my students (out of about 300) 
would admit to an attraction for Japanese traditional 
theatre, and none would admit1 knowing the name of 
any Kabuki or Noh play or actor.  Conversely, most 
were familiar with a wide range of internationally mar-
keted music (several could name many Seattle grunge-
rock bands) and films.  Despite this devotion to inter-
national commodities, more than eighty-percent 
responded that Japan is a culturally homogeneous 
nation.  
1. Of course, such an admission may mark the student as different from their classmates in 
terms of their taste, much as an admission of liking classical music might in a Junior High 
classroom in the US.  But then these were university students, and this is the primary 
period of their lives when they have the free time to acquire new tastes.
The reasons for this were simple, they argued, 
noting the circumstances of living on an island nation, 
with a language that is geographically specific to the 
national space, and a common heritage, both in his-
tory and as a people.  But when I pressed for the con-
tent they would use to describe this homogeneous 
culture, I found that this was not informed by a narra-
tive of ancient rice culture, nor a long history of elite 
cultural production, but rather the products of mod-
ern industrialization: televisions, VCRs, automobiles, 
cameras, video games, anime (cartoons), and karaoke. 
“We Japanese” manufacture the best electronics  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Four years of heaven —44—in the world.  “We Japanese” have the highest per-cap-
ita income in the world.  The content has changed, but 
the message is as strong as ever. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—discourse or dissent? —45—Discourse or dissent? 15
discourse or dissent?
“Because of the potential political
consequences linked to survey
results, faithfully confessing to
some unknown pollster on the
telephone may seem like a public
duty.
Quite the contrary, the act of con-
sciously misleading a pollster
may actually do more public good
in the long run. As an act of civil
disobedience, this is a fully legiti-
mate counter-population practice:
it announces that the individual
refuses to be interrogated for
some institution's convenience.
And it is not even illegal, not even
in Japan.”
(Caron 1996, 124)
While Pharr’s (1990) arguments about “conflict 
management” in Japan contain some assumptions that 
are difficult to accept (such as the “fact” of homogene-
ity, which she does not sufficiently critique), her work, 
read with attention to constraints on expressions in 
public, reveal practices that defer (and so defeat) dis-
cursive access by the majority of the public to the 
public sphere in Japanese cities such as Kyoto.   
By looking at the (mostly pre-War) history of 
protest by women and buraku dwelling Japanese, she 
reveals a pattern of institutionalized delegitimation of 
protest.  She describes how the steep requirements 
for legitimating public protest and the institutional 
practice of settling disputes without legitimating the 
right to dispute either the original situation or the set-
tlement constrain public protest, and public discourse 
in general.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—discourse or dissent? —46—Japan: a lawless state
“...Acts of civil disobedience are
examples of self-limiting radical-
ism par excellence. On the one
hand, civil disobedients extend
the range of legitimate, even if
initially extralegal, citizen activity
that is accepted by a given politi-
cal culture. Few would be
shocked today by a workers'
strike, a sit-in, a boycott, or a
mass demonstration.  These forms
of collective action have come to
be considered normal, yet all of
them were once illegal or extrale-
gal and could again become ille-
gal under some conditions. Thus,
civil disobedience initiates a
learning process that expands the
range and forms of participation
open to private citizens within a
mature political culture. More-
over, it is well known that, histori-
cally, civil disobedience has been
the motor to the creation and
expansion of both rights and
democratization. On the other
hand, civil disobedience defines
the outer limits of radical politics
within the overall framework of
civil societies”
(Cohen and Arato 1992, 567).
Because it is not used as a popular forum for 
counter discussions (which might lead to protests), 
the public sphere in Kyoto may be said to not exist as 
such, at least as this term is currently1 being used to 
necessarily include counter-public protests.  Of 
course, a similar argument has been leveled against 
the bourgeois public sphere in other nations: i.e., the 
lack of serious counter discourse brings into question 
the viability of the public sphere as an arena for social 
change.  However, in many states (mainly in nation-
tates, rather than in state-nations—Tienanmen is a 
counter example) there are signs of life within the 
public sphere: feminists challenging the masculine 
domination of this, and environmentalists challenging 
the market’s place in this.  These challenges often 
appear in the form of mass protests.  And so we can 
look for these events as a barometer for the viability 
of the public sphere.
Public protest is no more legal or illegal in Japan 
than it is in most parts of Europe and North America.  
And so why are there so conspicuously few protests 
on the streets in Japan?   In part, we can suggest that 
this is due to a longer history of a lack of mass protest 
(combined with a lack of an acknowledged history of 
mass protest— state controlled history books do not 
1. As (Hansen 1993, xi-xii) notes: “If these and similar questions are perceived today as part of 
the problematic of the public, it is itself a measure of major changes in the constitution of 
the public sphere, in the very fabric and parameters of experiential horizons.” A critique of 
the public sphere based on the opening this defends for practices of protest is itself a con-
scious re-visioning of the public sphere (in a practical utopian manner).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—discourse or dissent? —47—reveal this history).  Civil disobedience is a practice 
that requires, well, practice.  And the space it opens 
on the margins of social action needs to be used regu-
larly in order to be kept open.  
The state in Japan used the threat of Communism 
in the 1950s to move against the industrial unions, and 
since 1960 it has tightened its control over universi-
ties and teacher unions to the point where student 
protest is virtually non existent.  And so the memory 
of protest and civil disobedience has faded in Japan, 
allowing the state and industrial organizations to exert 
social, pre-legal forms of constraint against protest, in 
effect making these practically illegal without the use 
of the legal system.
 Pharr describes another reason for the lack of 
protest:  in Japan, a Private public sphere takes the place of 
the (public) public sphere.  The (public) public sphere 
is evacuated, a space of silence, while discussions of 
national policy and social grievances are instead 
pushed into the private enclaves (the boardrooms and 
back offices) of those who have acquired the auspices 
to speak and to act on behalf of the general popula-
tion.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—discourse or dissent? —48—One of the chief outcomes of a 
public sphere is the opening of a 
space between acts of active dis-
sent and those of simple articula-
tion of alternatives to official 
policy.  Dissent is still possible 
within the public sphere (although 
this may take a more symbolic 
form, such as flag burning, to self-
define it as dissent and not just 
another argument) but so too are 
discussions about and against offi-
cial policy.  Under State-nation 
modernity, where the public 
sphere is pre-occupied by the 
state, all public discussions of 
state policy acquire a potential 
interpretation as active dissent, 
and may result in sanctions by the 
state.
The lack of a public sphere is observable in all 
public discourses, from coffee-house conversations, to 
political speeches.  
A public sphere opens up a space between simple 
expressions or discussions of alternative views and 
statements of active dissent from official policy.   Ver-
bal acts of protest are treated within this sphere as 
legitimate discursive practices.   Within a public 
sphere, official policies (and those who manufacture 
these) are liable to a wide spectrum of comment, 
from serious critiques, to parodies and cynical dis-
missals.  This broad discursive space allows for a vari-
ety of discussions to happen without these becoming 
illegal, or de-legitimate, and thus subject to social 
sanctions (silence) or state interventions. 
The lack of a public sphere involves more than 
the lack of recognized public spaces and arenas for 





commentarium—discourse or dissent? —49—being anti-state, and by extension (as the state 
reserves for itself the voice of the public), anti-public.
the safety of silence
To speak out under these circumstances is to 
place oneself in a position of conflict with the state, 
even though this conflict may be perceived as minor.  
In the course of my research in Kyoto, Japan, I wanted 
to ask several of the people I was talking with about 
their opinions concerning how well the City repre-
sents their interests.  In order to give them some time 
to reflect upon these issues, I made up a short list of 
topics that I handed out at the end of one of my con-
versations with them.   I considered these topics to be 
fairly straightforward openings to the conversations I 
hoped to have about their circumstances of living in 
Kyoto.   The following is the list of topics/questions 
that were translated and handed to interviewees to 
think about.
“ALL Interviewees:  Questions for them to think about...
1Q-A.What differences do you see between Japanese and Korean cultures?  How are these cul-
tures similar?
2Q-A.What do you think of Japanese culture today?  What kind of things are good examples of
modern Japanese culture? 
3Q-A.Japan and Kyoto have democratically elected governments.  How well do these govern-
ments represent your interests?  Are you satisfied with the condition of democractic government in
Kyoto?  IF NOT SATISFIED:  how would you change Kyoto’s system of government to make this
more democratic?
4Q-A.Kyoto society has many social divisions.  Do people in all of the parts of Kyoto society par-
ticipate equally in the city’s government and benefit equally from the city’s economy?  [IF NO:
describe the reason for these social and economic inequalities.]  
5Q-A.Kyoto and Japan uses a family residence law that records where people live.  Many other
nations (for example, the United States) do not have such a law.  Does Kyoto need this family resi-
dence law?  What would happen if this law was not used? TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—discourse or dissent? —50—6Q-A.The Higashi-kujo community is a large community with many groups.  Describe in as much
detail as you can the different groups in Higashi-Kujo (the name of the group, who is in the group,
where do these people tend to live).
7Q-A.What are the most important changes that you have noticed in Kyoto in the last 10-20
years?  How do you feel about these changes?
8Q-A.What will happen to Higashi-kujo in the next ten years?  Do you think there will be any
changes in the place or in the society?  IF SO, what kind of changes do you predict?”
Before I began to distribute these questions, I 
gave them to an associate who responded, “This is a 
mistake.   These people are not in a position to speak 
on these issues.  If you give them these questions it 
will only make things difficult.”
“In many areas of Japanese life,
such as the private business sec-
tor, public bureaucracy, and rural
community, a hierarchically
grounded ideology of social rela-
tions operates as the “real” ideol-
ogy, even if the “official”
ideology, as set forth in public
pronouncements, is based on
democracy and egalitarianism.”
(Pharr 1990, 26)
And she was quite right.  I did go ahead and dis-
tribute this list, but none of the local residents would 
comment to me in any manner that would be linked 
to them (although some spoke “offu reco” [off the 
record]) about topics three through six.   “It is not 
good to speak out about such matters,” I was told, 
and a few people refused to talk with me at all again.   
This is not to suggest that there is no internal dis-
cussion about these issues that I, as an outsider simply 
did not have access to.  I am certain that all such top-
ics get talked about in private.  In this instance I was 
more interested in the characteristics of what would 
be said in public.  So I also took this refusal to be an 
important finding about the lack of casual openness 
concerning many of the issues that are of some local 
interest, and that are also made available for discus-
sion at and through the Higashi-kujo Madang. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Cybernetic governmentalities
“The persistence of status ine-
qualities as a major characteristic
of the Japanese social system has
been recognized in virtually all
studies of the society, from Ruth
Benedict's early analysis of 1946,
to popular accounts today directed
at American managers hopeful of
doing business in Japan, to works
by contemporary social scien-
tists. Generally, these analyses all
discuss status in equality in terms
of the importance that inferior-
superior (or junior-senior) rela-
tionships and other rank and sta-
tus considerations are accorded in
the ordering of social relation-
ships in Japan. ...”
(Pharr 1990, 8)
Giddens (1994,  58) develops a notion of a 
“cybernetic” governmental model, in which a central 
economic (mechanical) brain controls a dispersed 
organic body-politic.  This model has some value 
describing the instrumentality that creates the other-
wise oxymoronic situation we find in Japan: namely  
homogeneous inequality1.  The underlying inferior-
superior relationship that holds between the general 
public—the body politic,—and those of the governing 
oligarchy that manage the affairs of commerce and the 
state at the center (in Tokyo) is be legitimated for the 
polity as an outcome of a natural process whereby the 
most talented individuals automatically rise to the top 
(and, in Japan, migrate toward Tokyo).   This idealized 
“meritocracy” also hides a persistent, class-based sys-
tem of privileges. 
1. Although reports of the actual salaries of executives of top Japanese corporations show 
that their monetary income is not so much greater than that of the skilled factory workers, 
the executive’s access to non-salary, monetizeable and non-monetizeable resources 
(houses, transportation, golf-course memberships, entertainment, etc.) push this inequality 
into a range that is difficult to figure, but certainly comparable to that of top executives in 
American corporations.  And it includes an addition feature: the non-monetizeable 
resources (including personal connections) are non-taxable and also heritable. 
social hierarchy
The presence of social hierarchy within a “demo-
cratic society” is again not unique to Japan.  This is, for 
example, one of the features of capitalism, i.e., the de- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Cybernetic governmentalities —52—equalizing effect of unequal personal wealth1 .  And it 
applies as well to the formation of elite bureaucracies 
in other, e.g., socialist nations.   
One senses in Japan that the internal discourse of 
democracy (minshushugi) is more centrally connected 
to notions of social equalization and equal rights (byou-
douken) within the society, than it is with human rights 
(jinken).   The Meiji period can be seen as a time of 
equalization, where the nobility and the samurai lost 
their hereditary advantages.  And subsequent efforts 
to eliminate inequality at the other end of the old 
social scale by remedying the situation of those who 
dwell in buraku areas, is also seen in terms of social 
levelling (douwa).   What is perhaps problematic for 
democracy in Japan, articulated through the idea of an 
“equal society,” is the lack of counter-features to the 
underlying social hierarchy: the absence of a history of 
taking away the privilege of the elite2, the lack of 
memorialized sites where the public once-and-for-all 
asserted its right to govern, the lack of celebrations of 
this right.  
 A history of centralized, national control over 
social and economic features of life in Japan intensifies 
the vertical hierarchy within government bureaucra-
cies to the point where its apex again resembles a 
form of nobility, a family within the family, or a brain 
1. The fact that capital makes some people “more equal than others” in the marketplace still 
does not legitimate the influence of wealth in the political process and the public sphere, as 
President Clinton has discovered in his campaign finance debacle. 
2. Meiji was an elite-led reform in which status was “shared” with other classes with the stated 
end of ending class distinctions, but without an effective public oversight of this process. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Cybernetic governmentalities —53—within the body.  The institutional outcomes of a gov-
ernmentality that nation-states—most commonly, but 
not exclusively, in state-socialist governments—devise 
in order to maintain conscious, centralized economic 
control at the national level are liable to acquire a self-
electing authority in the process of guiding national 
interests.     TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The courts
“Given the awesome power of the
System to deprive the Japanese
citizen almost completely of the
means to litigate, it should come
as no surprise that action taken by
the private individual against the
government is virtually unthink-
able. The Supreme Court refuses
to use the powers of review given
it by the post-war constitution as a
means of safeguarding democ-
racy. In combination with the far-
reaching formal powers of gov-
ernment agencies in pursuing
broad social policy, this has had
the effect of almost totally insulat-
ing bureaucratic activity from
judicial review. When activists
persist in countering administra-
tive decisions with lawsuits, the
officials perceive this as a 'radi-
cal', almost violent action, ham-
pering national policy-making.”
(van Wolferen 1990, 215)
In a more structural vein, what is also missing is a 
“court of appeal” where the government is itself held 
accountable for its power.  That the “supreme” court 
in Japan early on abdicated its power to be a “consti-
tutional court” means that every law passed in Japan is 
an abridgement on the constitution, and the right to 
challenge either law or practice is basically unavailable 
through the court system.   The courts will only rule 
on how a particular practice might not reflect the 
intent or the wording of the law—not on the law 
itself.  And it is precisely “the law” here, as (Thompson 
1993, 34-35) notes, that should provide the opening that 
the judiciary makes in favor of those who are ruled 
through its use.
The close hold that the state maintains on the 
courts in Japan is fairly typical of the role that courts 
play under circumstances of State-nation modernity.  
Despite the physical existence of courtrooms in Japan, 
this state-nation has not yet undergone what Haber-
mas called the “first wave of juridification,” in which 
the courts assume an emancipitory posture against 
the prior, sovereign order:
“The first wave of juridification had a freedom-guaranteeing character to the extent that bour-
geois civil law and a bureaucratic domination exercised by legal means at least meant emancipation
from premodern relations of power and dependence. The three subsequent juridification waves
guaranteed an increase in freedom insofar as they were able to restrain, in the interests of citizens
and of private legal subjects, the political and economic dynamics that had been released by the legal
institutionalization of the media of money and power. The step-by-step development toward the
democratic welfare state is directed against those modern relations of power and dependence that
arose with the capitalist enterprise, the bureaucratic apparatus of domination, and, more generally, TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—The courts —55—the formally organized domains of action of the economy and the state. The inner dynamics of these
action systems also unfold within the organizational forms of law, but in such a way that law here
takes on the role of a steering medium rather than supplementing institutional components of the
lifeworld” (Habermas 1989, 366).
Here, Habermas describes how the courts in the 
early development of nation-states, supply a “steering 
medium” that operates externally to both the state 
and the market.  This operation has not occurred in 
Japan to date, and its lack is one of the hallmarks of 
Japan as a state-nation (see: State-nation modernity).
In terms of new social movements, the lack of 
courts of appeal increases the risk of protest, as this is 
subject to claims of illegality that cannot be subse-
quently countered by some court’s ability to overrule 
the state in the interest of the public.  The public has, 
in fact, no proven, legal interest outside of that which 
is granted by the state in Japan.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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the politics and semantics of homogeneity
“No nation of comparable eco-
nomic power seems so territori-
ally constricted, so ethnically
standardized, so culturally con-
tained: Japanese themselves com-
monly insist that theirs is a small
island country (shimaguni), a
homogeneous place. Its eco-
nomic expansiveness is parried by
a national inwardness and a dis-
avowal of internal differences
along class or ethnic lines, a dis-
avowal most often laid at the feet
of culture. The image of Japan as
the great assimilator arises to
explain away any epistemological
snags or historical confusions:
Japan assimilates, if not immi-
grants and American automobiles,
then everything else, retaining the
traditional, immutable core of cul-
ture while incorporating the shiny
trappings of (post)modernity in a
dizzying round of production,
accumulation, and consumption”
(Ivy 1995, 1).
Whether it is entirely the outcome of long-range 
nation-state formation activities by the Japanese state, 
or in part an outcome of Japan’s physical/cultural/lin-
guistic dis-connection from the Asian Continent, or, 
more likely the latter overlaid and transformed by the 
former, national identity in Japan now assumes a high 
degree of similarity, and the presence of a national 
habitus that is shared by nearly all of its citizens.
The politics of homogeneity—the various ways 
that this notion affects relationships between individu-
als in public—is a central concern for resident Kore-
ans in Kyoto, who, by their official “national” 
identification, are excluded from becoming Japanese, 
even when they become naturalized citizens.  “Even if I 
become a Japanese citizen, I still have this Korean 
ancestry.” One resident Korean in Kyoto explained to 
me.  While the official incorporation regime that pro-
spective citizens must follow demands a public and 
sincere desire to acculturate to Japanese life, the unof-
ficial exclusions of the national habitus do not admit 
newcomers into the “We Japanese...” identity.  
Koreans who grow up in Kyoto are virtually indis-
tinguishable from their Japanese neighbors, and can 
easily pass as Kyoto Japanese in anonymous transac-
tions.  But when their Korean ancestry becomes 
known, they sense a shift in the manner in which oth-
ers will interact with them.  They feel the marking that 
removes them from assumptions that apply within the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—the politics and semantics of homogeneity —57—“We Japanese” group identity.  
One alternative, which informs their festival 
Madang, and also their continuing discourse on inter-
national human rights as these apply locally to Kyoto, 
is to attack the very notion of homogeneity as the 
basis for a national population.  They also take their 
dual identity, their Korean-Japanese heritage, not as a 
halving of both traditions: they are not half-Korean 
and half-Japanese; rather they talk about a doubling of 
identity: they are both Korean and Japanese.  “Isn’t a 
tree with two roots stronger than a tree with only one 
root?” a resident Korean asked me, illustrating this 
position.  
What Koreans in Kyoto have not done (yet) in 
their arguments for heterogeneity is to critique the 
idea that Japan is naturally/historically a homogeneous 
society.  They may, in fact accept this notion as being 
valid.  But they would still argue that homogeneity 
cannot be used as the basis for citizenship today.  But 
Koreans in Kyoto are not alone in their tacit accep-
tance of Japan as a homogeneous society, Even Pharr, 
who was writing about inequality in Japan, made the 
assumption that the formation of the nation-state was 
informed by its homogeneity, which gave the rulers a 
natural legitimacy to acquire political authority. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—the politics and semantics of homogeneity —58—“Education has expanded and
developed dramatically in Japan,
due to factors that include the pri-
ority given to education, which is
part of the national character, and
rising income levels. Education
has been a driving force behind
Japan's economic, social, and cul-
tural development.
(Monbusho ibid 1994.)”
 Pharr (1990, 214) also makes the argument that 
in Germany, where heterogeneity was (in her argu-
ment) more evident, the state could not assemble the 
requisite sense of commonality to achieve uncon-
tested delegation of political authority (at least until 
Hitler did so).  “The great heterogeneity of Germany, 
with its major religious, ethnic, and regional cleavages, 
foreclosed the possibility that any such delegation of 
authority could have occurred there, even if such a 
pattern had been more consistent with German tradi-
tions. Thus, authority figures at the national level had 
to evolve methods for mediating among the compet-
ing interests of society.”  
“For Adorno, notably, any exist-
ing collectivity—under the
homogenizing force of monopoly
capitalism and fascism alike—
could not be but false; truth was
buried in nonidentity, to be
grasped only in the paradoxical
autonomy of modern(ist) art”
(Hansen 1993, xviii).
Pharr’s argument that public-sphere formation 
was possible in Germany because social heterogeneity 
required additional arenas for mediation also fails to 
predict the collapse of the public sphere in Germany 
in 1933, and it implicates a very general historical pre-
condition as necessary for the creation of a public 
sphere: by this it denies the possibility of the creation 
of a public sphere as the result of political practice.  
This last point reveals the lack of critical attention to 
the position of the notion of homogeneity in Pharr’s 
work.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—the politics and semantics of homogeneity —59—Notions of a homoge-
neous culture
“...As Tokugawa economic life
became more complex, self regu-
lating occupational classes and
functional groups developed. But
even though the urban worker,
merchant or artisan was occasion-
ally made aware that power also
emanated from sources other than
his own superior or guild, he
would still have had no sense of
any impersonal political organisa-
tion, any possible precursor of the
state, that might judge his conduct
objectively.’Public’ affairs meant
simply the sum of those things
that occupied the attention of his
superior.
(van Wolferen 1990, 164-165)
The word “doushu” is described in Kenkyusha’s 
New Japanese-English Dictionary (Fourth Edition) in its 
adjectival form as meaning “of the same kind [sort, 
description]; of the same family [species]; similar (in 
kind); same; identical; kindred; allied; congeneric; con-
gerous; homogeneous; of the same race.”  Doushu is 
the Japanese term used for the notion of “homogene-
ity,” for example, when this is used in describing some 
national Japanese society.   But note that the Japanese 
term’s semantic field differs from current English lan-
guage1 use of “homogeneous.” 
 “Similarity” and “uniformity” in the English mean-
ing are descriptive of the current condition of the 
object described, and are in semantic counterposition 
to objects that show “heterogeneity.” In the Japanese 
borrowing of the term, current similarities are out-
comes of a shared ancestry.   Similarity of organic 
objects, including humans, is explained within this 
term by racial or familial connections.  
This brings up a fundamental flaw in the debate 
surrounding Nihonjinron.  This discourse on “Japanese-
ness” has essentialized its object to the point where 
“being Japanese” is an unmarked position that 1) can 
only be appropriated by certain individuals (i.e., citi-
1. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language gives the following definition: 
“1. Like in nature or kind; similar; congruous. 2. Uniform in structure or composition 
throughout.”  The second meaning of the English term more resembles the Japanese term 
“kakuitsu” [uniform], while the main meaning has lost the etymologically available sense of 
“same beginning” [Medieval Latin: homo-geneus].  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—the politics and semantics of homogeneity —60—zens of Japan who have lived their life in Japan); and, 2) 
the right “being Japanese” can be lost through any of 
several ways of  marking the individual as divergent 
from a group Japanese habitus.   
“...I am attempting to write of the
western nation as an obscure and
ubiquitous form of living the
locality of culture. This locality is
more around temporality than
about historicity: a form of living
that is more complex than 'com-
munity'; more symbolic than
'society'; more connotative than
'country'; less patriotic than pat-
rie; more rhetorical than the rea-
son of state; more mythological
than ideology; less homogeneous
than hegemony; less centred than
the citizen; more collective than
‘the subject’; more psychic than
civility; more hybrid in the articu-
lation of cultural differences and
identifications—gender, race or
class—than can be represented in
any hierarchical or binary struc-
turing of social antagonism.”
(Bhabha 1990, 292)
But for resident Koreans and others who grow up 
in Japan, the Japanese group habitus, the “harmoniz-
ing” homogeneity that sustains the “We Japanese...” dis-
course, presents an ethnic barrier that no amount of 
assimilation (assuming there is a desire to assimilate) 
can overcome.  And so, as I talk about the discourse 
surrounding “homogeneity” in Japan, I would remind 
the reader that this is not disconnected from dis-
courses of race.  So too, the demand by the Higashi-
kujo Madang festival organizers that Japan recognize 
heterogeneity as a human right, is a demand that is 
not only made to assert cultural difference, but also 
ethnic and bodily diversity within the nation-state of 
Japan.  This demand is also a local reflective appropria-
tion of “multiculturalism” as a transnational practice 
with “obscure and ubiquitous” (See: Left) local impli-
cations. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Optimal Experience
One theory of optimal, or autotelic, experience 
has been developed following the work of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi at the University of Chicago.  This 
theory reverses the dichotomy between play and 
work found in some theories of play such as those of 
Huizanga (1950) and Callois (1958).  These latter the-
ories held that play, i.e. any game, as opposed to work, 
was a completely bounded experience, the risks of 
which had no effect outside the boundary of the 
game.  
What Csikszentmihalyi (1975) argues is that play 
is simply any activity that is internally motivated 
(hence autotelic).  This means that work (labor) can 
also be play to the extent that it provides internal 
motivation.  Certain structures of an activity increase 
the amount of its internal motivation and experience 
it creates.  “Common to all these forms of autotelic 
envolvement is a matching of personal skills against a 
range of physical or symbolic opportunities for action 
that represent meaningful challenges to the individual” 
(ibid. 181).  This experience of play Csikszentmihalyi 
calls flow, a name derived from a common element 
found in many descriptions of this experience.  
Highly autotelic activities tend to reduce the par-
ticipant’s awareness of time and of self.  Yet these 
activities involve intense attention to a perceived set 
of well defined parameters.  Flow activities are  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Optimal Experience —62—sequences of events that engender immediate chal-
lenges (risks), that demand a high level of mental and/
or physical participation, and that reward this partici-
pation with a correspondingly high level of enjoyment.  
Thus the effort to meet the challenges provided 
within the context of the flow event is matched with 
an immediate sense of pleasure.  Participation is its 
own reward.  
The greater the perceived risk, the wider the 
symbolic arena of activity—up to the point where the 
individual feels preempted from entering the activity 
because her personal skills cannot possibly meet the 
challenges involved—the more profound the flow 
experience will be.  Furthermore, flow is apparently 
not entirely a quantitatively measurable experience:  
one experience of an extremely “deep” flow nature is 
thus not equatable to several “shallow” flow experi-
ences.  Deep flow, once experienced, is apparently 
extremely psychologically addictive (ibid, 138).  
Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow has profound 
consequences for the study of festivals.  To begin with, 
it provides a basic motivation for these events.  Festi-
vals are collective flow events, they provide a group of 
people with deep flow experiences.  The ritual con-
text of the festival creates the structured arena (the 
technology of experience) within which deep flow 
experiences can be obtained.  The participants them-
selves create the need for the festival’s continuation.  
Again, people seem to have differential talents and 
needs vis à vis flow experiences.  This means that the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Optimal Experience —63—flow effects of the festival are differential.  
Festivals vary in their success at engendering flow.  
The only aspect of the festival that is assured by its 
simple performance is its ritual1.  The rituals of the 
event provide what I call its “technology of experi-
ence,” they are the stage, the props, the elaborated 
context within which meaning will happen.  Participa-
tion in a festival event varies from person to person, 
year to year.  The actual meanings that do happen, that 
people experience, these are shared in that they 
respond to a shared immediate context, yet they are 
differentially experienced, they engage the participants 
in multiple ways, depending upon the role of the par-
ticipant in the event, and on the participant’s immedi-
ate need and capacity to use the event as an optimal 
experience.
1. In Frits Staal’s sense.  Staal looked at ritual as a pure syntax of action, that is, action with-
out meaning.  The notion of ritual as meaningless action is joined with a concept of risk:  rit-
ual action is designed to reduce risk.  The results of ritual action are thus guaranteed by 
the proper sequence of action itself.  And so, ritual action is meaningless but not chaotic.  
Staal also looks at ritual as being prior to myth, as being the outcome of bodily actions that 
are relatively old in that they predate the formation of language and culture (as we know it).  
While at the present, this notion serves to isolate what Staal is doing from what others do—
others study ritual that seems, if anything, overcoded with meaning—I believe that in the 
future a typology of ritual will be developed in which this will anchor one end of the scheme 
and cultural performances will anchor the other (with various types of dramas and ceremo-
nies holding up the middle, I suppose). TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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 Imagine the festival as a building. 
A multistory structure on a commons in a city.  A 
building with a most peculiar history: it would be built 
so as to be torn down and reconstructed once a year.  
Every year the building site is cleared and the entire 
building is constructed from the ground up.  Con-
struction takes two weeks of concentrated co-labora-
tion, and it requires the work, the skills, the 
enthusiasm, and the financial support of the entire 
neighborhood.   All of these are brought together 
when the time for construction is nigh.  A collection 
of tools and skills, plans and paints, everything needed 
for this task remains in the neighborhood all year 
around, and the construction itself proceeds as the 
work of several teams that compete with one another 
and with their own history, for speed and skill.   The 
teams have practiced their coordination and strategy 
throughout the entire year.
    The object is to make the building complete 
again as fast as possible.  At the end of construction a 
grand party inaugurates the building for public use.  
People who visit the city only occasionally and walk 
through the neighborhood would see the building 
with its neighbors, standing there as if it were like the 
surrounding buildings, but always somehow looking 
newer than the others.  These visitors may not realize 
that the building is simultaneously the same and differ-
ent from the one they saw last year.
Each year, within its completeness, something  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Imagine the festival as a building. —65—new is added, and perhaps something else has been 
forgotten.  Most of the people who use it (and who 
participate in its rebuilding) are not actively aware that 
it changes over time.  They see it as their building, 
something whole.  
Anyhow, the changes are appropriate to the 
space and its use.   Two years ago the second floor 
was converted to a day-care center.  Last year they 
added fiber-optic cables that connect each room to a 
computer network.  And this year they took out the 
wall that separated the office of neighborhood’s com-
mittee chairperson from that of the secretary.  There 
are plans for more skylights, and for a passive solar-
heating wall on the south.  These changes keep the 
building alive.  
And the ability to change is what allows new 
neighbors to add their newness to its completeness.   
Newcomers can either join one of existing building 
collectives or start their own.  Last year, three families 
from Guatemala and another from Bosnia decided to 
add their own addition.   And so an extra alcove that 
was never there before looks out over the street.  It 
seems to fit just right, and its sudden presence is not 
at all obvious to most, but the newcomers point it out 
whenever they pass by—it is their piece of the local 
whole. 
Two ways to destroy this 
“festival”
SCENARIO 1
As a festival, this building is the most ephemeral 
of structures.  There are only a few tactics that can 
keep it going, and so many ways for it to fail. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Imagine the festival as a building. —66—No matter how many years this building is built, it 
still takes a enormous amount of resources to com-
plete it.  Not everyone is happy with this situation.   
Hours and hours of rehearsal, planning, and coordina-
tion meetings are needed just so that the construction 
can begin.  And during construction everything else, 
work, play, even sleep is forgotten.  Employers get 
angry, the schools are not happy, and the local busi-
nesses complain about traffic tie-ups and lost revenue.  
Besides, the building is a perfectly good building.  Why 
tear it down every year?  Why not every three years? 
or five years? or ten?  There are families who have not 
taken a real vacation in years.  Why not give them a 
year off?  And why is there this need to keep changing 
the building?  It would be much simpler to have one 
plan and stick to it.  
Meetings are held, votes are taken.  But slowly, 
with some subtle arm-twisting, a majority is reached 
on a plan to construct the building every seven years 
using the plan that was constructed last year.  There 
are to be no new cooperatives, and the existing coop-
eratives will each elect a single representative.  These 
representatives will meet together as an executive 
committee and make all required decisions.  
The first seven year period ended and the build-
ing was reconstructed.  It took an extra twelve days, 
and some of the interior remained unfinished for 
three months, but the building was renewed.  After 
the second seven year period, three of the coopera-
tives were unable to provide enough volunteers to  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Imagine the festival as a building. —67—construct the main structure.  After a month, the roof 
was still not finished.  By the time the winter came, 
the building was still not ready to be occupied.  On a 
cold winter night some persons found an entry and lit 
a small fire that destroyed the building.  The site 
remains vacant to this day.
COUNTER SCENARIO:
Festivals are vulnerable to “slack” times.  Because 
they maintain their own memory in their practice 
(unlike most sports which are codified in a manner 
that allows them to be relearned) they can be forgot-
ten when enough people stop performing them.  They 
are also relatively vulnerable/open to innovation, and 
so they change more rapidly than spectacle/rituals.  
To preserve the memory of a festival it is impor-
tant to maintain the continuity of its practice, under 
the festival logic.  During slack times, the performance 
can be allowed to become smaller (the building can 
shrink in size), but it will not survive if the time 
between performances is too long.  To counter argu-
ments that the festival “takes too much time” the 
many diverse outcomes of the festival need to be 
understood.  
In the case of this “building” festival, one might 
look at the improved condition of other buildings in 
the neighborhood (so many people know how to 
build), at the number of jobs that residents acquire in 
the building trade, and at the special qualities of the 
building itself, and how these might be better used.  
Document the interactions that take place in the plan- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Imagine the festival as a building. —68—ning and execution of the construction, and note the 
conversational opportunities within the event.
SCENARIO TWO:  The museum effect
Let’s say that one year the city determines this 
building and its practice of rebuilding is of “historical 
interest.”  They acquire this property, and they make a 
careful study of its rebuilding.  Then they hire building 
experts to perform the rebuilding every year accord-
ing to the precise calculations they have made.  They 
advertise the rebuilding event to draw in tourists, and 
they set up television cameras to show this to the 
nation.   The building is made a national monument.  
Books are written, tours arranged.  And every year it 
is rebuilt in exactly the same way as the year before.
By this, the state hopes to preserve the building 
and its construction for centuries to come.  The 
neighborhood no longer is burdened by having to per-
form this enormous task, and the tourists that come 
bring income to the local merchants.
However, by this the state has destroyed much 
more than it “preserved:” the building is now just 
another museum.  There is no more festivity in its 
annual reconstruction.  The stakes have changed: the 
goal is to do it “right” according to some preexisting 
determination.  The art of incorporating change and 
invention in the festival/construction has been lost.  
The game is no longer a game but a duty, a ritual with 
only the most shallow resemblance to its prior logic.
COUNTER SCENARIO:
The neighborhood needs to realize that it owns  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Imagine the festival as a building. —69—this event.  It must tell the city and the state to not 
interfere.  If the city/state is interested in this festival, 
then the festival participants can organize workshops 
to teach other neighborhoods how to do the same 
event in their location.  The idea would be to spread 
the logic of the festival in its original form: local, dem-
ocratic, always-changing.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Intimacy is first a connection to the body —70—Intimacy is first a connection to the body 21
Intimacy is first a connection to the body
“The world of intimacy is as anti-
thetical to the real world as
immoderation is to moderation,
madness to reason, drunkenness
to lucidity.  There is moderation
only in the object, reason only in
the identity of the object with
itself, lucidity only in the distinct
knowledge of objects
(Bataille 1988 [1967], 58)”
Intimacy is a currency based on a subtle mettle 
mined in the body.  Intimacy is at a different moment a 
transaction between individuals, as in an “intimate 
conversation” or an “intimate caress.”  And, as we will 
see,  this transaction must be mutual if intimacy is to 
be maintained (SEE: Intimacy is always shared).  In other 
words, what is transacted must flow in both direc-
tions.  But what moves in this transaction?  
“Tenderness is a relationship with
another person’s body, which we
treat as sensitive with the aim of
heightening its sensitivity and
enabling it to enjoy being itself;
this relationship with another per-
son’s body necessarily implies
heightening our own sensitivity.
Violence, by contrast, is a rela-
tionship of technological instru-
mentalization of the things of this
world whose sensory qualities
have been denied and it is, as a
result, a form of repression which
devalues our own sensitivity”
(Gorz 1989, 86).
[emphasis mine]
The easiest place to see intimacy as this becomes 
a part of the body is in music, art, and dance: in the 
body’s intimate skilling with instruments, objects, and 
movement.  Here the connection to and through the 
body is applied to gesture, melody, rhythm, shape, or 
color to produce a result that can only be attributed 
to the body’s intimate skills.  In recent decades, pro-
fessional sport has become more like art or dance in 
this way, and the bodies of athletes filmed in slow 
motion reveal similar skills.  
The appreciation of  art and music usually com-
bines the facility for making distinctions (as Bourdieu 
reminds us) with an attraction to the persons (and 
bodies) who can perform these feats.  Musicians, art-
ists, and sports figures inspire fanatical devotion in 
others who see, or believe they see, not only the vir-
tuoso ability of their “star” but some intimate quality 
that is necessarily genuine.   The idea that artists are 
somehow “more alive” or “more attuned to their  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Intimacy is first a connection to the body —71—environment” is a transference of the bodily intimacy 
that surrounds the artist’s skill to a more general 
capacity for intimacy.   The attraction of visible inti-
macy in art, the seduction that the artistic spectacle of 
“sensitivity” creates, is linked to the later necessary 
moment of intimacy: to its potential sharing.  
“ When the new connections
between sexuality and intimacy
were formed, however, sexuality
became much more completely
separated from procreation than
before.  Sexuality became doubly
constituted as a medium of self-
realisation and as a prime means,
as well as an expression, of inti-
macy.  Sexuality has here lost its
extrinsic connections with wider
traditions and ethics, as well as
with the succession of the genera-
tions”
(Giddens 1991, 164).
The expectation that a talented painter should be 
talented in other applications of intimacy may more 
often than not prove over-optimistic, but the logic of 
this expectation is not entirely wrong.  It simply 
neglects to account for the singularity of skilling in any 
art form.  The same person who will not expect a 
painter to necessarily play the piano, may still assume 
that the painter’s intimate relation to her canvas is 
transportable to private conversations and personal 
intimacy.  This kind of assumption is probably stron-
gest with fiction writers who might have penned pas-
sionate conversations in their last novel, and who are 
thus (mis)taken as being skilled in personal intimacy.  
However, writing, like painting, is a solo performance.  
mutual trust
Personal intimacy, now tied to a reflexivized sexu-
ality, is keyed to mutual trust, and trust is a gamble 
where each person contributes their own stock of 
mettle and assumes that the other(s) have their own: 
“To trust the other is also to gamble upon the capabil-
ity of the individual actually to be able to act with 
integrity” (Giddens 1992, 138).   Getting involved with 
an artist is a tactic aimed at reducing the risk of this 
wager (of course the attraction of popularity is  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Intimacy is first a connection to the body —72—another feature of this: the hope that popularity will 
“rub-off”).
“In the pure relationship, trust has
no external supports, and has to
be developed on the basis of inti-
macy.  Trust is a vesting of confi-
dence in the other and also in the
capability of the mutual bond to
withstand future traumas”
(Giddens 1992, 138).
The point here is that individuals enter into inti-
mate relationships, the continuation of which is deter-
mined by their capability in intimacy.  In much the 
same way that each member of a music ensemble 
must trust the capabilities of the others, so too, each 
partner in an intimate relationship needs to trust that 
the other partner(s) have been adequately skilled in 
the ways of personal intimacy.  These skills, like the 
talent of a top ballet star, are kept in the body, in a 
repository of the results of prior rehearsals, perfor-
mances, failures, and lessons.  
Intimacy is first a connection to the body.  It is 
the body that sends the signals that the ongoing con-
versation (the discursive requirement of intimacy) is 
sincere.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Intimacy is always shared —73—Intimacy is always shared 22
Intimacy is always shared
“To say that Madame Merle
improved on acquaintance states
meagrely the impression she
made on her friend, who had
found her from the first so ample
and so easy.
At the end of an intimacy of three
months Isabel felt she knew her
better; her character had revealed
itself, and the admirable woman
had also at last redeemed her
promise of relating her history
from her own point of view-a con-
summation the more desirable as
Isabel had already heard it related
from the point of view of others”
(Henry James, The Portrait of a
Lady).
The shared aspect of intimacy means simply that 
this must be reciprocal, otherwise it becomes a simple 
confession.  The priest listening to the confessions of 
the sinner does so through a screen and makes no 
confessions himself.  The paid sex worker goes 
through the motions of emotion and physical intimacy 
without giving sharing in what is really a sexual confes-
sion, and not intimate at all.
The moment of sharing is the performance of 
intimacy.  Where the skilling in the body is its 
rehearsal, intimacy is performed only as a shared 
action.   This means too that artists, musicians, etc., do 
share the intimacy of their art with those who appre-
ciate this (but it does not mean that they share a per-
sonal intimacy with their audience).  
It is this sharing that brings to the front the 
notion of trust.
The pure relationship is focused on intimacy, which is a major condition of any long-term stability
the partners might achieve.  Intimacy has to be distinguished from the more negative phenomenon of
lack of privacy, characteristic of most circumstances of life in pre-modern Europe and in many non-
modern cultures generally (Giddens 1991, 94). TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—A festival counters the dominant bourgeois lifestyle logic —74—A festival counters the dominant bourgeois lifestyle logic 23
A festival counters the dominant bourgeois lifestyle logic
“Objective distance from neces-
sity and from those trapped within
it combines with a conscious dis-
tance which doubles freedom by
exhibiting it. As the objective dis-
tance from necessity grows, life-
style increasingly becomes the
product of what Weber calls a
'stylization of life', a systematic
commitment which orients and
organizes the most diverse prac-
tices—the choice of a vintage or a
cheese or the decoration of a holi-
day home in the country. This
affirmation of power over a domi-
nated necessity always implies a
claim to a legitimate superiority
over those who, because they can-
not assert the same contempt for
contingencies in gratuitous luxury
and conspicuous consumption,
remain dominated by ordinary
interests and urgencies....”
(Bourdieu 1984, 55-56).
This is not simply a wishful bit of nominalism, but 
one of those aspects of festivals that need further 
examination.  Implied herein is an assumption that 
should there be a dominant lifestyle logic available at 
the place of the festival, and should this be describable 
in relation to some description of  a local “bourgeoi-
sie,” then a festival in this locale will operate counter 
to this.  Such a statement is constructed as much on 
the description of (globally available) bourgeois life-
style practices as it on notions of festival practices.  
The bourgeois life-style is at its core a spectacular dis-
play of the “affirmation of power over a dominated 
necessity,” as Bourdieu call this (See: left).   
To live in a world that seems comfortable, where 
economic and physical threats are remote from the 
quotidian flow of time: this is a life project goal at the 
center of the bourgeois lifestyle.  A history of the pur-
suit of this goal would include global institutions for 
policing and intelligence, agencies for insurance and 
transportation safety, for health care and, most 
recently, for environmental management. 
All of these institutions provide several rationales 
for their cost, but they are each a party to the mainte-
nance of a threshold of care-free comfort that lies at 
the core of the bourgeois life project.  This becomes 
most noticeable in the travel industry, where the 
transportation, feeding, lodging and entertainment of 
millions of tourists must be accomplished without any  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—A festival counters the dominant bourgeois lifestyle logic —75—gaps in the “comfort bubble” that is meant to enve-
lope the traveler from doorstep to doorstep.
Of course, the irony here is that this “bubble” 
also separates the tourist from the places they have 
travelled to.  Their journey is an expense of time and 
money, much of which is spent avoiding their destina-
tions.  And when they stay at home, these tourists still 
expect that the level of comfort and safety that they 
have acquired in their neighborhoods1will do nothing 
if not improve over time.   The bubble is created for/
by them on The Street.   The festival breaks this bubble.
A festival displays the domination of necessity, the 
hunger for desire, a need for laughter.  And so a 
“bourgeois festival” is oxymoronic (elsewhere, as in 
Disneyland’s new “Festival of Fools,” the “oxy-” is 
optional).  The most obvious elements in this claim are 
the direct connections of the festival to the body and 
to a type of sexuality (or sensuality) that is not deter-
mined by institutionalized “tastes.”  Also, in festival 
there is the ad hoc quality of physical resources: which 
may be gathered from refuse or modified from every-
day objects.  The inclusion of women and of (other) 
marginal groups also works against the exclusivity of 
the bourgeois public sphere.  The nature of festival 
performance, and the skilling it requires and pro-
motes, is also a factor in this theory.  
While this concept entails that events that do not 
1. This expectation chooses to forget that, in the current world market, much of the comfort 
that nations with high-percentage middle-class populations enjoy is paid for by the lack of 
comfort of the populations of other nations and other groups within the nation.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—A festival counters the dominant bourgeois lifestyle logic —76—counter the bourgeois logic of the dominant lifestyle 
are not festivals, it does not entail that all events that 
counter the bourgeois logic of the dominant lifestyle 
are festivals.  Internal military actions against citizens, 
for example, also run against the liberal, democratic 
governmentality. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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A festival is a space of social therapy
Therapy, in its broadest sense, attempts to bring 
unconsciously (non-discursively) acquired problems 
into the conscious, discursive awareness.  Therapy 
works when it extends the reflexive ken of the person 
under therapy.  The festival, practiced in public places, 
extends the reflexive apparatus of the community, 
bringing into its discourse those practices (and histo-
ries) of domination that normally—and necessarily—
exist outside of the ken of its members.  The festival is 
a model site for collective therapy.
A festival opens up a space of voluntary discourse 
and a democratic recoding of knowledges that are 
previously unavailable for comment.  This space is an 
arena for public meta-commentaries about the social 
circumstances of the community.   In short the festival 
is a discursive space where the availability of shared 
intimacy creates the potential for bringing into dis-
course circumstances that would otherwise remain 
misunderstood and thus oppressive.
Festivals are many things at the same time, so I do 
not want to imply that their therapeutic potential—
which will be explored below—confers their only, or 
in some places, their main use.  One can certainly 
imagine a festival where its space of therapy is rarely 
used, even as one can imagine a city neighborhood 
where social therapy is sorely needed. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Domination produces silences
“...the basis of criticism is not in
theory but in the taste a lived
experience of the world has for
the person experiencing it.  The
task of theory (or rather philoso-
phy) and literature, each in its
own way and at its own level, will
be to unravel the web of the domi-
nant discourse which reduces
lived experience to silence”
(Gorz 1989, 87).
Against the general notion of ideology as the 
articulation and enforcement of particular ideals 
(ideas with teeth), we have to also note the great 
silences between these ideals.  If you add up the dis-
cursive space of a dominant discourse and that of the 
implied silences, the space of silence far exceeds that 
of articulation.  Everything that “goes-without-saying” 
also belongs to the discourse that speaks through 
those who are authorized to do so.
Foucault put this well in his History of Sexuality:
“Silence itself—the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is
required between different speakers—is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from
which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said,
with them and in relation to them within over-all strategies.  There is no binary division to be made
between what one says and what one does not say; we must try to determine the different ways of
not saying such things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed,
which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of discretion is required in either case.  There
is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and perme-
ate discourses.  (1990, 27).
This notion, following Foucault, points to silences 
within the public sphere.  To look at silence as an 
expected outcome of the practices that dominate dis-
cursive fields shows this “black matter” that is as 
much a part of the field as what is said.  
On type of counter-discourse is to get up in pub-
lic and speaks what goes-without-saying.  Political sat-
ire can reveal the arbitrariness of government 
authority (a feature of governmentalities that govern-
ments will not speak about).  But most of all, realizing 
that silence is a product of domination opens up the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Domination produces silences —79—process of self reflection to explore the unexpressed, 
forbidden gray reaches of the imagination. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Practice creates its place —80—Practice creates its place 26
Practice creates its place
One of the great frustrations of planners and 
architects is that the users of their plans and buildings 
often find ways to make these into something different 
than was originally intended.   These later appropria-
tions of spaces disregard what the planner assumed 
would be the appropriate uses of them.  Such later, ad 
hoc uses may be only temporary or they may be more 
permanent.  Goffman provides us with a useful exam-
ple:
“The great modern case is President Grayson Kirk's office during the 1968 unpleasantness at
Columbia: 
    ‘One and a half hours after the President's suite had been cleared of student
demonstrators, Grayson Kirk stood in the center of his private office looking at
the blankets, cigarette butts and orange peels that covered his rug. Turning to  A.
M. Rosenthal of The New York Times and several other reporters who had come
into the office with him he murmured, "My God, how could human beings do a
thing like this?" It was the only time, Truman recalled later, that he had ever seen
the President break down. Kirk's windows were crisscrossed with tape and on
one hung a large sign reading, "Join Us." His lampshades were torn, his carpet
was spotted, his furniture was displaced and scratched. But the most evident and
disturbing aspect of the scene was not the minor damage inflicted by the students.
The everything-in-its-place decor to which Kirk had grown accustomed was now
in disarray—disarray that was the result of the transformation of an office into the
living quarters of l50 students during the past six days’ (quoted from: Avorn, et
al., 1969. p. 200).
 The great sociological question, of course, is not how could it be that human beings would do a
thing like this, but rather how is it that human beings do this sort of thing so rarely. How come per-
sons in authority have been so overwhelmingly successful in conning those beneath them into keep-
ing the hell out of their offices?”    (Goffman 1971, 288).
For the larger majority of people who are neither 
architects nor university presidents, the occupation of 
space is a continual problem and opportunity.  Living  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Practice creates its place —81—in spaces designed by others, often for uses that are 
no longer useful, coping with advances in technology, 
and aging infrastructure: people more or less make do.
Counter-domination
“But should a stranger or
employer or a janitor or police-
man approach the two players, it
will usually be quite sufficient to
know that the men are playing a
board game. The gearing of the
game into the immediately sur-
rounding workaday world is
largely in terms of this relatively
abstract categorization, for what
are involved are such matters as
the electric light, the room space,
the time needed, the right of oth-
ers to openly watch and under cer-
tain circumstances to interrupt the
men and ask them to postpone the
game or shift its physical location,
the right of the players to phone
their wives to say they will be
delayed because of a game to fin-
ish. These and a host of other
detailed ways in which what is
going on must find a place in the
rest of the ongoing world are rela-
tively independent of which
game is being played. By and
large it is the mode of transforma-
tion, not what is thus transformed,
that is geared into the world. And
yet, of course, this independence
is not complete”
(Goffman 1974, 248).
This slipperiness of place, its vulnerability to prac-
tices, set the limit to the production of space as an act 
of domination.  Practices of domination attempt to 
produce spaces of domination, which will allow domi-
nation to occur as the sole practice in the place.  Pris-
ons use panoptic availability to prevent prisoners from 
performing counter-practices.  Cities use codes to 
prevent the homeless from using the streets as either 
work space (panhandling) or housing (sleeping or def-
ecating). 
Counter-dominant practices create counter-
spaces by disattending to the spatial logic of the domi-
nant order.  Alternative rules and unofficial attitudes 
(such as cynicism) tactically retrieve a space for use by 
a local practice.   More profound transformations of 
space by practice require pre-planning and an alterna-
tive logic.  Jokes are a clear example of this, as are fes-
tivals.  
Counter-domination opens up spaces within the 
dominant order.  But the opposite is also true.  The 
market/state has tremendous resources, and author-
ity, as well as longevity.   It can quickly reseal the open-
ings that counter-events have made.  The longer term 
answer is to reveal and remove the practices of domi-
nation within the market/state, to democratize 
democracy and capitalism.  Only then will the prac- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Practice creates its place —82—tices of government and the market create places that 
are open and available to all. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The festival performs what it proposes
A festival performs its goals, these are internal to 
the event.   This little concept fronts the performativity 
of festival practices.  It also hints at the need to repeat 
the festival event: as much as the performance is the 
goal, its effect is established through a practice of iter-
ation.   Iteration provides the memory of the festival.
“...Liminal propositions, or what
Turner also called ‘frames,’ are
‘privileged spaces where people
are allowed to think about how
they think, about the terms in
which they conduct their thinking,
or to feel about how they feel
about daily life.’ These frames
place the spectator outside the
system of instrumental proposi-
tions and objective measures
used to conduct daily life. They
recognize that other scrutinizing
and evaluating procedures, really
meta-languages, are required to
talk about the system itself. At
times the space of the city takes
on this sense of liminality, it
becomes a text to be read or a
space to enter in order to retreat
from and subsequently reflect on
the social order and cultural sig-
nificance of its architectural pas-
sages and transformations....”
(Boyer 1994, 211).
One idea here is to make a clear distinction 
between festivals and spectacles, the latter which dis-
play features external to the event: status markers of 
powerful, famous, or historically noted individuals, or 
reminders of military and police strength.  
Think of spectacle parade as holding up a wall of 
specially constructed mirrors that reflect into the eyes 
of onlookers the surrounding buildings and their occu-
pants in a light complimentary to the parade’s organiz-
ers.  
And then think of a festival parade as surrounding 
itself with mirrors that shut out the gaze of onlookers, 
and distort and reassemble the identities of those 
within the parade, rendering external distinctions 
indistinct, and opening up to laughter, reflection, and 
sudden insight.   This moment is the goal of the festi-
val.
There is a tendency in the social sciences (in part 
because of an economistic bent) to only ask what 
effect the festival has on quotidian life, to view the fes-
tival as an “episode” and everyday life and work as pri-
mary and external to such cultural episodes.  In  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—The festival performs what it proposes —84—response to this tendency, there are a couple of fea-
tures of festivals that need to be looked at.  The first is 
the need for rehearsal, and the second is the availabil-
ity of “doubleness.”  
A festival does not simply erupt from the street 
(there are a few exceptions to this), it is organized and 
rehearsed throughout the year.  And so it is active in 
the lives and relationships of its participants all year 
around.  It is its own “lifestyle.”  This means it adds 
another “lifestyle” onto that provided by the market/
state.  This “doubling” of lifestyle helps to decenter 
consumerist lifestyle production in the life projects of 
individuals (one aspect of the festival countering the 
bourgeois lifestyle [see: A festival counters the dominant 
bourgeois lifestyle logic]).  A festival becomes a double 
identity, which attaches to its performers and to its 
sites.  Space is also doubled, and the street is made lia-
ble to short-term ad hoc appropriations by those who 
already know it as a festival space.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —85—State-nation modernity 28
State-nation modernity
“Modernity produces certain dis-
tinct social forms, of which the
most prominent is the nation-
state.  A banal observation, of
course, until one remembers the
established tendency of sociology
to concentrate on 'society' as its
designated subject-matter.  The
sociologist's 'society', applied to
the period of modernity at any
rate, is a nation-state, but this is
usually a covert equation rather
than an explicitly theorised one.
As a socio-political entity the
nation-state contrasts in a funda-
mental way with most types of
traditional order. It develops only
as part of a wider nation-state sys-
tem (which today has become glo-
bal in character), has very specific
forms of territoriality and surveil-
lance capabilities, and monopo-
lises effective control over the
means of violence”
(Giddens 1991, 15).
“Modernity” is too often a term used as unprob-
lematic in the singular.   And the processes that lead to 
and through this period are too often considered as 
uniform and ubiquitous.  Scholars working in and on 
Asian locales have led a counter-argument which 
notes that a plurality of modernities are to be found, 
each responding to local historical circumstances.  At 
the same time, there is no escaping the globalizing 
aspect of modernity, which includes the development 
of nation-states in geographical and organizational 
counter-position to one another.   So too, the disem-
bedding features of modern nation formation have 
unlinked internal locales from local histories, recoding 
these as sites of the nation.   And competition among 
nations steers their internal formations, resulting in 
homologous institutional arenas where the global 
holds sway over the local. 
Industrialization, militarization, capital formation: 
there are several arenas within modernity where 
states compete.  And this competition brings them 
into a dialogic relationship that reduces inter-national 
differences.   Institutions learn from each other, and 
copy one another in the process.  As with the bodies 
competitive athletes,  modern states begin to resem-
ble each other as they individually strive to master 
similar practices.
However,  internal “governmentalities” in each 
nation also reflects a local history of rules (and rul- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —86—ers), and of powers and places.  But here, too, in a 
general—however, I would venture, in a productive—
manner, we can speak of dominant modes of governmen-
tality as well as localized practices.  These modes of 
modern government are plural, but not as numerous 
as nations, and not as diverse as states might profess.  
Here I am using Foucault’s term, “government” in 
a meaning field that Foucault supplied: 
“The things with which in this sense government is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in
their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources,
means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in
their relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc.; lastly,
men in their relation to that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidem-
ics, death, etc.” (1991, 93).
Government, and its underlying “governmental-
ity” is the dominant discourse of relationships among 
people, and between people and cultural objects. 
Government is not restricted to the relations 
between the state and the individual, although this 
relationship in modernity has a marked quality 
because of the state’s monopoly over the means of 
violence—both carceral and military.  And there are 
also nations where the state’s hegemonic interests 
spread far wider than a control over the means of vio-
lence.  In fact, here is where the major difference 
among locally-present modernities is to be found.  
State-nations and nation-states
In some countries, the ruling state acquires a pur-
view that has few limits, while in others, the state 
operates within externally imposed limits, and other 
institutions operate more-or-less external to the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —87—state.   The latter “nation-states” display a form of 
modern state that is found, for example, in places in 
North America and Europe, and is the primary model 
for a modernity (of the West) where issues of civil 
society and the public sphere are central to critiques 
of modernity.  
The former (in order to distinguish them from 
the latter, I call these “state-nations”—as they tend to 
put the interests of the state at the front of the 
nation) are found, for example, in most places in Asia 
and Africa. In these countries, descriptions of the 
state, in its many interventions into the lives of its citi-
zens, form the main critique of local modernities.  
“For Deleuze and Guattari, desire
is neither inherently good nor bad,
only dynamic and productive;
desiring-machines can travel
along the path of becoming revo-
lutionary as well as becoming-fas-
cist; lines of escape can turn into
lines of liberation or destruction”
(Best and Kellner 1991, 105).
It is important to see both modes of modernity 
as a) informing the other, and b) capable of transform-
ing into the other.  State organizations in nation-states 
may envy those of state-nations, where the purview of 
state institutions is much broader.  So too, civil organi-
zations in state-nations may envy those in nation-
states for the latter’s greater liberty of independent 
action and influence.  Capitalist organizations recog-
nize the benefits of direct government support for 
research under state-nation conditions, but also com-
plain about state controls on the marketplace.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —88—“Reich is at his profoundest as a
thinker when he refuses to accept
ignorance or illusion on the part
of the masses as an explanation of
fascism, and demands an explana-
tion that will take their desires
into account, an explanation for-
mulated in terms of desire: no, the
masses were not innocent dupes;
at a certain point, under a certain
set of conditions, they wanted fas-
cism, and it is this perversion of
the desire of the masses that needs
to be accounted for”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 29).
Both modes of modernity are, to some extent, 
keyed to the desires of their citizenry (although this 
connection generally includes paternalist attempts at 
control over these desires).  And, to the extent that 
these desires, however articulated, are met, then the 
mode may be considered to have succeeded.  Today, 
both modes of modernity are increasingly linked to a 
“capitalist-production machine” (to use Deleuze and 
Guattari’s term) that is, itself, increasingly global in 
scope.  Of late, this machine has become more central 
to the articulation of lifestyle desires, desires that may 
run counter to existing or proposed state-nation or 
nation-state programs.
 Both modes are not ever fully realized, but 
reflect plateaus where the tensions between the state 
and its population are resolvable.  A universal com-
mand over the lives of its citizens is generally beyond 
the reach of even the strongest state, and so state-
nations are only relatively state-centered.  And, con-
versely, full independence from the state is not gener-
ally possible for civil-society organizations, and so 
nation-states are only relatively public-centered.  
Several attempts at achieving a dual state-nation/
nation-state: where the state behaves like a state-
nation in terms of supplying social resources, but also 
acts like a nation-state in terms of economic and pub-
lic-sphere issues have mostly failed, and this mostly 
because of the fluidity of capital.   “Liberal welfare 
states” use tax monies to provide state support for  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —89—social services1, but corporations and wealthy individ-
uals can simply move away, or take their profit centers 
off-shore, and so pay few taxes, creating a chronic 
under-funding situation that eventually undermines the 
state.   
1. A few states, such as Norway, have natural resources (e.g., oil) that they sell to fund social 
services.  This represents a temporary, artificial, situation.  China’s recent move to incorpo-
rate market capitalism within state-nation modernity is the most recent attempt to create 
hybrid state-nation/nation-state.  
“The fact that the welfare state
becomes a focus of conflict as
much as reducing it puts limits on
the fiscal resources that can be
generated to fund its services. ...
The 'taxpayer's revolt' places lim-
its on the resources governments
can muster to pay for the welfare
state in circumstances where they
have to compete for marginal
votes in the electoral system. This
squeeze tends to get tighter rather
than to relax. As levels of voter
dealignment grow, the parties can
rely less and less on their estab-
lished supporters alone and have
to capture those in the middle; a
resistance develops to paying
marginal rates of tax once broadly
acceptable to those who carried
the burden”
(Giddens 1994, 75-76).
In some countries, such as in Hungary,  a history 
of state-nation modernity is being challenged by social 
movements in favor of a public-centered nation-
state.   Other countries hold a history of movement in 
the opposite direction—from a nation-state to a 
state-nation—as Germany did in the 1930s.  
Most countries are still working within the found-
ing situations of their own modernity, and it is impor-
tant, when critiquing their current situation, not to 
direct an argument to this which lacks a purchase on 
the mode of modernity which holds sway locally. 
Now, the distinction between nation-states and state-
nations does not correspond directly to any of the 
“classical” modern political discourses: left-right, lib-
eral-conservative, socialist-capitalist, etc.  Instead it 
points to the role of the state2 and that of the public 
sphere within a nation as an outcome of a local, mod-
ern governmentality.  
2. As such it resembles the conservative/liberal (there is some debate about who “owns” this 
position) distrust-of-government discourse at times, and it also includes a more radical cri-
tique state-like authority in all organizations and groups, including families, e.g., a counter-











“Although he resigned in 1989
following charges of corruption,
Takeshita’s brainchild, the Furu-
sato kon no kai (Spirit of Furusato
Association) was adopted by the
present (1989) prime minister,
Kaifu Toshiki, as his personal
advisory committee.  Political
factionalism aside, the LDP as a
whole regards furusato-zukuri as
the means by which to forge a
new ‘cultural state’ (bunka kokka)
in tandem with a ‘new Japanese-
style welfare state’ (‘Nihonsei no
atarashii fukushi kokka’)”
(Robertson 1991, 26).
Japan, for example, is a place where a certain con-
tour of modernity has been accomplished, a matrix of 
modernizations and reflexive institutionalities that in 
their combination assemble what might be called a 
“state-nation modernity:” a modernity where agencies 
the state figure centrally in modernization and mod-
ern institutionalities.
State-nation modernity occurs in nations in sev-
ral parts of the world.  It is one of the stable forms of 
modernity that have emerged in this century.   Its 
basis is a strong, centralized government and a deter-
mined program of control over economic and social 
forms of life.  For decades it has been the main form 
of the modern state for more than half of the popula-
tion of the world.
State-nation modernity has the following six pri-
mary features:
1. Strong central state control over or active manag
ment of the means of production within the natio
2. Centralized governmental control over or manag
ment of health, education, cultural, and social pr
grams;
3. Centralized control over local governmental age
cies;
4. Centralized state control over or active manage-
ment of mass media, particularly over broadcast
media and newspapers;
5. A weak and ineffective public sphere either withi
or external to the state;
6. A court system dominated by the interests of the
central state, and a strong national police. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —91—“Conscious control means eco-
nomic planning, which to be
effective even in principle has to
be largely centralized. In socialist
theory, this forms a ‘cybernetic
model’ of economic organization.
The socialist economy (not the
state, which disappears') is regu-
lated through a 'higher order intel-
ligence', the economic brain,
which controls 'lower order' eco-
nomic inputs and outputs. As one
prominent author of the earlier
part of the century put it, produc-
tion and distribution will be regu-
lated by 'the local, regional, or
national commissars', who
'shape, with conscious foresight,
the whole economic life of the
communities of which they are
the appointed representatives and
leaders, in accordance with the
needs of their members'
(Giddens 1994, 58).”
Most generally, we find a strong centralized state 
that pursues a national state interest in the economy 
(through nationalized industries or through bureau-
cratic intervention), and an interest in providing for 
health care, education, and a variety of social 
resources, together with an interest in managing mass 
media and in using the justice and penal systems in the 
service of the state.   
The weak public sphere may be seen as an out-
come of the strong state, but is, I believe, more a pri-
mary feature of the relationship between the state and 
its population within the circumstances of state-nation 
modernity.  As the state is the primary conduit for all 
decisions of public interest, other arenas become 
peripheralized.
The state that emerges within conditions of state-
nation modernity uses its institutions to exert con-
scious control over the economic, cultural, and social 
lives of its population.  This control has been charac-
terized by Anthony Giddens (1994) on the model of a 
“cybernetic” organism, where the state is the mechan-
ical brain, and the population its organic body.  The 
notion of Cybernetic governmentalities articulates the dis-
tance between the state and its polity, a distance that 
magnifies the power of the state to act upon its popu-
lation, as the latter is fully objectified as a field of 
operation for the state. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —92—“This politics of The Prince, ficti-
tious or otherwise, from which
people sought to distance them-
selves, was characterized by one
principle: for Machiavelli, it was
alleged, the prince stood in a rela-
tion of singularity and externality,
and thus of transcendence, to his
principality.  The prince acquires
his principality by inheritance or
conquest, but in any case he does
not form part of it, he remains
external to it”
(Foucault 1991, 89-90).
 State-nations are countries where the state has 
not rejected the externality of the sovereign state in 
favor of the internality of the democratic state.  The 
state becomes positioned outside of the population.  
It announces its interests as those of the population, 
and it proceeds on their behalf, but it is not subject to 
interrogation by or oversight from the population via 
the public sphere.  This produces a weakened public 
sphere both within (e.g., in the instrumentalities of 
parliamentary discussions and decisions) and outside 
of the state.   
All the democracy that fits Given the widespread persistence of sovereign 
governmentalities (including colonial ones) up to this 
century, and the ready-made access to economic 
means that this form of governmentality provides to a 
ruling elite, it is really not surprising that subsequent, 
modern states have, on the whole, not embraced the 
internalization of power that would erode and replace 
this governmentality with that of an actually demo-
cratic state.  The practical advantages of  ruling under 
sovereign conditions are not obscure.  
Varieties of “democracy” have thus emerged in 
many countries that are not actually supported from a 
democratic logic, but which offer a modicum of 
democracy1 as a legitimizing feature both internally 
and externally.   State-nations use the discourses of 
1. Even the most “democratic” of democracies (wherever these may be found) struggle with 
questions over where and when a democratic logic should apply.  The notion of democracy 
within the family in the U.S. is an example of this debate, as is the notion of democracy 
within the military. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —93—democracy to code their own practices, but in the 
form of an alibi, rather than a logic of practice.  
“Japan’s experience demonstrates
the insufficiency of equating
democracy with the formal or
nominal presence of certain insti-
tutions.  The country is not a
democracy in the Western sense”
(Herzog 1993, 18).
This opens up the states of state-nations to cri-
tiques of democracy as this is practiced by the state.  
However, an expectation of democracy in state-
nations is not well-founded as a critique of the state’s 
role in the state-nation.   The same holds for expecta-
tions on an independent public sphere within state-
nation modernity.  What public discourse does take 
place in these circumstances is produced by or with 
the consent of the state, and so an independent public 
sphere is not an available option.  
Critiques of local democracy acquire usefulness in 
the larger critique of modernity, that is, of the choice 
of the mode of modernity itself.  Those who, like Her-
zog (1993), would argue that Japan is not a democ-
racy, hold a misplaced expectation, given the state-
nation modernity of which Japan is a well-formed 
example.  But those who would critique Japan’s choice 
of state-nation modernity as the locally practiced 
mode can use notions of democracy to articulate 
alternative—nation-state style—modes of modernity.  
The democratization of Japan, should this occur, 
would not only necessitate that the existing institu-
tions (the constitution, the diet, etc.) operate as they 
now claim to do, but a more fundamental break from 
the state itself as the instrument of governmentality, 
and also a break from the paternalist governmentality 
that informs not only the state’s position vis-à-vis its 
population, but also relationships within corporations,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —94—factories, schools, and families.  
In short, democratization, as this process is pur-
sued and critiqued within and about nation-states, is 
an ongoing recoding of relationships at all levels of 
society, and, most importantly under capitalist eco-
nomic systems, a recoding of the relationship between 
people and cultural objects.   
A critique of democracy within a state-nation is 
thus an external critique of the persistence of the 
state-nation system of governmentality, and necessar-
ily includes a counter-public critique of the lack of a 
public sphere as the forum where such discussions can 
take place.  But here we have to also mention that cri-
tiques of democracy within nation-states have also led 
to the formation of state-nations, even where there 
already exists a public sphere and a civil society. 
Where there is an pre-existing strong public 
sphere (such as in Germany before 1933), the move-
ment toward state-nation modernity is characterized 
by a state rhetoric of “national interests” and an ero-
sion of public sphere discourse as a means for deci-
sion making or oversight of the state.  This erosion is 
coupled to state efforts in acquiring control over the 
media, which may be accomplished under the ratio-
nale of  “protecting” national interests.   Finally, the 
centralization of institutional powers provides the 
central state with the means to direct the economic 
and social lives of its citizens.  
Where there not a pre-existing strong public 
sphere, such as in cases of direct transfer of power  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —95—from a princely state (as in the Soviet Union, Iran, or 
Japan) or from a colonial state (as in Indonesia), or 
both (as in China), the emerging modern state might 
suddenly acquire an ability to speak on behalf of “the 
national interest” and a centralized state apparatus 
may already be in place.   Under these circumstances, 
the notion of a strong public sphere or of active non-
governmental organizations would only threaten the 
ability of the state to govern1 in the manner in which 
it now operates.   
With the collapse of communist regimes in 
Europe it may be tempting to typify the state-nation 
form of modernity by reference to these, and so to 
announce that this is no longer a viable alternative for 
local modernities anywhere in on the globe.  How-
ever, state-nation modernity is still the most prevalent 
form of modernity on the globe, and it is nowhere 
more evident than in Asia.   And in Asia, it is today not 
linked to the Titanic adventures of state socialism, but 
rather rides the tigers of Asian capitalism.
Japan is a reasonable example of a state within a 
state-nation modernity, and it demonstrates how this 
type of modernity can foster rapid industrial growth at 
1. This type of modernity is also a current feature in debates internal to countries such as 
Great Britain and the United States.    While both the left and the right have expressed con-
cerns about state control, the left still looks to expand the state interest in social welfare 
intervention into the economy and society, and the right seeks to expand state cooperation 
with national economic/corporate interests.   However, where these debates are carried on 
within the public sphere, few suggest that the state be given more control over the media or 
the courts.  These controls occur only within conditions of state-nation modernity or some 
other form of modern nation-state (e.g., colonial governments) that has suppressed role of 
the public sphere. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —96—a national level.   By harnessing its control over the 
“national interests” of the population and corpora-
tions, central government planners in Japan created 
one of the world’s largest economies within a space of 
forty years.   And much of this economic growth can 
be described as the outcome of this nation’s fostering 
its own state-nation modernity1.  
The consequences of state-nation modernity 
include a strong state with an enhanced capacity to 
direct the lives of individuals, and with the means to 
plan for and invest in economic and social programs of 
national scope, on the long term.  Under these cir-
cumstances the public sphere is also “privatized” by 
the state (see also: Private public sphere).  And so we 
now see the growth of “state sponsored non-govern-
mental organizations” in nations such as Malaysia.   
The state penetrates the lives of individuals and 
encompasses the arenas for social and cultural partici-
pation.   
Such a state looks to legitimate its actions 
through the seamless appearance of its capability to 
plan for the future, and its own servitude to the 
national interests it articulates and promotes.  Its 
legitimacy does not rest on the claims it might make 
1. However, economic growth has been much more elusive for other nations that share this 
type of modernity, and so it is really not possible to make any prediction about the eco-
nomic consequences of state-nation modernity.  The lack of transparency in the relation-
ship between the state and the nation’s economic institutions (banks, insurance 
companies, and corporations) possible within state-nation modernity opens up a space for 
cooperation that can be used to promote overall economic growth and it can be used to 
hide gifts and favors that increase the transaction costs within the economy and hinder 
economic growth. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —97—as a democratic state.  Most of the population can dis-
cern how democratic a state is despite its own claims.  
However, the state becomes implicated in the goals it 
announces for national progress.  As long as these are 
attractive (or reasonable) and it subsequently meets 
them, it is not liable to critiques over its lack of demo-
cratic decision-making.  As formerly applied to the 
king (or the colonial power) this type of modern gov-
ernment often replaced, the state’s “sovereign” legiti-
macy hinges on a combination of evident benevolence, 
ultimate justice, and visible power.  
Above I mentioned that there are two dominant 
modes of modern governmentality.   Under the cir-
cumstances of nation-states where we find a strong 
public sphere (e.g., a public sphere that is involved not 
only in discussion, but in actual decision making) one 
of the possible outcomes a nation-state modernity: a 
modernity where a strong public sphere, a state appa-
ratus, and an independent marketplace confront each 
other in an open-ended contest where overall control 
is not possible or even desirable.  
nation-state modernity  While state-nation modernity may be described 
as conservative, as it maintains a prior “sovereign” 
governmentality, nation-state modernity is an experi-
ment in working democracy.  These states are marked 
in their formation by events (and today, by memorial-
ized sites) of democratic resistance to absolute sover-
eign rule, although, as state socialism reminds us, this 
history is not sufficient to warrant an ensuing dis-











e following six primary features:
7. Weak state control over or active management o
the means of production within the nation;
8. Weak central governmental control over or man-
agement of health, education, cultural, and socia
programs and active non-governmental organiza
tions in these areas;
9. Decentralized decision making: local governmen
tal agencies have more control over resources a
programs;
10. Weak state control over or active management o
mass media—and so strong legal protections an
social sentiments protecting the media from gov
ernment control;
11. A relatively strong public sphere both within and
external to the state;
12. A court system able to counter the interests of th
state, and localized law-enforcement.
During the past hundred years several states have 
approached this mode of modernity, and others have 
abandoned it.  National Socialism in Germany rejected 
this form of modernity in the 1930s in favor of state-
nation modernity.  The return of the king in Spain 
marked another move away from nation-state moder-
nity.   And welfare-state programs in nations of Europe 
and North America have tended to allow the state to 
penetrate the lives of citizens in much the same fash-
ion as states under state-nation modernity.   These 
modes are not fixed in any one locale and continue to 
inform and compete1 with each other.    Today, several 
countries are moving toward one or the other of the 
1. For example, US semiconductor companies have looked to the Japanese government/cor-
porate research practices and have pushed for similar practices at home.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —99—modal modernities.  And so there is an international 
discourse that critiques both modes, however this has 
often failed to recognize them both as “modern.”  Too 
often, state-nations have been seen as “pre-modern.”
The following illustrates the main tensions between state-nation and nation-state modernities:
Features of the two 
modal modernities
State-nation and nation-state modernities repre-
sent modal conditions for local modernities, condi-
tions that reflect the local relationship between the 
state and its polity.  In nation-state modernity, the 
state has been internalized by the polity and 
reemerges as a government subject to what Foucault 
























B.  External public sphere presence...
STRONGER/MOREWEAKER/FEWER
public arenas for discussion
media sources
memorialized spaces of democratization
non-government organizations
legal courts of appeal
cultural organizations












(1997) called “the question of liberalism:”   
“...liberalism resonates with the principle: ‘One always governs too
much’—or, at any rate, one always must suspect that one governs too muc
Governmentality should not be exercised without a ‘critique’ far more radi-
cal than a test of optimization. It should inquire not just as to the best (or
least costly) means of achieving its effects but also concerning the possibil
ity and even the lawfulness of its scheme for achieving effects. The suspi
cion that one always risks governing too much is inhabited by the question
Why, in fact, must one govern?”...  Liberal thought starts not from the exist-
ence of the state, seeing in the government the means for attaining that en
it would be for itself, but rather from society, which is in a complex relation
of exteriority and interiority with respect to the state. Society, as both a pre-
condition and a final end, is what enables one to no longer ask the questio
How can one govern as much as possible and at the least possible cos
Instead, the question becomes: Why must one govern? In other words, wh
makes it necessary for there to be a government, and what ends should
pursue with regard to society in order to justify its existence? (74-75 empha
sis added).
By viewing government as an unhappy compro-
mise predicated upon the current failings of society, 
liberalism1 imagines a society where the least amount 
of government is necessary, and looks to the practices 
that will realize this utopian vision.   
1. If this strikes the reader as a position closer to the “conservative” side of current debates, 
this is mainly because of another “liberal” concern—a suspicion of corporations and of the 
marketplace as a source of economic control.   It is about the role of the state as a check 
on the market and on corporations where “liberals” and “conservatives” (at least in the US 
and in Great Britain) as most at odds.
liberalism and the nation-
state
Looking at the history of liberalism in England, 
Germany, and the United States, Foucault notes that 
each case presents its own forms of liberalism, and  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —101—local distinctions between the state and civil society.  
But in each case, the above circumstances of nation-
state modernity are evident.  The presence of public-
sphere institutions that are external to the state actu-
ally mark the state’s position as internal to the public.  
The public sphere is what surrounds and sub-
tends the state.  Under these conditions, the state is 
not granted a controlling interest in the economy, nor 
in mass media, cultural production, or legal proceed-
ings1, etc..  These social practices might share the 
same techniques of government that the state uses 
(and this creates the problem of  “governmentality” as 
a logic that is hegemonic among even counter-state 
organizations), but they are managed independently 
from the state.  
In state-nation modernity the state maintains an 
(earlier developed) external position to the polity.  
This is its founding condition, and remains the opera-
tional logic.  Under these circumstances, the liberal 
question makes no sense.  Society has already been 
equated with the nation, and the state has already 
acquired control of the “national interest.”  
1. It is not inconsequential how judges and juries are selected, and at restrictions on access 
to courts.  State control over the proceedings of and access to criminal and civil courts is a 
hallmark of the state-nation. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —102—“The era of big government is
over”
US President Bill Clinton in a
State of the Union Address;
“The era of big, centralized gov-
ernment is over”
British Prime Minister Tony Blair
on the day of Scotland’s plebiscite
authorizing a Scottish parliament.
It must be noted that state institutions within 
nation-state modernity are not  “weakened”  because 
of the state’s lack of interest in controlling the eco-
nomic, social, or cultural lives of its citizens.   These 
states may seem “thin” compared to the “thicker” 
layer of state presence one finds everywhere in state-
nations, and there may be whole areas of life where 
the state plays no role at all (a circumstance that per-
sons accustomed to life in a state-nation may find diffi-
cult to imagine).  But even the “thinnest” state today 
still maintains its monopoly over the means of vio-
lence,  and it supports the nation’s legal infrastructure, 
collects its taxes, and usually shows some interest in 
economic matters, for example, monitoring the mar-
ket’s ability to monopolize economic resources 
against the interests of the consumer public.   (The 
state works to make rational and fair constraints on 
corporations, which, in turn, views these as onerous.)  
It may be said that today several countries in 
Europe and North America are well within the 
description of nation-state modernity, and that there 
is, in some other places, including Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, a movement toward this form of gov-
ernmentality.  This movement can be seen today in the 
collapse1 of the welfare-state governmentalities that 
were the liberal-social varieties of state-nation moder-
nity (e.g., “Thatcherism” in the United Kingdom), and 
1. Such changes can result from the influence of strong multinational market interests rather 
than from a strengthening of non-governmental civil society institutions to replace state-
welfare programs, and so these services (housing, food, health care) may simply disap-
pear as “rights” and be recoded as “commodities” available for a price. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —103—in the growth of civil-society institutions and public-
sphere arenas in former communist states.   
But it can also be said that state-nation modernity 
is, in many places, a central feature of the circum-
stances of modernity, and that this seems to be at 
least as durable in these places as nation-state moder-
nity is in other states.  In the People’s Republic of 
China, for example, despite changes in economic insti-
tutions, there has been little change of late in the 
desire of the central state to control the media, and 
to penetrate the lives of its population.  Notions of a 




As was mentioned above, “democracy” seems to 
be the single universal feature of all nations today—
either in its presence of absence, or both.  Each nation 
on the global pursues, or refuses to pursue, demo-
cratic governmentalities in ways that are imbricated 
within histories of local practices.  And so, definitions 
of “democracy” are debated locally in discourses that 
may not translate readily from nation to nation.  For 
example, state-nations may promote forms of 
“democracy” that are fundamentally different from 
those of nation-states.   This means that local demands 
for “democracy” within state-nations may have quite 
different goals than demands for “democracy” in 
nation-states.
Generally, calls for democratic reform in state-
nations (coming from citizens or from politicians) are 
calls for reform within the state, which range from a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —104—discourse of anti-corruption, to that of fairness in the 
state’s dealings with groups of citizens who feel 
unfairly excluded due to social or geographical cir-
cumstances.  Farmers, for example, may feel that the 
state spends too many resources on the cities.  These 
calls for reform are very similar in structure and tone 
to the kinds of petitions that groups under a monar-
chy might raise to the king.  Rarely do calls for reform 
question the position of the state within the nation.   
Democratic reform movements in nation-states 
may also center on reforms within the state (corrup-
tion happens everywhere), but also include discourses 
concerning the very need for state intervention in 
certain arenas (e.g., regulating the internet).  Again and 
again, the “liberal question” is raised.   And here too, 
the final result may not be a petition to elected lead-
ers, but a referendum that imposes the result of a 
debate from within the public sphere upon the state.
When analyzing democratic movements within 
state-nations, again, it is important to note first the 
position of the state within the goals of the move-
ment.  Social movements in nation-states may find 
their goals hampered by a lack of state controls, for 
example, controls over environmental conditions.   
These movements may then call for more state con-
trols. Whereas social movements in state-nations may 
find that the state’s control over the condition in 
question is simple refractory to external pressures.  
But what are the available counter-strategies in these 
circumstances?  Instead of calling for a decreased con- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —105—trol by the state, a position that would suggest that 
the state is not legitimate, protest groups look to 
increase their visibility as supplicants to the state.  This 




While the states of some state-nations, such as 
that of the People’s Republic of China, distance them-
selves from the very use of the term and the practice 
of “democracy;” others, such as that of Malaysia, cri-
tique the model of democracy derived from nation-
states in the West as inappropriate for their (state-) 
nation; and then others, such as Japan, maintain a 
façade of Western-style democratic institutions with-
out considering that these lose their democratic force 
when they are controlled entirely from within the 
state.  
“... there is a very funny, peculiar
feeling that if it is democracy,
then you must be fighting each
other. Otherwise, it is not democ-
racy. But we happen to agree.
That is also a choice. We have a
choice to consciously agree or
disagree. But the fact that we
agree or the fact that in this coun-
try if we don't change government
and parties at every election, is in
itself, an expression of free




(Far Eastern Economic Review
web site)
To reiterate, debates over democracy—and, 
oftentimes, over issues of human and civil “rights” and 
“freedoms,” issues that are historically linked to 
nation-state democracies in the West—need first to 
account for the position of the state within state-
nations.  Only then can the debate move on to discur-
sive strategies that would discursively “re-place” the 
state within the nation.  While the states of state-
nations may attempt to claim that they are the source 
of such rights and liberties,  in practice,  these rights 
and liberties must warranted as much by an external 
control over the state as they are by democratic insti-
tutions within the state.   This condition on rights and 
liberties is an historical feature of the discourse’s  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —106—founding within (Western) nation-states.   And so, this 
is where the liberal question becomes a fulcrum that 
might just re-place the state in state-nations.  For this 
reason, most state-nations—including Japan, where 
the state runs several “human rights institutes”— tend 
to overcode (see also: Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding) 
the state’s commitment to “preserving” human rights, 
although some state-nations, such as that of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, have simply dismissed the idea 
of civil rights as inappropriate for their locale.
Within a state-nation, counter-state discourses 
acquire the means to focus on issues of rights and 
freedoms (which are also linked to a public sphere 
operating outside of the state) by first asking the “lib-
eral question” that Foucault noted was the origin of 
the modern (Western) break with the Princely gov-
ernmentality—the question is: why do we need a 
state at all?  
practice against the posi-
tion of the state
Above, I noted that, to date, democratic nation-
states all have sites that commemorate where 
counter-sovereign actions and discourses made a 
break with autocratic rule.  This brings us to suspect 
that such actions and such places may be necessary 
for a public to appropriate the position of the state 
within a state-nation and lay the groundwork for a 
public sphere.  Even where the break was not, initially, 
successful (as in Tienanmen Square, and in Kwangju, 
Korea), such actions may be integral to the success of 
counter-state discourse/practice.  So too, the ongoing 
commemoration of prior democratic actions may be  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —107—in part responsible for maintaining a strong public 
sphere.  For all of its nods to rationality, modern 
democracy is also a bodily practice that begs for exer-
cise and rehearsals, and, most of all, for performance.
Nation-state modernity may be also character-
ized by the regular attention paid to the act of achiev-
ing the ground of a strong public sphere, and, 
correspondingly, we can expect state-nation moder-
nity to celebrate the formation of the state as the basis 
for the nation.  We can see here that modernities also 
reveal their primary modes in collective practices in 
the “theatres-of-the public:” in the streets of the cit-
ies, and in schools, as well as what happens in govern-
ment chambers and corporate offices.  
late modernity and the state
It may be useful to look at possible consequences 
which attend to either state-nation modernity or 
nation-state modernity under the conditions of what 
Giddens calls “late modernity”. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—State-nation modernity —108—“In conditions of late modernity,
we live 'in the world' in a different
sense from previous eras of his-
tory.  Everyone still continues to
live a local life, and the con-
straints of the body ensure that all
individuals, at every moment, are
contextually situated in time and
space.  Yet the transformations of
place, and the intrusion of dis-
tance into local activities, com-
bined with the centrality of
mediated experience, radically
change what 'the world' actually
is.  This is so both on the level of
the 'phenomenal world' of the
individual and the general uni-
verse of social activity within
which collective social life is
enacted.  Although everyone lives
a local life, phenomenal worlds
for the most part are truly global”
(Giddens 1991, 187).
One feature of this notion of late modernity is the 
disappearance of the nation-state as the site of the con-
struction of individual and group identities, lifestyles 
(see also lifestyle and state-nation modernity), and social 
movements.   As transnational flows of technologies, 
workers, tourists, ideas, and cultural artifacts increase, 
the arbitrary, political boundaries of nation-states lose 
cultural relevance.   The state’s ability to restrict 
access to these flows becomes problematic, both 
because the transnational marketplace relentlessly 
seeks out local market outlets, and because isolation 
may have negative consequences for the local econ-
omy.   
Under state-nation modernity,  states rely on 
state-sponsored lifestyle programs coded as national/
natural to promote social orthoposture and normalized 
social behaviors.  But these now must compete with 
market-driven trans-national (and so “de-natured”) lif-
estyle inputs.  Additionally, the emerging “free-market” 
global economy has been coded with the same “liberal 
question” that critiques the role of state governments 
to control national economies.  The state’s control 
over prices and production is now recoded as “pro-
tectionist” and the lack of transparent decision-mak-
ing by the state becomes liable to claims of 
“corruption.”  
At the same time the global job market in cultural 
production draws talent from smaller, national mar-
kets to international cosmopolitan centers, creating a 








antnations where cultural production is managed (usually 
by the state) as being by and for a national audience.   
National programs in media and the arts may fare 
poorly in competition against those produced by the 
new cosmopolitan centers.   And global media are 
now in a position (e.g., through satellite broadcasting) 
to ensure that this competition occurs despite state 
controls on local media.
What I am suggesting is that the circumstances of 
late modernity hold greater consequences for states 
under state-nation modernity than they do for states 
under nation-state modernity, and that this differential 
is now being felt acutely in places like Japan and China.  
In Japan, the state’s response has been to reassert 
a national character as one-among-many.   In order to 
resist a future where individuals will look outside of 
Japan for cultural identity, the Japanese Government 
seeks to strengthen identity with Japanese culture—
only this time, and ironically, in the name of “interna-
tionalization” (kokusaika). 
“In addition, what can also be thought of as something to be prized and
transcending different periods of time, is the need, in the education system
of different countries, to get children to learn their own country's language,
its history, traditions and culture, and to foster in them a spirit and state o
mind that will treasure these things. In the case of Japan, we have an impo
tant duty to see that our children, the rising generation who are to bear th
destiny of our country on their shoulders, become fully familiar with the
beautiful Japanese language, study the history that has fashioned Japan
well as its leading artistic and cultural accomplishments, its literature, its
folktales and its traditions, and as well as developing a state of mind tha





to the present age in which we live...
 In order to encourage zest for living in children in the context of steadily
increasing internationalization and a further deepening of international
interdependence, it can be seen as even more important than hitherto to ed
cate ‘Japanese who can live in international society,’ trusted by the world
and to foster an attitude of respect for the culture and traditions of Japan a
handed down from a continuous line of past generations” (MONBUSHO
1997).
This call for a renewed respect for the “culture 
and traditions of Japan” is made from a strategic posi-
tion that assumes other nations are promoting the 
same national cultural goal, and so it fails to realize 
that transnational cultural notions—culture 
unbounded from states— are the real emerging “com-
petition” for an increasingly globalized cultural imagi-
nation.
Nation-state modernities also face challenges 
under circumstances of late modernity.  In particular, 
the ability of corporations to escape national legal sys-
tems (for example, the hiring of slave laborers in for-
eign countries) hampers the efforts of nation-based 
public-sphere organizations to use the agencies of 
state governments to monitor and constrain the mar-
ket.   Until the public sphere is seen as a global dis-
course, and civil-society organizations acquire 
international legal standings, international corpora-
tions will be able to escape local efforts to oversee 
their operations.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Awata Matsuri
Neighborhood events
After years of reading about Japanese neighbor-
hood festivals, and witnessing these in my travels 
throughout Japan in the 1980s, in mid-1992 I had 
moved into a Kyoto neighborhood that held one of 
these events, and, by that autumn, it's weekend was 
finally upon us1.  
Shinto festivals in Japan have played a prominent 
role in some recent urban ethnographies, from Ted 
Bestor's pathbreaking Neighborhood Tokyo (1989) to 
Jennifer Robertson's landmark Native and Newcomer 
(1991). Still, by far the greater literature on festivals 
exists in Japanese.  Beginning with a period of bur-
geoning interest in local folklore at the turn of the 
century—an interest guided by the work of Japan's 
foremost scholar on this topic, Yanagita Kunio—many 
of the country's several thousand festivals (matsuri) 
have received some sort of scholarly attention.  
1. I would have the opportunity to participate in my neighborhood's annual festival three times 
while I was living with my family in Kyoto.  The first year, my 10 year-old son helped to carry 
the kodomo-omikoshi (children's portable shrine) around our chou (neighborhood).  In the 
second year the house where I was living became the temporary local resting-spot (ota-
bisho) for the main festival procession, and the temporary shrine for one of many represen-
tations of the regional deity.  The third year, I mainly took video of the event.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —112—Although it is a momentary punc-
tuation in the year’s activities, the
festival illustrates many of the
themes that suffuse Miyamoto-
choo’s mundane social life
throughout the year: the hierarchi-
cal structure of neighborhood
groups and the egalitarian ethos
that permeates many residents’
conceptions of the neighborhood;
tensions between internal and
external definitions of the com-
munity; Miyamoto-choo’s asser-
tion of its identity and autonomy
through local events and activities
that are self-consciously seen as
parts of the neighborhood’s evolv-
ing body of “tradition.” These
themes manifest themselves in
one form or another in all aspects
of neighborhood life. But they are
perhaps nowhere more clearly and
coherently evident than in the
annual festival for the Shinto tute-
lary deity.
(Bestor 1989, 225)
From local histories, to more analytic works, mat-
suri literature in Japanese is truly volumnous, although, 
like works on matsuri in English (and like works on rit-
ual in any language) these invariably focus on the 
event's ceremonial activities and scripts, at the 
expense of any serious notice of the less-scripted 
actions that are also expected to occur.  This means 
that we often have an extensive record of the ritual 
“scaffold” erected for and by an event, but a far less 
complete record of the event in its potential performa-
tive complexity.  It was my original task to explore 
these other, less recorded, aspects of festival produc-
tion in Japan, by looking at one or more festivals in 
Kyoto.
I was originally encouraged by the great number 
of matsuri events that happen every year, and by their 
self-professed position occupying the center of cul-
tural production in Kyoto city (albeit in the absence of 
other modes—such as television and music— of cul-
tural production).  
our invitation On the second Friday of October, the chounika-
ichou (the head of the neighborhood association) 
poked his head into our house's genkan (entry hall) 
and asked if my son would like to participate in the 
carrying of the kodomo-omikoshi (children's portable 
shrine).  I unhesitatingly volunteered my son's ser-
vices, and took the child's costume that the fellow 
handed me, which included a headband, a happi-coat 
and belt, and a light brass bell that was to be attached 
to this belt.  It would soon be time for the Awata Mat- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —113—suri.
Awata Jinja
By that time, I had visited the nearby Awata Jinja 
(Awata shrine) on many occasions.  Like other Shinto 
shrines in the area, it provides an open-space, park-
like ambiance that is not easy to find in Kyoto.  And, 
from its hill-side vantage point, I had watched the 
summer Obon fires1 on the hills surrounding the city.  
1. Kyoto is surrounded by hills on three sides, and every summer, at the end of the yearly 
Buddhist period of ancestor worship, fires are lit on these hillsides to encourage the visiting 
souls a successful return to their abodes.  [Ancestor worship is most prominent accommo-
dation between Indian Buddhist thought and family funerary practices in East Asia.  The 
very notion of ancestors (and graveyards) runs counter to the original idea of this-world 
reincarnation.  But today, in Kyoto, Buddhist temples make the largest portion of their 
income and devote the largest amount of their practice to the spiritual care and attention 
given to family ancestors, through rituals in the temples, rituals in home alters, and the 
maintenance of graveyards.]  Obon occurs in August in Kyoto region, and is a time when 
families traditionally get together, and one of the best alibis for a few days of vacation.
The view north-north-west from 
the Awata Jinja shows the 
Kitayama (northern mountains) 
that lie between Kyoto and the 
Eastern Sea (The Sea of Japan).
Awata Jinja's position at the Eastern entrance to 
Kyoto on a hill overlooking the old Tokaido road 
between Kyoto and Edo (Tokyo) lent it some promi- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —114—nence1 in former times.  But today it has a moribund 
feel about it.  In part, this might be due to its location: 
wedged between the expansive, and still vibrant 
Yasaka Jinja, and the even larger (as a national marker) 
Hein Jingu (Heian Grand Shrine), where the spirits of 
the first and the last of Kyoto's resident emperors 
have been enshrined.  
1. The Awata shrine was connected to the Shoren-in temple, a temple that maintains imperial 
connections, although the Shoren-in's connections with the Awata Jinja were severed (as 
were those of virtually all Buddhist temples and Shinto Shrines in Japan) during the Meiji 
period.  (Allan Grapard, personal correspondence).
Awata Jinja The Awata Jinja is nearly always quiet, and it lacks 
even a marriage facility.  On any given day it might 
appear abandoned, and often when I strolled its 
grounds I met not a single other person.  It is not until 
the week of the annual festival that one can sense its 
presence in the neighborhood.
The Awata Matsuri is an annual festival put on by 
the Awata Jinja, a Shinto shrine located about four-
hundred yards from my house.  All of the neighbor-
hoods in its precincts gather contributions from their 
member (ujiko) households for its operation, and 
some of these households also hold the right to set up 
temporary shrines where the main procession will 
pass by.  In many ways, this small festival is a miniature 
of the city's one great festival: Gion matsuri.  Like 
Gion, the Awata Matsuri's traditional practice relies 
upon the availability of historic-period architecture.  
This is where my house (although not my household) 
became the focus of the neighborhood festival the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —115—second year of my stay in Kyoto.
The entire process of setting up the neighbor-
hood display is guided not by some sense of religious 
or other meaning, but by the goal of reproducing the 
display according to a standard appearance, through 
the use of photographs. The duties were mostly 
divided between the adult men (who did the large 
construction and electrical work) and the women 
(who created the displays of fruit and nuts and did the 
fine work on the final display).  Young adult men and 
young unmarried women did not involve themselves 
in this process.
The two-day festival includes some ceremonial 
and also entertainment events at the Awata Jinja, and 
it centers around a double procession: in the after-
noon, a ceremonial halberd (hoko) is processed, along 
with the shrine's omikoshi, which was formerly carried 
by young men, but now sits on the back of a pick-up 
truck.  
Here we see the shrine’s main o-
mikoshi (portable shrine) paraded 
through the shrine precincts on 
the back of a pick-up truck.




along the same 
route, as the 
main “ritual 
cleansing” aspect 
of the event.   Today, the main “cleansing” aspect of the 
event occurs when it is used as an alibi for neighbor-
hoods to contribute volunteers to police some of the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —116—areas that are common to more than one chou (such 
as the riverbank of the creek (the Shirakawa) that runs 
through the district.
Our neighborhood kept a store-
house for the ceremonial fixtures 
in an overhead room between two 
houses.  The expensive articles 
(the brocade and the halberd) 
were kept at the home of the 
chounaikaicho.  (Image from the 
Awata video I, available by 
request)
 Each neighborhood hosts a children's portable 
shrine which is carried by children1 to the main shrine 
1. By 1994 the number of children in my neighborhood had dropped to where most of the 
people carrying the children's shrine were adults.  
Posters are displayed to announce 
the main festival events at the 
Awata Shrine.  This year, the clas-
sical festival music concert has 
been abandoned in favor of a 
karaoke event. (Image from the 
Awata video I, available by 
request).
after being carried throughout the neighborhood.  
This festival, TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —117— the annual district undokai (sporting meet) and the 
summer's Jizo-obon festival are events that include par-
ticipation not only of children, but also of retired peo-
ple (mostly women).  
Old families and foreign 
visitors
In my neighborhood there are today only a couple 
of families who trace their residence back to pre-Meiji 
times, when the area was a precinct of a local branch 
of a Buddhist temple1 with Imperial family connec-
tions.  I will call these the two “old families” in the 
area.  They still own many of the houses in this small 
neighborhood, and are the local landlords.  There are 
a few more families that have many decades (and sev-
eral generations) of residence, most of these have 
retail or service businesses in the area and own their 
houses.  I will call these the “main” families of the 
neighborhood, as they are the most active in neigh-
borhood affairs.  
1. The temple is still there today, and when the new Emperor first visited Okinawa in 1993, 
someone set fire to one of its out-buildings as a rather oblique means of protest.  This cre-
ated a period of plain-clothed police surveillance in the neighborhood that included a door-
step interview at my house in which a policeman asked me if I'd seen anyone strange 
(henna hito) hanging around, and then noticed my Grateful Dead t-shirt and decided I 
might not be a good judge of what he meant by “henna.”   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —118—The large lantern stands are 
assembled by neighborhood 
men.(Image from the Awata video 
I, available by request)
The rest of the neighborhood are relative “new-
comers,” including a disproportionately large number 
(seven) of households of foreign residents, all of them 
from the United States or Europe.  
Most of these, like myself, were living in Kyoto 
while they pursue academic1 interests.  There were no 
other (non-European) foreign residents in the neigh-
borhood, or, if there were, they were passing as Japa-
nese.  
Only one of the foreigner-occupied households 
has been stable enough (this one also contains a Japa-
nese spouse) to be admitted into the chonaikai.  The 
1. Most of the foreign residents are tenants of one of the old families, which has, for many 
years, been a benefactor to foreign scholars: finding lodging in Kyoto is never easy, and 
usually quite dear—between the rent and the necessary “key money” bribe needed to 
secure a lease.  The availability of a small house at reasonable rent in a convenient loca-
tion is an invaluable opportunity for someone coming into Kyoto from abroad.  The only real 
benefit that the owner maintains in the arrangement is that temporary residents will not 
stay long enough to acquire the rights that long-time renters feel they have in Kyoto.  In the 
months when money was short, and the weather was bad, it was this lovely  house that 
kept this researcher's family from regretting the agreement to spend this time so far from 
their home. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —119—remainder of the foreign “contingent” are not included 
in either the deliberations nor the circular information 
that gets passed through the neighborhood.  
At the same time that the neigh-
borhoods were “dressing-up” for 
the festival, the Awata Shrine 
became a stage where the offer-
ings of the precincts families were 
on conspicuous display. (Image 
from the Awata Festival video II 
available by request).
One of the newcomers, whose family had lived in 
the neighborhood for more than thirty years, but 
whose ancestors originated not only from outside of 
the neighborhood, but from outside of Kyoto, once 
complained to me that “it takes five generations to get 
past the genkan.”  Admission to genkan, the front hall 
where visitors and service people enter the house, 
does not signal status equality, while an invitation to 
come up into the house does.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —120—Neighborhood women assemble 
the interior display stands in my 
livingroom, after the front wall 
has been removed.  (From the 
Awata Festival Video I, available by 
request).  
This complaint fit into a mode of complaint that I 
often heard from Japanese who were not born in 
Kyoto—that old Kyoto families were emotionally 
“stingy” (kechi) or arrogant.  Some explained this to 
me as a consequence of the city's thousand-year role 
as the home of the emperor.  “Position” in the old 
imperial city, the relative proximity of one's house to 
the imperial center, formed a loose socio-geographical 
hierarchy centered on the imperial palace.  But then I 
could imagine that similar complaints about “old-tim-
ers” might occur anywhere that local tenure means as 
much as it does in Kyoto.  To the many who are con-
sidered newcomers to Kyoto (basically anyone who 
moved in after WWII), this lingering aftertaste of aris-
tocratic sentiment leaves them mis-placed and some-
times out of sorts.
A festival of forms The people I spoke with from my neighborhood 
had very little information to offer on meaning of the 
content of the Awata Matsuri processions, except to  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —121—point out that our neighborhood shrine contained a 
brocade that was noted for its beauty and antiquity.   
The inclusion of this brocade in a book about Kyoto 
brocades was celebrated by including a copy of the 
book in the display, along with the brocade.
The entire display is created to 
resemble master photographs of 
each detail.  The form of the dis-
play is thus reconstructed every 
year.  But the contents hold little 
meaning, and have become empty 
signifiers.  And I sometimes won-
dered what would happen if they 
ever lost the book of photographs.  
(From the Awata Festival Video I, 
available by request). 
 Where Bestor’s neighborhood used the event to 
demarcate its normally invisible boundaries within shi-
tamachi Tokyo,  the boundaries of the Awata Jinja’s 
precincts are normally well-defined—to the west is 
one of Kyoto’s largest buraku areas behind sanjo-eki, 
the third-street train station.  To the south are the 
temple grounds of Sanen’in and the enormous 
Chion’in, Maruyama koen, Kyoto’s largest public park 
(and a famous cherry blossom viewing spot in the 
spring), and the Yasaka shrine.   To the east are the 
Higashiyama hills, and to the north is the civic plaza 
created when the 1894 eleven-hundred year City 
anniversary was held, and which now boasts the main 
art museum, modern art museum, zoo, library, con-
cert hall, and the Heian Jingu.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —122—This festival does provide the one time in the year 
when the boundaries of my own immediate neighbor-
hood (chou) are marked.  The children’s mikoshi parade 
goes down every street and alleyway to the edge of 
the chou.  And as the neighboring shrines—the Yasaka 
Shrine to the north and the Heian Shrine to the 
north—have festivals (Gion Matsuri and Jidai Matsuri) 
that are today appropriated as national civic specta-
cles, the Awata matsuri is the only local event that 
remains attached to a longer-term geographical place.
A syntax of obligation The head of the chounaikai had a copy of the pro-
gram that the shrine prints every year which he read 
from to give me some idea of the event.   But even 
this document failed to narrativize the event as having 
either a definite purpose (although the use of flaming 
torches in one of the processions is generally 
explained as a technique of purification) or an identifi-
able myth.  The program provided a simple calendar of 
events, and space to acknowledge local donors.
What I am suggesting here is that the meanings  (a 
shared semantic load) provided by the event do not 
inform the main experience of it, rather, it is the 
events regular appearance, its syntax, that is most 
important.  For example,  I could not elicit a narrative 
story from any participant in my neighborhood.  One 
volunteer at the shrine boasted that this festival is 
“older than Gion matsuri,” and that it is always cov-
ered by the local television station (KTB).   (The first 
claim was not supported by others at the site, and 
there was never any evidence of television crews at  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —123—the shrine. ) This twin claim of antiquity and current 
media interest fronts the main dynamic for referents 
to this event: it is produced as a visible display of his-
tory.  It is nostalgia packaged as tradition and sold to 
others.  
Following photographs from pre-
vious years, the women complete 
the offerings for the display alter.  
Japanese persimmons (kaki) and 
chestnuts are the primary dis-
plays.  The work is tackled with 
general good spirits.  There is no 
noticeable division among the 
crews.  Older participants take on 
leadership roles without discus-
sion.  (From the Awata Festival 
Video I, available by request). 
The performance of the festival in my neighbor-
hood, indeed, in my house as the locus of this event 
one year, seemed to be mainly focused outward, to 
fulfill an external expectation.  To not do it, would be 
to abandon the neighborhood’s position in the larger 
shrine precinct.  And abandoning one’s established 
position in Kyoto, where position is acquired through 
multiple generations of dutiful behavior, is not an 
acceptable option—even when this duty requires that 
the neighborhood rely upon the cooperation of a for-
eign resident.
Machiya as festival place It was the second year of my residence in Kyoto 
when another person announced their presence in 
our genkan.  This time is was a member of one of the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —124—two old families in the neighborhood, a relative of our 
landlord.  She was there to request that we allow the 
neighborhood festival to use our front room for the 
ritual display that marks the neighborhood’s place in 
the shrine precinct.  
Our living room has been trans-
formed into an abode of the kami 
(the god himself has been 
installed in the form of a folded 
paper object).  For the next two 
days we will share our house with 
this display.  At the end of the fes-
tival, there was some discussion 
about what to do with the kami.  
“We probably shouldn’t toss it in 
the trash,” one woman observed, 
to the laughter of the others.  “I’ll 
take it back to the shrine,” another 
offered, solving the problem.  
(Video taken from the street) . 
(From the Awata Festival Video I, 
available by request). 
Again, as I had come to Kyoto to explore festivity, 
this request was entirely welcome, although it was 
also puzzling.  For all of the literature I had read about 
shinto festivals stressed the strict rules of ritual purity 
that any household serving as a locus of ritual activity 
would have to undergo.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —125—The display at the Awata Shrine 
was not dissimilar to the displays 
set up at the main neighbor-
hoods.  In fact, uniformity of dis-
play and of practices, a feature 
that was not prominent among 
Shinto-Buddhist festivals in prior 
centuries, became the central fea-
ture of Shinto festival practice 
through the efforts of national 
reorganizations of Shinto shrines 
in the last 130 years.  (From the 
Awata Festival Video II, available by 
request). 
To begin with, according to the literature on mat-
suri,this should have been an honor extended with 
great care only to those families who had tendered 
long-term service to the shrine.  And then the family, 
for the year before the festival, but with more atten-
tion in the weeks preceding it, would be required to 
avoid certain impure circumstances, such as the death 
of a family member.   During the event, the family 
must be careful not to have women who are in child-
birth or menses in the house.   These various ritual 
obligations were described as central to the festival’s 
task of ritually purifying the shrine’s precincts.  
 
 TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —126—The chounaikaichou was in 
charge of the construction of the 
festival display.  But when I asked 
him for particulars about the his-
tory and meaning of the event, he 
could only suck air through his 
teeth and reply “Saa...” (A local 
performative response when one 
does not know a reply).  Later, he 
offered me a program. 
“Here is a map of the event,” he 
said.
 None of these obligations were applied to my  
household.   For it was not my household that the 
neighborhood was interested in, it was our house.  
“What is the meaning of this festival?  What is its his-
tory?”  Such questions raised only the intake of breath 
that signals a lack of an answer (or annoyance with the 
question).  The head of the chounaikai was summoned 
as he passed by, and he had the same response.  “We 
do it every year,” he said.  “We always do it without 
fail.” Later he came by to give me a copy of the pro-
gram that is printed by the shrine (mostly to advertise 
those local companies and people who had donated 
the larger amounts).  “Here is a map of the event,” he 
said, “and here we are.”  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —127—With their own cries of “washoi, 
washoi” the children in our neigh-
borhood (with some adult assis-
tance) carried the children’s 
mikoshi (portable shrine) to the 
boundaries of the neighborhood 
(chou), and also to the shrine.
Notice that the older children, 
those above grade school age, do 
not participate, as they are busy 
with school work, and so parents 
also help to carry the kodomomi-
koshi.
©1993 Anjali
It was for this reason 
that the relative of 
my landlord was 
standing in my gen-
kan making a polite 
request that we 
allow the neighbor-
hood to use our 
house for this pur-
pose.On that year, 
the other old houses 
in the neighborhood 
were all, for some 
reason, unavailable.  
And so, by default, the neighborhood turned to us.   It 
was a request that I had already been coached to 
accept with equal or greater politeness.  But I added 
my own enthusiasm to this acceptance.  Indeed my 
only regret was that, on that year the neighborhood’s 
festival and the very first Higashi-kujo Madang were 
both taking place on the same day.  After a year of 
misgivings, it seemed that my festival cup was finally 
running over. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —128—When all the work was done, 
there was little left to do but sit 
back on benches in the street and 
sip sake and chat.
©1993 Anjali
Going by the book I present scenes from my neighborhood’s partici-
pation in the Awata Matsuri to illustrate various quali-
ties of event as these can be said to represent the 
social space of the neighborhood, and the expressive 
limits of cultural participation in that space.  
When meeting in public, practices 
of polite deference are still main-
tained by older people.   The con-
tinuation of these practices is one 
of the unintentional outcomes of 
events such as the Awata Matsuri, 
where formal occasions and for-
mal dress provide interpersonal 
situations where such behaviors 
are required.  The continuation of 
these formal circumstances on an 
annual basis increases the overall 
“formalization” of the street as a 
site place where micro-bodily 
control is expected. 
©1993 Bruce Caron
The space that is 
described in the 
neighborhood by 
participation in the 
Awata Matsuri bears 
a useful resemblance 
to the social percep-
tions/positions of 
the families in the 
neighborhood.  Dis-
tinctions based on 
length of residence, gender, age, and attachment to 
the volunteer lay organization of the Shrine are all dis-
played in this event, along with the positioning of the 
neighborhood as an integral part of the larger Shrine  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —129—precincts.  
The economics of the Awata Shrine also center 
on the festival and on the donations that the festival 
produces.  But donations are also accepted as these 
are appropriate to the position of the household 
within the shrine’s long-time hierarchy, which main-
tains as a visible vestige the prestige of those house-
holds who were in upper class positions before 
modernization.  To donate more than one should 
would be as ill-taken as to shirk one’s responsibility to 
donate as much as one has always done.  
The currency for status improvement is not cash, 
but rather time.  As decades pass, the fortunes of 
houses may decline and force them to neglect their 
position within this donation scheme.  This creates an 
opening for other households to step up in the ranks.   
This situation also makes it difficult for the shrine to 
take advantage of newcomers who might have the 
economic means to make significant donations.  
And so the situation at the Awata Shrine can best 
be described by a long duration (now a century or 
more) within which the ritual requirements and the 
economy of the shrine are slowly weakening, but are 
not subject to major reform.   As an institution, the 
shrine resembles (as it annually reassembles) a social 
order that was fixed well before its current members 
were born.  Newcomers to the shrine neighborhoods 
are kept outside of positions of ceremonial impor-
tance, and, as migration is increasing, the participant 
base for shrine events decreases. The annual festival of  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Awata Matsuri —130—the shrine maintains as much of the display of prior 
events as possible, but it has lost nearly all of the per-
formance and the meaning of this display.   
The fragile performative conditions—the amount 
and the organization of public performance—of this 
neighborhood may not be very different from other 
Kyoto neighborhoods, although I would not care to 
generalize either to the region or to Japan.  The many 
events in Kyoto that today claim to link the present to 
the area’s vaunted past share in this problematic: by 
preserving the formal aspects of events at the expense 
of creative and performative openings, they find them-
selves in control of events that no longer serve as 
expressive openings for cultural practice. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—machiya —131—machiya 30
machiya
Ours was one of the houses in the neighborhood 
that had been built in the nineteenth century, in the 
prevailing architectural style of the time.  And so its 
front room had a front wall that could be removed, 
exposing the entire room to the street.  It is a 
machiya, a townhouse  fronting the street, with three 
tatami-floored rooms in a row from front to back, an 
inner garden behind that, and a benjo (toilet) at the 
very rear.   Constructed of wood and paper (now 
glass in front and back), with reed mats for floors, 
hand-stuccoed walls, and a ceramic tile roof,  it was 
always drafty (a small blessing in the hot summer), 
generally dark.  Its front wall was acoustically trans-
parent to the street, which ran directly in front with 
no sidewalk.   
Preservation of machiya housing 
is the key for historical manage-
ment in Kyoto, according to the 




In this scene from the ISSK web-
site we see a machiya being torn 
down, opening up a tear in the 
local urban fabric.
Sitting in the middle room, one could hear quite 
plainly the hushed conversation of people walking in 
the street.  And as I often practiced my Japanese 
aloud, I sometimes wondered what passersby would 
make of the sound of a voice repeating the same sen- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—machiya —132—tences over and over again.  
The house was elegant in its design and construc-
tion,  with a tokonoma alcove framed in polished logs, 
a horikotasu sunken seating place, where we spent 
most of the snowy winter around a low table, with 
our legs dangling in a pit where a heater warmed our 
toes under a quilted blanket.  Best of all the house had 
a deep ofuro bath, with its own noisy gas heater that 
took the frigid tap water to near boiling in less than 
half an hour.  Here is where the aches of hours of film-
ing festivals were soothed away.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—machiya —133—With the lanterns out, and the 
place decorated, our house could 
have been back in the Edo period.
Having an ofuro meant that our trips to the local 
public bath1 were not as regular as they might have 
1. Like other public baths it is now only marginally economical to operate or to visit.  Within a few 
decades it will be torn down, like the one nearby that is now a parking lot.   But public baths are 
not the only pre-War Kyoto amenities in danger of disappearing. Almost every day, in my bicycle 
commutes to various sectors of Kyoto, I would see  old machiya houses being torn down and 
replaced by steel-frame houses built over garages.  The contractors had found a way to fit all of the 
parts of a torn-down machiya onto the back of one truck, and it was a regular sight to see these 
trucks on the road carrying the historical residential heritage of Kyoto away as landfill.  Many of 
these houses were in a state of some decrepitude by the time they were torn down, but still one 
could imagine a publicly sponsored industry that would recycle their best parts for use in restoring 
or maintaining other machiya.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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and I would visit the bath to enjoy its various pools.  
For most of its first century, our house had been 
occupied by families of craftspersons making cloi-
sonné ware for export.   By WWII, the house’s own-
ers had abandoned artisan occupations for 
professional ones.   But the original design of the 
house retained its multipurpose flexibility.  Our house 
had been constructed so that its front room could be 
opened to display wares for sale.    This meant that the 
house could also display the ritual items for the festi-
val procession.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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kone and kane: connections and money
Regular gift-giving is one of the practices that 
articulates this informal network of “personal relation-
ships” (jinmyaku).   But gift giving in Kyoto exists within 
existing networks of institutional and familial connec-
tions, it is a medium that signals an active relationship 
of obligations, of which the gifts are merely tokens 
(although they may be rather expensive tokens, and at 
times—such as the New Year and mid-summer— the 
volume of gift exchanges may be considerable1.)  This 
means that those persons and families who are 
excluded from institutional connections (such as uni-
versity or large corporate affiliations) cannot use gift-
ing to enter into relationships of obligation.  Although 
gift giving is seen as a practice that outsiders cannot 
perform correctly (as there are no correct reasons 
for outsiders to give gifts), this practice is not available 
as an official mode of national discourse.  It is, how-
ever, integral to the local mode of state-nation gov-
ernmentality that places top government officials—
who are top-feeders on the gifting circuit—into a 
realm of economic security that has no relationship to 
their official salaries and perquisites.  An entire gift 
1. I spent a summer in a room I rented from the owner/headmaster of an elite kindergarten in 
Kyoto, and this person required a separate building to hold the gifts that flowed his direction 
from hopeful or grateful parents, and even this, was, at times inadequate.  One day he 
called me over to his storehouse and told me to hold out my hands, into which he set cases 
of beer boxes of fruit, and other goodies that would no longer fit into this building.  He 
looked at the bulging shelves and wondered out loud what he was to do the next day when 
the package delivery van showed up with yet another load. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ety, erecting pillars of social capital (with easy transla-
tions into cash) that attach to key positions in 
government/corporate hierarchy.
Where much of the gift giving in China (See: Yang 
1994) seems to promote a reciprocal relationship of 
personal obligation, in Japan this usually promotes cli-
ent/patron relationships that, in official spheres, 
resembles bribery and corruption—particularly when 
these “personal” relationships are allowed between 
corporations and government offices.  Indeed, in both 
nations the practices of gift-giving1 may run counter to 
official, professional and bureaucratic standards and 
codes of ethics, but this hardly diminishes the scope of 
the practice.  And there are also at times official 
acknowledgments of the practice as “customary.”  
Recent disclosures of these practices in South Korea 
have prompted the government there to decry the 
practice as the “Korean disease,” a social affliction that 
threatens economic growth.  
In Japan, despite the token public prosecutions 
that always keep one or two politicians in the tabloids, 
the creation and care of personal connections to offi-
caldom remains the chief social goal of most families.  
1. In Japan as well as in China, the ability to give a gift is not simply a matter of economic 
wherewithal.  Politicians who forget this are often the first to hear from public prosecutors.   
Gifting is only one aspect of a more complex  social relationship that, after all, must also 
conserve its established hierarchical order and practices of exclusion.  It is precisely this 
conservatism that allows gifting to escape the label “bribery.”  This is also why these con-
nections work against foreign corporations, which do not have an established position 
within the local or national network. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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most keenly felt.  Even those few who have the eco-
nomic means to engage in active giving, lack the social 
capital to do so.  And for the rest, when the favors are 
determined, they  are confident these will not come 
their way.  One of the third-generation Korean 
Madang organizers once compared his life to series of 
Sumo wrestling matches.  “I go out and do my best, 
but even when I throw the other guy, the judgement 
always goes against me.”
counting connections
“Isolation follows from the way in
which the emergence of a bour-
geoisie has been halted; from the
way in which the middle class has
been incorporated into the hierar-
chy of business firms; from the
way in which the school system,
rather than educating citizens for
Japan, produces administrators
and salarymen for predetermined
levels of the System's hierarchies.
All this is most clearly demon-
strated by the phenomenon of the
so-called 'returning youngsters'
(kikoku shijo) —Japanese chil-
dren who have received an impor-
tant part of their education abroad
while their fathers were serving in
overseas offices of their compa-
nies.”
(van Wolferen 1990, 431-432)
The realities of the reproduction of a privileged 
class in Japan through intermarriage and personal con-
nections (jinmyaku) with the “gate-keepers” in institu-
tions, such as the elite national universities, are 
suspected by many, and perhaps most.  Public outcries 
about scandals over entrance-exam fraud occur with 
some regularity in the newspapers.  And the differen-
tial access of wealthy, well-placed1 families to elite 
preparatory schools, often with automatic admission 
into elite “public” universities (until 1945 these were 
imperial universities) is not at all hidden.  And the cul-
tural economy of connections is nowhere as fully 
understood as it is at the bottom of the scheme—
among Koreans and Japanese living in buraku neighbor-
hoods— and at the top, where, as van Wolferen 
notes, connections (kone) mean everything:
1. A friend teaching at a large private university in Kyoto revealed to me that more than a third 
of the entering students are admitted through “the side door” despite the fact that all stu-
dents are required to take the same entrance examinations.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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on who one knows. Kone (a Japanised abbreviation of the English word 'connections') often provide
the key to admission to desirable schools, and to finding good jobs. If one wants the best medical
treatment, a special introduction to busy doctors is almost indispensable. Most Japanese are thor-
oughly indebted in this sense to numerous other Japanese, and others in turn are indebted to them;
one of the main characteristics of Japanese life is an unremitting trade in favours. 
In the upper levels of society, the kone multiply to form whole networks of special relationships.
These may derive from one-time favours, school ties or shared experiences, or may involve intricate
mutual back-scratching deals. They are referred to as jinmyaku -Jin meaning 'personal' and myaku a
'vein' such as is found in mineral deposits, so that jinmyaku means a vein, or web, of personal connec-
tions running through the fabric of society. Jinmyaku are much more widespread, and of incomparably
greater importance, than old-boy networks in the West. 
Among top bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen, marriage facilitates the building up of informal
contacts with the élite. LDP politicians reinforce their positions by marrying the daughters of older,
influential politicians, then match their own sons and daughters with the children of prosperous and
influential businessmen. The resulting networks are known as keibatsu (family groupings through mar-
riage). ...” (1990 109-110).
Kone (connections) and kane (money) form the 
grease of social movement (up or down) that is, in 
many small and a few larger (through university admis-
sions) ways open to most Japanese families, although 
this opening eludes Koreans and Japanese living in 
buraku neighborhoods.   Kyoto adds an additional fea-
ture—residential tenure—to the game of connec-
tions.  As we will see in the organization of religious 
festivals, Kyoto maintains the privileges of its “old fam-
ilies” to the exclusion of newcomers, even newcom-
ers with cash or fame. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Heritage Management
Here I am introducing the notion of “heritage 
management” for two reasons: the first is that this 
process informs the city sponsored spectacles that 
claim to represent local cultural practices; and the 
second is that it also describes the field where cultural 
production, anthropology, and urban planning inter-
sect—here is where local cultural practices, and theo-
ries of urban planning are reflexively commodified 
(usually by city/civic (chamber of commerce) for sale 
to tourists and residents.   
“The generalizing tendency is
inscribed in the very principle of
the disposition to recognize legiti-
mate works, a propensity and
capacity to recognize their legiti-
macy and perceive them as wor-
thy of admiration in themselves,
which is inseparable from the
capacity to recognize in them
something already known, i.e., the
stylistic traits appropriate to char-
acterize them in their singularity
(‘It’s a Rembrandt’ or even
‘It’s the Helmeted Man’) or as
members of a class of works (‘It’s
Impressionist’).”
(Bourdieu 1984, 25-26)
All of the issues surrounding the management of 
urban cultural authority, legitimacy, and taste are born 
in this process, and in the longer term, people’s life-
styles and their bodies (habitus) are also managed.    
The appropriation of the work of artists and artisans 
leads to the formation of schools of art, and the 
xclusion of the works of those not admitted into 
such schools.  And in Kyoto there are various city, 
county, and civic art associations for every genre of 
artistic production, and each has its own exhibits and 
its own gate that can open up to the “right” person, 
and can shut out the rest.  The creation of positions 
within the field of artistic production informs disposi-
tions that are never fully discursified.  But the institu-
tional stakes within the market for authenticated 
tastes (and here, for “real-Kyoto” arts and artifacts) 
are visible and quantifiable—for example, one can eas-
ily look at what is put into cultural museums. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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style of cultural management, alternatives that are 
advantageous to the continuing production of cultural 
works in a city, and that also create openings for novel 
and counter-productions.  When heritage (patrimoine) 
includes the ongoing “work” of art in the city; and 
when management engages the need to protect and 
enliven the plurality of urban cultural forms—then the 
city itself becomes a cultural work, a factory of local 
production that requires little management, and that 
creates and critiques its own tastes, 
I will focus here on Kyoto, as the processes of 
heritage management were quite openly on display 
there during the time of my fieldwork1 (1992-1994).  
1. In fact, 1994 was a year-long “festival” in honor of the city’s 1200th anniversary, a celebra-
tion that was marred by the recent collapse of the local economy (and also of the national 
economy), a circumstance that forced the city to curtail almost all of the planned events 
(but curiously little of the advertising).  This situation highlighted the down-side of heritage 
management as spectacle-production: this brings with it expectations that can be quite 
expensive.
playing to the tourists
It is impossible to discuss Kyoto’s history and 
present circumstances without first addressing the 
realities of Kyoto’s tourist industry, and the effect that 
this has upon the city, its administration, and, most of 
all, its general economic future.  In some ways, Kyoto 
has always been selling itself.  For centuries the capital 
city, Kyoto was the locus of social and religious pil-
grimages, and it sold its wares and pleasures to secular 
and sacerdotal aristocrats.  Their patronage made  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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tural efflorescence. 
In what follows, I do not want to even appear to 
belittle the artistic heritage of this city.  But, the for-
tunes of Kyoto, which were not entirely good during 
the occupancy of the various emperors (the city was 
burned to the ground more than once) became much 
more problematic after the emperor Meiji moved to 
Tokyo.  
In actual and symbolic terms, the creation of 
“Tokyo”—arguably the world’s most dynamic metro-
politan center—has come at Kyoto’s direct expense.  
It was in adjusting to its reduced circumstances that 
Kyoto  has made its share of planning mistakes.  I do 
not intend to dwell on these mistakes, but will 
attempt, instead, bring certain social-scientific and 
urban-planning notions to the problems faced by 
Kyoto today.
Kyoto is a tourist town.  By the city’s own count, 
about forty million tourists visit Kyoto every year, 
although this figure includes the annual tsunami (del-
uge) of school groups that peaks in the spring.  To 
attract such hordes, Kyoto trades quite lucratively, if 
somewhat brazenly, on the longevity of its habitation.  
Much of Kyoto’s early history has been rather 
recently reinvented (along with histories to be forgot-
ten) to support the city’s contention that nothing 
essential here has changed.  It takes, however, only a 
brief stay and a bit of looking around for even the 
most devout tourist—who, after all, has paid good  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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the opposite conclusion:  here is a town where almost 
nothing is like it was before.  
Valorizing the old capital
Kyoto sells itself as a kind of Rome on the Kamo 
river: a place where ancient dynasties flourished and 
fought (and fornicated), and, in the process, forged 
that rare “alloy” known as “elite culture.”  Ever dwin-
dling stocks of this stuff make up the mother-lode of 
Kyoto’s tourist drawing power.  Kyoto spins less and 
less new “alloy” every year, and meanwhile, consumes 
itself in the process of pandering its historical image1.
Out on the streets, the cultural vending machines 
(the tourist traps outside all of the historic sites) are 
all in place, but today “authentic” Kyoto-esque mer-
chandise, old or new, are far too dear for the tourist 
trade.  Only those arts that, in former eras, were 
refined to meet aristocratic appetites for glamour and 
style, are today touted as uniquely Kyoto-esque.  
Kyoto’s famous goods: Kiyomizu pottery, Nishijin 
silk weaving, and hand-painted (yuzen) kimono—are all 
now fantastically expensive.  Upholding the standards, 
and the prices (and control over production and style) 
of these “aristocratic” artistic traditions also locks out 
novel and creative inputs.  The local artistic commu-
nity is trapped by the effects of ten centuries of this 
cultural “gentrification.”  Meanwhile, the sightseer is 
1. The year 1994, the 1200th anniversary of the founding of the city, was particularly expen-
sive for the city’s historical image, as every local event, from a prize-fight to new sewer con-
struction, was touted as a tribute to Kyoto’s ancient times.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Dean towel and “Hello Kitty” coffee cups they could 
buy anywhere in Japan—as remembrances of their 
visit to “historic” Kyoto.
This sort of reverse bait-and-switch marketing 
(show them the good stuff and then sell them kitsch) 
actually proves the deepest anxiety of the Kyoto tour-
ist industry: the fear that authenticity—real places, 
real history, real pottery—might now longer matter 
to the tourist.  When tradition becomes only a come-
on for the hotel trade, then Kyoto is forced to com-
pete with every other tourist destination in Japan on 
something like equal terms.  The irony here is that 
Kyoto is also guilty of sacrificing “tradition” for image.  
As David Harvey  noted, the substitution of a city’s 
image for actual historical continuity places cities, like 
Kyoto, in the same business as theme parks.
“...The irony is that tradition is now often preserved by being commodified and marketed as
such. The search for roots ends up at worst being produced and marketed as an image, as a simu-
lacrum or pastiche (imitation communities constructed to evoke images of some folksy past, the fab-
ric of traditional working-class communities being taken over by an urban gentry)....At best,
historical tradition is reorganized as a museum culture, not necessarily of high modernist art, but of
local history, of local production, of how things once upon a time were made, sold, consumed, and
integrated into a long-lost and often romanticized daily life (one from which all trace of oppressive
social relations may be expunged). Through the presentation of a partially illusory past it becomes
possible to signify something of local identity and perhaps to do it profitably.”
In this decade, in Wakayama and Toba city (both within 
a few hours by fast train from Kyoto)  new “historical” 
theme parks have opened their gates to the public.  
Porto Europa and Shima Spain Village both offer a 
complete, “historical” experience, from the cobble-
stones underfoot, to the banners on the turrets over- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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and with convenient hotels and thrill rides for the 
young.  The latter expects to draw three million visi-
tors a year.  The “eighteenth century” Porto Europa is 
being built on a new island, which means that not even 
the land was there in the eighteenth century.  
Managing the new/old Kyoto
As the home of the secretariat of the Conference 
of World Historical Cities, Kyoto has sponsored a net-
work of cities with a similar problematic in front of 
them all:  how does an “historical city” recreate its 
past as a project for its future?  And how does it 
develop its own history to open up new avenues of 
cultural production for its city-zenry?  
The most interesting input to the 4th World Con-
ference of Historical Cities, held in 1994 in Kyoto, 
came from Kraków, Poland.  The International Cul-
tural Centre in Kraków has described a project now 
called “heritage management, ” which takes historical-
city urban planning beyond the preservation and con-
servation of existing historical sites, to the integrative 
reconstruction of the urban landscape as an ongoing 
work of history.  
The tasks involved in heritage management are 
multiple and complex, dealing as they do with invento-
ries of ideologically supported national cultural histor-
ical symbolism as well as valuable real estate.  And 
nowhere are national symbols and real estate more 
highly valued than they are in Kyoto.  
Heritage management requires that the physical  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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up to a reflexive imagination.  The heritage of any city 
is a pluralistic one, and the future of this belongs to all 
of residents of the city.  So it is important that heri-
tage management is done transparently, in a demo-
cratically determined arena where conflicting ideas 
are available and where the outcome remembers this 
conflict.  
Whether or not there is the political will and the 
public financing necessary to accomplish the physical 
tasks of heritage management is a large question.  
As a recent issue of Kenchiku Bunka [Modern Cul-
ture] (February 1994) reveals, there is no lack of 
informed concern and design skills available locally to 
accomplish the physical/design end of the project.  It is 
on the other end of the task, on the cultural/symbolic 
side of heritage management, where there is need for 
new approaches if Kyoto is going to escape becoming 
a mere simulacrum of itself.  There is, for example, a 
real issue in determining just how much “historicity” is 
good for the present.
What is historicity?  To begin 
with, it is the living continuity of 
practices through time. 
What is historicity?  To begin with, it is the living 
continuity of practices through time.  Historicity 
resides only thinly in the stones of the streets, the 
tiled temple roofs, and the screened windows of the 
remaining old houses in Kyoto.  It dwells more deeply, 
and precariously, in the chorus of the feet that walk 
these streets, in the hands that build the screens, and 
the mouths that chant beneath these tiled roofs.  If we 
use “historicity” in this sense of practices or places  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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types of urban history to paleontologists and cura-
tors.  
1. Continuity is why the inner shrines of the Ise Jingu are legitimately the world’s oldest 
wooden buildings, even though they are completely rebuilt every twenty years.  The archi-
tectural design, physical skill, and materials necessary to rebuild these survives intact 
(which is much more than can be said for many important buildings completed in the 
United States in the last hundred years). 
Any city desiring to preserve its 
historicity must find some mode 
of dealing with its various histo-
ries. 
Any city desiring to preserve its historicity must 
find some mode of dealing with its various histories.  
The problem is to bring a healthy coherence to this 
deal.  As Michel de Certeau, surveying Manhattan 
from the top a skyscraper noted;
“Unlike Rome, New York has never learned the art of growing old by playing on all its pasts.  Its
present invents itself, from hour to hour, in the act of throwing away its previous accomplishments
and challenging the future.  A city composed of paroxysmal places in monumental reliefs.  The spec-
tator can read in it a universe that is constantly exploding.”  (1984, 91)
For de Certeau, Rome is a city content to built upon 
its own history, while New York represents not only 
the modern impulse to build, but the modernist 
impulse to dismantle its past in the process.  
de Certeau’s comment about the difference 
between New York and Rome applies internally and 
paradoxically to Kyoto, a city in the process of dis-
mantling itself in the name of tradition.  The outcome 
of this irreconcilable conflict in civic intention is that 
Kyoto is neither Rome nor New York, nor, eventually 
even Kyoto, as what it dismantles is not replaced by a 
conscious will to build.  Kyoto is rapidly becoming 
simply another suburb of Osaka, a place that will, if 
conditions continue, be known mainly for its proxim- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Kyoto, as much as other historical cities, should 
know that simple age2 does not make for historical 
interest.  It is the living continuity of the past in the 
present which gives the present its tenuous hold on 
the long beard of history.  So too, it is the grasping of 
the present for the future that determines the arena 
of cultural fashion.  
But Kyoto seems confounded by the conflicting 
desire to be both completely traditional and also au 
courant.  Or rather, one notices a concern that “tradi-
tion” and “fashion” (or innovation) have become 
mutually exclusive markets, and that all of Kyoto’s cul-
tural eggs are most precariously perched in only one 
of these baskets.  Precarious, because tradition itself is 
no longer treated with the measure of “traditional” 
respect that Kyoto had grown to enjoy.
In Kyoto the present and the past are never on 
very good terms. We have to consider that a major 
problem for Kyoto’s desire to maintain its historicity is 
directly due to the modernist impulse to reject his-
tory and tradition as the primary warrants for the 
value of practices and places in general.  And so, for 
Kyoto to preserve the heritage of its past, it must first 
come to some decision about the nature of its 
present.
1. Nara was the site of the Imperial Palace before this was moved to Kyoto.
2. Kyoto likes to think of itself as a city with a history of historicity.  This history is also of mod-
ern invention.  Kyoto has burned itself down many times and forgotten much more about 
itself than it now can, or cares to, recall.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The present found at any place is an outcome of 
that place’s past, and so these are all singularly differ-
ent.  The existence of local varieties of “the present”  
once provided the charms of travel (and thus, tour-
ism) and the central project of anthropology: to 
explore—and commodify—this plurality1.  
Where formerly “a present” held its geographical 
singularity on a basically local scale (much the same 
way that “local time” once ruled the clocks), there is 
now “the present,” a new place/time available on a 
much more distanciated scale.  This is the present of 
CNN and MTV, and of currency markets, the great 
urban metropolises (now linked by digital information 
nets and standardized construction codes), and global-
ized consumer commodity desires.  
As Gavatri Spivak once noted, there are still 
places and peoples on the margins, and sometimes 
increasingly so, of this global cosmopolitan network.  
In Kyoto the desire to belong to a globally validated 
life-style is very strong.  And the more this desire 
grows, the more it preempts locally validated cultural 
production.  Buying in to the global present requires 
opting out of purely local cultural critiques.  
The point here is that heritage management is 
1. The notion that “the past is a foreign country” was also inverted in the nineteenth century, 
when notions of a single evolutionary trajectory for “culture” —a time-line arrow with its 
point pointed at Western Europe—allowed anthropologists to discover “pre-historic” tribes 
in remote (from Western Europe) places.  This idea of looking for “our” past in “their” 
present dismisses the content and accomplishments of modernities in so-called “develop-
ing” nations. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ing global present.  To preserve historicity one must 
protect the value of local historic practices for people 
today.  But you also have to accept that antiquity has 
precious little exchange value in the global supermar-
ket of our common present.  And so, if the task of 
preserving history is not simply to be handed over to 
those who would profit from establishing a market for 
local antique wares (i.e., to the museums and collec-
tors) then we need to find some other reason to 
value the past as a local property.
Historical legitimacy and cultural value
Additionally, the wider historical problem we are 
faced with is actually quite the reverse of what we 
have proposed; it asks us to following: how do we 
escape those histories that seem to plague us?  Histo-
ries of totalitarianism, of intolerant nationalism, of 
official cruelty, of war and genocide; and the smaller 
histories of families which holds their own violences.  
How can we expunge these from the present in a 
manner that does not invite their eventual resurrec-
tion in the future (even if, as Marx noted, this comes 
as farce)?  How can the present strengthen its grip on 
the beard of the past while loosening history’s fingers 
from its own hair?  
The desire to simply forget, when history makes 
us uncomfortable, is a desire to avoid justice, to skip 
out when the bill comes due (it is the desire that 
someone else will forget).  It was Henri Lefevbre who 
noted, “silence is not the same thing as quietus.”   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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history of oppression.  For this history, as Connerton 
(1989) [after Foucault and Bourdieu] reminds us, is 
inscribed in language and space, and embodied in flesh 
and stone.   
In short, there are plenty of “traditions” around 
us that we might not want to preserve, and we have 
to have a way of disentangling these from those we do.  
The modern distrust of “tradition” as a blanket war-
rant for the value of practices makes all histories 
(including its own) subject to devaluation.  This opens 
up an arena for the discussion of historical legitimacy 
and innovative intervention.  It reminds us that the 
mere continuity of any practice does not signify its 
legitimacy.  Finally, the main advantage of heritage 
management as a practice is lost if we are simply, and 
without recourse to critical intervention, stuck with 
all the history we’ve inherited.  If that were so, I would 
be the first to say bring in the bulldozers.  
To create the kind of historicity that the future 
might want as its past, we have to dance on the grave 
of injustice.  And for this we have to re-place the sites 
of oppression.  Such sites are not always memorialized 
on the ground somewhere (not even by their forget-
ting).  This is because oppression also is carried in the 
body, the person: i.e., its subject.  Preserving the heri-
tage of Kyoto’s historicity matters little if this does not 
create a new personal heritage for all of Kyoto’s city-
zens.  In fact, heritage preservation, at its best, offers a 
space of therapy, of person-place identity, of continu- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Spaces that work One could, of course, assert that every Kyoto 
institution, practice, and object has its own history, 
and that these are intertwined into larger flows with 
durative episodes and also ruptures, and, finally that 
some even larger matrix contains the sum of what we 
could call Kyoto’s “history.”  However, when the time 
comes to consider heritage management, it does not 
help us much to note that everything is, in this way, 
historical and connected to everything else.  Kyoto's 
city-zens need a much firmer grasp on history.  In fact, 
we require a grip somewhat stronger than the one 
history has on us, if we are going to begin to manage 
Kyoto’s heritage.  
Heritage management must sort out what to 
manage and what to leave to its own future.  For this, 
it uses historicity as a theoretic-practical lever to pull 
from the historical field those practices and institu-
tions that have (or that we want to have) cultural/eco-
nomic value in the present, and to examine the 
reasons why value exists or, conversely, why practices 
that once had value have lost this.  
Adding value This use of historicity engages heritage manage-
ment in the larger power arena of cultural production, 
valuation, and consumption.  Here is where heritage 
management decisions will ultimately succeed or fail.  
Heritage management proposes to add value to the 
cultural assets of a city.  It can do this in either (or 
both) of two ways: by legitimating the antique value of  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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manufacture.  The former, antiquarian, impulse—the 
desire to produce monuments, historical parks, and 
museums—is generally (mis)taken as the main strat-
egy for heritage management.  And in Japan, where 
new building construction is viewed as a type of urban 
panacea, this impulse is particularly attractive to city 
leaders.  
Rather, I want to suggest here that heritage man-
agement should look first to support practices which 
unify the place and its past with its everyday life in the 
present.  This unity signals the active resonance a 
place has with its history. 
As Henri Lefevbre  noted, nowhere is this unity 
more evident than in Venice, Italy: 
“Venice, more than any other place, bears witness to the existence, from the sixteenth century
on, of a unitary code or common language of the city.  This unity goes deeper, and in a sense higher,
than the spectacle Venice offers the tourist.  It combines the city's reality with its ideality, embracing
the practical, the symbolic and the imaginary....Here everyday life and its functions are coextensive
with, and utterly transformed by, a theatricality as sophisticated as it is unsought, a sort of involun-
tary mise-en-scène. There is even a touch of madness added for good measure (1991, 73-74).”  
The space of Venice is still being reworked as a 
vital cultural matrix for the lives of its inhabitants; Ven-
ice is a live performance where the curtain never 
comes down.  Lefevbre is setting up Venice in contrast 
to other cities where, regrettably, the show has 
already closed for the season.
Lefevbre’s radical critique of modern notions of 
“space” is useful in determining the proper arena for 
heritage management.  For Lefevbre, a space is either 
the result of production or the result of work.  “Pro-
duction” refers to a process of marshaling labour and  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ucts (from VCRs to skyscrapers) share a common his-
tory as they are all outcomes of this production 
process.  
making products instead 
of works
The scope of production has greatly enlarged in 
the last two hundred years to include not only house-
hold appliances and vehicles but streets, houses, office 
and municipal buildings and their sitings.  Entire cities 
are now produced (e.g., Chandigar or Brazilia).  And 
spatial production extends across the landscape in the 
form of highways and railways.  
In a city, there are two possible types of spaces: 
the space-as-product1 and the space-as-work.  A 
space-as-product dominates the imagination.  It 
announces itself completely.  A space-as-product is 
not lived, but only used—and used in ways deter-
mined solely by the product.  Museums and historical 
monuments transform all of their visitors into tour-
ists.  And cities that manage their own urban spaces as 
historical sites turn their own residents into tourists, 
who, like the residents of Kyoto (and Japan—although 
not foreign tourists) wishing to visit to Old Kyoto 
Imperial Palace, who must wait for that one day a year 
when the gates open and the guards are ready to 
make sure that nobody gets too close to the wood-
1. To Lefevbre’s notion of a space-as-product, I want to add one more crucial point: a product 
has no historicity—it does not continue its creation up to the present.  The process of pro-
duction excretes its products, guaranteed dead on delivery.  As soon as a product is made, 
the history of its creation is finished.   A product that acquires exchange value as an 
antique does so through the loss of its historicity.  An artifact becomes “historical” by sever-
ing its use in the present. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Lives and Works For Lefevbre, “work” maintains its singularity, and 
its outcomes, such as “works of art,” are never actu-
ally finished.  An artist (or a worker, in Lefevbre's 
sense) always has the right to redo a work and change 
this.  However, works also become products, individu-
ally when they are sold, and as an opus, on the day 
their worker/artist dies.  If these products maintain 
their market, they will gain value as antiques.    
A space-as-work is a site of ongoing creations, 
interventions and appropriations.  It is an affirmatively 
anti-antique space, full of surprises and open to 
change.  The “village square” in many different societ-
ies is (or, too often, was) such a space-as-work.  
Through it flows a panoply of festivals, markets, exe-
cutions, rallies, and games.  
A space-as-work is the outcome of a spatial logic 
that refuses to be reduced to a single dominant use.  A 
space-as-work is not definable as the square, or the 
street, or the building itself, but rather it includes the 
daily life of these.  A space-as-work opens itself up to 
the imaginations of individuals who enter this.  This 
effect, of course, requires some careful upfront 
design-work.  
From Bauhaus to 
Maihômu
Modernist  architects in the beginning of the cen-
tury attempted to release the imaginations of those 
who live or work in their buildings by freeing their 
designs from static canons of ornamentation, scale, 
and construction.  However, the proliferation of mod- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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in every city in the world (including Kyoto) that were 
constructed without serious architectural intent—
heralded the failure of modern architecture (at least in 
its “international style” mode).  Whether this was a 
failure to adequately articulate its own logic of design, 
or a more radical defect in this logic, is still being 
debated.  
Instead of “less is more,” (a modernist credo) the 
world has discovered that “less” regularly means 
exactly that.  And cities that settled for less are now 
saddled with it: hulking drab cubes with vacuous open 
floor plans and façades worth not even a first glance.  
These spaces-as-products, excreted from the same 
modernist design process, make up the great majority 
of post-war construction in Kyoto.  By their graceless 
presence, and their lack of historicity, they are 
destroying the living unity of Kyoto.  
The design task of heritage management is to uti-
lize local spatial logics and vernacular construction 
skills to repair or rebuild buildings-, streets-, neigh-
borhoods-, and cities-as-works that are lived, that are 
theatrical and festive.  A city where people want will 
want to live, work and play.  A place, in fact, much too 
good for tourists (which makes it that much more 
attractive to them).
The limits of cultural planning
Before getting to more specific ideas about heri-
tage management in Kyoto, there is one caveat that 
needs to be aired.  A central predicament of urban  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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oriented,” produces cities that are products rather 
than “works.”  The more that planners attempt to cre-
ate a total environment, the more that their plans 
become totalizing: closed to further creative appropri-
ation of the spaces so planned—and the more the city 
becomes a product, which is similar to other prod-
ucts, to other cities.  In terms of historicity, this means 
the more a space is planned, the more it acquires the 
history of the planners and less it can maintain any sui 
generis local historicity.  This limit to planning will 
become much clearer when we talk about festivals, 
but it applies just as well to buildings and parks as to 
parades (See also: Imagine the festival as a building.).
Good urban planning is intentionally partial.  It 
provides the seed that starts the life of a city-as-work.  
This germinal effort must plan-in a load of complexity, 
ambiguity and, perhaps, even a little madness, as sur-
prises for those who will live with these spaces 
throughout their lives.  After all, any culture that does 
not delight its owners is better off forgotten.  And so, 
heritage management must relinquish the desire to 
create a turn-key heritage landscape.  
Festivity — laisser les bons temps rouler!
Here we have the final challenge for heritage 
management:  how to conserve the performances of a 
local culture.  Again, the tendency (in Kyoto and other 
“historic cities”) has been to treat all cultural perfor-
mances as ritual dramas, and to repeat these, as much 
as possible, precisely as they were done the time  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Heritage Management —157—before.  In this way, performance becomes a product, 
separated from its initial creative inception, and its 
space-as-product is but a dark, cold sarcophagus.  
Every year in Kyoto, this sarcophagus is opened 
and the corpse of some former cultural work (now a 
helpless antique) is made to dance the very same rit-
ual dance it has staged for far too many years.  They 
call this event “Jidai Matsuri” or “Aoi Matsuri” (the 
two are, at times, as indistinguishable as they are 
undistinguished).  Then the costumed body is sealed 
back up for another year.  The tourists are sold on the 
authentic antiquity of what they are shown, which 
only serves to make them embarrassed by their own 
yawns. 
The boredom of onlookers who 
wait through traffic interruptions 
and other delays to watch the 
spectacle of Kyoto’s biggest festi-
val, Gion Matsuri, is a sad com-
mentary on an event with a 
history of active festivity.  Depic-
tions of this event in prior times 
(the Edo period) show clowns and 
dancers engaging the onlookers 
who are themselves in danger of 
being in the path of the giant yam-
aboko floats.
photo by author
The festival-as-product can never improve on 
itself, it can only fail (a horse throws its rider, a cos-
tume is worn backwards, someone forgets to light the 
sacred fire).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Heritage Management —158—Today, many of the participants of 
the Gion Matsuri perform their 
stylized roles with barely con-
cealed boredom.
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Instead of laughter, such 
an event comes loaded 
with excuses (it was rain-
ing, the sound tape broke, 
they don’t make’ em like 
they used to).  But then, a 
festival-as-product is not 
actually a festival.  A festi-
val-as-product begs the 
question: “Are we having 
fun yet?”  The answer, as 
you already know, is this: “Not if you have to ask.”
Vital signs
As I noted in relation to its repertoire of neigh-
borhood festivals above, overall, the civic festivals in 
Kyoto suffer from what might not inaccurately (if per-
haps too glibly) be called “cultural sclerosis,” caused by 
a hardening of the artistry which once created the 
events.  The major civic historical festivals of Kyoto 
(the Aoi Matsuri in May, the Gion Matsuri in July, and 
the Jidai Matsuri in October) are mostly well sup-
ported and competently managed, in the sense that 
they begin and end on time and look nearly the same 
as the did last year.  And with some more careful look-
ing the amount of artistry that went into an earlier 
construction of these events becomes evident in their 
costumes and appurtenances.
Indeed, with all of this activity and splendor it is 
even more curious, and rather sad, to note how com-
pletely many of these historical festivals fail to exhibit  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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rently made available for festivity in Kyoto, there is lit-
tle reason to be pessimistic about the potential for 
Kyoto to reinvigorate its festival production.  All this 
would take is some new creative imagination. 
All production and no play
What Kyoto’s planners lack (and this lack is 
widely shared among urban and civic planners in other 
cities around the world) is an adequate grasp of some 
rather fundamental predicaments of historicity and 
festivity.  The concept of “historicity” is far too often 
confused with “antique value,” even though these are 
roughly antithetical.  So to, the notion of “festivity” is 
often confused with its “spectacular” appearance.  As 
if looking festive was enough.  
These two mistakes are often combined into 
events called “historical festivals,” but which are, actu-
ally, “antiquarian spectacles:” pageants-as-products.  I 
would suggest that festivity is related to its spectacle 
component much as a good meal is to its written rec-
ipe.  There is an undeniable connection between the 
two, but which would you rather find on your plate?
In precisely the same way that a good cook and a 
great recipe work together to produce something 
awfully tasty, the city space and its community need to 
work in concert to make a festival “festive.”  It is the 
transformation of physical and social space during this 
work that gives festivity something to do.  That makes 
festivity worth the attempt.  Later in Part Two I will be 
focusing on festivity itself, here I will simply mark out  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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From these, we can begin to notice where this does 
not occur, might occur, should occur (but doesn’t), 
and, most of all, probably will occur any time now.  
We can, within certain limits, begin to plan for festiv-
ity.
In The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald noticed that, during 
a party (any good one) there is a special moment 
when the party actually begins, despite the minutes or 
hours before this moment when people were also 
dancing, drinking, and laughing.  At that moment a 
transformation occurs, a boundary is crossed.  
Gatsby’s town is, of course, Hollywood:
“The bar is in full swing, and floating rounds of cocktails permeate the garden outside, until the
air is alive with chatter and laughter, and casual innuendo and introductions forgotten on the spot,
and enthusiastic meetings between women who never knew each other’s names. 
The lights grow brighter as the earth lurches away from the sun, and now the orchestra is playing
yellow cocktail music, and the opera of voices pitches a key higher. Laughter is easier minute by
minute, spilled with prodigality, tipped out at a cheerful word.  The groups change more swiftly, swell
with new arrivals, dissolve and form in the same breath; already there are wanderers, confident girls
who weave here and there among the stouter and more stable, become for a sharp, joyous moment
the center of a group, and then, excited with triumph, glide on through the sea-change of faces and
voices and color under the constantly changing light. 
Suddenly one of these gypsies, in trembling opal, seizes a cocktail out of the air, dumps it down
for courage and, moving her hands like Frisco, dances out alone on the canvas platform. A momen-
tary hush; the orchestra leader varies his rhythm obligingly for her, and there is a burst of chatter as
the erroneous news goes around that she is Gilda Gray’s understudy from the Follies. The party has
begun.” 
Erving Goffman in his book Frame Analysis (1974, 
262) used this quote to note how events such as par-
ties (and here I would certainly include festivals) are 
planable only to a certain level, after which the orga-
nizers can only hope that their event, like an inspired 
infant, takes it to mind to stand up on its own and  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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New suggestions for heritage management
In a special “1200th Anniversary” edition of the 
Kyoto Journal, I suggested the briefest of outlines of a 
basic plan for city-wide heritage management in 
Kyoto.  I also convinced the Kyoto Journal to allow me 
to approach the Graduate School of Architecture and 
Urban Planning at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, to ask its students to participate in a design 
project centered on a reexamination of the Kyoto 
Gosho—the site of the Imperial Palace before the 
Emperor moved to Tokyo.  Here is the outline I sug-
gested in 1994:
At the physical end of the task, heritage manage-
ment must come down to the street level, to those 
remaining buildings and sites of any antiquity in Kyoto.  
The following plan represents the least intervention 
sufficient to reconstruct an historic living urban physi-
cal landscape for Kyoto.  
As with any preservation scenario, this one starts 
with a moratorium on the destruction of buildings 
older than, say, seventy years in Kyoto’s downtown 
wards (Kamigyo, Nakagyo, and Shimogyo) and the 
conservation of these structures.  But the more inter-
esting task comes in the re-imagining and realization 
of the Kyoto streetscape itself as an historical site.  
Architectural review using a vocabulary of historically 
grounded design parameters needs to be instituted 
for all new construction.  Finally the reconstruction of 
a contiguous street façade based upon some agreed  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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and demolition of some modern buildings.  
Historicity Pathways Kyoto deserves to be strolled through; to retell 
its own stories in the echoing footsteps of the casual 
pedestrian.  This is its true scale and rightful future.  
The major emphasis for heritage management should 
be the creation of pathways through the city.  A selec-
tion should first be made of certain avenues that will 
serve as historically conserved pathways connecting 
cultural, retail, and commercial nodes.  Along these 
historicity-pathways actual period (wooden construc-
tion) buildings could be assembled, having been moved  
from their current sites in and out of the city.  Fortu-
nately, the typical Edo-period city-house (machiya) is 
relatively easy to move and reassemble.  The control 
of auto traffic and other measures designed to 
enhance the experience of these pathways, including 
the retail mix, will need to be determined in consulta-
tion with the people who will live on these streets.  
The historicity-pathways should be managed as 
social and cultural residential/retail cooperatives, and 
used to attract a variety of artists into the city.  This 
will help stimulate a creative mixture of art forms that 
have long local traditions, together with others that 
might inform new traditions.  Some of these houses 
should also be made available to those city-zens of 
Kyoto who are now living in areas of the town that 
are subject to Japan’s unique form of residential rac-
ism.  To reduce the effects of gentrification, these 
properties should be held as a public trust, with man- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Still other sites need to be looked at to provide 
civic spaces for recreation and cultural production in 
addition to their value as historical places.  And there 
is a need for hundreds of small-scale projects each 
aimed at enhancing a corner here, a building there, or 
a river course, in order to articulate the pluralistic 
desires and histories of individual neighborhoods.  
There it is, at its most programmatic level: a basic plan 
to jumpstart Kyoto's heritage management effort.  But 
where to actually begin?
Central Park Kyoto In Kyoto, the central space that most needs 
rethinking is the Gosho, the grounds of the Old Kyoto 
Imperial Palace, which is geographically and culturally 
the central place of the city, and should be opened up 
for multiple uses by the local residents.  The Kyoto 
Journal is proposing a redesign project for the site of 
the Old Kyoto Imperial Palace (the Kyoto Gosho).  
This project, called “Central Park Kyoto,” will improve 
the economic and cultural value of the site in several 
ways, while returning this (or much of it) to all the 
city-zens of Kyoto.  
The current Kyoto Gosho buildings and grounds 
are neither very old (by Kyoto’s standards), nor very 
interesting in terms of their political history.  This pal-
ace was mainly occupied during the time of political 
rule by various Shoguns.  Japan’s real “capital” during 
this period was Niji Castle and later Edo Castle.  At 
the time of the Meiji Restoration, the Kyoto Gosho 
was hastily abandoned in favor of the Edo (Tokyo) pal- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ings—which are absolutely worth saving—would be 
carefully moved and rebuilt (perhaps on the site of the 
Tokyo Palace or on the grounds of Nijo Castle).  One 
might note that Kyoto also has a long history of such 
re-sitings.
The current realities of the absence of the 
Emperor from Kyoto, and the new democratic politi-
cal system of Japan, have turned this cultural work 
into another antique—into a product of history.  
Without the actual august personage in residence 
(and with the purse to make the cultural perfor-
mances roll) the palace is only another period-style 
building.  But the Gosho site, by its scale and geogra-
phy, and its connection with the history of the impe-
rial court, lies close to Kyoto’s heart.  It is a mirror of 
the city’s self-image.  And so the Gosho will be the 
centerpiece for any heritage management in Kyoto.
To explore the potential for redesigning the 
Gosho, the Kyoto Journal enlisted the help of graduate 
students of the Graduate School of Architecture and 
Urban Planning at the University of California, Los 
Angeles.  In its proposal, the Kyoto Journal outlined the 
project in this way: 
“The task for your students would be to redesign the Kyoto Imperial Palace grounds to empha-
size multiple uses for this site...:  [1] a new residence built to accommodate members of the imperial
family...;  [2] a public historical monument to the imperial history of Kyoto;  and [3] a “central park”
for Kyoto with maximal open space, and which is connected to the surrounding residential and busi-
ness districts.”
The intention is to add value to this site for use 
by the city and the city-zens of Kyoto.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Giddens proposes that (post-traditional) late 
modernity can be described as a period of increasing 
institutional reflexivity, combined with a high level of 
individual reflexivity (e.g., in relations with expert sys-
tems).   This increase is proposed in comparison to 
earlier modernity: not to pre-modernity.  The rela-
tively low level of individual reflexivity evidenced in 
early (“classical”) modernity was not a hold-over from 
earlier, traditional times, despite the popular percep-
tion of “tradition” as inflexible and intolerant to 
change—this perception describes, at most, the con-
ditions of some traditional practices after these were 
subject to modern (and modernizing) discourses.   
Here I would have to agree with Habermas and 
Bakhtin (in one of the few issues where they agreed 
with one another) that we need to find a way to look 
historically at the lifeworld before this was penetrated 
by the systems of modernity if we are to find how tra- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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1. We can surmise that traditional practices (in pre- post-traditional times), the normalcy that 
the traditions provided was mostly governed within the individual as a toolbox of skills used 
by individual practitioners.  Today, games retain this feature of traditional practices, and 
players are expected to show their skilling in their play.  Because the practices were 
acquired individually, individual innovations, and also individual mistakes would have been 
commonplace.   Traditional practices did not require that the individual maintain the tradi-
tions as a part of the “undesigned” mode of their Umwelt.   Quite the oppposite:  a self-
refexively organized repertoire of skilling that individuals acquired would have been a cen-
tral feature of the individual’s Umwelt.   To be proficient at doing the wide range of practices 
that one needed to know in order to get on would require that one designed one’s time and 
effort toward this end.  In fact, innovations in all areas of traditional practices—innovations 
arising from individual talents—would have been routine, except where these practices 
became subject to institutional controls.
Institutions (such as guilds and religions) that attempted to control access to certain “tradi-
tional” skills—mostly when these entered into a marketable arena— created a gatekeeper 
function that enforced secrecy and promoted authority in order to maintain discursive 
power over these knowledges.  This type of “traditional” control—similar to what Giddens 
calls “authoritative power” (1979, 100)—is also maintained in modern states wherever 
selected people are authorized to perform actions not available to everyone.  
 “...it is usually the case that nor-
mal appearances, typical appear-
ances, and proper appearances are
much the same,...
...impropriety on the part of others
may function as an alarming
sign.  ...;conventional courtesies




It is sufficient here to suggest that normalcy in 
pre-modern times included a  number of necessary 
skills, which, because they were skills, allowed people 
to become more or less skill-full—based on their own 
initiative and talent.  These skills opened up normalcy 
to the individual capacity for innovation and caprice.  
Both Giddens and Habermas see subsequent, modern, 
conditions of the Umwelt as characterized by a general 
trend of deskilling.   While Marxists have looked 
mainly at deskilling in the  arena of what Giddens 
called “allocative power,” e.g., in the means of produc-
tion (including, as Bourdieu would remind us, cultural 
production), cultural theorists, often led by feminist 
theorists, are exploring deskilling in  “authoritative 
powers”: particularly in the reflexive reappropriation  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Heritage Management —168—of these, i.e., the power to become one’s own author.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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learning to roudou
Similar to conditions that Willis (1977) recorded 
in England, there are two exit criteria which students 
face, and that play into their desire to monitor their 
own behavior in schools. Those students who are pre-
paring for university entrance must work toward the 
examination, and also be aware that their general 
behavior is being monitored and recorded by their 
teachers on reports that they will never see, but will 
be made available to high-schools and colleges.  For 
these students demeanor and performance require-
ments are quite severe.  
Other students who are not preparing for selec-
tion into universities have less of a need to conform 
to the codes of correct behavior, and are freer to 
explore work-place style behaviors that may include a 
necessary show of toughness1.  They are, in Willis’s 
terms, “learning to labor.” In Higashi-kujo, where there 
is a higher percentage of day labor (hiyatoi roudou), and 
where the daily tussle for work requires the mainte-
nance of a physical presence among one’s fellows, 
toughness is just a part of the résumé.
1. The social and economic disparity between the lifestyle made possible by salaried employ-
ment in a large Japanese company or in government service after graduation from a uni-
versity, and those of other careers, from agriculture and small-scale manufacturing to retail 
trades creates a divide that is perhaps the greatest single social threshold in Japan.  For 
working-class families to have one their children cross this divide and be employed in a 
large corporation or government ministry marks a profound moment in the family’s history.  
The growth of the large stock-holding (kabushiki) corporations in the last fifty years in 
Japan has brought many families to this moment, but only a token few resident Koreans. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Madang night
“Where's your camera,” she asked, shouting over 
the noise of the post-Madang party.  
I was wedged into a vinyl padded booth of a res-
taurant that could have been a Dennys, except that on 
the floor next to the counter a dozen Korean drum-
mers were pounding out a beat that sent a hundred 
revelers into dancing wherever they were standing.  
The restaurant's staff had retreated to the kitchen, 
and took turns peeking out through the swinging 
doors.  Near the front picture windows, a long buffet 
table stood emptied of its Korean fare, and the latest 
of many cases of 750ml bottles of beer was nearly 
gone.  
“My camera?” I shouted back, “I'm out of film.” 
“Video?”
“No more tape.”
She looked at the pockets of my utility vest. “Tape 
recorder?”
“Battery's dead,” I replied.
She smiled at me.  It was the first time in fourteen 
months of meetings and rehearsals and performances 
that she'd shown anything but cool distrust of my 
presence in her neighborhood.  Trust was a scarce 
commodity between this neighborhood and outsiders.  
Most people who lived somewhere else would not 
even walk through this part of Kyoto.  And when out-
siders came here with video cameras, as NHK (Japan's 
PBS) does every decade or so to produce another  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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the residents already know its not done for them.  
She was a person, like many of her friends, 
trapped in the middle of a load of troubles with no 
good way out and few expectations of any significant 
changes for the future.  But then she was also partici-
pating in change by helping to organize the Madang.  
It was nearing midnight on the day of the Madang.  
I had been up since 5 am finishing the photography 
exhibit.  I had my own part to play within the Madang 
drama, and I was playing the role of ethnographer for 
a Yomiuri Television crew, who were using my interest 
in the Madang to create a feature news story.  They 
were shooting me shooting the event, and I was also 
shooting them shooting me shooting the event.  And 
now I was completely shot.
The Madang rolled to a close around seven, and 
then we all worked to get the tents down and the 
equipment packed and the trash collected and carted 
off, so that the schoolyard was neater than it was 
when we set up the day before.  Last year, the PTA 
complained that the Madang had left a mess behind 
(which it hadn't, but someone just had to complain 
about something).  So this year the schoolyard got an 
extra-thorough cleaning.  This normally severe school-
yard, not much more than a rectangular expanse of 
gravelly dirt, which today had contained, but barely, 
the festival commotion, had finally been returned to 
its disciplinary mode.  
When the last truck pulled out, the mood picked  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—Madang night —172—up.  It was time to celebrate.  The party began around 
nine, and hit its stride an hour later.  Those who relied 
on public transportation would began to drift away by 
eleven-thirty.  
I had stashed all my equipment at a locker at 
Kyoto Station.  Like I said to her, all of my film and 
tapes and batteries were used up, and so was I.  Now, 
after three hours of serious drinking (this was not a 
crowd to let a glass go empty) the uphill bicycle ride 
home was looking less and less attractive.  The drum-
mers had switched rhythms, pushing the tempo.  Peo-
ple were dancing on the empty buffet table.
She gave me a second smile and poured beer into 
my glass.  
“You came here anyway,” she shouted.
“Mochiron,” I said.  “Of course I did.”  
“Welcome to the community!”  she said and put 
her hand on my shoulder. 
“Thanks.”  I returned the smile. “Nowhere else I'd 
rather be.”
She nodded and headed away.  
The party was hitting its limit.  The drummers 
pushed the tempo further, louder.  Everyone was 
dancing, jumping to the beat.  Bodies touching, faces 
stretched into grins that verged on some permanent 
rearrangement of tissue.  The crowd pressed itself 
together.  And me without a camera.
It occurred to me that here was another moment 
to the day's festival, a moment not less significant by 
its intimate scale—the entire year of festival prepara- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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rehearsals for this moment.  This party was not the 
end of this year's event, but the budding communion 
that would assure the next.  Here was fecund moment 
drenched in body sweat, and sweetened by a heady 
abandon.   
Suddenly, with a sharp report, one of the drum-
heads broke.  The crowd whooped its approval of this 
signal that their passions had torn through some 
unspoken barrier.  The other drums used the sound to 
signal their coda, and slowed to a final measure.
Some days later, I asked her one of my standard 
questions, “What's the worst scenario you can imag-
ine for what Higashi-kujo will be like in twenty years,” 
“The worst?” she replied, “is to stay exactly like it 
is today.”  
Thinking back on the party, I reflected that she 
need not worry about Higashi-kujo remaining the 
same.  Already, the Madang had opened a space for 
comment, for reflection, and for social therapy.  In 
one year the neighborhood had already changed.
October 1994. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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civic privacy
Democracy also requires places that are private, 
hidden from view, unmarked on the map.  These are 
spaces of hiding from the state——places that give the 
externality of civil society its physical presence.  I call 
such places spaces of “civic privacy1.”  At its most 
basic level, civic privacy is performed by the curtain on 
the voting booth, where privacy assures the anonym-
ity of the voter, freeing her from personally directed 
political reprisal.  But the right to hold meetings in pri-
vate opens up a shared space of privacy.  Society 
decides not to use its x-ray, spy satellite, radar imaging 
on this or that place, conversations are not recorded, 
and some meetings not constrained by the visible 
presence of surveillance.  While public space is gener-
ally perceived as the space of democratic action, actu-
ally, places of civic privacy and public-ity co-articulate 
the working space of democracy.  But we have to be 
very careful in determining where and what types of 
hiding can be legitimated.
The “right to privacy,” is a right that can only be 
1. Civic privacy is secured as the right to form a barrier against panoptic intrusion.  Civic pri-
vacy creates a condition of externality to the state.  Civic privacy is absolutely vital to the 
creation of a public sphere, to the maintenance of democratic society, and to the welfare of 
individual life projects.  Many of the debates over social policy today (abortion rights, eutha-
nasia, domestic violence, censorship) are really attempts to reset boundary conditions 
between state intrusion and civil privacy.  We can only understand these debates fully 
when we comprehend their social geographical consequences.  Civic privacy is also often 
used as an alibi for other types of hiding, so we have to be very careful about this notion.  
For example, the notion that a government organization has a right to privacy is a mistaken 
use of this concept. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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locations support this right; it does not exist within 
the state nor the marketplace.  “Official secrets,” 
“black projects,” “covert operations,” and “trade 
secrets” are compromises made to purchase a local-
ized strategic advantage of certain information against 
the designs of enemies and competitors.  The grudging 
acceptance1 of these practices should not be confused 
with the granting of a “right to privacy.”  All informa-
tion within the state or in corporations should be 
accessible to outside oversight organizations, and usu-
ally the courts fulfill this role (although, in Japan, the 
courts do not have an active history of doing so).  The 
lack of oversight organizations in Asia Pacific nations, 
such as Japan, supports a “culture” of hiding, and 
marks a weakness in civil society's purview vis-à-vis 
the state or the market throughout the region.  
What about openness within civil society?  Above 
I noted that civil society is the arena for places and 
practices of “civic privacy.”  Civic privacy is a neces-
sary moment in a process of articulating views that 
are external to the state.  The privacy protects individ-
ual participants against personal reprisals.  Apart from 
this type of privacy, civil society organizations should 
reflect the same internal level of openness and trans-
parent decision making that they expect of the state.  
1. This acceptance is warranted through a discourse of shared advantage.  National corpora-
tions (an increasingly anachonistic term) are represented as working in the interest of the 
national good.  Therefore we all benefit when new technology is kept secret from “foreign” 
competitors. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
commentarium—civic privacy —176—The very issues of delegation1 and representation that 
are often the focus of reform agendas brought by civil 
society organizations against the state are also active 
within civil society organizations themselves.  Alex-
ander Kluge's (1988) work on the process of democ-
ratization of production for a counter-public sphere 
gives us a good example of a reflexive attempt to 
marry theory and process within an organization.  
However, today, even an acknowledged “right of 
privacy” does not ensure absolute civic privacy.  The 
general conflict between the desired protection of 
individual member privacy and the need to be inclu-
sive, to openly recruit members, generally means that 
a civil society organization cannot today assume that 
the contents of its meetings are actually unknown to 
1. Bourdieu's arguments are sanguine here: “This process of concentration of power in the 
hands of delegates is a sort of historical realization of what is described by the theoretical 
model of the process of delegation. People are there and speak. Then comes the party offi-
cial, and people come less often. And then there is an organization, which starts to develop 
a specific competence, a language all of its own. (Mention might be made here of the way 
the bureaucracy of research develops: there are researchers, and there are scientific 
administrators who are supposed to serve the researchers. Researchers do not under-
stand the administrators' language, which may be bureaucratic 'research budget', 'priority'. 
etc.—and, nowadays, technocratic-democratic 'social need'. They immediately stop com-
ing and their absenteeism is denounced. But certain researchers, those who have time, do 
stay. The rest of the story is easy to predict.) The party official (permanent) is, as the term 
suggests, the person who devotes all his time to what is, for others, a secondary or, at 
least, part-time activity. He has time, and he has time on his side. He is in a position to dis-
solve all the prophetic, that is, discontinuous struggles for power into the tempo of the 
bureaucracy, into that repetition that swallows up time and energy. It is in this way that del-
egates secure a certain concentration of power and develop a specific ideology, based on 
the paradoxical reversal of their relation with their mandators whose absenteeism, incom-
petence and indifference to collective interests are denounced, without it being seen that 
this indifference is the result of the concentration of power in the hands of the party offi-
cials... (1991, 218)" TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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A civil-society group can expect that its “private” 
meetings are not subject to public-sphere media dis-
tribution, and that the state's use of its information 
about private meetings is constrained and moni-
tored.  Laws that protect the state against organized 
efforts to overthrow it are legitimated as strategies 
against the potential of violence against the nation's 
citizenry, but they also serve the interests of the state 
against the citizen's rights of civic privacy, and these 
must be subject to external (e.g., legal) review.
1. Anti-Vietnam war protest meetings I attended were always assumed to include government 
informants, and the meeting organizers were often at a loss to find tactics to organize pub-
lic demonstrations that might surprise the local police.  Usually, on the day of a demonstra-
tion, the police tactical squad would arrive at the demonstration's “secret” starting place 
before the organizers did.  This also led to increasing acrimony, disorder, and (perhaps jus-




“Atarimae” is a word with two related meanings: 
the first is “proper; right; just; fair... reasonable, natu-
ral...deserved, merited, due” (Kenkyusha’s New Japa-
nese-English Dictionary).  The second meaning is 
“common; ordinary; average; normal; usual (ibid).”  
Atarimae literally means “in front of the hit.”  It is 
something so usual, so normal, so proper that it is 
absolutely a priori.   Atarimae describes those aspects 
of everyday life that are so expectable that they need 
no attention: it describes all of the aspects of everyday 
life that are a part of the undesigned mode of (Goff-
man’s) Umwelt.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Buraku
Something that must be said right off:  There is no 
such thing as a “burakumin.”  
“‘Japan is now a highly educated
and fairly “intelligent” society,
much more so than America,
where intelligence on the average
is still very low.  In America, there
are many Blacks, Puerto Ricans,
and Mexicans.’”
1986, Nakasone Yasuhiro,
then Prime Minister of Japan.
quoted in Coates 1990,p1
The term “buraku” in Japan marks a place, a neigh-
borhood, a district that is set outside of the remain-
der of Japanese places, neighborhoods and districts.  
The term “min” or “minzoku” means “people” or 
“race.”  (“Minzokugaku” is the term used for “ethnol-
ogy,” and “minzoku kokka” is the term for “nation-
state”—and so essentializing “nation” as a racially 
determined group).  To apply the term “min” to the 
place “buraku” is to already accept that the stigma of 
the place can be located as well within the bodies of 
the people who dwell there.   It calls into being a 
“race” of people defined by buraku residence.  It con-
nects a history of spatial segregation to the bodies of 
current residents of these segregated spaces.  As I will 
be discussing how this connection between space and 
bodies was made, I will not begin by asserting this 
nominally.
This preamble to a description of places that are 
called buraku (or toshoku buraku) in Japan shifts the 
primary focus from the western notion of stigma, 
which is always first attached to bodies, and only then 
by their presence to spaces (e.g., ghettos).  But I do 
not, by this, wish to suggest that the bodies of persons 
who have been forced to dwell in buraku areas are not 
also intimately affected by this circumstance.  And 
there is an entire essentialist discourse that natural- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Buraku —3—izes the historical and current reasons for separation 
of people from the “general” population of an equally 
essentialized Japanese “race.”  
The discourse surrounding the term “buraku”  
starts with the idea of physical separation as its pri-
mary cause.  The people who were resettled in these 
separate places are also made different by their his-
tory of separation.  And now it is this difference that 
gives their continued separation added legitimacy in 
the imaginations of those who continue to make this 
distinction.
The term “buraku” is a designation that once 
meant simply a “hamlet,” a generally applicable term 
for a small-scale residential unit, widely used through-
out Japan before the Tokugawa (1603-1868) period.  
Today buraku refers mainly to those “hamlets” where 
shunned, stigmatized individuals and their families 
were put, that is, they were either directly sentenced 
to dwell there by an official order, or migrated there 
as the only available destination when they were 
pushed out of other circumstances.  Over hundreds of 
years, families in Japan’s buraku neighborhoods have 
been serving the punishment of their ancestor’s origi-
nal crimes—sometimes this was the crime of coming 
in from the outside, from Tohoku, say, other times it 
was something more local, an indiscretion severe 
enough to force the family from their locale through a 
process of murahachibu (shunning).  Buraku are those far-
away places that “bad people,” or people who simply 
looked or acted different (congenital physical or men- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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selves banished to.   But they were not far away, but 
close by, where all could watch the ongoing deprava-
tion that their residential “sentence” produced.  
Histories of confinement
The wedding of the Japanese 
Crown Prince in 1993 renewed 
the discourse on the purity of the 
imperial heritage and with this the 
concomitant discourse on the 
impurity of the heritage of “oth-
ers,” most directly (although 
never mentioned in the press) the 
latter includes Japanese persons 
living in buraku areas.  This 
photo, reproduced from the pro-
gram of the 4th Higashiyama 
buraku liberation meeting, was 
used to illustrate the intimate con-
nection between these logics of 
hereditary exclusion.
To start to understand 
Kyoto’s buraku, you have to 
begin with a history of 
institutional control over 
space.  The notion of law 
enforcement and punish-
ment in Tokugawa (1603-
1868) Japan includes sev-
eral practices, the logics of 
which can be still traced in current practices, working 
either directly in modern society (such as the Imperial 
Household), or through their supposed reversal but 
continued marking (such as equal rights measures for 
women and Japanese living in buraku areas) as signifi-
cant features where the discourse is silenced, but the 
practice is active.  
The social ecology of outcasting, and of marking 
marginal persons in pre-modern Japan created a class/
caste economy that out-grouped those who could not 
muster the wherewithal to keep up with the market-
place.  The penalties of falling behind one's neighbors 
were truly extreme.  More than any other condition, 
this yawning gulf between those who have some 
socio-economic stability and those sinking into the 
oblivion of hinin status produced the desire for mid- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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grouping punishment was designed to run in perpetu-
ity, an expression of the implied longevity of social 
contracts which still carries great weight in Kyoto.  
The fact also that the buraku were not remote 
islands,  but rather, sub-urban prison-hamlets, made 
their inhabitants (hinin (outcaste)) visible signs of the 
downside of social bad-behavior.  Their poverty and 
the jobs they were allowed to do (cleaning up every-
body’s shit, and tanning and working leather, disposing 
of dead bodies) added an ongoing stigma to their 
ancestor’s “original sin,” now long forgotten.  
And their social isolation and collective guilt over 
time fed rumors that these were a different kind of 
people.  I have heard this difference expressed as a dif-
ference in the consistency of their blood, for example, 
(which, I was told, was believed by some to be 
“thicker” than that of “Japanese” people).  
Of course, the move to a representation of the 
Japanese government as a democratic state in the 19th 
century, made official discrimination dangerous to 
announce, although lists of each and every buraku 
address in the nation have long been available to com-
panies and investigators, and Japan’s formal residence 
registration requirements (one of many pre-occupa-
tion regulations that have never been eased) makes it 
impossible for a family to simply move away from the 
buraku and forget the past.  No one, it seems, is really 
willing to forget, even though the government makes a 
point of expressing its desire to bring equality to all its  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Buraku —6—citizens.  
After 1910 when Koreans began to enter West-
ern Japan in large numbers, many of them were 
housed not in company dormitories (with the rest of 
the workers), but in boarding houses in buraku areas.  
And so the history of the buraku and that of resident-
Koreans have, in Higashi-kujo, coalesced into a collec-
tive predicament.  In terms of their cultural geography, 
Koreans living in Higashi-kujo burakus find themselves 
twice removed: being of an alien nationality and living 
in a highly marked, stigmatized neighborhood.   And 
so, in Kyoto, and elsewhere in this region of Japan, Jap-
anese and Koreans living in and near buraku areas find 
common complaints about social discrimination and 
lifestyle problems.
The more recent history of buraku politics and 
social movements has been summarized by Neary 
(1989) and Noguchi (1990).  Ongoing efforts by 
buraku organizations in Kyoto1 (e.g., Buraku Libera-
tion Research, Higashiyama Executive Committee, 
burakumondai o kangaerukai [Meeting to Consider the 
Buraku Problem]# 4, 1994) and elsewhere highlight 
the fact that, despite official silence over their situa-
1. I attended an evening meeting, which was held in a hall that was filled with men in business 
suits.  The speakers spoke with passion about their histories and circumstances.  The audi-
ence listened with barely controlled impatience.  The final speaker asked for questions.  
When there were none, the meeting ended.  Outside, I noticed that, as they walked away 
from the meeting, and out of the buraku, clusters of government officials and business 
executives chatted animatedly.  Many of them fumbled in their pockets, and returned to 
their lapels the lapel pin that marked their corporate affiliation—The pins they refused to 
wear even though their supervisors required that they attend this meeting.  By this gesture 
they affirmed the active social discrimination that the meeting was supposed to address.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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characterized their out-caste condition have not been 
addressed. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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gonin (tonari) gumi
Many of these practices are spatial in their effects, 
and they include relationships between neighbors as 
well as those between individuals and the state.  For 
example, social control— formally managed for three 
centuries, mostly informal since 1945—in Japan has 
long been based on the practice of assigning individu-
als to groups which could then be held jointly respon-
sible (and liable for punishment) for the actions of any 
one member.  The resulting “cooperation” and “trust” 
between members of these groups, aspects of local 
social life that are often showcased as representative 
of harmonious life becomes cruelly ironic, as both 
cooperation and trust, in the usual sense of these 
terms, require voluntary participation.  And this, in 
turn, requires a space for voluntary non-participation.  
Looking at individuals with no choice but to “cooper-
ate,” in the groups they are connected to, and with 
constant surveillance as a hedge on “trust,” it is diffi-
cult to measure the possibility that, under circum-
stances where voluntary association (and 
disassociation) were possible, one might still find 
cooperation and trust, despite Fukuyama’s (1995) sim-
plistic pronouncement of Japan as a “high-trust” soci-
ety.
During the Tokugawa bakufu, five-person groups1 
(gonin gumi) (ibid, 6) linked neighbors to each other as 
1. This practice has a long history as well in China (Mayfair Yang, personal communication), 
and was modified within the cadre system of Maoist China. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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neck by individually and preemptively prompting an 
official investigation of a suspected infraction) and as a 
group that was officially complicit in any infraction of 
the rules.  Surveillance become the duty every person 
against their neighbors, and out-grouping became a 
tactic for mutual protection.  Preemptive ostracism 
(murahachibu) of troublesome neighbors was probably 
safer than any later confession to authorities, who 
were still in a position to administer group punish-
ment (renza).  
It is the arbitrary imposition of group culpability 
that lends terror to this exercise of power.  And this 
terror, reflected by the group in its own internal polic-
ing, remains a shadow feature of modern neighbor-
hood organizations (chounaikai).  Before WWII these 
were also organized as “tonarigumi” [neighbor groups] 
five household units (every house is connected to the 
two across the street and the neighbors on either 
side) that served a self-surveilling function much like 
the earlier Tokugawa gonin gumi, but with added 
emphasis on the control of expressions in regard to 
official, national doctrine1.  
1. When we moved into Kyoto, our house was, by proximity, a member of my landlord’s tonar-
igumi, and we were coached to be on our best behavior at all times.  We failed in this duty 
more than once, I’m afraid. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—gonin (tonari) gumi —10—“Kumi resemble the wartime
tonarigumi, the neighbor groups
that were banned under the Occu-
pation in 1947 because they were
seen as fundamentally undemo-
cratic and tainted by their intimate
links to wartime mobilization and
social control.  Though residents
of Miyamoto-cho sometimes refer
to kumi as tonarigumi, the kumi of
today have none of the powers of
coercion and control exercised by
the wartime tonarigumi, such as
collective responsibility for mem-
bers’ behavior, control over the
distribution of foodstuffs and
other basic necessities of life, and
formal statutory links to the state
apparatus
(Bestor 1989, 170)  .”
 Counter-doctrinaire expressions could be dan-
gerous to the entire group, and neighbors were 
charged with monitoring such matters.  While legal 
guilt and punishment is no longer meted out en masse 
to neighbors or family, the relationships that neighbor-
hood organizations manage retain an informally obliga-
tory (rather than voluntary) force.  And the city uses 
these organizations to broadcast its own version of 
how the city is managing its affairs.  The chounaikai are 
still responsible to see that official notices are read by 
every household, and that other information (on pub-
lic health, say, or about cultural resources) has 
reached each family.  While urbanization has removed 
the economic threat of shunning (most people live at 
some distance from their job site), social relationships 
in the neighborhood can become strained, and bad 
feelings can persist for many years. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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murahachibu (shunning)
The use of shunning (murahachibu) to punish—
with the aim of driving out—a difficult neighbor 
before they might attract official notice (or for other 
reasons), gave local village organizations their own 
means of control.  For losing one's official residence 
meant that the entire family would become homeless 
(mushuku) and potentially assigned (a process known 
as hinin teka) to outcaste (hinin) status and thus liable 
to be “sentenced” to reside in a specified hinin village 
(buraku), or some other confined locale.  This change 
in status was not confined to the person or genera-
tion that first occasioned the original ostracism, but 
extended in perpetuity.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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hinin (outcaste)
 The result of expulsion from, or lack of integra-
tion into established residential groups was a status 
known as hinin.  Even earlier than the Tokugawa era in 
Japan, there were  persons and groups who were so 
out-casted.  The reasons given for this practice are 
many and their margins fuzzy.  Neary (1989) notes 
that an occupational1 stigma (based on Buddhist 
notions of defilement) surrounding the handling of 
bodies or excrement of animals or humans was one 
feature of these areas.   
Other groups, such as those who had been cap-
tured during conquests of outlying regions, or itiner-
ant entertainers, filled a marginal zone of quasi 
outcaste status.  But it was only when the land itself 
was measured and its tenure noted that the means of 
escaping this stigma became problematic.  It was 
through the controls placed on residence and move-
ment across the land that those who had no could 
were trapped by their lack of property.
Hinin were also workers in the penal system, from 
guarding prisoners to disposing of their beheaded 
corpses.  And beggers, who were required to register 
during Tokugawa times (De Vos, 26), filled a liminal 
stage between ryoumin (good people) and senmin 
1. Other occupations with less-obviously Buddhist-related stigmas (such as bamboo manu-
facture and indigo dying) also carried a stigma.  These may have been occupations that 
required little capital or land, and were simply available to persons with little means, and so 
were marked by their lack of entry-controls. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The spatial availability of  buraku as receptacles of 
those who had lost their residences through shunning 
or through economic reversals in the early decades of 
the agricultural market economy facilitated the pro-
duction of such homeless people, by removing them 
from the locales they formerly occupied.  These bura-
kus, many of which are still maintained through a com-
bination of official inattention, bureaucratic marking, 
and (unofficial) social stigma, are the spatial outcome 
of the confluence of economic inequality under early 
capitalism and social/political controls levied directly 
or by proxy by the Tokugawa bakufu government.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Domestication
Reaching again into the tool box of anthropology, 
I would like to bring up a notion that has had broad 
application in this field: the idea of “domestication.”  
Victor Turner (1969, 42) turned to “domestication” to 
describe the use of symbols during rituals to render 
safe what were formerly dangerous emotions among 
the Ndembu; while Susan Sontag (1966) noted that 
modernity seems to verge between two impulses: sur-
render to the exotic, and the domestication of the 
unknown, of the exotic, mostly by science.  
Marcus and Fischer's  (1986) comments on 
anthropology as cultural critique bring up an inverse 
notion: that of defamiliarization, of making exotic 
what had previously or elsewhere been domesticated.  
In his 1987 article on cricket in contemporary India,  
Arjun Appadurai commented on how cricket, one of 
the “hardest” of British cultural forms, has been 
domesticated within India.  And we cannot overlook 
the literature on gender and the domestication of 
women.  
In other fields, Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 13) 
accuse the Oedipal impulse (at the service of society) 
of domesticating our very desires.  Finally, Zygmont 
Bauman (1990) warns us that the domestication of 
space by the nation replaces the means that individu-
als and local communities formerly domesticated their 
own neighborhoods--making us incapable of telling 
friend from enemy--and thus ultimately failing as a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The national space, Bauman notes, is too large a 
place to be familiar, and so we all live in unfamiliar sur-
roundings that resist our attempts at local appropria-
tion.  No longer given the authority to domesticate 
our own locales, we are now subject to larger (in 
space and time) processes of market-state domestica-
tion.  We are, ourselves, domesticated along with the 
places where we stroll and eat, work and play.
Robert Sack brings a related term “homogeniza-
tion” to his discussion of national memorial spaces:
“The multifunctional character of some memorials makes them less than sacred. Even among
nationally recognized memorials, there is no hierarchy of importance, as there would normally be
among sacred places in an organized religion. And what power are these places supposed to possess?
Certainly not the power of miracles or even of eliciting the truth (which was attributed to even
minor Chinese city temples as late as the nineteenth century). This does not mean that such memo-
rials do not work. They do evince shared and often strong sentiments in the form of common mem-
ories. But mostly they work by thinning out the meaning of the events and the place so that they can
be shared quickly by a modern, heterogeneous society. People visit them not only to remember but
to quickly and vicariously experience adventures of the past. In this sense, national memorials are
more like generic tourist attractions and theme parks than they are like shrines and sacred places. 
Eviscerating the power of the sacred is part of the general modern tendency to thin out culture
and homogenize modern places. This tendency is supported by several modern conditions. One is
that the use of the public, objective, geometrical meaning of space makes it difficult to convey the
specific and emotional contents of place and thus tends naturally to emphasize their generic quali-
ties. The same holds true of the scientific perspective. Another modern condition is the trend
toward a global economy and culture, which seems to require that places all over the world contain
similar or functionally related activities and that geographical differences or variations that interfere
with these interactions be reduced. After all, if we live in a global village, then we must feel at home
anywhere, and the simplest way of making us comfortable is to remove the strange and the unex-
pected. The thinning out and homogenizing of culture can be expected as a consequence of yet
another important condition—modern mass communication, especially television. (Sack 1992, 95-
96)”
This removal of “the strange and the unexpected” 
has another consequence: a coding of those things  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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things that are irredeemably strange and unexpect-
able.   The criminalization of recreational drug use is a 
widespread example of this, as are the various modes 
of homophobia.   
I will use the term “domestication” in two main 
senses: the first is the hegemonic reading: a domesti-
cated space is a place under paternalist control.  A 
place that services its owners.  The second meaning is 
that of “familiarity”-- the other space now joins the 
household, losing any exotic or dangerous meanings 
by this joining.  
Domestication, in the two senses I use here—the 
creation of spaces both of the familial and the famil-
iar—is a notion of some real value for anthropologists 
working in East Asia.  It helps us see through the simu-
lation of unity, and of history, to grasp the hybridity of 
places of local cultural production.  
The domestication of Japanese history during 
Meiji hoped to cut the island off from its mainland cul-
tural heritage, and the domestication of the West is 
today positioning the island somewhere off the coast 
of Europe.  What we have to do, in our ethnographies, 
is to carefully avoid reifying the process of domestica-
tion, and work toward a better theoretical purchase 
on this process as it is found in various locales on the 
Pacific Rim.  
The state and the market, often in concert, but 
increasingly with oblique goals, offer up cultural 
desires that share a common power aspect:  they are  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Domestication —17—beyond the control of the residents of the city, who 
are all treated like tourists, welcome to watch and 
spend, but not to act on their own.  A domesticated 
national cultural place cannot be appropriated by local 
residents, it has already been reduced to a single 
meaning, and is closed to dialogic intervention.
So, it is not only the foreign, exotic space that is 
subject to domestication by the marketplace.  Domes-
tication also describes a process that produces places 
of the state from a former landscape of local spaces.  
The nation-state domesticates local histories (which 
are dangerous to national “unity”) into a single 
national history.  But why do we tend to allow the 
state this process as a feature of its own production?  
And what are the tactics (in de Certeau's  sense) that 
can re-hybridize a domesticated locale?  This is a cen-
tral problematic for my research.
Domesticated bodies The other result of practices of domestication are 
domesticated bodies, bodies that are trained to act 
within the norms for self control.  The presence of 
domesticated bodies in a space is vital to the ongoing 
domestication of the space.  When all others in a 
space are behaving “appropriately,” the undomesti-
cated body becomes marked and available to the 
attention of institutions that maintain surveillance (the 
police, local merchants, neighbors).    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Domestication —18—“If some of the crowd's actions
can be seen as countertheatre, this
is by no means true of all. For a
third characteristic of popular
action was the crowd's capacity
for swift direct action. To be one
of a crowd, or a mob, was another
way of being anonymous,
whereas to be a member of a con-
tinuing organization was bound to
expose one to detection and vic-
timization. The eighteenth-cen-
tury crowd well understood its
capacities for action, and its own
art of the Possible. Its successes
must be immediate, or not at all. It
must destroy these machines,
intimidate these employers or
dealers, damage that mill, enforce
from their masters a subsidy of
bread, untile that house, before
troops came on the scene”
(Thompson 1993, 69).
When enough people find personal reasons to 
disattend to the “rules” of bodily domestication, then 
the tables turn, and it is the domesticated individual 
who becomes marked.  The sudden turn that trans-
forms a “crowd” into a “mob” is often mistakenly 
given as an example of this.  But this transformation is 
more often a counter tactic with a direct, collective 
purpose in mind...and not well suited as an example of 
un-domestication.   Undomestication, which occurs in 
festivals, is linked to an individual distancing from 
domestication, and is not liable to the “mass” effects 
that result in a mob.  
So too, Buford’s (1992) accounts of riotous foot-
ball (soccer) fans showed that they used their num-
bers to confound the usual police response to 
individual crimes, rushing en masse into convenience 
stores and stealing absolutely everything, then using 
the empty racks to break the windows before rushing 
back out again onto the street.  Like a flock of small 
birds distracting the hawk, the crowd enables lawless-
ness by submerging the individual into its mass.  
Undomestication I will take a better example from a work experi-
ence I had.  In a large organization in which I was 
working as a writer there was a once a year “retreat” 
for all of the executives.  This day-long event sent vir-
tually all of the bosses off to a local resort for a day of 
pep-talks, strategizing, and conversation (later I 
became one of these and joined in this event).  But 
that day was also a day when the remainder of the 
workers—the people who actually did most of the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Domestication —19—work in the office—were left unsupervised.  Within an 
hour the entire space had been reinvented.  
Impromptu games (a football was tossed around until 
it broke a lamp) were assembled.  People from differ-
ent departments began to talk with one another, using 
the director’s office (with its plush furniture) as a base 
for gripes about the general office situation.   Orders 
went out for pizza to be delivered.  Dresses and 
sports coats were exchanged for jeans and t-shirts.  
There were two people who did not find entré into 
this transformation.  The telephone receptionist was 
required to answer the phones, but between calls she 
signalled her desire to belong to the games.  The 
director’s secretary tried in the first hour to assert 
her authority and maintain office “decorum.”  She was 
unable to do so, and thereafter was “marked” as a 
possible snitch.  While she stayed in her own office 
most of the day, when she wandered about, her pres-
ence provoked an irritated hush among those in close 
proximity.  
The domesticated space and bodies of office 
workers is linked to the authority of superiors, and to 
the economic consequences of actions in their pres-
ence.  This means it is weak form of domestication, or 
even a mere show of this.  There are more durable 
forms.  The domestication of public space, particularly 
in a democratic society where authority is legitimated 
in an inverse relation to its exercise (shooting into a 
crowd becomes illegitimate as soon as it happens, 
although the police have this authority), must be  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Domestication —20—enforced through “voluntary” compliance.  
This compliance is accomplished by a discipline, 
the desired outcome of which is a repertoire of 
proper behaviors, and an orthopostural (SEE: orthopos-
ture) attitude toward these behaviors.  Domestication 
of the body (and the resulting decorum) is acquired as 
an aspect of individual identity through body schooling.  
What results is the Public Body. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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dialogic democracy
Giddens’s call for a “dialogic democracy,” for a 
strong public sphere where differences are displayed 
and consensus is not the goal, points to a new politics 
of representation, and to the end of the nation as a 
homogeneous order: 
“The potential for dialogic democracy is... carried in the spread of social reflexivity as a condition
both of day-to-day activities and the persistence of larger forms of collective organization. Second,
dialogic democracy is not necessarily oriented to the achieving of consensus. Just as the theorists of
deliberative democracy argue, the most 'political' of issues, inside and outside the formal political
sphere, are precisely those which are likely to remain essentially contested. Dialogic democracy pre-
sumes only that dialogue in a public space provides a means of living along with the other in a rela-
tion of mutual tolerance—whether that 'other' be an individual or a global community of religious
believers” (1994, 115).
A dialogic democracy is incompatible with obliga-
tory membership in a community—either enforced 
from without (as when Nazis required Jews to identify 
themselves as Jews) or from within (say, when a reli-
gious cult does not permit its members to abandon 
membership).  But voluntary communal identity is not 
at issue within a dialogic democracy, as long as individ-
ual members of the community act as strangers when 
they enter into the public sphere.  This latter idea has 
a couple of main features.  
A dialogic democracy does not support the dele-
gation of expression.  A person may claim leadership 
in a community, but this does not add weight to the 
voice she or he brings to the public sphere.  Another 
member of the same community with a different opin-
ion carries the same weight (ideally).  Second, the 
interests of the group are always seen as competing  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—dialogic democracy —22—with the public interest.  There is no possible com-
plete coincidence of community interest with that of 
the public.  And so an expression of the group’s inter-
est as such is liable to critique of the conflicts 
between this and the larger public interest.  Individuals 
who carry group markers into the public sphere may 
be suspected of not participating with an adequate 
distance from the interest of the group. 
“These endemic problems do not,
I think, account for the travails of
liberal democracy in the present
day—for the fact that its emer-
gence as the only game in town
coincides with its ailing condition
even in those societies where it is
most firmly established. Nor do
they provide much of a clue about
how democratization might be
further advanced; here the well-
established debates pitting partici-
pation against representation offer
little purchase”
(Giddens 1994, 112).
The public sphere (like the democracy within 
which it operates) is not a gift from the government 
to its citizenry.  It is, rather a task that citizens and 
residents take upon themselves.  The misrecognition 
of media corporations and government ministries as 
“shepherd” for this practice (and of the mass of the 
population as its sheep) inserts what Foucault called a 
“pastoral governmentality” into the public sphere.  
But the public sphere is a place for active democracy, 
the space from which the future of liberal democracy 
will be determined.  The “well-established debates” 
about representation and participation are founded on 
notions of modernity that are no longer (if they ever 
were) capable of describing democracy as a feature of 
nations within the emerging transnational cosmopolis.   
Notions such as that of a “dialogic democracy” enable 
us to imagine alternative forms of democratic action 
in late modernity. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Festival
Various meanings of the term “festival” overlaps 
in a most unhelpful way with other terms:  feast, rit-
ual, rite, celebration, pageant, rite of passage, fair, 
parade, occasion, event, drama, etc.  Although I am on 
the lookout for a clever neo-logism, the word “festi-
val” will have to do in the meanwhile.  
Some basic aspects of this term as I shall use it 
are these:  Festivals are group activities with pur-
pose.  They cause the participants to pay attention to 
certain symbols.  They represent a genre of cultural 
performance that has historically been linked with reli-
gious institutions, however, this link is not universal.  
Festivals happen more or less regularly, they reoccur.  
Festivals have a beginning a middle and an end.  
Festivals contain rituals, but they also entertain 
aspects of non-ritualized action.  Ritual is the road the 
festival takes to a place and back;  no matter how 
carefully the road is mapped, no matter how often it is 
travelled, the journey still brings surprising and unex-
pected vistas.  Festivals are people doing culture;  
every time it is done it is done differently.  The differ-
ences matter, to them and us.  Festivals change the 
people that perform them.  Non-humans (kamis, 
devas, kachinas, fauns, etc.) are sometimes invited to 
join festivals.  
The group that participates in a festival shares, at 
least temporarily, a heightened awareness of inti-
macy.  The people who are excluded from entering a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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the festival itself (i.e., the inclusion/exclusion of people 
has a non-festival, social referent).   Different people 
perform festivals for different reasons and show differ-
ential abilities to experience benefits and risks from 
their experiences.  No two festivals are alike. 
Festivals come in many local varieties.  So, I do 
not wish to define these practices too narrowly.  At 
the same time, there are many events called “festivals” 
that are, I believe, entirely misnamed.  
A festival is an event organized to allow a de-con-
trol of emotions among its participants.  It is made for 
collective, spontaneous enjoyment.  People do these 
to have fun.  This means that festivals fall into that 
non-work, non-family area of society we now call “lei-
sure.”  But this should not suggest that they are of lit-
tle practical consequence.  
Finally, festivals are group events, they are a genre 
of organized social play, and are performed in a public 
space.  In addition to these spatial and experiential 
requirements, we can also say that a festival is highly 
inclusive; it avoids and denies the social boundaries 
that are normally maintained in a place.  Festivals can 
be extremely democratic. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Jinjahoncho
The headquarters for the main Shinto shrine 
organization in Japan is based upon the shrine system 
set up during Meiji, and has as its main shrine the 
Grand Shrine at Ise.  This organization controls more 
than twenty thousand shrines spread around the 
archipelago.  But the headquarters (as would be 
expected) are in Tokyo, adjacent to the Meiji Shrine, 
which is one of the largest open spaces in the central 
city, and one of its properties.  The headquarters 
building was recently rebuilt and now resembles the 
headquarters of any large corporation: its tower is 
clad in glass, stainless steel, and marble.  
I visited the Jinjahoncho in 1989, looking for 
information on the current situation of Shinto festivals 
in Japan.  Their representative provided me with a 
video they had produced for an agricultural fair in 
Brussels, at which Japan’s Agriculture Ministry was 
pleading for the continued closure of Japan’s rice mar-
ket.  
The Ise Jingu as portrayed in IBM 
Japan’s “small planet” website: 
http://www.ibm.park.org/Japan/
hometown/ise/ise-e.html.  This is 
on IBM home page for the 1996 
internet World Expo in Japan.
I was also told about the plans to reconstruct the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Jinjahoncho —26—Ise Shrine, an event that happens every twenty years.  
The next reconstruction would be the most expense 
of all, they noted.  This wooden structure, about the 
size of a Santa Barbara 4-car garage, would be rebuilt 
at a cost of something greater than $US 800 million.  
“Doesn’t that create an economic problem for 
your organization?” I asked.  They assured me that 
their annual intake was more than sufficient to cover 
this. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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body schooling
“So long as the work of education
is not clearly institutionalized as a
specific, autonomous practice, so
long as it is the whole group and a
whole symbolically structured
environment, without specialized
agents or specific occasions, that
exerts an anonymous, diffuse ped-
agogic action, the essential part of
the modus operandi that defines
practical masters, is transmitted
through practice, in the practical
state, without rising to the level of
discourse. The child mimics
other people's actions rather than
'models'.  Body hexis speaks
directly to the motor function, in
the form of a pattern of postures
that is both individual and system-
atic, being bound up with a whole
system of objects, and charged
with a host of special meanings
and values. But the fact that
schemes are able to pass directly
from practice to practice without
moving through discourse and
consciousness does not mean that
the acquisition of habitus is no
more than a mechanical learning
through trial and error”
(Bourdieu 1990, 73-74).
While the state and the market are busy in the 
production and control of micro-territories (which, in 
turn, results in the built environment of the street), 
much of the work of establishing normalcy is done not 
by politicians or bureaucrats and their business 
friends, but through regimes of social-schooling in the 
home1, in public educational institutions, and through 
the media.  This, mostly informal, education (taught, 
or example, at school but not necessarily in the cur-
riculum) trains us in the micro-management of the 
body (as Giddens would call this).  
The history and practice of body schooling has 
been attempted in part by Elias (1978) and by Foucault 
(1979, 1990).  Elias looks at how the mannerisms and 
deferential courtly behaviors of the nobility were 
commodified and acquired by the middle class as 
“manners” and “courtesy.”  Foucault points to an 
increasingly pervasive governmentality with an inter-
est in the discipline of entire populations, and the con-
sequent development of technical apparatus for this 
purpose (schools, factories, prisons, asylums, the use 
of clocks, the increase in surveillance, the discursifica-
tion of “hygiene” as a public policy).  Bourdieu (1984) 
1. A common feature of this year's US presidential election is the call for “the family” to shoul-
der a greater share of this schooling.  Of course, “the family” here is only a front for “the 
church” as the wellspring of moral instruction.  Also implied in this return to “family values” 
is a critique of the marketplace as a surrogate source of social edification, and an underly-
ing sense that necessary skills are not being learned, because nobody is teaching them.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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both institutional outcomes (the creation of arbiters 
of taste) and bodily ones (such as a disgust of the lack 
of manners).   
Body-schooling is the primary input to Bourdieu's 
notion of the habitus of class1.  In its carceral mode, it 
describes Foucault's2 notion of a disciplined popula-
tion.  Advertisers use a more seductive variety (as 
Baudrillard [1990] noted) to feed consumer appetites.  
The sum effect is to teach our bodies how to act nor-
mal3 in the street and to expect and demand normal 
behavior in others (See also: Public Body).
1. Normalcy is also a territorial outcome of class.  Streets, neighborhoods, and districts 
become concretized articulations of class desires, moulded also by class-directed market 
forces.  For example, in Kyoto, the city's several buraku neighborhoods have been obvi-
ously excluded from the massive real estate speculation that remade most of the city in the 
last 50 years.  But the “hardware” of city life: buildings and trains and boulevards, are not 
the topic of this paper, although this is also important in the creation of the “reality” of the 
street.  Here I will be looking at the “software,” at cultural practices and expectations, and at 
the use of space to express cultural imaginations.  
2. It was, of course, Michel Foucault who noted the transformation of governmentality from an 
external, princely rule, to an internal pastoral rule as a condition for the modern nation-
state.  He also noted that this transformation created a break between the open display of 
violence upon the bodies of subjects—as, I would add, feature of normalcy—and the mod-
ern government's carceral programs of institutionalized (and hidden) re-schooling of crimi-
nals; a practice that was sequestered from the street.  The rehabilitation of criminals in their 
prisons was not different, Foucault noted, from the training of children in government-run 
schools, nor from the regimenting of armies in military camps, nor from the disciplining of 
the workforce in factories.  A carceral regime developed which acted upon bodies as docile 
instruments of this new governmentality.  Having read this before I moved to Kyoto, I was at 
times struck by the visual uniformity of the street in Kyoto, which could very well have 
advertised itself as Foucault-land, except that it really is no different in this respect than 
other cities in the region.  
3. This fulfills Aristotle's notion (in Nicomachean Ethics) of the “right education,” that is, one 
that teaches us “both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought...” (1941, 
954).   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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“Enlightenment thought (and I
here rely on Cassirer's, 1951,
account) embraced the idea of
progress, and actively sought that
break with history and tradition
which modernity espouses. It was,
above all, a secular movement
that sought the demystification
and desacralization of knowledge
and social organization in order to
liberate human beings from their
chains. It took Alexander Pope's
injunction, 'the proper study of
mankind is man,' with great seri-
ousness. To the degree that it also
lauded human creativity, scientific
discovery, and the pursuit of indi-
vidual excellence in the name of
human progress, Enlightenment
thinkers welcomed the maelstrom
of change and saw the transitori-
ness, the fleeting, and the frag-
mentary as a necessary condition
through which the modernizing
project could be achieved”
(Harvey 1989, 12-13)
Compiling the recent accounts of body schooling 
can be a disheartening task.  The resulting cocktail of 
historical, anecdotal, and theoretical descriptions and 
notions is simultaneously convincing and confound-
ing.   While the most basic notion of the Enlighten-
ment might include the increase in “reason” against 
unreasonable authority (kingly or religious) and an 
increase in rational thought against revealed (and so 
unknowable) knowledge, the story of modernity 
seems to produce the opposite outcome: domination, 
misrecognition, authoritarianism in the most mundane 
arenas (such as clothing styles) and a general reduc-
tion of populations to uniform subjecthood and an 
epistemological coma.  
Today, political power is wielded through a skein 
of democratic (or so represented) practices, from 
population polls to popular elections, but this power 
is also ubiquitous and intrusive on the lives of all resi-
dents.  In contrast, in other, former times, the dictates 
of the monarch or pope were arbitrary and final, but 
they were also limited in scope.  So much of everyday 
life seemed to go on without the attention of higher 
authorities.   Power was apparent as the earthfall of 
some deadly asteroid, but those who steered clear of 
its path were also free of its effects.  One of the unin-
tended outcomes of modernity seems to be an 
astounding increase in available power, and a continu-
ing acquisition of this by various institutions, against 
the power of individuals.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ance of power in favor of institutional interests is not 
somehow structurally fixed, but represents an oppor-
tunistic snatching of power.  And so there is little to 
legitimate this taking.  For this reason there are many 
opportunities for individuals (singularly or in groups) 
to take back resources and authority from institu-
tions.
Giddens’s work on intimacy suggests that individ-
uals can work against body schooling, creating reflex-
ive knowledge that can return the imagination to the 
individual, and bring a new equation to bear on rela-
tionships with expert systems.  The festival experi-
ence, both in the planning and rehearsal, and in its 
public performance, is another shared body schooling 
that is external to, and which confronts that of the 
disciplined social body. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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bosozoku
There is, however, an age-determined period 
within which deviant behaviors are allowed (although 
the deviance is also often uniformly enacted as Sato 
[1991] noted).   Youthful folly is excused until the per-
son attains an age when s/he is expected to move 
along (20 for non college students, graduation for col-
lege students).  
Sato, who did his work among communities in the 
new city additions of western Kyoto, found that this 
expectation of a natural end to expressions of alterna-
tive life-styles was expressed as the “measles effect” of 
youth gang bosozoku (“crazy gang”) activity:
“It is widely acknowledged that bosozoku is essentially a youthful phenomenon and that few Japa-
nese youths are bosozoku after twenty.  This public recognition of the “graduation” from gang activity
with the attainment of adulthood has led to a folk theory known as bosozoku hashika setsu (measles
theory of bosozoku).  This theory views bosozoku activity essentially as youthful indiscretion or as a
manifestation of the “storm and stress” characteristic of adolescence.  It is assumed that youths’ par-
ticipation in gang activity is a sort of youthful fever which can be “cured” by self-healing, as in the case
of measles, if one matures enough.”(Sato 1991, 158).
Every year, thousands of youth gang members 
across Japan reach the age where they are expected 
to trim their hair, change their clothes, find full-time 
employment and conform their public behavior in 
accordance with that of older people.   Within months 
their connections with the gang have atrophied, and in 
a few years, they would not easily talk about this 
period of their lives.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ken
Everyday interactions “in situations of co-pres-
ence” acquire hyper-reflexivity when a doubt arises as 
to the presence of a differential between the ken of 
various people in the situation.  The doubt produces a 
suspicion that the situation has been fabricated to 
produce this differential.   Cheating someone else at 
the market or in business or during a game of chance 
requires that the subject (the dupe) not become 
aware that the situation is being fabricated against 
them.  The cards are marked,  the frozen fish has been 
stuffed with ice, the oil well is dry, but these facts 
must remain outside the ken of the dupe. 
Ken is the universe of what is knowable in a social 
situation.  Almost all social interactions between 
friends and strangers begin with the assumption that 
each participant has roughly the same ken.  Interac-
tions with expert systems, on the other hand gener-
ally rely upon the notion that the expert system (and 
its experts) have an expanded ken.  
The question in state-nations (also a question 
within nation-states) is whether or not the state is an 
expert system.  If it is so, then it can legitimately main-
tain a differential between what it knows and what it 
tells its population.  If this is not so, then it should 
make clear all of the knowledge it uses to come to a 
decision about any issue. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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orthoposture
“The crucial point for the moment
is that in taking on a subject posi-
tion, the individual assumes that
she is the author of the ideology
or discourse she is speaking.  She
speaks or thinks as if she were in
control of meaning.  She ‘imag-
ines’ that she is indeed the type of
subject which humanism pro-
poses—rational, unified, the
source rather than the effect of
language.  It is the imaginary
quality of the individual’s identifi-
cation with a subject position
which gives it so much psycho-
logical and emotional force”
(Weedon, 1987, 31).
The terms available to describe the ascription of 
correct attitude in a population are not adequate— 
“orthodoxy” and “orthopraxy” describe an adherence 
to correct speech and behavior, but the additional 
notion of a proper attitude requires a bit of neo-
logism.  I call this “orthoposture.”  Orthoposture 
describes the willingness of the individual to spontane-
ously submit to a supplied attitudinal condition in a 
social circumstance.  It requires that the individual not 
maintain a distance from this requirements, and so not 
engage in any counter reflection.  It thus avoids the 
outcomes of parody, cynicism, and critical scrutiny. 
The condition of orthoposture can describe the 
complicit agreement of the subject position under cir-
cumstances of domination.  This attitude masks domi-
nation by pretending that the subject is actually in 
control.  The pretense is supported by narratives 
(myths) that naturalize domination as an inherent fea-
ture of the subject’s personality.  The outcome is a 
subject that is, in effect, self-dominated.
Orthoposture is a common attitudinal require-
ment in many formal and informal encounters.  For 
example, in the sport of baseball, the center fielder 
attending to the approaching flight of a batted ball, 
cannot afford to also simultaneously muse about the 
overall circumstances of professional sports.   Ortho-
posture releases the player from such a critical per-
spective, and allows for spontaneous action.   This  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—orthoposture —34—attitude is a factor in the successful completion of the 
current game encounter, and in the player’s ability to 
enter future similar encounters.  
“Why should the factor of sponta-
neous involvement carry so much
weight in the organization of
encounters?  Some suggestions
can be made.  A participant’s
spontaneous involvement in the
official focus of attention of an
encounter tells others what he is
and what his intentions are, add-
ing to the security of the others in
his presence.  Further, shared
spontaneous involvement in a
mutual activity often brings the
sharers into some kind of exclu-
sive solidarity and permits them
to express relatedness, psychic
closeness, and mutual respect;
failure to participate with good
heart can therefore express rejec-
tion of those present or of the set-
ting.  Finally, spontaneous
involvement in the prescribed
focus of attention confirms the
reality of the world prescribed by
the transformation rules and the
unreality of other potential
worlds—and it is upon these con-
firmations that the stability of
immediate definitions of the situa-
tion depends”
(Goffman 1961, 40).
The orthopostural attitude is that of spontaneous 
involvement directed as what is serious for the 
game—whether this be a baseball game, a political 
rally, a business meeting, or an intimate conversa-
tion—and an equal neglect of what is trivial within the 
game.  The central task of an ideology is to guarantee the 
orthopostural attitude of all its players.  The illusio here is 
to “buy-into” the game.  Bourdieu is quite correct 
here.  There is yet another illusio, which is also implicit 
in Bourdieu's sense of this term: which is the illusio 
that one is, in reality, a “player.”  In fact there are two 
reasons why this may not be true.  First, one may be a 
player in a low-level game that a higher-level game 
promotes, and which has the effect of limiting player-
ship in the higher-level game, while tricking the player 
into thinking they are playing in the higher level game.  
Bourdieu's notion of the dominated fraction of 
the dominant class describes how a game of “culture” 
is perceived to be autonomous to and equal to the 
capitalist “economy” game.  But its autonomy is illu-
sory, as is its equality.  
And second, one might not be “a player” at all, in 
the sense that the ability and authority to effect 
changes (to “make plays”) may be tightly constrained 
by others.  This is the common outcome of domina-
tion, and orthoposture here is both the main out-
come of domination and also its main practice. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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market-state
I use the term “market-state” to replace the term 
“nation-state” at certain locales in states that are 
politically decentralized to the point where local or 
regional control over resources allows cities and 
provinces to work directly with multinational corpo-
rations to create local sites of production (such as 
BMW factories in South Carolina) and consumption 
(e.g., privately owned shopping malls and amusement 
parks).  The interests of “the nation” are, at best, only 
indirectly served here.  The market-state1 competes 
with the national government in constructing spaces 
for consumers.  As more and more of the cityscape is 
managed by corporate interests, the public street 
1. The rise of the market-state within the modern nation-state is a primary feature of late 
modernity.  This process brings global flows of culture and capital to many a city, but it also 
interrupts the circulation of local spending, shunting this return flow of capital into the inter-
national monetary organizations that finance the market-state.  The city in a market-state is 
a decentred space, defined not by its boulevards and plazas, but by the number of “world-
class” consumption palaces it can boast and the number of minutes it takes the travel 
between these.  The public street becomes only a conduit that takes people somewhere 
else.  And so we cannot reimagine the public street without finding a way to release this 
from its service to the market-state.  Note also that Japan (perhaps even more than Sin-
gapore) is a singular example of a national market-state where the national government 
and national corporations control local production for consumption to the exclusion of both 
local interests and transnational corporate interests.  The slow relaxation of Japanese 
national cartel control, under external trade pressure, does not require the opening up to a 
market-state, although this seems to be what is happening in Kyoto.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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maintain a positive mix of economic, social, and 
expressive cultural uses.  Curiously, while private indi-
vidual expression has been curtailed on the street, 
expressions of market-state desires are everywhere 
found.
1. The city that once embodied the nation-state now touts its private pleasure realms and cur-
ries corporate capital by offering tax incentives for private development of properties, 
development that leads to further abandonment of real estate connected to the public 
street and to sites of public history.  Public parks that were once ceremonial centers, are 
now surrounded by vacant lots and shuttered businesses.  Under long-term market-state 
conditions, the city can no longer serve as a metonymic site of a national heritage—except 
as a cynical mirror reflecting a lack of this—and even sites of local history fare badly in 
competition with the spectacles that transnational capital can provide.  And so Los Angeles 
becomes the home of Universal City. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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matsuri
The descriptions of matsuri found in English lan-
guage sources are generally brief (and in being brief, 
overly general).  We find article-length descriptions 
and analyses of various matsuri (Inoue, Noriaki, Yana-
gawa), and article-length theoretical descriptions of 
matsuri. (Harada, Plutschow, Sadler).  There is a longer 
description of a non-matsuri festival in the northeast 
of Japan (Yamamoto), and there are other accounts of 
calendrical festivals, such as oshogatsu and tanabata, 
etc. (Casal, Erskine).   
On the Japanese language side, there is an ency-
clopedic body of literature on the study of various 
matsuri by Japanese folklorists and local historians.  
Since the efflorescence of Japanese folklore (nihonjin-
ron) studies earlier in this century, matsuri have been a 
favorite object of reflexive folkloristic attention (in 
particular, see: Kunio 1985).  These sources provide a 
welcome record of previous practices for specific mat-
suri, however, on the main, one expects that they pro-
mote the Post-Meiji unitizing description of matsuri, 
i.e. its correct performance (although local elements 
are highlighted) and its ahistorical beginnings as 
described by National Shinto.  Other sources run 
from descriptions of festivals for Japanese tourists (for 
example, Koma and Asano, 1977), to major works 
intended for a scholarly audience, such as that of Son-
oda Minoru (1990).  
The descriptive apparatus of the latter is far more  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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nomenological works provide little purchase for social 
theories of human action (however, the more rigorous 
ethnographic/sociological studies, such as Inoue 
(1979), Robertson (1991), and Bestor (1989) are 
exceptions to this general critique, and will be dis-
cussed below).  There are several reasons for this 
limit, the main one being a lack of scope—the descrip-
tions of matsuri usually fail to include descriptions of 
the communities involved as the latter are externally 
constituted.  Instead, the matsuri is presented as com-
plete in itself.  Another problem, one common to the 
ethnographic literature, is a lack of a sufficient prob-
lematization of matsuri practices in their time and 
place.  The structuration of the event is not 
approached apart from its general, and discursively 
available forms.  What then do we learn about matsuri 
from English and Japanese language sources?
Matsuri ritual forms Working from various sources on the descrip-
tions of matsuri ritual practices, we find that there is:  1) 
some but certainly not a predictable overlap in individ-
ual descriptions, and 2) a wide range of interpreta-
tions from these descriptions.  These conditions point 
to two main problems in the study of matsuri:  frag-
mentary descriptive evidence and a lack of a ground-
ing theory of matsuri.  It is difficult to know if the lack 
of overlap in the descriptions is a product of the 
description or inherent in the event.  A similar prob-
lem arises in theory:  are the matsuri themselves so 
different in their functions and meanings, or is this the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—matsuri —39—result of studies disjointed at the level of theory?  
The general matsuri ritual 
script
A basic frame for matsuri performance is provided 
in Plutschow:
The Shinto festival can be divided into three major sequences.  According to Haruo Misumi,
most Shinto festivals are thus divided.  The first can be called Kami-oroshi (also kami-mukae or kami-
are), meaning the arrival or bringing down of the deity: the second, kami-asobi, which means enter-
taining or placating the deity, and the third kami-okuri (or kami-age), sending off the deity [See Misumi,
1979, 80].(84)
Curiously, these specific terms do not show up in 
the descriptions of individual festivals, although the  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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evident.  Again, we find a trifold activity pattern 
(beginning/middle/end) which might also relate to the 
now-classical van Gennep structure for rites of pas-
sage (separation/liminality/reintegration).
The opening and ending parts of the festival seem 
laden with boundary demarcating rituals that set off—
and also purify—the space and time allotted to the 
festival.  Purification, and with it the notion of pollu-
1. The three sequences, in Plutschow’s analysis, involve a dialectic between chaos/eros and 
society/civilization.  In the middle, liminal state, chaos has been invited into the village.  At 
the end it is again banished to a remote place.  Thus the festival is a commentary on the 
control of dangerous extra-society forces:
“Japanese and non-Japanese documents suggest that the opening kami-oroshi sequence 
not only refers to the end of time but to the overthrow of the social order.  Therefore the 
community reacted in noise and confusion, releasing hostilities, reversing social roles, and 
rousting about with erotic license and orgies.  Such sexual license is recorded in the so-
called utagaki (poem hedges), poems composed during the festivals dedicated to the dei-
ties of Mt. Tsukuba [cf. Manyoshu, 1965, 222].  Even today, violent competition and unruly 
behavior can be observed in Shinto festivals and injury to the shrine bearers is not uncom-
mon.  The ancient Japanese matsuri were certainly more violent than those of today, when 
the law curbs such behavior our of respect to human health and safety.”(85)
“Nowadays the kami-asobi sequence often takes place at a temporary shrine called 
tabisho (travel rest), specially erected to entertain the deity.  After having toured the com-
munity on the shoulders of the shrine-bearers, the deity is finally brought to a temporary 
rest at tabisho.  The tabisho toady may be placed in a sacred reserved area within the 
human territory or it may be at or near the frontier between cosmos and chaos.  As a neu-
tral place, the frontier seems a most appropriate site to enact this sequence of the Shinto 
festival.”(86)
After the series of kami-asobi performances, which have properly appeased the deity, the 
community prepares to send the deity back to his territory or his shrine.... the deity in the 
Wakamiya festival makes his ceremonious return to this mountain shrine under the cover 
of darkness, symbolizing chaos.  Dozens of shrine priests tightly surround the shintai (sym-
bol of the deity) carried by the highest-ranking priest.  Such kami-okuri (or kami-age) pro-
cessions end the matsuri sequence and its ritual recreation of the original cosmogony.  The 
Shinto festival having thus been completed, time and order are temporarily restored and 
the community returns to its orderly daily routines.”(93-94) TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ritual (Harada 100, Yanagawa 8, Noriaki 144).  In fact, 
Harada uses purity as the defining feature of matsuri: 
 “The sacredness of a member of the Uji-ko [worshippers of the Uji-Gami, the village deity] is
entirely due to his oneness with the deity and to his life with him.  It follows, therefore, that each
member of the Uji-ko retains his clealiness [sic] by living such a life as becomes his title.  Retaining
cleanliness is called kessai or purification.  A Matsuri is nothing more than a series of the Uji-ko’s
deeds to keep himself clean.”(Harada 1960, 100)
The main types of purification rituals described 
(See Yanagawa 8) include certain temporary food 
taboos, restrictions on contact with blood or death, 
and the hanging of special ropes (shimenawa) in homes 
and at the boundaries of the village.
The end of the festival often includes a special 
meal (naorai) which originally would be shared by all 
participants, but in larger communities is taken by 
neighborhood representatives (Yanagawa 74).  The use 
of food during the festival, and in fact, a theory of 
feasting in general is not found in the English language 
matsuri literature.
The middle period of the festival has been vari-
ously described as “a temporary rupture of an every-
day pattern that is stable and uniform” (Noriaki 159), 
an act of communal “consciousness-expansion” 
(Sadler 16) and, even as a dream:  “... the festival brings 
disparate elements into a single space at a single time.  
If the festival was previously likened to a drama, here 
it seems rather like a dream.”(Yanagawa 41)  
Of the various activities that occur during this 
period, one of the main, and perhaps the defining 
activity of matsuri, involves the parading of the kami in  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—matsuri —42—a portable shrine, or mikoshi.  
To go among its people, the holy spirit needs a vehicle....  That...is called in Japanese o-mikoshi, and
is a splendidly ornamented and decorated gilt carriage, with silken cords and golden bells, and a
golden phoenix at the top.  It is carried by the young unmarried men of the village, who sometimes
fast the day before the festival begins, and spend the night inside the shrine, in the presence of the
holy.  When the sun dawns on the festival, they don uniform hapi coats (over their undershorts),
powder their faces white..., and ... they begin jogging down the streets, zig-zagging all through the
town, chanting a work chant, and gradually surrendering themselves to a dizzy state of ecstatic
exhaustion.  The mikoshi is heavy, and although the elders go along to guide them and to ry and pre-
vent them from injuring themselves or damaging property, the kami-presence gradually takes over,
and their procession becomes more and more erratic and exuberant.  The kami, with their help, is
going among his people’s homes and dispelling evil influences, driving out infirmity, and bringing vital
energy to all.(Sadler 1969, 6)
Another type of procession common to larger 
matsuri are those of neighborhood floats which can be 
quite large and are pulled along a set route by many 
men (Noriaki 144, 147; Yanagawa 10).  One type of 
float is large enough to have a stage on which dances 
are held at various stops.  [None of the sources 
offered an overall typology of the floats used in vari-
ous matsuri].  Along the procession route are found a 
variety of artistic displays from drama to dance to 
poetic readings and music.  The history and role of the 
arts within matsuri, briefly described in Plutschow, 
deserves a more rigorous examination.
Participants An important feature of matsuri is that not any-
one can participate.  The choice of participants in the 
matsuri and in the ongoing supervision of the neigh-
borhood matsuri  activities is made according to sev-
eral criteria, most of them related to visible social 
status and rank (Noriaki 141).  Thus the festival is seen 
as a way to display neighborhood identity (Noriaki  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—matsuri —43—147-8; Yanagawa 16) while enhancing neighborhood 
integration (Noriaki 147-8; Yanagawa 21, 13, 27; Inoue 
177-8). 
Descriptions of ingroup/outgroup distinctions 
usually differentiate between some type of “native-
ness”.  Inclusion at any level is often determined first 
by consanguinuity and then by household location.  To 
be included one would ideally be born to a family that 
dwells within the boundaries of the space demarcated 
for the festival.  If a person moves to a new village, 
inclusion would be determined by this person taking 
active role in the community, through which she 
express a lasting identification with this new village.  
Presumably, participation in the old village’s matsuri 
might show a conflict of identity.  Matsuri is thus often 
performed by and for the native-born inhabitants of 
its place (Harada 100).
Recent studies of urban matsuri both reflect and 
further problematize the notion of inclusion in the 
matsuri.  Robertson (1991) noted that the creation of 
a city-wide “citizens’ festival (shimin matsuri) still main-
tained a native/newcomer distinction, even though it 
was created to bring these two groups together (ibid, 
44).  Particularly, this distinction was displayed in that 
segment of the festival event that mimicked other, 
Shinto-shrine based, festivals (in which the “natives” 
continue to participate at other times of the year and 
to the exclusion of the newcomers).  Robertson was, 
of course, describing something different than the 
shrine-based matsuri: the differences are many, but  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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and transacted placeness (the festival occupied only 
the main street of the city), the inclusion of a variety 
of heterogeneous events (activities at various “cor-
ners”), and a conflation between the festival organiza-
tion with that of the city government.  
As this new shimin matsuri attempted to import 
the practices of shrine-based matsuri, it did so with 
perhaps counter-productive effects.  The new festival 
failed to provide a level “playing-ground”in which the 
natives and the newcomers could all participate, 
instead, it reified distinctions it was designed to ame-
liorate.  
These native/newcomer distinctions operate also 
in urban shrine-based matsuri, as Bestor (1985) 
described.  Participation in the neighborhood’s mat-
suri was emblematic of recognition of a household’s 
status as a full-fledged member of the neighborhood, a 
status which is also marked by inclusion in other activ-
ities of the “neighborhood organization” (chookai) (ibid 
147) and membership (acquired through economic 
and performative participation) in the local Shinto 
shrine1.  
Today, the matsuri presents a double facade—it is 
religious and also secular, a time to play with one’s 
neighbors and also to play with the local deity.  There 
1. Shinto shrines, and (before Meiji) Buddhist temples, have historically played an important 
political and social role throughout Japan, as the organization of shrine/temple member-
ship was a ubiquitous means of communication and surveillance in cities and towns.  In 
recent decades this role has been supplanted by organizations such as the chookai. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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any particular individual will cathect (ibid 234).  
Beyond function and 
structure
Bestor (1985) and Robertson (1990) both 
approach matsuri with a relatively unproblematized 
approach vis a vis the performative and micropolitical 
aspects of such activities.  (In fairness, neither text 
was centrally concerned with matsuri per se, although 
matsuri played a key role in their main arguments, 
which would therefore have been strengthened—and 
probably will be ex post facto—by a fuller, more multi-
dimensional, description of matsuri)  While Bestor 
outlines the functional organization of his Tokyo neigh-
borhood’s matsuri, this description pays little attention 
to those who, for voluntary or exclusionary reasons 
were not included in this event or in other chookai 
activities.  Similarly, Robertson loses the “voice” of the 
newcomer in her description of the dialogue between 
native and newcomer.  The use of matsuri not only as a 
tool for neighborhood or civic inclusion, but also as a 
display of civic exclusion, of marginalization and cen-
trality needs further examination.  In addition, matsuri 
as performances are liable to a variety of aesthetic and 
experiential critiques—the people who do them and 
those who watch are aware of the performative fail-
ings and successes of such events.  The dynamic pro-
cesses of participation and reflexivity disappears 
almost entirely in both Robertson and Bestor.  
One area of reflexivity that does receive some 
attention is that which concerns the notion of the 
kami (deity) and its participation in the matsuri.  Rob- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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tival without a kami falls outside of the central 
definition of “matsuri” (39), although she also provides 
some evidience that Kodaira natives do, in fact sup-
port this same conclusion:  
Kodaira natives are aware of the deities’ absence from the mikoshi and consequently refer to the
citizens’ festival as bereft of authenticity, the implication being that a “real” (shrine) festival is contin-
gent upon a supernatural presence.  One participant interviewed at a shrine festival remarked that
“without kamigakari, festivals are no fun” (Matsudaira 1980, 98).  (Kamigakari refers to both the pro-
cess of becoming possessed by a kami and the individual possessed.) The same person also remarked
that one “can’t kamigakari at city hall-sponsored festivals” because the deity is not present.  At the
Kodaira citizens’ festival, the countless cans of beer quaffed by the bearers at the two half-hour rest
stops apparently compensated for the absence of kami.  Historically, alcohol (sake) has been a stan-
dard feature at festivals, especially at the social gatherings following a mikoshi procession.  City hall
apparently had considered banning alcoholic beverages but realized that without beer the “adult”
shrine procession in particular would lack the essential zest.   (Robertson 1991, 64-65)
The notion that a festival without a kami is 
“authentic” as long as there is enough beer, while it 
does open up to the performative aspect of matsuri, it 
also closes down the affective role of the kami in such 
performances.  Changes in the sincerity of belief 
about kami are reflexively discursified by the perform-
ers in this and similar contexts (For example, see: Ivy, 
186).  Particularly as the kami is felt to have a special 
affinity for those who were born and/or have a long 
tenure in its precincts, such changes would play an 
important part in the native/newcomer discourse.  
Also, as Bestor (234) notes, the presence of the kami 
in the mikoshi is important in that it supplys the moti-
vation (integral to the process of kami-asobi) for the 
movement of the mikoshi throughout the neighbor-
hood.  The movement of the kami articulates the 
neighborhood as a place apart from its normal  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—matsuri —47—description.
Origin of Matsuri The sources provide minimal information or even 
speculation on the origin of matsuri.  Harada’s view is 
that in old days farmers worshipped the kami continu-
ously and so were always in a state of purity, and 
therefore had no need of matsuri.  It was only when 
non-agricultural occupations were made and when the 
need for agricultural surplus distracted the farmer 
from his daily worship that matsuri were started to 
periodically purify the people and the place.  Here the 
dynamic is between purity and pollution.
Plutschow, on the other hand, sees the central 
dynamic in the dual nature of the kami.  
The Shinto festival strongly reflects the belief in local deities who reign supreme over ara, or
chaos, but who could be transformed—only in part and never completely—into niki or benevolent
deities.  Whenever people settled an area and transformed the landscape, they automatically divided
the local deity or deities into his or their ara or niki aspects.  Throughout Japanese Shinto one can
recognize the belief that an uncontrolled evil deity, once appeased, becomes a benevolent deity, and
that its original malevolence can be transformed, without losing its power, for the good of the com-
munity. (77)
The origin of matsuri then represents the on-
going tension engendered by the need to control the 
kami.  This control includes harnessing the protective 
aspect and banishing the dangerous aspect.  An origi-
nal “deal” appears to have been worked out where the 
kami is split and his dangerous side contends itself 
with a small area left undeveloped while his protective 
side is housed in a village shrine and worshipped con-
stantly.  Every year the two sides are allowed to rejoin  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—matsuri —48—in the village for a set period of time.  This is matsuri.  
(Plutschow 77).  
The discourse concerning the origins of matsuri 
has been centrally occupied by the notion of matsuri 
as a purely Shinto event of great antiquity.  The history 
of any matsuri needs to be problematized in light of 
recent discussions concerning the formation of 
National Shinto (particularly the breaking up of the 
Shrine/Temple multiplexes) during Meiji, and the sub-
sequent articulation and spread of “authentic” (e.g., 
ancient) matsuri activities which reinvented and re-
traditionalized these performances during the last 
hundred years.  
Festival and change A final aspect of festivals is their performative 
dynamic.  As ritual, festival resists change.  As perfor-
mance, festivals embrace it.   A tension is thus evident 
between the role of the festival as a medium of com-
munication and its ritual context.  This tension is evi-
dent in the description of a new “matsuri,” the Kobe 
matsuri.  While the original idea of the Kobe matsuri 
excluded any kami, was open to yearly variation in its 
content, and specifically included tourists, the event is 
rapidly taking on the traditional ritual and activity 
framework of a matsuri. (Inoue 177).  While the cen-
tral kami has yet to be determined (and might never 
be officially included), various neighborhoods have 
already involved their kami in this matsuri.  And so the 
ritual of the festival frames the communicative aspect, 
circumscribing attempts at change within matsuri.  
However, where matsuri is centrally defined by atti- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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changes in these will, and probably are having a 
decided impact on the general attitude toward mat-
suri.  
Inoue alludes to a work by Yanagita Kunio which 
supports the notion that matsuri has been giving way 
to other types of ceremony since the fifteenth cen-
tury:  
He [Yanagita Kunio] divided the general category of festivals into matsuri or classical feasts and
sairei or religious festivals accompanied by para-festival activities, and he regarded the change from
matsuri to sairei as a matter of historical change.  In the matsuri particular respect was shown for the
religious purification, abstinence, and ablutions of the participants, and communion with the kami or
divine spirits through various ceremonies occupied a central position.  In the sairei, on the other
hand, the focus of interest shifted to the para-festival activities (for example, contests, parades, and
public entertainments) that had once been of peripheral importance, and at the same time a separa-
tion between participants and spectators became prominent... Yanagita thought that sairei grew in
popularity, especially in towns and cities, from about the fifteenth century.(Inoue 166)
Yanagita suggests that today’s matsuri display the 
results of previous changes; a change from an original 
activity of matsuri bound up in notions of purification 
to that of an eclectic matsuri/sairei activity which 
incorporates a variety of additional ingredients.  As 
Robertson shows, such revisions in the defining 
notion of matsuri are, in fact, ongoing.  Changes in 
matsuri to include shimin matsuri (citywide festivals) 
and other forms of matsuri, with or without the inclu-
sion of a kami will be further accelerated by the the 
new roles that matsuri play in the process of furosato-
zukuri—in the recreation of the traditional Japanese 
locale.  
Matsuri and the national 
imagination
Robertson (1990) places the recent resurgence of 
urban matsuri within the context of furusato-zukuri  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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sents a style of nostalgia-based urban and social design 
which is pan-Japan in scope (it has central government 
inputs) and evidenced in a variety of ways in different 
places (part of its program is the articulation, the re-
territorialization, of individual locales).  These re-
placed native-places become both tourist destinations 
(see also: Ivy 1988, 33-86 for an analysis of the Japan 
Railways advertising scheme [“Discover Japan”]; that 
promoted furusato as tourist destinations) and cul-
tural-revanchist locales for their local residents.  
The repertoire of supposedly ancient matsuri 
practices that Japanese folklorists and Meiji ritualists 
had described as central to this activity become essen-
tial in this quest for legitimacy, even if these had never 
been locally practiced.  The local matsuri is thus disem-
bedded from its original matrix (or, at least from any 
attempt a recreating this) and reembedded into a 
grammar of authenticated practices which make all 
matsuri somewhat identical.  This sameness, which 
should, perhaps, reveal the contrived nature of these 
events, is instead employed to support its legitimacy 
as an essentially local and ancient practice.  Such mat-
suri have thus become “simulacra.”  They not only bear 
no resemblance to real (informed by the situated his-
torical model) matsuri, but they achieve a higher level 
of reality by disregarding the real.  The sameness also 
serves the discourse of nationalism, reinforcing the 
continuity of national history and practice as they pro-
duce new memories of a hegemonic “collective” past.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—matsuri —51—Furusato-zukuri relies upon the reconstruction of 
local practices and histories, emblematic among these 
is the practice of matsuri.  “Television stations regularly 
cover local festivals and broadcast special reports on 
‘traditional’ pastimes.  For urbanites wishing to enjoy 
their leisure in a matsuri frame of mind.  The Furusato 
Information Center provides detailed information on 
regional festivals and ‘traditional’ events accessible to 
domestic tourists”  (Robertson 1991, 38).  The use of 
matsuri in this process reinforces the reflexive demand 
for “authentic” matsuri activities.  The reflexive appro-
priation of local matsuri practices by the national 
model reflects another change in the discursive and 
practical field within which matsuri operates.  While 
Robertson and Ivy touch upon the connection 
between tourism, nationalism, and matsuri, there is 
much work to be done in this area. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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politics of recognition
The politics of recognition goes beyond any 
“identity politics” based on a simple identification with 
a gender, ethnic group, class, or age cohort.  It pre-
sumes multiple planes of cultural domination and mul-
tiple counter-tactics aimed at both re-marking and re-
moving privileged access to the public sphere, and re-
inserting marginalized individuals (as strangers) into 
the space of the public sphere that was formerly held 
by privileged individuals.  It seeks to change the cul-
tural/symbolic coding of the public sphere to allow for 
diverse diversities—for singularities and heterogene-
ities.
This politics goes hand-in-hand with the “politics 
of redistribution” that seeks to remedy political/eco-
nomic inequalities and injustice.  Symbolic change is 
too often offered by those who would “permit1” this 
as an alibi to retain political/economic privilege.  And 
so symbolic change first is not requested, but demon-
strated, and second, is not allowed to replace or dif-
fuse demands for economic justice.
1. “Allowing” multiculturalism while promoting this as a mere “play” of difference—for exam-
ple, by forcing difference into a normative framework, where each group fills a pre-figured 
slot in a matrix of cultural practices—recreates difference as a variation on a single theme.  
Culture “X” is allowed this and that distinct cultural properties, and culture “Y” has corre-
sponding properties of its own “unique” variety.  Authentic, incommensurable difference is 
not allowed, and individual variations are not important.  Difference is domesticated by 
being subsumed under a framework of expectable variation. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Nihonjinron —53—Nihonjinron 17
Nihonjinron
“Returning now to the Japanese
case, one might say that it repre-
sents racism in the sense of being
genetic determinism, because the
Japanese are strongly aware of
their ‘racial’ and cultural distinc-
tiveness from other peoples and
because they closely associate
‘race’ and culture.  In the ‘race
thinking’ of the Japanese, the sec-
ond aspect (‘racially exclusive
possession of a particular cul-
ture’) predominates over the first
(genetic determinism).  The con-
cept of ‘property’ suitably
expresses that sense of Japanese
uniqueness, since possessiveness
is its main attribute.  Exclusive
ownership is claimed upon certain
aspects of Japanese culture.
Nihonjinron describes a discourse (ron) in and 
about Japan the topic of which is the Japanese people 
(nihonjin).   Coming out of academic reflections that 
helped inform the Meiji reformation in the mid-nine-
teenth century, it later acquired its nationalist and 
racialist vocabulary through interaction with more 
global discourses on nation and race.  Nihonjinron is 
not atypical of discourses in and out of Japan—and in 
and out of anthropology—that attempt to encapsulate 
essential configurations of qualities that mark a 
national population as distinct in itself and from its 
neighbors.  In the pre-War period, cultural configura-
tionalism in anthropology linked tribes and their prac-
tices (including language) to a history made unique by 
isolation, and made possible and meaningful through 
practical adaptations to the surrounding environment 
and subsequent linguistic (symbolic) formations.  
“The Japanese philosophy is
deeply embedded in our individ-
ual consciousness, and it is a way
of life we preserve through all the
revolutionary changes of time...
.... Virtue is expressed in mutual
concessions.
The family feeling is continuous...
Yet the concept is larger than the
individual, and the family ulti-
mately embraces the home, the
place of work, society in general,
the nation, and the geography of
Japan itself.”
Here is JAPAN
The mixture of ethnography, ecology, biology, 
nationalism, and racism that each supplied facets to 
this discourse has left a residue of meanings that are 
all present when “We Japanese” is called upon to 
make a statement or defend a policy.  While individual 
writers at different times may front one or two areas 
of the larger family of meanings within nihonjinron, by 
not divorcing their remarks from the remainder of 
meanings that are active within the discourse, their 
works promote readings that are simultaneously all-
of-the-above.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Nihonjinron —54—The other point concerns the
Westerners’ sense of difference as
fundamentally one of superior-
ity.  This is understandable as rac-
ism arose in the West as an
ideology to rationalise colonial
expansion and domination The
sense of difference of the Japa-
nese from the others (westerners)
in the prevalent discussions of
Japanese uniqueness has been
basically that of horizontal differ-
ence or difference in kind. (This
does not mean that the sense of
superiority is absent among the
Japanese as in the case of their
attitude towards the Korean
minority in Japan.) Many of the
nihonjinron of the 1970s have
presented the image of the Japa-
nese as simply being very differ-
ent without explicitly claiming
superiority, though some litera-
ture has discussed the strengths of
Japanese society.... The important
point to be noted here is that
explicit claims of Japanese superi-
ority have not been so common as
non-Japanese readers, who may
equate the Western style of racism
with race thinking tout court,
might have supposed.”
(Yoshino 1992, 29)
The side of nihonjinron that separates Japanese 
people, in their bodies, their desires, their abilities, 
and their sociabilites, from other peoples (and most 
often and most noticeably in value-laden terms from 
their continental neighbors—Koreans) is less of inter-
est to me than the amount of commonness that is 
ascribed within Japan in order to bolster this differen-
tial cultural calculus.
It seems that for the Japanese to be different, they 
all, at some essential level must be the same.  Internal 
d fferences are muted, discarded, and disavowed in 
this process.  The Ainu and the Rikkyu islanders disap-
pear.    Yoshino (1992) goes to some length to show 
that “racialism” in Japan cannot be transparently con-
flated with Western ideas of “racism.”   But then trans-
parently conflating any such notion (e.g., culture, 
gender, paternalism, etc.) would be problematic.  And 
where Yoshino would use this practical/semantic prob-
lematic to defend nihonjinron against the claim of “rac-
ism,” his conclusion rests on the proposition that 
Japanese “racialism” is so intertwined with “cultural-
ism” that no strong genetic determinism is implied.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Nihonjinron —55—The claims made in this video 
(and in other parts not show here) 
include the idea that Japan’s ecol-
ogy has created a unique society, 
which spontaneously (along with 
its religion—Shinto) developed 
through the use of rice cultivation, 
which was imported into Japan in 
pre-historic times.  The notion of 
an unchanging cultural tradition 
that informs current society, and 
which, though the guidance of 
Shinto practice, provides a moral 
ground for living, is presented as 
a local (national) heritage which 
is at once historical and genetic.  
 The video produced by the Jinjahoncho to deflect 
attempts by foreign growers to open Japan’s internal 
rice market (a move that would save the Japanese 
consumer several hundred billion Yen every year; and 
cost the government-run food agency, and also farm-
ers, as much) is a good example of nihonjinron from 
the 1980s.
“The Japanese mode of thinking
and behaving is habitually associ-
ated with the ‘Japanese race’,
itself an imaginary notion, in per-
ceptions of Japanese identity. This
perceived relationship itself, in
turn, depends upon the ‘uni-racial
assumption’ of respondents,
according to which the racial
homogeneity of the Japanese is
unchanging.”
(Yoshino 1992, 120-121)
This conclusion fails to adequately theorize the 
cultural underpinnings of “racism” in the West, and it 
also fails to read the quotient of “racialized” meanings 
in the terminology (such as “homogeneity” which in 
Japanese carries a central uni-genetic meaning).  To an 
extent greater than he allows, assumptions of race, 
and of blood and heritage may enter into the dis-
course even when overt arguments are not made on 
the basis of race.  And so the racist elements of the 
nihonjinron discourse are perhaps more difficult to 
recognize and to counter than are the more overt ele-
ments of racism in the West.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Nihonjinron —56—The persistance of nihonjinron statements and the-
ses to the current day Japan is also of some concern 
(as is the persistance of racism, homophobia, and gen-
der oppression in the West).   This concern included 
Western scholars who continue to reify Japanese 
uniqueness in a variety of arenas, offering modern 
adjustments to Ruth Benedict’s war-time1 ethnogra-
phy, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1974 [1946]).  
  van Wolferen makes reference to the practical 
uses of nihonjinron to defend economic policies in 
Japan that protect internal markets:
1. This work has the ethnographic distinction of being written without the author having ever 
visited its location.  Benedict used interviews with Japanese interred in camps in the US to 
write this highly influential book.
“Very little serious writing by Japanese on anything relating to their society is entirely free of
nihonjinron influence. It is also amazing how much nihonjinron has crept into assessments by foreign
authors. The possibility of coercion or indoctrination as formative factors of Japanese behaviour is
not considered in the universe of nihonjinron imagery. And therein lies its propagandistic force. In
the nihonjinron perspective, Japanese limit their actions, do not claim 'rights' and always obey those
placed above them, not because they have no other choice, but because it comes naturally to them.
Japanese are portrayed as if born with a special quality of brain that makes them want to suppress
their individual selves. 
It is striking how casually Japanese seem to accept that they are physically 'a race apart' from
other peoples. I have heard officials explain to foreign businessmen that medicine manufactured by
foreign firms must undergo special tests before being allowed into Japan because of the different
construction of Japanese bodies.  The former chairman of the association of agricultural co-opera-
tives, Zenchu, Iwamochi Shizuma, once explained before an audience of foreign correspondents that
since 'everyone knows that Japanese intestines are about one metre longer than those of foreigners'
we should all understand that American beef was not suitable for digestion by Japanese. Visiting
Washington in December 1987, the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party's agricultural policy
research council, Hata Tsutomu, also spoke of longer Japanese digestive tracts that had difficulty in
coping with red meat. 
The great 'scientific proof' of Japanese uniqueness was supposed to have arrived with the famous
studies of Dr Tsunoda Tadanobu, who discovered that Japanese brains are essentially different from
Western brains or, indeed, the brains of most other people in the world. According to this TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Nihonjinron —57—researcher, Japanese hear insect sounds, temple bells, humming and snoring with the left half of the
brain, whereas Westerners do so with the right half. 
Dr Tsunoda implies that Japanese reasoning is different from that of other people because they
use their two brain halves differently. His testing methods are highly suspect. My impression, based
on an account by one of his foreign guinea-pigs, is that auto-suggestion plays an important role. Yet
his books sell well in Japan, and his views have been officially credited to the extent of being intro-
duced abroad by the semi-governmental Japan Foundation” (1990, 265).
That a shared history of isolation would create 
not only cultural differences, but biological ones as 
well is a central feature of nihonjinron.  And this logic 
of sharing a common and unique history is also avail-
able to use against Japanese living in buraku areas who 
have been isolated from  Japanese society, often for 
several hundred years.  The suspicion that these per-
sons now have a divergent biology—that they no 
longer share the full genetic heritage of the “We Japa-
nese” gives this discrimination its racist undertones.  
“Lots of people consider burakumin to be different,” a 
Kyoto University student once told me, “for example, 
there is a belief that their blood is thicker than that of 
Japanese.”  Just how widespread such racializing 
notions are, I cannot say.
On a recent (1994) April fools day, Kansai Timeout, 
an English language, leisure magazine in the Kyoto/
Osaka region, printed a phony story which claimed 
that doctors in Japan had just determined that the rea-
son why Japanese had difficulty learning English was 
that their mouth was shaped differently from West-
erners.  A simple surgical procedure can alter the 
shape of the mouth, and those Japanese who have had 
this procedure suddenly speak fluently with ease.  The 
magazine’s editors were inundated with requests for  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Nihonjinron —58—more information, and had to circulate a disclaimer in 
the next issue.   For the editors, the very idea that 
Japanese mouths were different, that this difference 
might affect English language learning, was an obvious 
joke (after all, millions of persons with Japanese ances-
try who grow up in other countries speak other lan-
guages without the need for surgical intervention).  
But for many in Japan, the joke overlapped with a dis-
course that they had been hearing for decades, a dis-
course that is used by government and industry and in 
the schools, and in the home.   
“The objective homogenizing of
group or class habitus that results
from homogeneity of conditions
of existence is what enables prac-
tices to be objectively harmonized
without any calculation or con-
scious reference to a norm and
mutually adjusted in the absence
of any direct interaction or, \a for-
tiori , explicit co-ordination. The
interaction itself owes its form to
the objective structures that have
produced the dispositions of the
interacting agents, which continue
to assign them their relative posi-
tions in the interaction and else-
where.”
(Bourdieu 1990, 58)
 Despite the failings of Yoshino’s (1990) theorizing 
about racism in nihonjinron, he is certainly correct to 
point out that, unlike racism, “Japaneseness” has per-
formative aspects.   In this way it is much more like 
Bourdieu’s habitus.  While the entry condition to 
appropriate this habitus is determined by heredity, 
continuing sincerity in observing its behavioral con-
straints is also expected.  Those who venture outside 
its social institutions (e.g., the national school system) 
and its physical boundaries (e.g., living abroad, or even 
independent travel abroad) invite suspicion about 
their desire to remain truly Japanese.  The sedimenting 
outcome of a shared habitus is furthered when sharing 
becomes obligatory, and the “harmony” that is so 
often associated with groups in Japan is far less a har-
monic congruence of differences (a true harmony) 
than it is the repetition of similarity, i.e., uniformity.  
When everyone sings the same melody line, it is a 
simple matter to see, and to mark, anyone who misses  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Nihonjinron —59—a note.
At Ritsumeikan University, where I had part-time 
employment, a semester abroad program sent those 
with a desire to do so (and with advanced English 
skills) to Vancouver, Canada.  But returning students 
were many times so disoriented (or dis-Oriented) 
from this experience that special counsellors had to 
be hired to help them deal with: a) isolation and the 
loss of connection to groups and friends they had left 
(for 4 months); and b) various, new dissatisfactions 
with school life in and out of the classroom.  The 
experience abroad had, in fact, achieved more than it 
advertised, it had dis-located students from a lifetime 
of pursuing “Japaneseness.”  But it also left them 
strangers in their own backyard. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Nihonjinron —60—Omni-present 18
The omni-present is the present we find on the 
street.  Not the “anthropological present” of narrative 
ethnography.  It is the present that determined, as 
much as anything, the future.  It is the present where 
the openings of culture are found. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding —61—Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding 19
Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding
“...The social axiomatic of mod-
ern societies is caught between
two poles and is constantly oscil-
lating from one pole to the other.
Born of decoding and deterritori-
alization, on the ruins of the des-
potic machine, these societies are
caught between the Urstaat that
they would like to resuscitate as
an overcoding and reterritorializ-
ing unity, and the unfettered flows
that carry them toward an abso-
lute threshold.  They recode with
all their might, with world-wide
dictatorship, local dictators, and
an all-powerful police, while
decoding—or allowing the decod-
ing of—the fluent quantities of
their capital and their populations.
They are torn in two directions:
archaism and futurism, neoarcha-
ism and ex-futurism.  paranoia
and schizophrenia.  They vacillate
between two poles: the paranoiac
despotic sign, the sign-signifier of
the despot that they try to revive
as a unit of code; and the sign-fig-
ure of the schizo as a unit of
decoded flux, a schiz, a point-sign
or flow-break.  They try to hold on
to the one, but they pour or flow
out through the other.  They are
continually behind or ahead of
themselves”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 260).
Notions of “coding,” “recoding,” and “overcoding” 
refer to applications of meanings/values to bodies and 
practices, these meanings/values having been acquired 
from discursive/practical fields many of which are 
maintained (the meanings and the fields) by institu-
tions such as religions, schools, corporations, hospi-
tals (and other expert systems) and governmental 
organizations.  The terms themselves are derived from 
the use of these in the work of Giles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari and Michel Foucault, but with an added 
attention to semantic theory, particularly that of 
George Lakoff.  And so, the linguistic vehicles for 
these practices are figures of speech that overlay and 
underlie the myths that claim to be figureless, i.e., that 
proclaim meaning as natural (as Barthes noted).  
These practices are at work within and between dis-
cursive/practical fields, and to a greater extent are 
now proving the inadequacies of attempts to limit 
knowledge to specific fields.  This brings in a forth 
notion: “Decoding,” which dissolves the boundary 
conditions that allow the other three notions to oper-
ate as levers between knowledge and power.
“Coding” refers to the action of applying a mean-
ing/value within a discursive field.   The discursification 
of knowledge within a field of science results in this 
knowledge being coded into practices (grant applica-
tions, career opportunities, etc.).  Coding is the out-
put of discursification as this informs identity and  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding —62—practice.  
Coding is an ongoing process, a machine that 
doesn’t work once and then stop.   Coding is what 
reproduces a discourse over time.  And because this 
must be done with some care, the institutions with an 
interest and position within the discourse develop 
strategies and procedures to ensure that the coding 
neither stops, nor is recoded by others.   Overcoding 
(see below) is one strategy that maintains a code by 
applying this to other codes, and so reducing the 
potential for alternative narratives.  But within the dis-
course itself, the code is also strengthened, say, by a 
consistent application of this to all practices and 
places, and/or through a monovocal logic that resists 
internal counter-narratives.  The result is a singular 
code with universal application to a space: e.g., the 
national space and narrative.  
In these ways, the code becomes “self-authoriz-
ing.”  Institutions and persons receive it, but claim to 
not have authored it, and the question of authorship 
does not arise.  “Scientific knowledge” has this 
“found” quality: it is discovered, not authored.  Even 
so, scientific institutions spend time and resources to 
code existing knowledge in ways that resist appropria-
tion by others (e.g., through access to funding, and by 
authorized texts [journals]). 
“Recoding” occurs when one code is replaced 
with another.  Recoding occurs with some regularity 
in discursive fields where new knowledge is highly val-
ued.  Because most of discursive fields have preexist- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding —63—ing conditions, much of what occurs as a change 
within them today is the result of recoding.   Recoding 
occurs for several reasons, such as the discovery (or 
the imagination) of new knowledge or the success of 
alternative sources of authority within the field.  
“Recoding” is the central tactic that marginal 
groups have to break the chain of codes that marginal-
ize them.  However, recoding must take place within 
the discursive field, and so access to this field is cen-
tral concern, and exclusion the main strategy of domi-
nation.  And so, the job of recoding is a multipart 
operation.  Recoding is also the tactic that individuals 
use to resist the identities that have acquired their 
own imaginations.  The recoding of the individual by 
the individual is one of the primary moments of the 
recoding of a discursive space by a counter-discourse 
group.
“Overcoding” is the practice of applying meaning/
values from one discursive field to others.  This is 
where power connects with knowledge to create 
codes that dominate not only their own discursive 
field, but others as well.   This may occur through 
active institutional programs which insist that their 
scope is universal.  Religions, such as Christianity or 
Islam, may be promoted in this fashion, overcoding 
discourses of diseases, of sexuality, of economies, and 
political behaviors, etc.  
But meanings/values may also spread as individu-
als apply these without reflexive attention to their 
useful limits.   Overcoding happens at the reception  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding —64—side as well. Meanings/value judgements about sexual 
gender, for example, may be applied to circumstances 
where this notion, upon reflection, is at best an arbi-
trary feature.  But then a history of overcoding1 con-
figures the space within other discourses so that this 
imaginable arbitrariness becomes masked by everyday 
practices that avoid just this imagination.   
When sexual gender becomes a logic that is 
applied to employment, to social roles (say, in public 
spaces), or to a role within the home, then this over-
coding of these practices by the discourse of gender 
can acquire a history of use that obscures the fact of 
overcoding.  In the same way, the coding of practices 
and spaces as “national” practices and spaces colors 
these practices and spaces in a way that, over time, 
avoids attracting attention to the fact that this mean-
ing/value was overcoded from a more limited discur-
sive field.
Overcoding also occurs when a discursive field 
acquires meanings/values from external sources, 
thereby enlarging its purview.  Here again, “national” 
narratives that acquire (or reinvent) pre-historic, 
mythic narratives overcode these as national narra-
1. I once got into an argument with an economic anthropologist who insisted that women did 
not have the upper-body strength to handle a plow, and so could not receive the direct ben-
efits of this agricultural innovation.  Having seen women carry 50 kilo sacks of coal up 
steep mountain trails in India, I was not impressed with this claim.  Rather, I argued that 
there were other reasons for the sequestering of women into domestic spaces, which then 
led to many women not developing the upper-body strength that they might use should 
they find themselves, unexpectedly, in a situation of having to control an ox and plow.  But 
give them opportunities to strengthen their bodies as children, and nearly all women could 
do this task. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Overcoding, Coding, and Recoding —65—tives.  National narratives may acquire local myths and 
recode these as national narratives.  Anderson’s 
(1983) description of nation-state formation is cen-
trally a process of recoding and overcoding leading to 
a naturalized, geographically uniform narrative that is 
continually coded by the state. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Public Body
“I call it a scholastic bias—a bias
to which we are all exposed: we
think that the problems can be
solved only through conscious-
ness. And that is where I differ
from Foucault, and would draw a
contrast with his important con-
cept of discipline. Discipline, in
French at least, points towards
something external. Discipline is
enforced by a military strength;
you must obey. In a sense it is
easy to revolt against discipline
because you are conscious of it. In
fact, I think that in terms of sym-
bolic domination, resistance is
more difficult, since it is some-
thing you absorb like air, some-
thing you don't feel pressured by;
it is everywhere and nowhere, and
to escape from that is very diffi-
cult. Workers are under this kind
of invisible pressure, and so they
become much more adapted to
their situation than we can
believe. To change this is very dif-
ficult, especially today. With the
mechanism of symbolic violence,
domination tends to take the form
of a more effective, and in this
sense more brutal, means of
oppression. Consider contempo-
rary societies in which the vio-
lence has become soft, invisible”
(Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992,
115).
The intersection of bodies and public spaces 
opens a host of potential outcomes.  And so much of 
“history” has been performed and accomplished, 
determined and demolished (through warfare) in this 
intersection that it is surprising how little attention 
has been paid to the calculus of the public body.
In part, I would guess that a legacy of “private” 
elites (royalties and sacerdotal hierarchies) through-
out much of recorded history and in many places 
where these records were kept has created an unbal-
ance in the reporting of “where the action is”, while 
also delegitimating the actions of bodies in public.  
That is, the above imbalance is both an artifact from 
and desired outcome of the externality of the rulers 
to an (not fully determined) “public” in both space and 
body.  (So, we cannot simply “shoot” the historian.)  
And in part, I would also suggest that the more 
recent, although increasingly global, rise of democra-
tizing institutions has brought increasing legitimacy to 
actions and bodies in public.  This means that we need 
to be more careful to record public actions, and more 
rigorous in determining how to best study bodies and 
public spaces.  
Anthony Giddens is one of the recent social sci-
entists who has granted “place” its own place in his 
work.  And while his writings still lack an attention to 
specific spatial, ethnographic locales, they present 
locale as a necessary feature of action.  For example,  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Public Body —67—take the following:
“The zoning of the body seems in most—perhaps all—societies to be associated with the zoning
of activities in time-space in the trajectories of the day within locales.  Thus eating usually occurs in
definite settings at definite times, and is usually also 'public' in the restricted sense of involving gath-
erings of family members, friends, colleagues and so on.  The dressing or adornment of the body may
not be universally regarded as 'private', but at least in most cultures seems to be so regarded.  In
spite of Elias's claims that sexual activity was carried on in an unconcealed way in medieval Europe,
genital sexuality seems everywhere to be zoned as a back-region phenomenon—with many varia-
tions, of course, in intersecting modes of public and private behaviour” (1985, 280).
Giddens’s “zones,” like Goffman’s “frames,” point 
to a multiplicity of “bodies” determined by—and also 
determining1—appropriate actions in specific places 
and times.   But where spaces determine actions, the 
questions are begged of how this comes about?  How 
are these actions taught?  Why are they accepted as 
appropriate?  Why is this idea of appropriateness uni-
tary?  
body schooling accounts for the training of the body 
and the recognition of public spaces as having a single 
mode of appropriate actions. Body schooling, in its 
aggregate effects, contributes to the sense of “nor-
malcy” we encounter—as if it were something of the 
place—when we venture onto the street.  But nor-
malcy is not cheap.  This expense is counted both by 
the amount of coding required to normalize bodies 
and street-scapes, and by the increased effort 
required to counter or resist this coding—as feminists 
have discovered in their struggle to rearticulate the 
1. Curiously, “public” places are usually seen as places where the former happens, where the 
place determines appropriate activities.  Spaces where an individual’s actions can signal 
which “body” is appropriate are thereby marked as “private.”  I say this is curious, because 
there might also a presumption of freedom of action in public space.  It would not be 
bizarre to suggest that a public space should be open to multiple frames. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
vocabularium—Public Body —68—masculine-coded public workplace as a multigendered 
space.
 The public body is the body we take into the 
street.  It is the bodies we meet there.  It is the body 
that apologizes without thinking for brushing against 
another on the sidewalk.  And, as I mentioned above, 
it is the body, the presence of which, more than any 
other feature, that makes a place public.  
This last notion is rather foreign to our aware-
ness of our own presence in public.  The discursively 
available part of the public body (our own body) tells 
us about the “rules of the road.”  We can discuss, for 
example, eye contact, nudity, defecation, queuing for 
the bus, staring and being stared at, whistling, talking 
to oneself, picking one’s nose, using a public water 
fountain, and a hundred other topics where prohibi-
tions and generally expected behaviors are known and 
knowable.  
Why is it that we do all of these things without 
giving much attention to them? And why do we pay so 
much attention when others violate these behavioral 
expectations?  Garfinkel’s (1984) ethnomethodology 
attempted to answer some of these questions for spe-
cific practices.  But in general we can point to the con-
struction of public space as a pre-determined “game” 
arena where we enter as players by assuming an 
orthopostural (SEE: orthoposture) attitude that disat-
tends to the construction of the space.  We have 
learned how to play, and what to do to repair our 
own mistakes.   But how is this game managed?  And  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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“As an example of proprieties of
the body we might consider table
manners. The topic is addressed
in explicit detail in a famous trea-
tise by Erasmus, his De civilitate
morum puerilium of 1530. This
book specifies maxims of conduct
with respect to what Erasmus
calls 'outward bodily propriety';
such 'outward' proprieties, of
bodily carriage, gesture, posture,
facial expression and dress, being
seen as the expression of the
'inner' person. The impact of the
treatise was immediate, wide and
lasting. In the first six years after
its publication it was reprinted
more than thirty times; it was rap-
idly translated into English,
French and German; and in all
there were more than 130 edi-
tions, thirteen of these as late as
the eighteenth century. The ques-
tions addressed in this treatise...
gave new precision and centrality
to the concept of civilitas.... Since
decorum and restraint were essen-
tial attributes of civility, it was
natural that crucial importance
should be assigned to the cultured
control of appetite in the most lit-
eral sense, and hence to table
manners”
(Connerton 1989, 82).
This is a question of some enlarged interest of 
late, as several think-tanks have been recently set up 
to ponder the “collapse of civility” in the United 
States.  While there may be some argument about 
presuming that the US federal government has an obli-
gation to reproduce the inputs to notions of public 
propriety (through school curriculae and other 
media), there is a more general agreement that this 
goal needs to be somehow accomplished (in families, 
through churches, etc.).   In other nation-states, such 
as Japan, the lead role of government in this task is not 
questioned.  And so the state makes its own claims 
over the construction of the normalized public body.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Reflexivity
“The reflexive monitoring of
action in situations of co-presence
is the main anchoring feature of
social integration...”
(Giddens 1984, 191).
It would be difficult to understate the importance 
this word, in various uses, has acquired in the social 
sciences today.   It is absolutely central to the debate 
about the conditions of late/post modernity: about 
modernity as an increasingly reflexive order wherein 
the “loops” of reflexive knowledge range from inter-
nal, personal “self-awareness,” to interpersonal, famil-
ial and social relationships,  to global corporations 
that target trends in local markets by tracking innova-
tions and reflexively appropriating these into new 
products.  Reflexivity is the outcome and the input 
into the global knowledge industry.  And it is the quiet 
voice of “self-help” that resists the influence of expert 
systems, reappropriating expert knowledge into the 
personal life project.
At one level, reflexivity describes the mirror with 
which the individual surveys their own ken.   This feed-
back loop allows the individual to assess the condition 
of their self  knowledge, and compare this to their 
knowledge about others (and about the ken of oth-
ers).   This mirror is generally kept at arms length, and 
is one of the background features of life that does not 
rise into the field of conscious attention.  In traditional 
life-styles, self monitoring was actually discouraged 
because the decisions (over marriage, career, and resi-
dence) were made by others (parents, clan leaders, 
etc.).  However there have always been times when 
the mirror is held close and what it reveals becomes  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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open to inspection.  Let me call this a moment of 
“hyper-reflection”.  This moment used to be most 
common as the moment when a doubt arose about 
the circumstances of a personal interaction (for exam-
ple when five aces appear at the same hand of poker).  
At the time of hyper-reflection the edge of one’s ken 
becomes known.  And this knowledge is what allows 
the ken to grow.  
The enlightenment promised a release from the 
mystifications of religion and cultural dogma; it pro-
posed a new “rational” social order.  This rationaliza-
tion, as a project of modernity, has been shown to be 
both incomplete and, at times, inappropriate.  
“Modernity,” as an empirical accomplishment, is some-
where ahead of us still—fully as much as it is behind 
us—but this will not look at all like what its 19th cen-
tury prognosticators foretold.    
“Late modernity,” which describes our current 
situation, is seen as a time when an increase in the 
available information and the reflexive application of 
this information is pushing rationalization to its limit in 
certain arenas: notably in lifestyle planning, and in 
institutional management.  As these feed-back loops 
become built into institutional plans and personal 
interactions the outcomes of these plans and interac-
tions become destabilized, and so, unpredictable.   The 
end of prediction is the beginning of late modernity.  
But where every consequence may become unknow-
able in advance, they are not all unintended.    TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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the increase of knowledge, and in increased, demo-
cratic availability of this.   Modernization, which for 
decades has been based upon an instrumental logic—
industrialization, efficiency, control, prediction—pro-
ceeds, and even accelerates, but it must also coexist 
with reflexiviation, as a social and institutional feature 
of late modernity.
For Giddens, reflexivity begins with the availability 
of individuals and institutions to reflect upon their 
own circumstances.
The point is that reflection on social processes (theories, and observations about them) contin-
ually enter into, become disentangled with and re-enter the universe of events they describe. No
such phenomenon exists in the world of inanimate nature, which is indifferent to whatever human
beings might claim to know about it....It is impossible to have a modern sovereign state that does not
incorporate a discursively articulated theory of the modern sovereign state. The marked tendency
towards an expansion of political ‘self-monitoring’ on the part of the state is characteristic of moder-
nity in the West in general, creating the social and intellectual climate from which specialized, ‘profes-
sional’ discourses of social sciences have developed but also both express and foster.     (Giddens
1984, xxxiii)
Of course, the academy is (or should be) a foun-
tainhead of such reflection.  Giddens goes on to note 
that one of the distinguishing circumstances of moder-
nity is the active incorporation of reflection/correc-
tion/reform/response into institutional, interpersonal, 
and individual actions.  
For sociology, itself an engine of reflection, to 
ignore the actual and potential practices of reflection 
within social organizations, is to make a fundamental 
error which reduces the grasp that its theories hold 
on empirical practices.  Sociology and social anthro-
pology have so far failed to account for reflexivity in  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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nizing feature of modern institutions and lifeworlds is 
the central critique that Giddens applies to the works 
of earlier theorists (Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, for 
example).  And the need to account for ever more 
locations where reflexive practices now occur means 
that a new sociology must be built, one that has the 
scope of Weber, and the critical focus of Marx, but 
one that is also constructed through and for a new 
account of discourses and practices as these are 
reflexively organized. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The notion of “symbolic violence”  as I will use 
this comes from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, this 
notion represents an extension of the term “violence” 
to include various modes of social/cultural domina-
tion.  Symbolic violence is the unnoticed (partly 
unconscious) domination that every-day social habits 
maintain over the conscious subject.  Symbolic vio-
lence should not be confused with “media violence.”  
It is not the acts of murder and mayhem portrayed on 
television.  Actually, symbolic violence is not normally 
even “recognized” as violence.  For example, gender 
domination, and gender itself (say, in the construction 
of sexuality) represents one prominent arena of sym-
bolic violence.  
Institutionalized modes of “discipline and punish-
ment,” as Foucault noted (in his work of the same 
name (1979)), have also acquired a positive social 
value, without much further thought about the vio-
lence involved in these practices.  Indeed, Bourdieu 
tells us that such “soft” violence has been mostly over-
looked in social theories, and is subject to “misrecog-
nition” in everyday life.  Misrecognition allows 
symbolic violence to hide itself within dominant dis-
courses as these are spoken, and within other forms 
of violence as these are applied to bodies.  
 We can further locate symbolic violence as those 
forms of soft violence which, through their misrecognition, 
are applied by the subject to the subject.   Misrecognition 
is integral to the effects of symbolic violence, which 
opens this up to precisely the forms of therapy avail- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Much of the symbolic violence that Bourdieu is 
describing is “purely” psychological in the sense that it 
is internal to the self-consciousness of the individual, 
most often without tell-tale, observable features; to 
counter this, some form of individual psychotherapy is 
required.  Psychotherapy replaces the misrecognition 
of this form of symbolic violence with reflexive dis-
courses that allow the individual access to their self-
consciousness.  
However, some forms of symbolic violence oper-
ate upon the body, and these articulate a (misrecog-
nized) relationship between the individual’s self-
consciousness and their body.  The body becomes the 
site of this violence. These embodied violences articu-
late the non-discursively available portion of social 
identity, which is reproduced simultaneously within 
the self-consciousness and also as a social practice, 
that is, as a shared habitus.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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theory
From one vantage point you can call a theory a 
type of concept.  A concept-as-tool.  You use it to 
articulate something formerly inarticulate.  You use it 
to unscrew the inscrutable (as Ken Kesey would 
remind us).  You use it up when you use it; once it has 
fully articulated its object it has no other conceptual 
use.  For the object acquires the theoroid while being 
articulated.  The inscrutable knows it’s been 
(un)screwed.  The concept is first set loose as a signi-
fier, but then it is captured by its signified.  
What type of concept is a theory?  Well, all con-
cepts in Deleuze’s sense.  Gilles Deleuze (1994 
[1991]) unscrambled the omelete that is modern phi-
losophy and renamed philosophical concepts as “cen-
ters of vibrations, each in itself and everyone in 
relation to all the others”  (23).   Concepts do not 
cohere, they are not building blocks in some greater 
construction, they are not a part of a greater philoso-
phy; they constitute philosophy through their multi-
plicity.  They are each a knife-edged bridge between 
what is and is not discursive.  And they stay sharp by 
being replaced, not adored.   Deleuze notes that con-
cepts are “...like multiple waves, rising and falling...,
...the archepelago,... a spinal column not a skull,... 
concrete assembages, like the configurations of a 
machine,...  Concepts are events,... [they] pave, 
occupy, or populate...” (ibid 36).   A theory is a con-
cept that is directed at a practice in a place.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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areality
In contrast to “hyperreality” in which “reality” and 
its (unreal) image compete in a struggle that reality 
ultimately loses, areality is a state in which reality and 
its images coexist without struggle, but also without a 
default preference for “reality.”  Areality exists, for 
example, when an NHK documentary team goes to 
Nepal and then films a disaster that has been staged, 
without considering that this might be a problem.  
Areality exists when a Japanese cabinet minister spec-
ulates that the “rape” of Nanking did not happen.
Areality is the wedge between history as a 
recordable happening in a place, and the desire to for-
get what happened and record something else.  It is 
the time between memory and forgetting.  Because it 
can mix made-up images with found objects and prac-
tices, areality offers institutions a means to overlay a 
nasty and recalcitrant institutional history with images 
that deflect attention from this.
The presence of the real within areality masks the 
role of the non-real in this.  The real becomes the alibi 
for other desires.  The impact of collapse of the “bub-
ble economy” in Japan has real consequences, but the 
concept of a “bubble” economy is itself an areal con-
cept, as this takes away attention from the manage-
ment responsibility of the Ministry of Finance (which 
had taken much of the credit for guiding Japan’s post-
War economy until then).  The bubble becomes some-
thing that happened to everyone, like a typhoon. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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not just that most people in Kyoto talk about “the 
Pacific War” instead of “World War II,” but rather how 
they talk about this, as though it was another natural 
disaster that swept across Japan and then ended.  
“After the Pacific War ended,” they say, except for 
Resident Koreans, who might prefer, “after Japan was 
defeated in the last War.”
Areality happens mostly in a passive voice.  It is 
useful in describing circumstances that might other-
wise reveal institutional involvement.  It often 
describes a reality that is beyond intervention.  In 
Kyoto, burakus exist in an areal haze of nationally 
funded remedial programs, and official inattention, and 
covert discrimination.  What is real is the fact that lit-
tle happens to change the stigma that keeps buraku-
dwelling persons trapped inside their neighborhoods. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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civil crowd
A civil democracy is realized through actions 
taken by its citizenry.  The use of the street for dem-
onstrations of civic belonging and collective celebra-
tion are not merely windowdressing for the mass 
media.  Simply consuming the spectacles of the state is 
not nearly sufficient to reproduce the ground for a 
democratic nation, and this ground—spatially and dis-
cursively—must be reproduced regularly.  In particu-
lar, there must be room for the collective voice of 
crowds.  
Places and crowds fill the histories1 of democratic 
revolutions.  Civic festivals are the reenactments of 
these founding moments, and civil societies are their 
offspring.  Because there were crowds that used vio-
lence to protest social and economic circumstances, 
crowd control became another feature of the modern 
street.  And again, this constraint was said to be aimed 
at others, at anarchists and gangs, but its effect was to 
preempt the crowd event as a regular forum for civic 
participation.  By and large we can today track the dis-
appearance of crowds on the streets of our cities.  But 
then what are the effects of this absence on democ-
racy and on the public sphere?
1. From Boston to Philadelphia, to Paris and London, to Moscow and Warsaw and Tienanmen 
in Beijing:  the places where the public acquires its legitimate claim to its self rule are 
places defined by crowds and by protests and festivals.  Note here the absence of such 
events in Japan. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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of the agency of what I call a “civil crowd.”   The 
notion that a civil crowd has agency, that its formation 
can open up space where a difference is produced, has 
been almost entirely subsumed by the metaphor of 
the crowd-as-mob, and its agency reduced to anarchy.  
Bill Buford describes in fine detail the riots of British 
soccer fans, who created their own game, one that 
involved glass breaking, car turning, head busting, and 
police confrontation.  There is, however, no civic 
intention in this, nothing inherent in the violence that 
makes the resulting rampage somehow work toward 
any external goal.  Rabblerousing does carry its own 
history, but this history is not sufficient to explain the 
potential for civic action by a crowd.  As Thompson 
(1993, 65-66) notes, “...the “to-fro lackeying” of the 
crowd itself has a history of great antiquity: the “prim-
itive rebels” of one age might be seen, from an earlier 
age, to be the decadent inheritors of yet more primi-
tive ancestors. 
Too much historical hindsight distracts us from 
seeing the crowd as it was, sui generis, with its own 
objectives, operating within the complex and delicate 
polarity of forces of its own context.”  In fact, the ata-
vistic “mob effect” that Gustave Le Bon (1960 [1895]) 
discursified 101 years ago, is only parasitic on this 
agency. 
What the civil crowd represents at its potential 
limit is a display of individual expression that is uncon-
strained, and therefore uncontrolled, and thus, in a  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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crowd follows no leader, and, should it speak in a sin-
gle voice, an actual consensus appears that is neither 
prefigured, nor subservient to an external interest.  
But consensus is not the goal of such a crowd.  For it 
is a crowd of strangers, in that peculiar sense where 
all citizens must be strangers in public to join in the 
public sphere.  And where this crowd of strangers 
finds consensual agreement may be a point less valu-
able than where the crowd voices a plurality of 
desires.  
Whatever the content, the source of the crowd's 
inherent democracy is the performance in public of 
individual expression.  The latter, in turn, legitimates 
the actions of a civil crowd in the public sphere (cf. 
McClelland 1989, and Canetti 1962).  More than pub-
lic opinion polls, which respond to questions posed by 
pollsters, and more than voting, which offers only a 
choice between preselected alternatives, the civil 
crowd opens up to dialogical and multivocal interac-
tion.  Here is where the melodies of democracy 
become polyphonic.
What I wish to discuss is how, and, more specifi-
cally, where civil crowds take place.  For a civil crowd 
is a spatial performance that is not possible apart from 
public places that situate its practice.  While the media 
now broadcasts images of this place to other places, 
such a crowd cannot be generated by the media itself.  
Most crowds are not civil crowds, although this 
notion is neither exclusive nor singular in its defini- TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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genuine expression depends upon a complex series of 
moments; it is a game that must be played with some 
skill.  And so this process is liable to various types of 
failure.  For example, the internal dynamics of the 
process will collapse into an orchestrated simulation 
of a civil crowd, if the participants allow their expres-
sions to be scripted.  This is a common feature of 
political demonstrations where leaders with bullhorns 
prompt a chant from the crowd.  Conversely, 
attempts at orchestration may also fail.  Nicolae Cauc-
esceu's final orchestrated demonstration is an exam-
ple of a civil crowd developing out from a scripted 
event.  The force of this chorus of genuine expression 
sent him scampering for his helicopter.  
And, though a civil crowd can come about with-
out planning1, I want to look at how one of these can 
be planned.  How does one organize an event that 
cannot be led, in which individuals feel free to display a 
genuine expression of their desires?  The claim that an 
expression is genuine is what needs to be examined 
here.  Quite obviously, “genuine” here is a scalar 
notion.  Its more-or-less quality is tied to the location 
of the expression in question.  Which is to say that the 
more an expression is produced by the individual qua 
individual, the more this can be called genuine to the 
individual.  The civil crowd is a aggregate of individual 
1. Tienanmen is an example of a civil crowd fashioning a collective agency out of a wellspring 
of genuine expression.  Its failure, was, in large part, due to the failure of bringing this 
expression into a realm of planning and into a coherent voice. TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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There is a whole literature on hegemony that 
describes how the expressions of individuals in 
modernity are externally managed, other comments 
on modernity detail the deskilling of individuals in var-
ious modes of experience and knowledge, and so we 
have to be careful in assigning the site of production 
to an individual, and we must ask what skills are 
required to author a “genuine” expression.  These 
twin conditions of late modernity—the surrender of 
individual authority, and the bodily deskilling in 
expressive practices—are structural impediments to 
the civil crowd as a site of democracy.  It may be that 
we are today “crowd-impaired” to an extent that it is 
difficult even to imagine the potential agency of a civil 
crowd.  But it is not impossible.
getting private in public I have constructed a theoretical scaffold for the 
notion of the civil crowd in public space.  This theory 
is based upon the work of several social theorists, 
with some major enhancements, mostly accomplished 
by assembling scattered parts.  There are times, I 
argue, when “private”1 spaces open up within a public 
space.  Festivals are typically times when this transfor-
mation can, an indeed, must take place.  Step outside 
on a certain evening in February in the French Quar-
ter in New Orleans, and normalcy is conspicuously 
1. A private space “in public” is no longer “private”, but then neither is the public space during 
this event “public.”  These terms show their limits under these conditions.  It is this transfor-
mation that opens up a public space to a civil crowd.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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of joy and sexuality.  But Mardi Gras, like many festi-
vals, is a civil crowd that refuses to take itself seri-
ously, and so its range of expression is quite limited.
This takes me to my final point.  A civil crowd is a 
serious private party on a public street.  It is private 
because it opens up to a form of intimacy that denies 
the visual monitoring of the street.  Individuals in the 
crowd dis-attend to the “publicness” of the street, and 
actively transform the space into an ad-hoc private 
realm.  
Now, the crowd is a “party” because it uses 
embodied skills to carry the individual to a condition 
where emotional self-monitoring is no longer possi-
ble.  This decontrol of emotions is what actually war-
rants the genuineness of the expressive display, and 
the (above) disattention to visual monitoring of 
expression is what promotes the sharing1 of this con-
tent.  The civil crowd is a festival rehearsing its own 
performance—but where the rehearsal is the perfor-
mance.
Finally, the crowd is serious in that its expressions 
are representational of the participants' desires and 
perspectives.  A type of “sur-rationality” emerges that 
1. The word “share” here is important, as the means to arrive at this condition is mutually cre-
ated.  The participants rely upon each other's willingness to proceed to a plateau of collec-
tive intimacy.  Intimacy is always shared (otherwise it is just another confessional episode 
of modernity), and in this sharing an active trust is formed.  Like combat, or brain surgery, 
or baseball, the civil crowd makes a team out of individual participants, and it manufactures 
memories that persist.  And, like, baseball or brain surgery, practice hopefully does make 
perfect.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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conviction congeals on the spot, binding words to 
emotions to bodies and to the crowd as a group.  
Such an event probably comes as close as one gets to 
Habermas's ideal speech situation.  The work of the 
civil crowd can now begin.
Giddens (1994: 127) talks of “active trust” as a 
formative feature of a “dialogic democracy.”1  The 
crowd creates active trust between individual partici-
pants, beginning a public conversation that has long-
term effects.  To take the street away from the cops 
and the shops and the government for an hour or two 
decentres, if only momentarily, positions of influence, 
and brings new voices into the center stage.  
The possession of the public square by a crowd 
establishes a claim to ownership, and to belonging in 
public.  The voices emerging from (or spoken to) the 
crowd enter into a public-sphere arena of discussion 
and dissent.  The crowd demands to be heard, and any 
democratic state that does not listen does not 
deserve the title.
Here I am also promoting the idea that a festi-
val—should the process of organization and perfor-
1. During the course of the festival any number of expressions are possible, as these are pro-
duced dialogically and without scripting.  Individual comments reverberate and are 
inverted, parodied, and reflect the plurality of individuals within the event.  Bodies and 
words play an ensemble of discursive sonatas, the content of which is never predictable.  
But the content is also not what is foremost in the event.  Here is where silence also 
speaks, as it is not, for a moment, the product of terror.  The ability of a state to allow the 
festival in its streets brings with it a measure of legitimacy, as the crowd's voices and 
demeanor will comment on the state.  The availability of civil protest also legitimates the 
state, as this marks its openings to democratic reappraisal.   TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
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scripting and an open invitation to its membership—is 
a model example of a civil crowd.  TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
